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BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE NATURAL THEOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.

BY REV. JOHN BASCOM, PROFESSOR IN WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

No. II.

TREATISES on natural theology aim at impression quite as much as at proof. They multiply illustrations, they give in full detail some of the more striking adaptations with which nature everywhere abounds; the fluids of the eye, the construction of the ear, the tongue of the woodpecker, the stomach of the camel, the sucker or claw of the cuttle-fish. They do this, not because the argument depends on the number of these contrivances, or their striking character; but because these are especially fitted to impress the mind, and, with a fresh impulse, carry it strongly over to a position which it had either feebly reached, or not reached at all. In doing this it is not so much that broad survey, on which, after all, the fate of the argument must depend, that is sought for, as those peculiar features which, with less force of logic, carry with them more of feeling, and bring home to the mind the minute and perfect oversight of the Divine Architect. Probability is reflected on the divine government by exhibiting the nature and extent of that providence which the world discloses.

It is plain, however, that the argument itself does not rest

on these specifications, on the ingenuity found here and there in the external world. The thoughts of men are not to be caught, as in a trap, by those cases of peculiar cunning; nor to be shot by them heavenward, as from a cross-bow. Reverence has a broader basis, worship a profounder hold, the infinite glory more adequate supports. Whether these instances of contrivance be more or less numerous, more or less wonderful, the theory adopted for their explanation will not be affected thereby. If we can account for one, we can account for all. If we can explain the existence of those simple, fundamental laws on which, while less impressing our senses, our childish thoughts, fond of all that is mechanical, the order of the universe chiefly rests, it is plain that these secondary contrivances, curiously wrought pebbles on the beach, must share their fate; either be swept with them into the vortex of nature, and find explanation under that great system of physical forces supposed to inhere in matter, or be gathered up with those leading lines of power into the hand of an infinite God.

The argument is not made up of minutae. It is not as when in the wilds of Central America we behold here and there traces of human labor, the heaping up of material in this mound and that edifice, and thence infer the character of a previous race. The ground is not now gained by us point by point, slowly securing, in the accumulated wisdom of many instances, a foundation broad enough for the throne of God. The proof is more overwhelming and perfect than this would imply. The very existence of the universe, not merely the finish of its parts; the sweep of its primary laws, and not the working out of special purposes here and there; the whole volume of nature, and not its initial letters and scattered vignettes, — proclaim the Creator. If these are not sufficient, those also are of no avail. If we cannot look forth on the heavens and the earth and believe in God, we cannot find him in the wing of a beetle or the sting of a bee. This is not rhetoric, but exactly the reverse, a severe logical statement of the final point on which the argument rests, — the

origin of organic and inorganic matter, and thus of the forces acting in and through it. The perfection with which the world is finished, the scrupulous diligence with which it is ruled, are indeed most interesting points, revealing more fully the character of that Deity whose existence has been previously recognized.

That the primary forces of matter affect us so slightly, while the contrivances which the details of the plan reveal impress us so strongly, is due in part to the fact that these are more level with our minds than those, and in part to association. We connect mechanical adaptations with man, and thus with a rational agent. We are constantly observing this structure and that mechanism, and referring them to man's ingenuity. The mere presence of matter, as earth, rock, water, on the other hand, calls, in the ordinary experience of life, for no explanation. It is what we find given, granted us in all our labors. We associate permanence, indestructibility with it; we look upon it as something which has long been, and, except in inquiries like the present, ask not for its origin. The result of this association is that the mere presence of the world brings but little pressure on the mind for solution, while its separate contrivances, which we better measure, which have been more newly revealed to us, which are more allied to what we ourselves do, urge the inquiry upon us with sensible force: Whence do these arise? If we could overcome the impression which long and constant association has made upon us, that matter has an independent, passive existence, requiring nothing to perpetuate it; if we could look upon it as it truly is, a wonderful and tremendous lock of forces, a putting forth of incalculable power in attraction and repulsion, the lavish pouring out of effects, as of heat and light by the sun, capable of conversion into mechanical action, compared with which the water and steam enginery of the world would be the merest insect hum, is in fact an infinitessimal part seized and used by man; if we could so contemplate the universe, we should feel this matter, this ocean of force, with the ebb and flow of law in it, on

which we are lapped, to be that which chiefly requires explanation, and most profoundly proves a God.

While we see in the argument from contrivance much of the influence of association, there is also in it, besides its superior power of impression, one further advantage: it keeps the rational, personal element uppermost, and brings God near to us, — near to us the kindness and constancy of his supervision. We are not left afloat on pantheistic power, but are guided securely by his wisdom, and in the hour of tempest moored close to his love. It is not merely valid but vivid ideas which affect our thinking, and give truth the control that belongs to it. He, therefore, in any department which furnishes a close, living, perfect picture of God's action, which brings home to us his existence, attributes, and government, and puts us under the influence of convictions which may have found cold admission to the mind, subserves a spiritual, even more than a logical end.

The instances of wisdom and kindness more frequently adduced are those furnished by the physical world; while these have the advantage of a superior sensuous impression, they frequently also suffer the disadvantage of belonging to the details of a plan not much affected by them. We shall now strive to bring further light, if may be, to the character of God and his government from the moral and intellectual laws which control man and society. If in doing this we tax the attention more severely, and are often compelled to substitute abstract relations for the pleasing details of facts, we trust, nevertheless, to find this compensation, that our minds will thus be directed to those more inherent principles of order which God has planted in the highest departments of action, and by which he binds to his plan and will the free, independent power of rational spirits.

In the physical world we observe grades of law, the lower grade preparing the way for the higher, and completed by it in a new and more perfect whole, comprehending both. Thus we have the laws of gravitation and cohesion, of electric, thermal, and chemical forces, working up matter into systems and

worlds, into mountains, hills, and valleys, separating and arranging its elements in fertile soils and stratified rocks, in mineral beds and metallic veins. Hereby we secure the foundations and the ground-plan of the coming structure.

New forces are now introduced, those of vegetable and animal life, using without suspending the forces beneath them. Straightway the surface of the earth assumes a new aspect. It is everywhere covered with the excellence and beauty of life, and becomes the field of innumerable processes of growth, a consumption which enriches the earth from which it feeds, and, multiplying organic food, prepares the way for higher forms of being.

At length there appears a third grade of laws, not merely organic, but intellectual and rational. A spiritual being with spiritual ends makes the earth his abode, not by way of displacing, but of completing, what has been done. This new force does not supplant lower forces, but in a wonderful manner gathers them all up in its own action and under its own influence ; with a most comprehensive use reaches below the surface into mines and quarries, reaches abroad on the surface, reaches above the surface into sunlight and air, for physical food and ministrations, for intellectual strength and spiritual life. The earth becomes no more than a box wherein to contain the roots of this new plant, the air no more than a room wherein to give space to its branches and volume for its respiration. The world is understood by understanding these several strata of laws which enwrap it, that inorganic foundation, that organic basement, that intellectual superstructure which makes it the abode of a rational spirit, and resolves all its preparation and purposes into the life and pleasure of that spirit. Thus an observatory hides its base deep in the earth, resting it on the solid rock, rears into light its chambers, and opens its casements heavenward, that it may look out on the universe; as if one of those invisible cords of thought which bind worlds together had touched the earth, turned to stone, and formed attachment here. The link of things, seen and unseen, near and remote, is man.

We find that which is analogous to this in man's constitution, in the construction and government of the moral world. Here, also, there are grades of law, the one below the other, each inferior series able to secure a certain measure of order independently of those above it, yet each higher series completing and employing those beneath it, revealing their exact office, and through itself uniting them to their only complete and adequate end; even as man in their ministration to himself gathers in and explains all the forces and occupants of the earth.

In dwelling on this order and symmetry of the moral universe, revealed in man's social action and intellectual constitution, we trust we shall not render a less important service to the right understanding of the plan of the Architect, nor be brought less near to him, the Maker and Ruler of all, than by the contemplation of his physical works and laws.

The first and lowest series of forces is that which rests on self-love, on interest. Man, endowed with appetites, passions, and tastes, finds pleasure in their gratification; and the means by which this is to be secured, whether wealth, knowledge, or power, call forth his desires. All that action which seeks these means as means to personal pleasure is interested action, action that has reference to self. These interested efforts, springing from our own appetites, desires, and returning thither for their gratification, have a legitimate, a moderated form, that of self-love; an illegitimate and excessive form, that of selfishness.

This grade of law is like gravity in the physical world; nothing can fall below it. The lower anything sinks in the scale of being, the more perfectly and singly is it ruled by gravitation. The further man falls in character, the more completely is he subject to the law of self-love. It is impossible, without moral extinction, to plunge deeper than selfishness. The more debased men become, the more is this the sole force that rules them; the laws resting thereon, the only laws to which they respond. On the other hand, man cannot rise above self-love. Interest must go with him, and con-

stitute a staple motive, a potent and pervasive force in his highest attainments.

The second grade of laws lying in a higher region, transcending in their authority and impulse those of interest, is that of morals. Our moral nature furnishes independent motives. It is self-contained, self-sufficient, and may thus become a distinct rule of action, not merely setting limits to pleasing impulses, but enforcing courses of conduct not in themselves acceptable to us. Man may thus be a moralist, making the law of conscience the law of life, and bringing his activities under its precepts, with or without pleasure, as the case may be. It is evident that the line of action which our moral nature induces is by no means wholly new, that it simply exhibits new laws, new forces at work upon the old incentives of interest and pleasure without superceding them. We may rise to this new platform of law, this higher development of life, or we may sink below it, cast hither and thither in the strife of interest, seeking passionately the objects of gratification nearest or dearest to us. It is also evident that these higher laws are given to direct, limit, complete, those inferior forces which find play in self-love; so to subject them to government as to make of them balanced elements, commendable ingredients, in individual character and social well-being, safe foundations on which may later rise the columns of spiritual strength and beauty.

The third series of laws are those of love, of the affections. The affections are most intimately allied to the moral nature, moral qualities, character imbued with moral purpose, call them forth, invigorate them, and give them new breadth and power. Yet are they simple, original feelings, the counterpoise and complements of our passions, our selfish emotions. Through these it is that religion becomes more than morality, enkindles a high, spiritual life, and makes the soul free, spontaneous, joyful in its obedience. Love is the primary impulse of the religious life, and though it causes conduct to run into the moulds of duty, and fill them faithfully out, it does this, not mechanically and by constraint, not as the

molten metal is poured into the sand; but by a free, independent, vital activity, as the seed expands under the light and heat into the form peculiar to it. Thus the religious life is not merely the moral life, but the life of affection, bringing new forces and fresh vitality to the rigorous, legal, formal precepts which lie beneath it. The law is no longer in tables of stone, to be slowly deciphered, pondered upon, and applied with painstaking thought, but in the heart, the half unconscious rule of its spontaneous action, the gushing up and out of its generous, gracious affections. There is the same difference between piety and morality as between health, complete, joyous, untiring health, and the invalids painful and reluctant observance of the laws of health.

Yet even this truly regenerate life, begotten of God's love, does not displace interest. It rather shares the field with it. We are to love our neighbors as ourselves; love rules over self-love as the supreme life. Thus the first command becomes: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind." The moral law, on the other hand, pervades this self-love and equal love, and is in them both an inherent force of order, quickening, restraining, combining, the lower and the higher impulse into harmony and perfect proportion. Thus the living principle weds the soul of man to matter, and compacts these diverse agencies into a physical life, whose several functions are on one side limitations, on another, powers. The mind sees with a material eye, hears with a material ear, hence hears only so much and sees only so far as the range of its organ suffers, but otherwise might not see or hear at all. In the higher, spiritual life, all the acuteness, the quick and varied sensibility of interest, become, under the law of duty, an organ by which we more profoundly know and thoroughly feel the wants of others, and the conditions of their well-being. He who cannot be trusted with his own interests cannot be entrusted with another's. It is vain to expect much from one working for us who has not learned to do well for himself, and disciplined his providence and trained his sagacity in the

search of personal good. Love uses what self-love acquires. The actual surface by which we know the world, and are able to handle it skilfully for others, is found at our own finger-ends, in our own feelings. That which is noblest, least material in man, articulates itself on the tongue, and comes forth at the mouth, finds its instruments and opportunities in the physical world, and, by its union with that which is lower, makes itself known and felt as that which is higher. So, too, the generous impulses of the soul quicken the pursuits of commerce and come under the laws of interest, that, acquiring wealth, power, knowledge, they may have that which shall give value and command to themselves. The benevolence of the beggar, the good-will of the impotent, the counsel of the ignorant, are as unsubstantial a reliance as the aid of a disembodied spirit. The highest life of love must often assume the form and feel the motives of interest, if it would be as powerful in act as it is generous in wish. The highest spiritual life blends the forces beneath, and gives them their most complete expression. We never know how wise, how excellent the action of self-love may be till we find it combined with benevolence. Nor can self-love discover its own highest ends till it sees them with the eyes of love. Interest, as a blind impulse, is at war with philanthrophy. Morality, even, coldly accepts it as a duty, and not till the affections find their own native, independent life, are they able to hush the clamorous brood of coarse desires, open the circle, and call to the first places therein, benevolence, sympathy, pity, all the gentle offspring of heaven.

Akin to our affections is our aesthetical sense, inducing order of the same nature, and giving new and nobler motives of action than those of interest, freer and more cheerful ones than those of duty. The beautiful, while it is more than the useful, more than the skeleton of law, combines these, making them the framework of the edifice which it itself shapes with more complete skill, and adorns with a more penetrating and spiritual eye. Beauty works upward, works off the low grade of naked uses, sends a spire, a tower, an attic into the

air, yet rests on the ground as certainly and firmly as the lowest stone which hard-handed labor and short-sighted use lays in the bottom of the first ditch. Spiritual beauty makes morality a blessing and a delight, the admiration of the mind, the enthusiasm of the heart.

In the plains of law which rise one above another in the physical world, and starting with matter in its coarsest forms, as soil, rock, metal, at length yield it as brain and nervous tissue, ready to be the organ of thought, to stand as a days-man between the external and the internal world, to catch at the one extremity the sense and vision of things, and bear them inward, and at the other the suggestions and feelings of spirit, and bear them outward, a most marked feature is the independent yet subordinate existence of the lower, the dependent yet controlling existence of the higher. The lower can do much by itself, yet what it does is of no ultimate value except as the higher comes in to use and complete it. The higher can do nothing by itself, as the statue cannot stand in air without a pedestal, yet what it does gives to the lower its worth and dignity.

These gradations of order by which completeness is reached, this use of the lower by the higher to which it is made finally to minister, are as marked features of the moral as of the physical world, features which here as there signally illustrate the divine government. The same elements are subject to very various forces according to the particular position in the circuit of changes they at the time occupy. A drop of water may float down the stream with its fellows; it may be caught in an eddy and spin for a moment in its vortex; it may suffer evaporation, and seemingly cease to feel in its airy and brilliant flight through fleecy and gorgeous clouds the force of gravity; it may, under the cold breath of the north be condensed, and come tumbling down like a fallen spirit; it may now be drunk by the thirsty leaf or root or horse; or it may be frozen in the stream, or help to fill the boiler of an engine, or be passed in vapor over the heated filings till the key turns in the lock, and the imprisoned gases

leap forth; yet everywhere it meets laws which play upon it, and into which it can play through a long orbit of diverse and marvellous phenomena, together making up half the creation of God. So, too, the atoms which now in the brain of man seem to touch, if not to enter, the spiritual world, may, eaten by the raven, become muscle, slipping thence by decomposition enter the circuit of vegetable life, and this extinct, fall back to the first platform of chemical forces. Nowhere do they escape a system of laws able to handle them as a factor or rule them as subjects.

The kindred range of moral government, reaching the worst as the best, finding impulses to play upon as certainly in the lowest as in the highest, and in all its diversity of motives paving the path of progress, and gathering up the past in the future, the inferior in the superior, the strife of interest in the obedience of conscience, the tasks of duty in the play of love, is the theme we have now to unfold.

The department of social action we shall first and chiefly consider is that of economy, public or political economy. There is no one pursuit so general or so constant as that of wealth, or attended with more uniform success; and this, because there is no one thing external to virtue which stands in the relation of means to so many and so varied enjoyments as wealth. There is, perhaps, not an appetite, passion, or affection which wealth may not directly or indirectly aid us in gratifying. The lowest and the highest feelings find here the means of indulgence, as from the head of a full reservoir we can carry a stream in all directions. Do we love God? wealth gives us additional power wherewith to labor for his kingdom. Do we feel strongly the brute within us, asserting its appetites and lusts, and sending us with greedy palate in search of roots and fruits, of flesh and wine and revelry? Still wealth is our chief means of indulgence. We cannot build cathedrals or dwellings, churches or theatres, colleges or palaces, stores or barracks, ships or cars, without wealth. It is only the anchorite and the barbarian — who are in fact but one — that can dispense with wealth, and that because

they dispense with all things, have neither comfort nor intelligence, humanity nor religion, and have slunk ignobly back from rational life into brute existence.

The desire for wealth at present outranks the other desires in intensity and universality. Wealth and knowledge may reciprocally stand in the relation of means and ends. We may get knowledge that we may get wealth, or wealth that we may get knowledge. Yet the first is the constant and familiar order. Wisdom is largely valued for the price it brings, for the command it first gives of physical, and ultimately of social and intellectual good. We are set apart to labor, educated thereto, educated therein; nor is this greatly wrong, since thus the broad foundations of the general weal are laid; labor makes way for leisure, and furnishes, for us and for all, the conditions of a nobler, more thoughtful, and enjoyable life. The civilization, the rank of nations, chiefly expresses itself in the products of wealth, in forts and fleets, in stone, brick, and mortar, in manufactories and warehouses, highways and railroads, in comfortable and elegant life, in the endowents of education and the edifices of religion. To be sure there may be a soul back of all this, not touched of avarice, nor tainted of the market, but we can no more reach it than we can the spirit of man save through its body, the body with which wealth endows it, of material opulence, social appearances, artistic and educational structures, and the physical organs lodged by presses, libraries, teachers, preachers, under the will of virtue. How few things there are which are not paid for, which are never expressed, directly or indirectly in any stage of transfer, in dollars and cents. Light is free, but the gospel comes at a price. Air is free, but knowledge, the breath of the soul, is hawked in the streets. The merest stand-point, the most naked existence is given man; all else must be gotten, and in the getting will somewhere at some time bear a price, the equivalent of the labor expended. A man may breathe for nothing; but he must shortly eat, and then his work begins, not again to end. Political economy has caught him, never more to relax its

hold, unless, as we do not believe, God in another existence shall choose to float him, like an idle ship with unfurled sails, on the bosom of his infinite resources.

The desire of power, another chief impulse of action, stands in like close relation to wealth. Power cannot enlarge, maintain, or express itself except in its simplest and rudest, or in its most elevated and spiritual, forms without wealth. National strength, individual strength, rest constantly on the appliances of wealth; nor can any people or persons successfully cope with those who avail themselves of these means, without also calling in their aid. National strength expresses itself in the command of armies, improved ordnance, and the best marine; in commercial and manufacturing cities, in land and water thoroughfares; while the knowledge which confers upon man the most immediate power is that of mechanical and physical agents, of the means of national development and material prosperity. There is, indeed, a higher though less generally coveted power attendant on intellectual and moral truth, and on holy character, which, at first scarcely discerned, spreads far, passing from nation to nation and generation to generation, and returning with posthumous honors to adorn the monuments of the great and good. Yet even this true power of the spiritual life, though for the time divested of the accessaries of wealth, does not aim ultimately to divorce itself from material good, will not fail at length to stoop from its high flight, and, like other forms of power, call in, at least, as the images and incidents of its presence and perfection, streets of gold and gates of pearl.

Wealth is power; and power cannot be complete without wealth. The appropriation and command of external agencies are both wealth and power. If, through our own activity, we are to grow into our inheritance of good, secure the kingdom made ready for us by the divine hand in the world about us; if we are to get to ourselves the products and forces of nature, then must there be a simultaneous and perpetual growth of wealth and power, mutually maintaining

each other. Certainly not in this, we believe not in any, form of existence, will that indolence which enervates the mind, makes benevolence impossible, and takes the spur from all our powers, be made the order of life by a divine prodigality, which shall cause all good to wait on an idle wish. Wealth, then, which is the material expression of power and knowledge, the solidified product of intellectual and moral activity, is not, without a profound purpose in our constitution, made the absorbing pursuit of man. It is the first visible, tangible expression of those attainments which all time is to increase, an early and stern school of those faculties which eternity is to develop. Economic laws are not fleeting precepts, springing from transient circumstances, but lie rooted in our nature, and arise in the development of essential parts of our constitution. They interlock the efforts of men, give necessity and promise to them, and, in their interchange, fix the lines of justice, and thus the beginnings of that love which delights in overstepping these limits, and making inroads of benevolence beyond the claims of right. We can give no gift till we have learned to distinguish what is due; we can have no philanthrophy till we have first seen where lie the borders of obligation. First just, then generous, is hardly less a principle than a precept. We lose both justice and generosity if we cease to distinguish them, and know not where either lies.

The desire for wealth, so permanent, pervasive, and influential in the action of man, gives rise to the two subordinate desires—to acquire the most possible, and to do this with the least exertion possible. The desirableness of wealth, and the irksome nature of labor, must occasion these feelings. Other considerations aside, such as the restraints which morality or public opinion may impose, no man can choose a less in place of a higher reward for the same labor. Such an action would be irrational, and inconsistent with the very motive which led him to perform the task. If he can neglect a part of the advantage, the remainder should have no hold upon his mind. It does not belong even to liberty to choose one

in place of two dollars, if the money as money, as a representative of the entire circle of gratifications, calls forth any desire. To make such a choice, some third consideration must be called in. The mind must at least have in view the pleasure of asserting its own power, or showing its own willfulness. No normal man in a normal state can have such narrow, definite, and limited desires, that they covet one dollar and are not enlarged by the presence of two. We never reason with more certainty concerning the action of man, or with a principle of broader application, than when we assign to him in the pursuit of wealth a desire for the largest return.

The second desire, to obtain wealth with the least expenditure of labor, is of the same nature as the first. The labor being fixed, we seek the largest return; the return fixed, we desire the least labor. With whomsoever either labor is irksome or wealth coveted, this must be the frame of mind toward the two. To diminish the gratification when we reach it, or to postpone it by needless exertion, is contradictory to the very nature of the desire which has inspired our effort—is an action to which ambition and sluggishness are equally averse.

The first conflicting feeling, then, which the desire for wealth meets in our constitution is the love of ease, the indolence native to us, or, as another phase of the same feeling, the wish to choose that form of activity most pleasant to us. All controlled, sustained, patient activity of body or of mind, comes in conflict with this natural inertia, or natural liberty of man, and in the lowest, most impulsive, most savage forms of human life is therefore rejected. With the barbarian the horizon of thought is so narrowed; anticipation presents so few pictures, enkindles so weak desires; the social life in which he moves makes so few claims and inspires so few ambitions; the circle of incentives is so contracted, so concentrated into the spasmodic prick of appetite,—that action becomes uncertain and fitful, and indolence, with steady gravitation, binds the soul to the earth. Thus, by this torpor of thought, so

feebly conceiving and slightly adorning the future, by this utter loss of the ideal, with the sluggishness of desire consequent thereon, barbarous life sinks close to that of the brute, and lingers on with entire arrest of progress, waiting, as the germ in the seed, for some external agency to quicken it.

This contest, however, can have but one conclusion in the normal man, when his nature begins to be aroused, and the many open sources of pleasure to present themselves to him. Wealth is so universal a means of enjoyment, that his appetites, passions, tastes, and moral impulses will, one after another, range themselves on the side of acquisition, and, save in those rare cases in which the love of ease is so excessive as to outweigh the entire man besides, labor is the result. Against sluggishness all desires make common cause, and are more concentrated in that of wealth than in any other. So many and various are the rays of influence which gather in at this focus, that this desire, capable of becoming the most controlling and exorbitant of passions, is chosen to open the assault on the indolent soul. One must have risen very high, or have sunk very low, not to feel the steady pressure of this force. Those usually are the most worthless members of society who are most exempt from its influence. It is the mainspring of daily life, which keeps in steady play its mechanism; once broken, and there are a few, fitful revolutions, a half dozen ticks, and all is still again: the unmeasured, unrecorded night of barbarism sets in.

Here, then, we find the most diversified motives early concentrated into one overruling power, and brought to bear on the mind, impelling it, with ceaseless activity and toil, through all the growth of civilization. Knowledge, taste, virtue, each higher impulse as it is developed, serves in turn to enforce and further stimulate this desire, by presenting new objects of acquisition, new forms of action, to which are requisite the resources of wealth. Nor does the fact, which we fully accept, that savage tribes cannot be rapidly or certainly civilized without first appealing to the religious nature, diminish the value of this incentive of gain. It only shows

that this force cannot at once find adequate foothold in a mind so narrowed down to brute appetites as that of the barbarian. Touch the life of that soul with life, let moral light penetrate and unlock it, let it begin to burst forth, and gather the material of growth, and forthwith the desire of wealth comes in with varied and steady incentives, as a first impulse to be made use of in securing constant, coherent development.

There is a barbarism more painful than that of the savage found in the lowest classes of civilized nations, and it is almost always accompanied with circumstances which check or forbid acquisition, which remand the unfortunate ones — unfortunate in deadened desires, unfortunate in obstacles which hem them in like walls of stone — to the daily indulgence of appetite, the naked maintenance of life.

While this powerful, constitutional force, which all parts of our nature serve to strengthen and support, is designed to open the struggle with the torpor and inertia of the soul, and apply the incentives which are to push society from point to point in the growth of civilization, this is by no means its only service. The desire of wealth, though resting back in part upon appetite and passion, being valued as a means for their gratification, is yet in conflict with their present and their excessive indulgence. This pursuit of property opens at once a school of discipline; there is in it a strict and thorough barter of the present — of present ease, expenditure, and pleasure — for the future. The harvest of to-day must be made the seed of to-morrow. Those indulgences which blunt the faculties and waste the resources must be checked as inconsistent with that complete, immediate success which the man ambitious of gain aims at. So confirmed do these frugal, abstemious, industrious habits usually become in those who themselves acquire wealth, that rarely are they departed from, even when large possessions invite profusion.

It is when this discipline has found only partial play; when sudden riches have been achieved by a stroke of fortune or of wit, with little labor; when one is born to afflu-

ence, and the desire for property arrested by full gratification, that passion and appetite, undisciplined to self-denial, and with abundant means at their disposal, break forth and undo the work of sobriety and diligence.

Thrown back on poverty, these prodigals may again be taught wisdom in its severe and natural school, and slowly climb the slippery assent from which, in child's sport, they have so rapidly glided. The ground, however, which this impulse gains in individuals and nations cannot be held by itself alone. Wealth, mere wealth, is indeed an icy steep, which we clamber up only to slide down again. It is when it plays into higher impulses that secure foundations are laid for prosperity. The moment opulence turns from the ministration of virtue to that of evil, it begins to cut the sinews of its own strength, and to fall into decay, thus revealing its true relations and dependence.

This desire is also a chief instigator in the pursuit of knowledge. We have shown that knowledge, offering many new objects of pursuit, quickens acquisition. Acquisition, in turn, makes constant demands on knowledge, and becomes the great school of the faculties of the mass of men. Mark the enterprise which commerce develops, the discoveries to which it gives rise, the varied skill it calls forth in the structure of vessels, in the material employed, in their form, equipment, machinery, and navigation; the surveys it occasions; the new forms of production it stimulates; and the knowledge of the condition, resources, and wants of the globe it imparts. Or look at invention in the aid it furnishes the useful arts. We are struck by the thought of the intellectual activity compressed within the compass of a library. From how many nations, quarters of the globe, and periods of time have those contributions to the literary wealth of the world been gathered. How many wan, laborious men have compressed themselves into these volumes, have dipped their pens into the fountains of their own lives, and thus written of things physical and spiritual. But there is a literature of the arts, more scattered, but not less striking. The weapons of physi-

cal wealth, the tools, machines and processes of production, which contain and express the potent thought, the cunning and skill of successive generations of stalwart men; those happy thoughts shaped in wood, wrought in iron, engraved in steel, cut in brass; that engine, a royal octavo of human ingenuity, and this steam press, an almost mythical product of the brain, yet existing before the eye in solid iron, with perfect execution and marvellous performance; these wonder-working looms, with more fingers and a more precise thought to guide them than belonged to fabled monster of old; these sewing, knitting, and card machines, instinct with the omnipresent life of successive inventors; these reapers and threshers, casting about them with the strength and execution of a squad of men; these rollers and crushers, Titans of power; such, and a thousand more, make up the wonderful literature of art, the solid volumes in which cunning men, the most of them overlooked and forgotten, have bound up their wise thoughts, and left them a legacy to their fellows; not, as many books, to create without repaying labor, but to take to their hard, untiring muscles the tasks of life, and, working by day and by night, to come with the boon of ease and leisure to the grimy sons of toil everywhere.

Such a literature is that of invention, so busy, so skilful, so untiring, so stable, ponderous, pliant, ductile, precise, beyond the hand and eye of him who made and rules it. The minds that gave birth to the engine, the gin, and the jenny have done more for the labor of the world than those great progenitors from whose loins have sprung nations. Those who have carried the printing-press from stage to stage of progress have put the sceptre in the hands of the kings of thought, and built the throne on which they sit. Let us be astonished at poetry and philosophy, but not less astonished at the productive resources of men, the many agents of earth, water, and air, of mechanical, chemical, electric, and thermal force, which tug at our tasks, and make the agriculture and manufactures of the globe a workhouse of sensual and supersensual powers more marvellous than the shop and cyclops

of Vulcan. Yet these solid tomes, with backs of polished steel, pregnant with water power, steam, and gunpowder, fill but one of the alcoves wherein are filed away the products which man's acquisitive faculties have called forth.

The noble edifices of past and present — private, public, and religious; the works of improvement and of art; the comforts and elegances of home, and the beauties of the landscape, testify also to the vigorous and refined thought awakened by the pursuit and presence of wealth.

Nor do our domestic affections and moral impulses owe less to it. It has brought liberty to the birth, and strengthened the law of equality. It was the cities of Mediaeval Europe, wherein artizan and merchant gathered and grew into opulence, that first discovered that a power equal to any, and formidable to all, lay in the agents of industry, and accompanied the accumulation of wealth. Sheltered in these nurseries of production, the middle classes began to feel strength, claim rights, and weigh down the sword with the purse, till the length of the one has found full compensation in the depth of the other. The industry and wealth back of armies settle the campaign. There can be no skilful and varied manufacture, no wide-spread riches, without more or less honor rendered to the craftsman and trader. There can be no growth of arts, no progress of agriculture, without a corresponding elevation of this agent, thus conferring power, and paving the way of liberty. The ten thousand pursuits of industry, each important, each a specialty, confer a peculiar and effective gift on those who ply them, and enable them to enter the arena of traffic and of influence weapon in hand. Society is interlocked in dependencies which draw upward and downward, right and left, and leave each with the possibility of overthrow and also of elevation. The lines of commercial and productive influence are not all lodged in one or two hands, but are capable of indefinite distribution, carrying everywhere a fraction of power.

But these offices do not express all that falls to the pursuit of wealth to accomplish in the growth of man and society.

Our moral impulses sometimes come in conflict with this desire, and should always set it limits; yet not the less do riches furnish a chief means of expressing and enlarging the religious life. Production begets its own circle of virtues — industry, honesty, economy, patience, forethought, courtesy, enterprise, submission to the conditions of success, and to the self-denial it imposes. It leads also to a high estimate of civil law and social order, the safeguards of sobriety, and decency, and those restraints which give the largest liberty and security to individual enterprise. Violence, theft, fraud, irresponsibility, are its greatest enemies, and it seeks protection behind the barriers of a firm, just, and definite civil polity. It thus labors with our best impulses in laying the foundations of law, justice, and public order, in establishing those social forces which build the structure of intelligent, refined, and pure society. Beyond this, it places a varied and vast instrumentality at the disposal of the religious impulses, when these are present, and enables them to enter on a stage of progress not otherwise possible.

If we have a comprehensive view of the perfection involved in the full expansion of our religious nature, we shall feel that it includes every subordinate good, as the greater contains the less. Comfort, refinement, elegance, art, though not of the substance of true religious life, are of its incidents, and wait a perfect, permanent reunion with it. The service of God has two branches — diligence in business, and fervor of spirit. Buckle has shown his bitter feeling by attributing to Christianity a temper hostile to the amenities of life. It will not indeed accept the semblance for the substance, the show of good breeding, the form and processes of wealth, the indulgence of heartless luxury, for the benevolence and joy and completeness of Christian manhood; but it rejects no beauty, no possession, nothing of good report, for those who can hold them in submission to love. The meek shall inherit the earth.

Such, then, is the important part which the impulse of interest takes in human society. Among the most calculable

and definite of the forces that play upon man, resting back upon self-love alone, basing its calculations upon the single axiom of production, that each man desires the most with the least labor, this desire of wealth is capable of becoming a chief force in promoting civilization, building cities, and improving character; in reaching the opulence of Tyre, the power of Carthage, and the refinement of Athens. Though not as complete and noble in its government as the moral and religious impulse, it renders those who are subject to it valuable and reliable members of society. The man who is controlled by an enlightened self-interest, by a thorough and discerning selfishness, if you will, is a most calculable and efficient force for progress in the community. As a power for good he suffers only in comparison with those under the influence of intelligent, Christian love. The rules of morality are so far coincident with those of utility, that long periods and entire communities being contemplated, their precepts are the same.

There is, then, a series of laws, springing from the very selfishness of man, which seek beneficently to control his action, which catch him as he falls from the grace and love of God, and begin anew in him the work of order and ultimate restitution. They can, indeed, by no means accomplish this work till they are joined once more to the higher forces of regeneration; yet this junction effected, their efficacy does not cease, they still maintain a function and perform a service. All the laws of the moral world, equally those of interest as those of love, work upward, tend to bring man to the surface, to open his nature to higher influences, and put him in possession of new resources and motives; while that which relates and interlocks all in the play of a perfect life, is love. As a subordinate desire the love of wealth is essential to the health of the soul. It gives play to its activities, and material to its virtues; yet it is the vigor of the higher impulse that assigns it an office, and makes it a safe and sober servant. The nobler, more spiritual qualities of manhood must root downward in the soil of interest; the inferior limited impulses branch upward into the light of love.

Amid these disciplinary forces, the lower as well as the higher, man preserves his liberty, may break through them and work downward, controlled by the appetite of the hour, the frenzy of the moment; yet in every stage of descent he meets some check, and passes some barrier which God had placed for his arrest. If at last he bursts away, a comet, into the rayless void, it is because in his own mad impetuosity he will not be swayed by those attractions, which, bending his orbit at apogee, would lead him back again to the Source of light and heat.

ARTICLE II.

REMARKS ON SECOND EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS IV. 3, 4.

BY REV. SAMUEL DAVIES, LONDON.

Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι κεκαλυμμένον τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις ἐστὶ κεκαλυμμένον· Ἐν οἷς ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου ἐτύφλωσε τὰ νοήματα τῶν ἀπίστων, — Ex. rec. J. J. Griesb.

"But if our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost: In whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believed not."— Authorized English Version.

Among the apostles of our Saviour a distinguished position was occupied by Paul as a minister of Christ to the Gentiles (Gal. ii. 7–9). Not that the heathen world was exclusively the sphere of his labor; for while his profound acquaintance with the ritual of Sinai, and the gospel it foreshadowed, together with fervid love for Israel, eminently qualified him for labors among "his brethren according to the flesh," his constant practice also appears to have been in every place, first to make known the glad tidings to them. In every city embraced in his missionary toils, from Antioch even to Rome, he acted on the principle stated Rom. i. 16: "To *the Jew* first, and also to the Greek."[1]

[1] Acts xiii. 5, 14; xvii. 1, 2, 10; xxviii. 16–28.

Though so eminently fitted to discharge the functions of his ministry among his own people, he was a vessel specially chosen to bear the gospel to the heathen. "To me," said he, with his characteristic humility, "who am less than the least of all saints, is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ" (Eph. iii. 8). And inasmuch as the Gentiles were to be admitted into the church of God as brethren on an equal footing with the Jews, without a previous proselytism to Judaism, or submission to the rite of circumcision, and to enter by another door, even by faith alone, it was indispensable that an apostle to them should be superior to the prejudices which enslaved by their power the great mass even of Jewish believers (Acts xxi. 20, etc.), that he should possess a clear insight into the import of both covenants, with the relation of each to the other, and be prepared, if by misguided teachers a Gentile convert was led with an observance of the institutions of Christ to join those of Moses, to denounce the latter as "beggarly and elementary" (Gal. iv. 9).

Such was Paul. As having kindled his torch at the altar, on which, as a libation to heaven, the blood of the proto-martyr Stephen was poured; as having his lips touched with its living coal; as drinking in inspiration from the eloquence of that servant of Christ when standing on the verge of both worlds, his spirit already in the higher and better, with an angelic radiance on his countenance he declared the former things to have passed away and all things to have become new,—did Paul converse on divine themes, preach Christ, and write for the illumination of the church of every age and clime.

And in order to a ready apprehension of the sense of many parts of those profound writings of his, it is necessary that his readers' mind should be imbued with like sentiments. The elements of all sciences are beggarly, compared with their ultimate or even earlier developments; they form, however, the ladder by which we climb to a more commanding position and gain extensive prospects. The knowledge of revelation forms no exception. "Beggarly" as are its "elements"

compared with the riches of divine truth exhibited in Christ, the higher lessons of the latter will be best known and appreciated by those who have first diligently cultivated the former. Thus Paul alone of the apostles, as a master-teacher, struggling in the greatness of his conceptions of divine truth, is found in sympathy with the feebleness, dullness, and unappreciativeness of those to whom he ministered, dimming his own torch that the brethren might bear its light, and arresting his own divine words, when their sublimity called to heights which his disciples could not climb (1 Cor. iii. 2; Heb. v. 11, 12, comp. ii. Pet. iii. 15, 16).

These thoughts were suggested to the writer of these pages by what appeared to him the unsatisfactory rendering in our common version of the words of Paul indicated at the head of this Article. Glancing at Calvin's version, Beza's, the French of Ostervald, Olshausen's Commentary, and those of other persons, he found that King James's translators were by no means singular in their apprehension of Paul's meaning. Led thus to a more careful examination of the passage under review, he was confirmed in his opinion, that the declaration of the inspired writer is altogether different from the generally received rendering of it, notwithstanding the imposing list of learned names by which it is supported.

The forced and unnatural style of the authorized version readily awakens in the mind of a thoughtful reader suspicion that the sense is not correctly given, and that the translators covered their own dubiousness under a word-for-word translation of the inspired penman; — a method often adopted where a writer is not understood, that is, where the signification of each word is known, but the import of the whole in combination is matter of doubt. In this way it is believed, that many verses of our version may be accounted for, the translator oscillating between different interpretations, or having no conception what the writer meant, gave a verbatim rendering, leaving the English reader no chance, except that of consulting commentaries. Instances of this probably occur

in 1 Cor. xi. 10; 1 Pet. iii. 19; Isa. lxiv. 5 in the phrase "in those is continuance."

When our version says (2 Cor. iv. 3) "If our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost," a very good sense lies on the words, and a very solemn truth is told us; but when it is immediately added, "in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them that believed not," we see at once a styled forced and unlike that of Paul. Is it intended in the terms "those that are lost" (τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις), to describe a class of persons distinct from those indicated under the terms "them which believed not" (τῶν ἀπίστων), which the English reading seems to require? Then the gravest inconveniences offer themselves, of which it is not the least that it distinguishes between the lost and the unbeliever, while elsewhere the scriptures uniformly make them coextensive, nay identical. But if, as would be generally conceded, the two designations are descriptive of the same persons, then what inextricable confusion of thought and style is there in making the minds of the latter to be blinded in the former.

Olshausen endeavors to set aside the difficulty by alledging "a kind of Hebrew construction." But Hebrew idiom it is not, and the learned commentator too well understood the syntax of that language to suppose it was. Hence the extenuating phrase "*a kind* of Hebrew construction." Probably he suspected a mixture of the Greek and Hebrew idioms as best adapted to explain such an unusual collocation of words. But even this plea will not do. In the commonly received sense of the words, the construction is neither Hebrew nor Greek, but must, with such a meaning put on them, be accounted a solecism in any language.

The error lies in mistaking the subject of the ἀπολλυμένοις. This word being undoubtedly used elsewhere by Paul of rejectors of the gospel,[1] it is not strange that the mind of any reader should at once receive the impression, that the

[1] Vide 1 Cor. i. 18 and 2 Cor. ii. 15 where τοῖς σωζομένοις appears as its antithesis.

writer by the same term is designating the same object, though the conclusion of the sentence plainly shows that he does not; for, assuming that he does, it is not possible to make any tolerable sense without admitting at the same time a solecism in language.

But if now by ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις[2] be understood the things that are lost, have perished, or ceased, namely, the entire furniture and ceremonial of the Mosaic economy, to which also the κεκαλυμμένον in the same verse points, indicating that the splendid ritual of Moses as a κάλυμμα, obscured the glory of the gospel, by pre-occupying the mind with its transitory and unsubstantial glory, as though it were imperishable and divine, the sense of the whole becomes plain, and the anomaly which an incorrect rendering had brought on the language of the sacred writer is removed. The passage would then stand thus: "But if our gospel be veiled, it is veiled by the things which are lost, whereby the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them that believe not."

Nor have our interpreters erred with respect to the τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις alone; but by confounding the τῶν ἀπίστων with it as descriptive of the same object, they have extended the latter to embrace all unbelievers, whereas the reference of the writer, as we shall proceed to show, is not general but particular. Indeed, if the view above contended for be the correct one, it becomes necessary to limit the ἄπιστος to those whose deadness to the high claims of the gospel of Christ on them is induced by an exaggerated and altogether false estimate of the legal institute of the Old Testament; for in reference to such alone can it be said that the gospel is "veiled" to them, "by the things that are lost,"— the ritual, whose "glory" is gone, the "commandment," whose authority is "annulled" (Heb. vii. 18). We believe, indeed, that the apostle's reference is even more limited, pointing especially to those Judaizing teachers who vilified his person, and calumniated his character and ministry, and endeavored to gain to themselves and their own doctrine a confidence

[1] ἐν before the instrument, as usual.

which apostolic authority alone could claim. To vindicate himself and ministry from their foul aspersions is Paul's great object in this epistolary communication.

This special object of the writer pervades the whole epistle, and can be traced even where his adversaries appear to be lost sight of by him. And, as might be supposed in a case of such delicacy, where the penman has a refinement of mind and nobleness of character such as distinguished Paul, his language receives a certain coloring, and a vein of irony scarcely perceptible where the leading object of the epistle is overlooked, or where there is little sympathy in the lofty bearing of the writer's mind, to whom nothing was more abhorrent than the necessity of self-commendation, as in parrying the threats of the masked gladiators who struck at him. To speak of himself as of one "not worthy to be called an apostle" was in perfect keeping with his character; but to contend for the purity of his aims, the disinterestedness of his motives, and sincerity in presenting the word of truth; to descend into the arena with such vile, skulking, yet specious hunters after popularity as assailed him, and that apparently on mere personal grounds, was repugnant to every feeling of his nature; nor could he pour forth upon the Corinthian mind the full tide of his indignant eloquence till he had laid aside for the present the robe of ministerial dignity, and the wisdom, moderation, and humility of an apostle, and begged permission to appear among them a little as a boaster and "a fool"! Under this appearance, and in this name, how masterly, how perfect his defence! It was probably this change of character, this personating the fool that led Erasmus to say of him: "tanta vafrities est, non credas eundem hominem loqui."

The first direct reference to his antagonists occurs chap. ii. vs. 17, which verse stands in the closest connection with the passage under notice: "For we are not as the many who corrupt[1] the word of God, but as of sincerity, but as of God,

[1] καπηλεύοντες, a term expressive of a high degree of contempt, from κάπηλος, *a tavern-keeper*, and applied by Paul to his adversaries in allusion to the prac-

in the sight of God, speak we in Christ." The comparison made in chap. iii. of the dispensations of Moses and Christ is not a digression, but directly to the writer's purpose. The attitude of Paul to the old economy, and his doctrine respecting it, inspired the rancor of his antagonists toward him, while the object of their labors was to procure for the former dispensation a respect incompatible with the loftier and exclusive claims of Christianity. It is therefore most pertinent to show, as Paul very decisively does, in a few masterly strokes of his pen, the infinitely superior glory of the Christian to that of the legal dispensation. A certain transitory glory, indeed, belonged to the covenant "engraven in stones" (vs. 7) by the finger of God, but it had lost its brightness by the superabounding glory of the gospel — the one is letter, the other is spirit; that is done away (*καταργούμενον*), this remains; the one is the ministration of death, the other of life; the former is the ministration of condemnation, the latter of righteousness. Verses 14, 15 describe the influence of this covenant on its adherents, in contrast with the privilege of those who, beholding the glory of the Lord therein (*κατοπτριζόμενοι*), are changed into the same likeness by the transforming power of the Spirit, "their minds were blinded, for unto this day when Moses is read, the veil (*κάλυμμα*) is on their hearts."

The self-vindication continued in chapter iv. is direct and open, where undoubtedly in repudiating things unworthy of an ambassador of the cross, and challenging to himself those qualities which the service of Christ pre-eminently demands, he tacitly points out the deficiencies of his opponents, and casts on them as the *πολλοὶ καπηλεύοντες* of chapter ii. ult., the charges which they had preferred against him.

The subject introduced toward the close of the third chapter is then resumed. It is asserted (iv. 3) that the gospel is veiled from these unbelievers by the transitory

tice of adulterating liquors before retailing them; a trick in trade not yet extinct, as recent revelations show, under the extenuating term of extension.

splendors of the old covenant,[1] and that the god of this world exerts an influence on their minds to this end. Thus while the view above taken is demanded by the internal structure of the passage itself, it is found also to be in perfect harmony with the general object of the epistle, and with the scope of the writer in the immediate context.

ARTICLE III.

THE NATURE OF SIN.

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THE characteristic doctrines of the gospel — the atonement, regeneration, justification, and sanctification — all derive their form and meaning from the nature and tendency and ruin of sin. The great aim of gospel preaching, and of all the appliances of the church of God to the end of time, is man's redemption from the curse of sin. This has been the work of the ages past, and is to be of the ages to come; and the song of Moses and the Lamb will be the rehearsal of this great achievement.

Our views, then, of the nature of sin will greatly affect our understanding of the gospel, and our sense of its adaptations to the work it proposes to do. The question, What is sin? is not a mere problem of speculative theology, to be discussed in the schools as a matter of intellectual discipline. It enters into all our practical operations, is an element in all our conceptions of human character, and gives shape to all our endeavors to elevate and save mankind. Every one is interested in it who is himself a sinner, or who has to do with sinners. Sin is the great fact in human experience, and an intelligent apprehension of that experience is essential to a

[1] In ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις the old covenant is viewed distributively, in its variety of rites of worship; in τὸ καταργούμενον collectively, as constituting one institute.

knowledge of man's danger and his safety; his grounds of hope and fear.

The scriptures give us no philosophical definition of sin. They treat of it as a thing essentially understood by every one. There are certain primary ideas, as those of right and wrong, duty and obligation, sin and holiness, which every moral agent has by virtue of his nature, and without which a revelation to man would seem impossible. They are awakened in the mind as it reaches moral agency, but can never be imparted, like a historical fact, from one who has them to one who has them not. The Bible addresses those possessed of these ideas, speaks to men as understanding what sin is, but gives clearer conceptions by directing attention to its nature, and distinguishing it from all other things, and thus helps them to comprehend the contents of their own thought. This is all we need — all that in the nature of the case is possible.

There is one text which in form approaches a definition: "Sin is the transgression of the law." A careful study of the expression shows that it is a comparison of two synonymous terms; each comprehends the other. The use of the definite article with subject and with predicate indicates that the words are co-extensive in meaning; sin is the transgression of the law, and the transgression of the law is sin. There is no other sin than transgression, and there is no other transgression than sin.

The standard and test of sin is the law of God. That law is righteous, because God is righteous; and it covers all righteousness. There can be no duty which God's law does not enjoin, nor can it require anything that is not duty. It can neither go beyond nor fall behind absolute justice. The law embodies all obligation; it is satisfied when obligation is met. It requires of every man just what he ought to render, and when he fails to render that, he transgresses, is blameworthy, is a sinner. The law requiring of the sinner what he ought to render, must require of him what he can render. Ability to do is an essential element in the very thought of obliga-

tion; and it is vain to distinguish between the faculties which constitute the moral agent, and the motive force necessary to their action. The ability upon which obligation rests involves both these, so that there shall be no shelter to the transgressor from the righteous claim of the law. What that claim is we are fully informed: "All the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this: thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." "Love is the fulfilling of the law"; and lest we might mistake some natural affection or movement of complacency for the love which the law requires, we are taught that it is due to every moral being — to God as supreme, and to our neighbor, without reference to character or relationship: "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven; for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." It involves complacency when God is its object, or any child of his. It involves displacency when directed towards the unworthy and the hateful; but in all cases it is essentially the same, a voluntary regard for the well-being and interests of its object; a hearty putting of every being in the place that belongs to him — God first and over all; our neighbor by our side, according to his nature and value.

The thing directly required is a state of heart, a disposition; not any fixed amount of outward performance. The outward action follows, as a stream flows from its fountain, according to the powers possessed, and the opportunities afforded. It can never fail except from a failure of the required disposition. Strictly speaking, the obligation extends only to our voluntary powers, requires only a right state of the will. Let this be right, and we have met our obligation; all other exercises follow in their place — complacency toward the good and displacency toward the evil.

The degree in which these voluntary powers are to act is quite distinctly expressed in the law: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and

with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." The language is adapted to every moral being, expresses the great law of heaven and of earth, meets every person just where he stands and as he stands, and requires just what he has to give. If it asked more, it would transcend obligation, duty; if it asked less, there would be duty beyond the law, and sin that was not the transgression of the law. This needs no proof. We know it as we know that a whole is equal to all its parts. It is an axiom which lies at the basis of all conception of duty and ill-desert. What we can give we ought to give, and beyond this, *ought* has no application and no meaning.

Sin, then, is the transgression of this law of God, the law of obligation, and the transgression of this law is sin, and there is no other sin. Sin is a unit—one thing, and nothing else; disobedience to the law (*ἀνόμια*); a failure to present the required disposition of heart; a refusal to love, to yield to God his place, and to man; a coming short of what the law requires; a voluntary coming short where obligation actually exists, based on the power to be and to do. A coming short from want of power shows weakness, infirmity, not sin. A coming short of some ideal excellence beyond our power to attain, is no transgression of the law, because the law requires no such attainment. The power of which we speak includes natural power and all superadded help.

That the sin with which God deals in scripture is of this character, is clear from all the declarations in regard to it. It is the object of God's displeasure and condemnation, not mere dissatisfaction, such as might arise from viewing an imperfect work of art, but moral disapprobation and condemnation, involving blame: "To them that are contentious and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation, and wrath, tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil." Again, the sinner himself is represented as condemning it: "For if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things; beloved, if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence towards God; and whatsoever we ask we receive of him, because we

keep his commandments, and do those things which are pleasing in his sight." This passage proves, too, that God condemns only where there is occasion for man to condemn himself.

The sinner is everywhere spoken of as deserving punishment and needing forgiveness: "If we confess our sins he is faithful, and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." "He that confesseth and forsaketh his sins shall find mercy." "Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him, and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon." Such language as this applies to one thing in human experience, and only one; and that is actual, voluntary transgression of the law; a failure in duty which could have been avoided, and which ought to have been. For this transgression sin is the proper name. For this transgression, too, we are taught the atonement was devised: "He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and by his stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray, and the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquity of us all." "If any man sin we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world."

The scriptures further represent this sin and guilt as personal, attached to the one who contracts it. The idea of blaming one man for another's sin is mentioned only to be reprehended: "What mean ye that ye use this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying, the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge? As I live, saith the Lord God, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel; behold all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine. The soul that sinneth, it shall die." "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son. The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon

him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him." All this accords with our intuitive knowledge of ill-desert or blameworthiness, that it is in no conceivable manner transferable, either by imputation or by natural descent. Our sin belongs to us, and the sin of our ancestors belongs to them. We may share in the evil consequences of the sin of others, but not in its guilt or ill-desert. Christ suffered for the sins of men, but no blame for this accumulated guilt ever attached to him in the estimation of God or man. God does indeed speak of "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation," but they are the generations of those that hate him; and he again assures us that "if a son seeth all his father's sins that he hath committed, and considereth and doeth not such like, he shall not die for the iniquity of his father; he shall surely live."

From these and many similar representations of scripture, and from our own intuitive convictions of its nature, we gather that sin, which is the transgression of the law, must be distinguished from everything which can strictly be called ignorance, and from everything which necessarily results from ignorance. Ignorance often results from sin, and sin is often occasioned by ignorance, but the two are not to be confounded. Ignorance is an evil to be remedied if possible, not to be blamed or punished. The sin which caused the ignorance is blameworthy, so is the sin which is occasioned by the ignorance. So far as the ignorance goes it sets sin aside; and sin comes in only where ignorance ends and knowledge begins. If the ignorance be total, sin is impossible. That "ignorance of the law excuses no one," is not a maxim of divine jurisprudence. "The servant that knew not his lord's will, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes." "If ye were blind ye should have no sin; but now ye say we see, therefore your sin remaineth." Paul condemns the heathen on the ground of their knowledge, implying that ignorance would excuse them. He represents himself as having obtained mercy for his own sin, because he "did it ignorantly in unbelief." His partial ignorance was

a mitigation of his guilt. So with the "sins of ignorance," which in the Old Testament are contrasted with presumptuous sins. Error, departure from the right way, with a knowledge of the right is sin; without that knowledge it is simply error, mistake, ignorance, not sin. The remedy for ignorance is knowledge; the cure of sin is repentance and forgiveness.

Sin, again, must be distinguished from any and every defect of constitution, pertaining either to the body or the soul. We cannot conceive God as blaming men for any abnormal condition of their faculties or susceptibilities coming to them by inheritance from ancestors, near or remote, or brought upon them by any force not under their control. Such derangement of constitution is misfortune, not sin; an occasion for pity, not blame. There was sin in the past where that derangement originated, not in the unfortunate inheritance of a perverted constitution. Whatever corruption of intellect or sensibility or will comes to us as the necessary or appointed effect of Adam's sin, is our misfortune, not our fault. As surely as God is good, he will look upon us with pity for this heritage of ill. He will blame us only when we fail to do the best we can with our poor constitution.

Hence, again, sin must be distinguished from any shortcoming which is a necessary result of such defect of constitution. If we have less of energy and power and fervor for the service of God by reason of our enfeebled and corrupted nature, in spite of our best endeavors, then that deficiency is not written against us as sin: "If there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to that a man hath, not according to that he hath not." That this is a principle of universal application in the government of God we know, because God is just, and all his ways are truth; and this is simple truth and justice. We may go even further, and say that if a man has injured his power by his own sin, so as to have only one talent where he had five before, if he turns to God and does works meet for repentance, using with all diligence the power that remains, he fulfils all present duty, and meets the claims of the law; for the law meets him where he stands: "Thou

shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." The sin which brought this infirmity and degradation upon him still stands, and must be forgiven — a sin of the past. But in the present he meets obligation when he uses all his powers according to God's will.

But we are asked: If a man contracts a debt, and afterwards deprives himself of the power to pay, will not the debt still stand against him? The sinner owed to God all the power he ever had; and does not God's claim stand after he has destroyed that power? We answer: The analogy is apparent, not real. The claim against the debtor is a legal, technical claim, and it stands as such even after the power is gone; but we do not blame the man as to his present state if he does all in his power to pay the debt. If he ever recovers his power to pay, we blame him if he neglects to do it. The obligation then becomes a moral as well as legal one. But God's law lays its claims upon a man just where moral obligation lies, and not a hair's breadth beyond, and sin is a failure to meet this moral obligation. But is not this letting down the law? We answer, No: not one jot or tittle has passed away. It stands forever: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart"; "and his commandments are not grievous."

But it is said we cannot trust our faculties to form judgments on such points. Then there is nothing we can trust. God in his word appeals to these faculties for his own justification: "Are not my ways equal? Are not your ways unequal?" All that we can know of righteousness in God's character or requirements must come through these same faculties, and there is no contradiction on these points between God's word and our necessary intuitive judgments.

In a similar manner we must distinguish between sin and any tendencies to sin which lie back of voluntary action. If that tendency be considered as lying in the susceptibilities and desires, then it is a part of our constitution, and can only be eradicated by suppressing the desires. It is the nature

of desire to fasten on its object, and ask for gratification. In this form desire existed in our mother Eve before she fell. She saw that the fruit was pleasant to the eyes and good for food, and a tree to be desired to make one wise. She yielded to the desire, and sinned. But the desire was not sin. All that was needed was to control it, in obedience to the will of God. Yielding to desire in opposition to duty is sin. If the desire be aggravated or overgrown by reason of the fall, still all that can be required of us is to control, according to God's will, this abnormal desire. We cannot blame the subject of it, except as under its power he falls into sin.

If the desire be an artificial or unnatural one, in the sense that it was not an element in human nature as it came from the hand of God, but is a legacy of evil from some sinning ancestor, like a hereditary love of strong drink, the same principle applies. We can only ask of the unfortunate man that he keep his desire under, and never allow it to betray him into an improper indulgence. Nay, if that desire has originated in the man's own sin, the product of a life of self-indulgence, he still meets the requirements of the law when he subjects the base passion to the control of duty, and allows it no license. We may comfort the converted inebriate with the assurance that God looks upon him with approbation, in his struggles with the passion which his life of sin has fostered. If it be said that all these perversions and corruptions must be removed before the man can enter heaven, we answer, so must his infirmities of body; but this does not prove either the one or the other to be sinful. We may leave all these things to him who said to the dying thief: "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise."

Or again, if the tendency to sin be thought to lie in a set of the will towards sin, before there has been any voluntary, responsible action, then the man must stand acquitted when he withstands that constitutional inclination of will, and acts as God requires. If he cannot resist this original set or tendency of will, then he is no longer a moral agent. This inability to obey carries with it the inability to transgress.

What belongs to our nature, original or derived, as distinguished from our voluntary action under the law, can never be a ground for moral praise or censure.

By a similar discrimination sin must be distinguished from every form of temptation. If the temptation be the instigation of Satan, the sin is his. Of course the faculties of the tempted soul must be, to a greater or less extent, occupied with the suggestions, as in the case of the Saviour's temptation; but while the vile proposals are rejected without parley, God is satisfied, and angels will come when Satan takes his leave. The same remark applies to our natural desires, appealed to and aroused by the objects on which they fasten. While clamoring for indulgence they are mere temptations. Sin begins when there is a movement to unlawful indulgence.

Nor should that inclination or tendency or facility which we call habit, in the direction of wrong-doing, be mistaken for sin. It is of the nature of temptation. It is the result of sinful action; but when the action itself is arrested, the residuum of habit, which may survive repentance, in the form of a tendency which must be constantly guarded, is not a ground of present condemnation. The condemnation pertains to the past course of sin which generated the habit.

And in general the consequences of sin, either to the sinner or to others, must be distinguished from the sin. It is true that the guilt of sin is aggravated by the consequences which may be reasonably apprehended; but, under the same circumstances of light and knowledge, the guilt must be the same whether the natural consequences follow or are providentially interrupted. The guilt of the assassin is not affected by the question whether the weapon which he uses reaches his victim or is turned aside. The guilt of refusing to love God and keep his commandments is involved in the act itself, aside from the consequences to the sinner and to the universe.

The sin of transgression of the law should never be confounded with what is vaguely called the violation of physical

law, or the laws of our being. There are principles of our constitution the observance of which tends to the preservation of life and health. In general the moral law, the law of God, requires conformity to these principles; and the sin of disregarding them lies in the violation of the law of God, the moral law, not physical law, or rather these principles of our constitution. It is not a rare occurrence that the law of duty sets aside entirely regard to physical law. Physical law would keep us nursing our own life; moral law asks us to lose it. Physical law would keep us from the fire; moral law led the ancient worthies and martyrs into it. Physical law would lead us to shun malaria and pestilence; moral law sends the gospel herald to climes where "death floats on every passing breeze, and lurks in every flower." Physical law might detain our patriot soldiers at home, out of harm's way; moral law takes them to the field of carnage, and buries their mangled forms in nameless graves. Physical law merely indicates a fact of more or less significance; moral law imposes a duty. By a strange perversion of ideas men talk of penalty for the violation of physical law. Then, is it punishment that the brave and the true encounter who love not their lives unto the death? No, these are merely hardships which lie along the path of duty, a part of the discipline of our mortal life. That only is penalty which is designed to express God's disapprobation of the deed. Penalty is the correlative of sin.

Such discriminations as these are necessary, because every just and successful presentation of God's law must carry the conscience. No progress can be made in any heart without this. If the impression be made on any mind that God's law extends at all beyond the sphere of voluntary, responsible action, to that extent the force of the law is broken. The sinner retires behind a rampart which nothing can penetrate but the solid bolt of truth. In the same way his sense of sin is relieved when the impression is conveyed that God blames him for anything that transpired in the indefinite past, before his moral agency began, or for any evil about his body or his soul which he did not originate, and which he cannot

remedy. Every such representation robs sin of its peculiar characteristic — its sinfulness, and puts it on a level with disease or natural infirmity. The deepest views of sin are those which present it in its true character as wickedness, unconstrained and inexcusable, justly condemned by every moral being, and incurring God's righteous wrath as expressed in his word: "The soul that sinneth, it shall die."

The law of God shows what duty, obedience, holiness is. Sin is a failure to render what the law requires — the transgression of the law; a refusal to love God with all the heart, and one's neighbor as himself. It may not be without profit to inquire further: What does the sinner propose to himself in refusing to love God and man? What scheme occupies his thought and purpose to the exclusion of God's righteous claim? His powers are employed; what account can he give of his activity? What work lies open to him who declines the pursuit which the law enjoins? He declines God's service; whom does he call master? The scriptures often represent the sinner as the servant of Satan. Thus the Saviour says to the Jews: "Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do." Paul referring to the former sinful life of the Ephesians, speaks of them as walking "according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience." We do not gather from these passages that worldly men have consciously chosen Satan as their leader, or have espoused his cause intentionally. Satan has a bad reputation, even with the wicked. They are no admirers of his. He is their prompter to a life of sin, as of our first parents in the garden; but it is very rare that he distinctly and avowedly proposes his service to the tempted, as to our Saviour: "All this will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me." His appeals are, in general, more skilfully adapted to the weaknesses of men.

Again, men are called the servants of sin. Paul says to the Romans: "When ye were the servants of sin ye were free from righteousness"; and it is a very natural figure to call

sinners servants of sin, as the righteous are called servants of righteousness. But we are not to gather from it that men love sin, and pursue it on its own account. Men love a worldly life in spite of its sinfulness. If it were not sinful they would like it better. Sin is in itself distasteful, offensive; and sinners pursue their course for other reasons than because it is sinful. Indeed, so strong is this instinctive disapprobation of sin, that men in general rarely march up to their evil deeds with open face and embrace them in their true character. The thief flatters himself that the world owes him a living, and he has a right to get it. The forger merely proposes to use a little of some rich man's surplus wealth, often with the half-formed purpose of returning it presently. The rebel is a hater of tyranny and a lover of liberty, even when the tyranny he hates is good government, and the liberty he craves is license. So of the thousand forms of sin. Men consent to practise them, but the sinfulness of them they do not love. They are slaves of sin, not cheerful servants.

It is a very common apprehension that sinners are servants of themselves, that they are seeking their own interests or their own good, and thus refuse to obey God. Hence sin is often represented as selfishness, or living for one's self. I do not speak of this as a representation of scripture, for I do not find it there. A single passage in the Old Testament says: "Israel is an empty vine, he bringeth forth fruit to himself." A single passage in the New Testament, giving a catalogue of the different classes of sinners that shall appear in the last days, says: "For men shall be lovers of their own selves, covetous, proud, blasphemous," etc. Perhaps one other passage should be included; "If any man will come after me let him deny himself." But selfishness, in the sense of seeking their own good, is nowhere presented as the grand characteristic of sinners. If it were claimed that the scriptures represent sinners as neglecting their own interests, and bartering their real good for what is worthless, the claim would better correspond with the fact. It requires

no proof that the sinner is not seeking his true good. He turns away "from the fountain of living waters, and hews out broken cisterns, that can hold no water." The words of wisdom are: "He that sinneth against me wrongeth his own soul. All they that hate me love death." "As righteousness tendeth to life, so he that pursueth evil pursueth it to his own death." But it will naturally be suggested that all that is intended is, that the sinner thinks he is pursuing his own good or is seeking his own happiness. But even this does not express his consciousness. What sinner does not know that the future world is vastly more important than this, and has a more important bearing on his welfare? But where do we find sinners living with reference to that future? Nay, it is rare that we find a worldly man who lives wisely, even in his own estimation, with reference to the present world. How few order their pursuits and regulate their indulgences so as to secure the greatest amount of worldly good, taking their own judgment as the standard. It is the way of sinners to sacrifice a known future good, pertaining to this world, to a present gratification, when in their own view the gratification is contemptible in the comparison. It is related of Demosthenes that when he had gone to a distant city to give a few hours to sinful pleasure, and learned the cost in money to which it would subject him, he denied himself the pleasure, and turned homeward, with the remark, that it was buying repentance too dear. Deep down in the consciousness of the sinner there is always the conviction that the course he is pursuing is an unprofitable and disastrous one, and that he shall one day look back upon it with regret. Hence sin is appropriately called folly in scripture, and sinners are called fools; not in the sense that they are totally ignorant of the better way, and therefore err; but that knowing the better course, they take the worse. As Bunyan represents it, an angel stoops over the sinner with a crown of glory, and asks him to look up and receive it. He hears the call and catches a dim reflection of the glory, but bends still to his muck-rake and the worthless offal. The folly of sin! there is nothing

like it in this world or in any other — folly that is self-conscious and self-condemned.

Not that there is not a sort of seeming good in the course which the sinner pursues. There is a dream of happiness to be secured in the object which he grasps; but he knows that he is dreaming, and that he drops the substance while he clasps a shadow. The sinner is not pursuing his own interests or his own happiness as the great end of his life; nor does he even think that he is doing it.

But it is suggested again that he is pursuing his own gratification, and that his aim or purpose is to secure the greatest amount of satisfaction possible through his susceptibilities and desires, and that this is the selfishness which constitutes sin. If this is his deliberate and chosen end he will pursue it wisely, according to the dictates of his own intelligence. For if he does not pursue it thus, then he does not pursue it as an end at all — an object which his intelligence has embraced, and which becomes the grand reason for all his action. If self-gratification is his supreme end, he will carefully compare the various sources of pleasure and deliberate upon probabilities and risks. He will defer a present gratification to a future and greater one. He will sacrifice a temporary pleasure to an enduring, permanent one. He will not by present excesses obliterate or put in peril his susceptibility of future enjoyment. He will so shape his life as to make it on the whole a life of the highest enjoyment of which he is capable. And if he has any reasonable evidence of a future state — a state which is permanent, everlasting, compared with which our present life is but the meteor's flash, he will "lay up his treasure in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal." Such a course must come from a simple pursuit of pleasure as an end, guided by intelligence.

> "Take all the pleasures of all the spheres,
> And multiply each through endless years,
> One minute of heaven is worth them all."

If the enjoyment of heaven is to the sinner's apprehension

so much more desirable in its character and so permanent, and if enjoyment, the satisfaction of his susceptibilities, is his deliberately chosen end, then he will shape all his life to the attainment of heaven — the very thing he never dreams of doing. More than this, he does not pursue the pleasures of this life with any proper judgment or discrimination. The world is full of men given up to some base passion, who know that in their own estimation, by the standard of mere worldly pleasure, they are bartering their birthright for a mess of pottage, and that in the light of mere worldly good they will "mourn at the last when their flesh and their body is consumed, and say, How have I hated instruction, and my heart despised reproof." If sin be selfishness it is some other selfishness than that of seeking one's own happiness, or even one's own pleasure, the gratification of the desires as a deliberate end.

But we must not therefore conclude that desire is not the influence that determines the sinner's action. It doubtless is desire, and nothing else, that prompts him to refuse obedience to God's law — desire operating directly as a motive, not impelling him to seek pleasure as an end, but in its blind strength fastening upon its object, and soliciting indulgence in that specific form. The drunkard drains his cup, not because he has resolved to seek pleasure, and flatters himself that the highest pleasure lies in that direction; but he has surrendered himself to that terrible passion, and it drives him on with its scorpion whip in the way of indulgence. No one knows better than himself that in that deadly draught he swallows anguish and shame and death and deep damnation, with an infinitesimal admixture of pleasure; and yet he drinks. The desire controls him, and not any choice of pleasure as an end. The example is extreme, yet it displays the principle of action in every sinner's heart. There are comparatively few in whom one consuming passion predominates over all other hope or fear or desire. The usual experience of sinners is to follow now one desire and now another, as circumstances change, or as the objects of desire present

themselves. With the mass of men under the influence of Christian civilization, the desires harmonize in general with outward decency and morality, often with the outward requirements of philanthropy and benevolence. Self-respect, the respect of others, the happiness of friends and neighbors, and the elevation of the degraded become objects of desire, and give form to the life of the sinner; and still he comes under the description given by Paul of the Ephesians in their unregenerate state: "And you hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins. ..... Among whom we all had our conversation in times past, in the lusts of the flesh, fulfiling the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature the children of wrath, even as others." And again: "They that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh; for to be carnally minded is death. For if ye live after the flesh ye shall die; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body ye shall live." In a similar manner James says: "But every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. Then, when lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin, and sin when it is finished bringeth forth death." John calls this same state of mind the love of the world, contemplating the objects of desire as well as the desire itself: "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world." All such scriptures seem to teach that the sinner is given up to the control of his desires, and that these, as one or another prevails, give form to his life; that his general state is carnal-mindedness or regard to his desires, rather than selfishness or regard to his own happiness; that his life is a sort of instinctive, impulsive, animal life, yet sinful, as mere animal life is not, because he has before him, within his reach, the proper object and end of life, to serve God and to serve his generation, and refuses to accept it.

Human responsibility, then, exists under these conditions.

On one side is our conscience, our reason, our judgment, enlightened and quickened by God's Spirit, presenting the objects which should control our activity — God and his service, man and his well-being. On the other side are the desires of the flesh and of the mind, blind to all duty, to all real interests, and only alive to the objects which excite them, using the intelligence merely as a guide to gratification. It is our prerogative to choose between these principles of action. The good man yields to conscience and to God's Spirit, and pursues true good, holding desire subordinate to conviction. He is spiritually minded. The sinner gives the rein to desire, and follows where it leads. He is carnally minded; his life presents no definite, self-consistent aim, like that of the good man. The desires themselves are conflicting, and which shall be in the ascendant depends upon constitutional organization, education, and changing circumstances. A single predominant passion makes the ambitious man, the miser, or the sensualist. A happy constitution and the culture of well-ordered society furnishes the man of outward integrity and morality, the amiable friend, the good citizen, presenting the semblance of many of the Christian graces. Yet the principle of action is the same in all — "fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind."

Sin, then, lies in this permanent state of mind, and is as constant as carnal-mindedness. It is the fountain from which flow the outward actions which we call sins; but sin, blameworthiness, is not all concentrated in these sins. The sinful state underlies all the activity, as well when the outward action is amiable and proper and right, as when it is mischievous and hateful. No phrenological manipulation, suppressing one desire and elevating another, can cure the sin. The disease lies deeper, and can only be cured by delivering the soul from the dominion of desire, and enthroning duty where passion has reigned. No mere intellectual view of the reasonableness of obedience and the unreasonableness of transgression will avail. The sinner always knows that his life is unreasonable, contemplated in the view of his pleas-

ure, his welfare, or his duty. The mystery of sin lies in its unreasonableness, not in its nature, nor in the motive which prompts it. The gospel of Christ and the forces which gather about it are the only efficient remedy: "For what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit."

If the views of sin now presented be correct, then there must always be in the human consciousness grounds and reasons upon which to justify the ways of God to man. There is no occasion to resort to any mysterious principle in the divine administration by which he distributes praise and censure, rewards and punishments. He throws himself upon the consciences of men, and permits them to ask, in all boldness: "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" The mystery of his providence lies, not in any incomprehensible principle of action by which he is governed, but in our ignorance and short-sightedness in reference to the fit means to the great ends of goodness. If it be true, as a theological writer has recently said,[1] that "the finite moral conceptions of man furnish no adequate type of the rule of God's conduct, whose ways are not as our ways, in his eternal administration over the life of man," and that this is proved by "the perennial fact in human judgment that God's moral administration of this world has always seemed to human reason less perfect in justice than the moral standard which man sets up in each age as the criterion of moral conduct," then all inquiry on such subjects is hopeless, and all justification of the ways of God to man is but a dream. How cheering to turn from all such apologies for God to his own word, where he brings forth his righteousness as the light and his judgment as the noon-day.

[1] Princeton Review, Jan. 1862, p. 19.

ARTICLE IV.

THE CLAIMS OF THEOLOGY.[1]

BY REV. J. R. HERRICK, D.D., PROFESSOR IN BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

FATHERS and brethren: The position in which I speak to-day, and your choice in placing me here, have determined beforehand my theme of discourse. It would be presumed I should speak of the Claims of Theology, and such shall be my theme; but in speaking of these claims it will be quite appropriate to have some special regard to our own times.

It is evident, however, that we cannot well appreciate the claims of theology, or wisely apply it to meet the wants of our time, till we have defined to ourselves the idea itself of theology, or what it imports or demands. The answer to this question, therefore, will first require our attention. This I apprehend we shall find to be threefold.

1. The first demand is a *personal* God, who may be apprehended as such. Evidently, if there were no personal God, or if he could not be known, we could have no theology.

Before this audience, and on such an anniversary occasion, you would hardly allow me to suggest that you need vindicating for the interest you feel in your Seminary. Those who have cherished it with sincere devotion and unwearied effort for a generation, and whose interest only increases with their years, would not tolerate the implication that I need any justification for accepting your appointment to stand with them, and in the place of my worthy predecessor, to maintain this as an Institution of sacred learning.

But surely we cannot follow far the tendency of modern thought to see that your interest and my acceptance of the chair of systematic theology in this Institution must both

[1] An Address delivered on the occasion of Professor Herrick's Inauguration as Buck Professor of Systematic Theology in Bangor Theological Seminary, Aug. 1, 1867.

alike be fully vindicated, or not at all. For, the line of distinction between a belief and a disbelief in the supernatural, between a belief and a disbelief in a personal God, is becoming every day more sharply defined. Whether truth for man lies wholly in the natural world, or in part, and quite as really, in the supernatural also; whether, in fact, we have a theology about which professors and students, ministers and churches and private Christians, need so much concern themselves; this is the question which we are to solve; and we must be definitely fixed in our beliefs, or this modern thought will fix them for us.

Or, granting your foundation to be a safe one, granting you have valid reason for your belief in the supernatural, as I thoroughly hold, I would then say, there are those who would withdraw from under you your firm support; and who, if they find this impossible, would prevent others from coming safely upon it, preferring to let them float amid the rocks of infidelity, or become wrecked on the shoals of scepticism.

Suppose the assumption at once thrust upon us — God forbid we should entertain it — that our finite minds cannot possibly reach forth to the infinite, and that, therefore, there is for us no actual, personal God, who can be the centre and life of a system of theology; what would then be left us?

Why, indeed, deny the existence of a personal God, and our professed revelation from him is not a reality, and our biblical exegesis might as well be an exposition of Newton's Principia. Our best system of theology would be only a concatenation of useless abstractions, worthy of no living age or people; we should have no distinctive church history for no life of Christianity upon earth; and worse still, no Incarnate Deity, and no Holy Ghost; and, of course, all our preaching of what we call the truth of God and the gospel of Christ would be the height of human folly; and in this case, too, our theological seminaries might better cease to be.

Nay, but let this hypothesis be true, and what would then be left to human life on earth? What to the individual soul? Every unlettered Christian would feel himself robbed thus

of his dearest treasure; nay, the unconscious longings of every finite spirit, when rightly interpreted, declare that on this supposition, that is not left which belongs to it, and which it may claim as a birthright possession.

Do you ask, "Why speak thus?" I answer, for no other reason than to set in bolder relief the positive truth of God.

Certainly we cannot create God out of our finite reason, as it is said Fichte once proposed to do. And yet starting from this, we ought to find him; for we have a consciousness of God, however in many cases it may be held in unrighteousness and abused.

If, as Paul affirms, God may be known by the things made, surely the one thing of all others which is the strongest proof, is this creature man, endowed with reason and conscience, — with reason that he may think of the Creator and his works; with conscience, that he may feel himself bound as a finite person to obey the Infinite Father.

To any atheist who would be honest, the question might well be put: "What mean these moral feelings and intuitions if they have no corresponding object?" It is true, and no one ought to be ignorant of it, that the moral set the intellectual powers in motion, and prompt their search after God, rather than the reverse. It is in our moral convictions and intuitive perceptions of God that all our inquiries in respect to him have their rise. Our sense of responsibility more than that of dependence points towards him. For this responsibility is grounded in free-agency and finite personality, and hence declares our relation to a free personality, infinite and uncreated, also, our reason adds. Hence, likewise, God cannot be a pantheistic "Welt-Geist," or soul of the world; but a first-cause, independent of his works, while creating them by his own spiritual activity.

Our interest thus awakened, we may press our inquiries through the outward works of the Creator, and find profit by so doing, especially if we interpret his works by his word; for, as has been well said, the Bible alone, with the help of one's own conscience, is sufficient proof of being divine. I

say we do thus come to realize more and more distinctly, that he with whom we have to do is a spirit, self-sustained, needing nothing from without, yet able to put forth from himself laws, and to create a universe, which is still his in all the parts thereof, everywhere upheld and controlled by him, and for his own ends. Thus is a personal God, knowable and known, the first demand of a true theology.

2. But if there is a personal God, and if he has created a universe of finite beings, then he, *as such*, must be the centre of the whole system.

The more we study the world of nature, the more thoroughly convinced we become that what of life it possesses is due on the one hand to its pervasive laws, and on the other, that this life and these laws are dependent upon, as they were ordained by, God. As we advance from the material, we find, indeed, laws of life in the vegetable and animal kingdoms; but there is one fact incontrovertable, which, related, as it is, like a higher law, to all the laws of the created universe, material and animal, ought to be accepted as undoubted proof of their subordination and dependence. I mean this: that they are limited to their own sphere. For example, simple attraction can draw bodies together, but it needs another law to produce crystalization; nor can crystalization beget chemical combination, electricity, or magnetism. And it is not in the power of all these agencies combined to originate life; nor in the sphere of life can the vegetable pass into the animal; still less can all the forms of animal life beget a rational soul; spiritual life is distinct, separated, as by the impassable gulf, from all below it, having its own sphere and its own laws.

Nor is this law of limitation of which I speak a self-imposed one. On the other hand, if we are to credit the naturalists, it would seem the lower laws have been trying hard ever since the world was made, and a long time before, to do the work of the higher, and to prove them unnecessary, or at least of the same kind with themselves.

But unfortunately, with the help of all their advocates,

every attempt has proved a failure; in spite of the utmost zeal of these midwives, every child has been still-born; and it remains true, as it was in the beginning, and ever shall be, that each new species, each kind differing from the preceding, came into being by a direct fiat of the Almighty, by a word of the personal Jehovah, who is omnific creativeness, limited in his products by nothing out of himself, only by his own good pleasure.

But before the work of his hand appeared, in which its formative law inheres, was this law then self-sustained? Where was it, but in the mind of the all-wise Creator, possible then, to be sure, but to become actual only according to his will, but by no means to be independent of him.

In ourselves we unite the material and spiritual, the natural and supernatural, and are permitted to verify in experience both higher and lower laws; but those of animal life and those of spiritual life, the mental and moral laws of which we are conscious, are all God's as to source and authority.

Indeed, he ordained the laws of man upon the earth in all his manifold relations; nor has he let them go out of his hand, so that now the nations and the race are independent of him, being a law unto themselves. By no means. Tell me, rather, what is human history if we do not rise high enough in our conceptions to find God's power and wisdom displayed in the different nations, and through the successive ages; showing some phase of his wise design, preparing for, or working out, some part of his majestic plan, the realization of which he is causing to move forward, however unconscious of it sin-blinded mortals may be; while they nevertheless weave the woof into those invisible threads held in the hand of him who worketh all in all. Why, surely God must be the great centre of all our knowing. For all we can know is either about the Maker or the things made; and the latter everywhere point us up to the one original fountain of all being.

But think again: Can truth in its highest form, truth as ultimate, be separated from a personality? A personal God

must, of necessity, be the centre of all truth that does not die out in abstractions and dead forms.

But more of the system, since we are seeking a theology which is the science of God. May we have here an order, a system, or not? What is it, let us ask, but the adjustment of sun, planets, and satellites, and their orderly and harmonious movements among and around each other, that gives occasion for speaking of the solar system? And what are our separate sciences but an understanding of the laws which pervade and limit the several fields or spheres of actual knowledge? And whence comes the order of these parts, if not from a higher order; if not from their belonging to the universal system of which God is the author?

The fact, too, is suggestive, that when we know thoroughly one of the so-called sciences, we presume that others will in like manner be pervaded by law and order. Strange indeed, then, beyond measure strange, if God's moral universe, highest, because spiritual, should be found to be lawless! No; it cannot be. Though the central idea, its unifying principle, may lie above us and not be clearly discerned by our weak vision, nevertheless, if we could attain to it, we should find it perfect order and giving harmony to all. Thus astronomers, who suppose our system and other like suns and systems to have a motion among themselves, and around some far-off centre, all having yet another centre, are sure, if it be so, that the whole must still be controlled by the law of unbroken harmony.

And what must that theology be which has for its centre, not some pantheistic abstraction, no more satisfactory, as an ultimate, than the huge tortoise-shell of the heathen cosmology, but an independent and personal — independent, because personal — Jehovah! If he, the All-wise is perfect order, let us banish forever from our minds the false notion that no system of theology is possible. This system, with the personal God at its centre, is the second requisite.

3. In a system of revealed truth Jesus Christ must be the actual and personal centre. In idea, no doubt, a true theol-

ogy begins with God. And yet, in order to attain it, we may need to go forth from our earthly habitation, our finite consciousness, and philosophize before we theologize. So in astronomy, there is a sense in which we must be geocentric before we can be heliocentric; and in order that we may be, we must first find an exact measure on the earth. But this is only that we may safely transfer ourselves to the astronomical heavens, and verify all our estimates from the true point of view there. Indeed, if "natural theology" does not raise us so far it is of no value. But we are most concerned with a system of revealed truth; and in this the person of Christ is central. It is not without reason that those who reject revelation attack it at this point. It is not without reason that believers in revelation concentrate their interest in Jesus of Nazareth; for he is the touchstone of all theology. Reject him as divine, and you have no theology; accept him as divine, and you find manifest in him all that can be known of God. It is thus, too, obviously, that the Christian system is sharply distinguished from all others.

A personal Christ must be our actual centre: First, because he is the divine Revealer; and this, not like some Mercury, who can only declare what is taught him, but rather as being himself the revelation. And the Logos of the New Testament and the Jehovah of the Old being one and the same, what if from the beginning it was necessary that he, and he alone, should be the Revealer? Be this as it may, we do know that in these last days God has spoken to us by his Son, and the pregnant words, "Hear ye him," are evermore spoken for the head as well as for the heart of men.

Again, Christ as the unifier of the system marred by sin, must be our centre. We have here a most fearfully disturbing element to deal with; and unless taught by him who can bring order out of chaos, we shall find no solution of the deep, dark problem of sin. We need to know, as we can know only when instructed by the Redeemer of men, how God regards sin, whether simply as a foible, an infirmity, as an excusable turning from the mark, as a necessary step to

something higher, or as a culpable breach of the divine order, — actual guilt; and that we may know, not merely how he regards it, but what he does with it and on account of it as existing in rational creatures. And the light which must guide us is the light of the cross; the law which must reconstruct the discordant system is the law of redemption in Christ Jesus.

And, in the third place, he must be the centre, since he alone can bring us into harmony with the divine order, and thus fit us to see the truth as it is. Christ is the life and the light both in one person, and is able to raise us from a death of sin to a life of righteousness, while he scatters our moral darkness, or by doing it to scatter our darkness. It is the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus that makes free from the law of sin and death; and how essential this freedom is that we may appreciate the truth of God. The more we strive, through the grace imparted, to be one with the highest law which God has ordained for us, the more do we see the Father revealed in the face of his divine Son.

But shall we, let me now ask, when we speak of the remedial system, shall we make the remedy everything, and the system nothing? Because *in* the mystery of redemption are we *out* of the sphere of law and order? I answer in the emphatic μὴ γένοιτο, God forbid, of the apostle Paul, whose epistles, in form as well as matter, answer in the negative. In very deed is not redemption God's great work for all time? And can it be any more separated from his other works than from himself? How much more consistent to say that in its height and depth and breadth and length, — including probation, including providence, including the incarnation and the divine atonement, including the drawing of the Father and the personal agency of the Spirit, — who can tell just how much it does include, or how much it does not include? I say in all this mighty, however mysterious, work of the Triune Deity and of the Incarnate Son, there must be harmony of parts. And, though we do need to be taught of God by a revelation from heaven; yet having this revelation, it remains for

us to study reverently, but diligently, the oracles of divine truth, that in them we may find our materials, and gain therefrom what help we can in arranging the great facts of human sin and divine redemption, and the several doctrines connected with them, into an orderly and complete system of revealed truth, and hence into a system that shall be one with all truth. We shall thus approximate, if we do not fully realize, the conception of the Moravian poet:

> "I'm apt to think the man
> That could surround the sum of things, and spy
> The heart of God and secrets of his empire,
> Would speak but love. With him the bright result
> Would change the hue of intermediate scenes,
> And make *one* thing of all theology."

If now from this view of what theology is, we ask in regard to its claims, which are of a more general and universal character, to express the whole in fewest words, we find these to be twofold, though not separable, resulting first from its comprehensiveness, and secondly from its law of life which inheres in our personal and divine Redeemer; or rather, in its all-comprehending law of life.

Says another: "Theology, being the science of God, is the ocean which contains and embraces all other sciences, as God is the ocean in which all things are contained." [1] All-comprehending, let us say, first, in giving to each its proper place and relative importance; and secondly, in unifying all possible knowledge in the system which has for its centre a personal Jehovah.

But the total elevating and educating influence of theology it were not possible to declare, not even to conceive, it so pervades literature, art, science, politics, affects man in so many ways, — as an individual, in domestic life, in social life, in civil life, — everywhere and in all respects; and for this reason, primarily, because through it the wisdom of God is let down upon our finite minds to enlighten and guide them, and which, in proportion as we are willing to be enlightened

[1] Donso Cortes, as quoted in Brownson's Catholic World.

and guided by it, makes us as much wiser as God's thoughts are broader, higher, better than ours. Theology, by being what it is, is comprehensive and thorough.

But again, let us not doubt that by being what it is it does more for man through its moral than through its intellectual influence. It does not put knowing before being, but the reverse. It proposes moral ends, even the highest, placing the ultimate, not below, but above; not in things made, but in the Maker; not in man but in God; teaching us that we should live for others, and make God's will, as the highest reason, our supreme law. And what a mighty influence has thus been, and is to be, wrought among men.

I know it may be said that this moral renovation can be accomplished without a system of theology; that Christianity as a religion more than as a theology strictly, transforms the world, elevates, inspires high aims, sets forth a perfect standard, and not only promises much, but gives strength to attain the high end proposed.

No doubt there is force in the distinction. But if Christianity is a life, it is a law of life at the same time; and the better we understand the law the more wisely can we deal with the life. The religion of Jesus Christ is not freedom from law, but freedom in law. To be sure, it is most essential we keep in mind that we have to deal with spiritual truth; hence, our system must not degenerate into empty forms, but remain so in harmony with its living centre as to be a true expression of the highest life. Our human imperfection may fall short of this ideal, and yet we must strive for it, that we may hold fast the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus. Observe, moreover, that a true religion implies a genuine theology; and that Christianity in the world has ever been striving to find a rational basis, to show itself in harmony with reason.

There are historic facts also which are suggestive. For instance, England's greatest men — Milton, Bacon, Shakespeare, and the rest — were produced in what was pre-eminently her theological age. Then poets, statesmen, and

philosophers were theologians, and ministers were nothing without a "body of divinity" in their heads and in their sermons. Take from its literature its theological element, which first helped to mould these men, and which they then helped to develop, and the "Elizabethan age" would sink to a level with other ages.

What, again, would have been the permanent influence of the Reformation had it left no system of theology? Or shall we say that Calvin and his "Institutes" proved as necessary as Luther and his German Bible? And what does it mean that in the very time of the upheaval the bold Reformer needed Melanchthon with his "Loci communes" by his side, if not to fix thereby what of doctrine had been reclaimed through the influence of his preaching and that newly translated Bible?

And is it not likewise in the wider sense true that the generations perpetuate their influence through succeeding ages mainly by systems of thought? False religions and philosophies hope to live on from age to age only by the help of some system, like that of Mohammed or Confucius. The Platonic and Aristotelian age continues to influence the minds of men almost wholly through the systematic thought of the masters. It was thus that Hobbes and Hume, in their way, got to themselves a name. And our modern Positivists hope to extend their influence and usher in the new dispensation, only by making as perfect as possible their nature-system. And does the analogy lose its force in theology? Surely, living, earnest preaching is needed to awaken and direct the religious life of a period. Chrysostoms and Luthers and Whitefields are greatly needed to quicken and intensify the religious life of the church. But, for the most part, the best preachers have been well trained in a system of theology. There is no better popular definition of rhetoric than Lyman Beecher's, "Logic set on fire." The most effective eloquence must repose on philosophy and systematic thought; of this fact Burke and Webster are good illustrations.

Nor can it be doubted that much awakened life dies out because not fixed by a right perception of its spiritual laws. And I think it may be justly affirmed that what is gained to the church as her heritage for after ages from this awakened life, making it one and continuous, is largely due to her Augustines and Anselms and Calvins and Howes and Owens, who give systematic data and outward form to the inward and spiritual life of Christianity.

But to bring our subject nearer the form and pressure of the times; have we now special need of a true and pervasive theology?

To gain an answer to this question, let us again refer to the strong tendency of the present age to ignore the supernatural. Pantheists, infidels, and positivists are agreed in doing it. Scientific and literary men — not all of them, for the Hugh Millers, Pye Smiths, Hitchcocks, Sillimans, and Danas are noble exceptions; but some (and we could wish their number less), not only in Germany and France, but also in the two most Christian countries on earth, join them in it. And to what is the rationalizing church-party in England tending, if not to the same result? These men, if they do not directly affirm it, imply and teach that nature is all, and that there is no supernatural world. And yet, who so much as they, claim to think in a connected, self-consistent, and complete system, which includes — to borrow Herbert Spencer's expression — the entire "rational curriculum" of possible knowledge? Who so much as they, boast of having found, each in his own way, the Eureka of all human desire? Is it not then presumable that when they make their thrusts at theology, the basis of true religion, it is with intent to have the superstructure fall to the earth? Why, to them religion is superstition, and the sooner it vanishes the better; while theology, belonging to the "dark ages," either has already gone, or ought at once to go, into desuetude. Where, in one of their systems, by the side of it, or in any way attached to it, can place be found for a theology that is such indeed?

Is the question as to absolute truth? Human reason is the

judge that must end the strife, if any such end is possible. Is it as to inspiration? Homer and Milton, Plato and Newton, were inspired quite as much as Isaiah, Paul, or John, or even Jesus Christ. Although the later wise men, in coming nearer the central light of pure reason, can, in this respect, claim superiority to them all. If the question be of laws, they are written in the volume of nature; and it is of course easy for positive science to declare them all. Would you most thoroughly educate the individual — and what but to be educated does he need? — then set him to the study of nature that he may understand what she is; or if you would elevate the race, then correct your principles of civilization, — and the manipulations of Buckle, Spencer, and Draper, will greatly aid in this, — and so corrected, apply this mighty power of civilization to meet the demands of an advancing age.

Now let it be thoroughly understood that we do not at all object to the study, the thorough study, of nature. What we oppose, and ought to oppose with all the interest we can feel in a divine religion, is the determination to shut man up to this lower sphere, and to give him no range beyond or above it.

And these theories — which we must never forget are intended to be practical, and to bear directly on the great problem for all time of human existence and human weal — these theories, I say, are to a large extent pervading the popular mind, and taking in it the place of the saving truth of a supernatural religion.

If you ask, "How is this leaven being infused?" I answer, It is not by directly denying revelation; but by saying very little about it; not by affirming that the Bible is not worthy of being believed and taken as an infallible standard, but by making the laws of nature supreme, and demanding that they, and not God's law, shall be our practical as well as intellectual guide; not by openly advocating Pantheism, but rather a reverence for the mystery and science of nature; not by omitting to mention God and religion, but by using these and other sacred terms in a new sense, of the real import of which the uninitiated are little aware; nor yet is it by declaring

that there is no need of the grace of God and a higher life begotten by God's Spirit to perfect and save humanity, but by insisting upon the necessity of a rational nature-development, with the implication that this is all-sufficient.[1]

Now we know that every device for the race or the individual which leaves no room for man's relation to a personal God, and no possibility for revelation and the grace of God to reach him, will and must in the end prove a failure. However attractive and whatever its application, a mere system of naturalism cannot, while disregarding the world to come, make man perfect even for this world. All theories of reform and salvation devised by men deceive only to destroy.

And what, with emphasis it should be asked, what shall save us from this powerful current of systematic error, whose practical and moral effects are evil, but a system of divine truth, whose practical effects are only good?

If we would successfully withstand the schemes of theology and scepticism that teach us to disregard a direct revelation from the Father of Spirits, we must vigorously oppose to all gospels ordained by men a system that has in it a living God, a living Christ, and a quickening Spirit. We must set forth in bold relief a theology that comes down from God out of heaven, and is able to draw men up there, as well as having a light to point the way, and not one that springs from human nothingness, not able to remove the sinner's guilt or teach him how he may become God-like.

And have we such a gospel, such a theology, for our time? Thank God we have one which, when faithfully applied, will humble man's pride and self-glory, by showing that the foolishness of God in the revelation of his Son is wiser than all the philosophies of men; and that the weakness of God, through his supernatural grace, is stronger to raise and hold up the fallen and earth-prone sons of Adam than all human machinery and combinations of machinery ever devised and applied to effect this, though aided by every form of modern science and civilization.

[1] See the Author's Critique of Herbert Spencer on Education, in Presbyterian and Theological Review for October 1863.

And let us know this, that as we are controlled in practical life by our opinions, and as speculative opinions become the more powerful as they assume the popular form and pervade the masses, so, if possible, we are to pre-occupy the minds of all with the truth, with God's truth; and if this be not possible, if we find false leaven infused and already working, we have then no other antidote against prevailing error than this same truth — the truth of him who is over all in the spiritual and in the natural world; besides which we need no other.

Believe me, my friends, — and here I pass to one application of our subject, — the bane of our time is not, as some carping critics would have us think, an excess of theology, but the want of it. We need surely a vital godliness; but this, in order to be healthful and vigorous, must be the outgrowth of a sound theology, of one that begins with and draws its power from a living Jehovah. All would say, we want a religion grounded in principle; but what is this after all, but to have a theology that we can everywhere trust, and that can be known, the essential features of which may be taught to our youth and children?

We need more of theology in private life for the individual. We need more of it in domestic life for the family. We need more of it in the business world to revise and control the laws of trade and to improve our political economy. Our social life needs curbing as well as first purifying by its influence. Our statesmanship needs elevating by its principles, and our politics need the scourge which the Lord of the temple has the right to use, and then to be re-adjusted by that morality which has its sanction in him who rules among the nations. Our history for the last four years shows most sadly that our civil life needs a religion grounded in a Christian theology and conformed to it.

If religion is the bond that holds all by a divine idea to the one common Father, why should not all understand this divine idea? If Christianity is to pervade the whole of life on earth, not less than the blood these earthly bodies, why should not the laws of this vital circulation be known? Nay,

should we not suspect that they who would keep us ignorant of them, would willingly inject poison into our main artery? Is there no fear, that they who would have us remain ignorant of this most sacred law of our being would do it, to have us join them in treason and rebellion against the King immortal and invisible?

Among Protestants the time is past, or ought to have been, long ago, when we should be afraid to let the truth and the common mind come in closest contact with each other. We believe the want of this is the reason why Rome still holds two hundred millions of men in spiritual bondage. And how do we hope to convert the world but by having men embrace the principles of God's truth, in which a transforming religion may be rooted and grown?

Why, even those who raise an outcry against theology and creeds, would if possible, as has been said, have the masses understand all the laws of this lower world — of nature. Why not then, if there is a higher world, a supernatural, as we fully believe, why not try to understand, and have all understand, the science of sciences — the laws of God and his moral government, which connect us so vitally with this invisible but real world? What churches to-day are most reliable, most effective for good in the community and the nation, and most abundant in missionary efforts to evangelize the heathen? And what Christians are most stable amid the eddies of infidelity, most self-denying in a luxurious age, and most wisely active for the cause of Christ, while so many schemes of reform are propounded? The very suggestive answer is: They are those churches and those individuals whose religion is thoroughly rooted in the principles of Christianity. History, in fact, declares the same to be true in every age.

And was there ever greater reason than now why every one, older or younger, should know what he believes, and why he believes it, that he may not be entangled in the subtle snares of a plausible, wide-spread scepticism? And yet I fear we do not sow seeds of truth enough and thick enough

to choke down the seeds of error now so thickly sown; that we have not enough of theology to keep out neology and infidelity.

I pass to a further application of the subject before us. If the masses need it, how much more do their leaders and teachers need a profound and comprehensive theology!

I know we should have a theology that may be practical and affect the life; but has not one of our faults as ministers been to allow ourselves to be too much influenced by the popular notion of the practical, as if it meant only the outside life of men, and nothing more; while, in fact, religion has to do with the invisible above us, and with our inner and spiritual life; and yet is there anything practical in so wide a sense as this? Those who teach error take advantage of our folly in this respect, proposing to satisfy a deeper than the merely superficial want; not by any means that they really can do it, while the deep things of God that we claim to handle can satisfy man's deepest want. And we are not to lose sight of the fact that the great need — not the popular demand, till this is in the right way developed — but the need of our time is a profound as well as practical, or more strictly speaking, a profoundly practical theology. Milton sings:

> "How charming is divine philosophy;
> Not harsh and crabbèd as dull fools suppose,
> But musical as is Apollo's lute,
> And a perpetual feast of nectareal sweets,
> Where no crude surfeit reigns."

We, leaving out the philosophy, try then to satisfy ourselves with the poetry, which with us has, after all, very little of the divine in it.

Now if the great battle of the church is preparing, and is to be fought with the manifold forms of infidelity, the church must be prepared to meet it. But how shall she be prepared, if not through her ministers, at once her teachers and leaders? They must qualify for captains and colonels and generals in the army, and should know the enemy's battle-ground and mode of attack. They must not only be willing to march

with their forces to "the front," but know how to do it wisely; while they ought to, and can, if wisely bold, do it in full confidence of success, since all the divisions and subdivisions of the foe are southern rebels and traitors against a just cause, and weak by being in the wrong.

Our ministers need to appreciate and so be prepared to meet the subtle but manifold and growing infidel tendency of our times, whether it most appears on the continent of Europe, in England, or in the United States, — for its influence is not confined to nation or continent, — be prepared to meet it with a full and living theology, which, like Moses's rod, shall swallow up all the rods of the magicians. In order to this they must have more than separate truths and their appropriate proof texts. To be sure, the parts of the system are to be known, and the sword of the Spirit in the hands of Christ's ambassadors must be kept keen and bright, and be well applied in the very words of him out of whose mouth it proceeds. But the whole system of divine truth, well-adjusted, will be needed for the modern style of offensive assault which the enemy is choosing to adopt.

We should be aware of this also, that the dangerous errors of the present time root themselves in a false philosophy before they appear as an infidel theology. There is much in the saying of Sir William Hamilton: "We have to encounter no difficulty in theology which has not already appeared in philosophy." If this be so, shall we not say that the coming ministry need to unite a true philosophy with a true theology; the first to give method, the second furnishing the matter revealed by God which must fill the system and unify the method? Our work as ministers is indeed twofold; first, to know the truth ourselves, and this in opposition to error; and secondly, so to use it as to keep our people from error and in the truth.

We know that Christianity cannot prove a failure, but will accomplish its divinely appointed work on earth. But shall we allow this assurance to be the occasion of carelessness in regard to the success of our cause? Should it not rather,

while an interest of such magnitude is committed to us, inspire us with greater courage and an intelligent purpose to gain the victory in behalf of our Emmanuel?

Very suggestive are the words of Guizot, uttered in Paris in 1864: "The assault on the bases of the Christian faith is made everywhere, in Germany, in Switzerland, in Holland, in England, in France," and he might have added in America. "People say they are not afraid; neither am I, provided that the defense answer to the attack; provided that believers remain not inert and indolent in the presence of unbelievers who are ardent and active. I have full confidence in the Christian cause; but men are the instruments of God. It was through the faith and labor of the first Christians that God founded the Christian religion; it is by the faith and labor of Christians now that that religion should be defended. We have before us a great crisis and a great work, greater, indeed, than we can appreciate."

Let, then, the young men, our future ministry, look well to their preparation for the work which the Master is preparing for them, and into which they must soon enter. It is evident they cannot know the truth of God without being thoroughly in sympathy with Christ. To know divine things, as Pascal says, we must love them. To meet their responsibility, they need not less, but more, of the transforming, all-inspiring life of Christ. But having this, they must seek to know the law of Christianity also. Then, with full confidence in a supernatural religion, a divine gospel, and a Christian theology, they need not fear the foe, however bold and daring he may become; for they shall know how to meet him in every form, in every change of base or change of front.

If, then, we surely have a Christianity, we have a distinctive church history; let us vindicate it as such, and be instructed by it. If we have a Bible, the inspired word of God, in which this Christianity is revealed as the light and life of men, let us have for it the best interpreters. If we have a theology, let us put it into a system that shall agree with man's moral constitution, God's character, and his revealed

word. If we have a gospel to preach, let us do what we can to fit young men for their high duties. And for this end and the attainment of this desirable object, let our seminaries of sacred learning still stand; and let the instruction which they give be adapted to the wants of our times, and of those who must bear so important a part in moulding the next generation, and in giving character to the church of the coming age.

And let those who have consecrated their best energies as our instructors in the things of God be accounted worthy of double honor; and when after their long and successful day of toil they fall asleep, may their sky, and that of the church whose interests they have served, be cloudless, and irradiated by the beams of divine love.

Finally, — if I may be pardoned for a word more personal to myself, — I am well aware that to the double responsibility of the minister, there is added on the part of the theological professor that of "teaching the teachers." And if, to use the apostle's expression, "I magnify mine office," I do at the same time, and by doing it, magnify my responsibility in attempting to fill it. Nor yet should this magnifying be for the office sake or his who fills it, but for the truth's sake, which in itself and in its bearings is an endless study, and in which we must all alike be ever learners, with the consciousness that the bounds are not reached, and cannot be reached till we see as we are seen and know as we are known.

With earnest, devout study, and a steady purpose applied on my part to this congenial but arduous task, I shall need, as I ask, your forbearance, your sympathies, and, above all, your prayers; that in attempting to teach divine truth, the enlightening Spirit, who knows all the laws of life and of a life-giving theology, may instruct me; that by him I may be guided and assisted in the responsible work to which, through you, and in the providence of God, I am now called.

ARTICLE V.

THE EGYPTIAN DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE.

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., NEW YORK.

According to Herodotus "the Egyptians were the first who maintained the doctrine that the soul of man is immortal."[1] They were also the only people of antiquity who approximated the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body, a belief which was beautifully symbolized by a bird resting on the bosom of the mummy-case — the soul, the true psyche, returning from long wanderings to occupy again the body which had been so scrupulously preserved.[2] "Considerable portions of the funereal ritual referred to the preservation of the body, and especially of the heart. That the body should not waste or decay was an object of great solicitude; and for this purpose various bandlets and amulets, prepared with certain magical preparations, and sanctified with certain spells or prayers, or even offerings and small sacrifices, were distributed over various parts of the human form or mummy. In some mysterious manner the immortality of the body was deemed as important as the passage of the soul, and at a later period the growth or natural reparation of the body was invoked as earnestly as the life or passage of the soul to the upper regions."[3]

Both these doctrines, that of the immortality of the soul and that of the resurrection of the body, or the rehabilitation of the soul with its proper body, must be distinguished from the transmigration of the soul through inferior animal forms, which the Egyptians regarded either as a punitive degradation or a purgatorial discipline in reserve for the wicked after

[1] Herodotus, ii. 123.

[2] Some fine examples of this are to be seen upon the sarcophagi in the Berlin Museum.

[3] Dr. Samuel Birch in Bunsen's Egypt's Place in Universal History, Vol. v. p. 135.

death, "the number and duration of these transmigrations, and the kind of animals through which they passed, depending on the extent of their impieties, and the consequent necessity of a greater or less degree of purification."[1]

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and to some extent also that of the resuscitation of the body, was based upon the legend of Osiris, which lay at the foundation of the Egyptian mythology.[2] This is one of the most complete of the religious myths of antiquity, and its exquisite pathos suggests the notion that much of the old nature-worship, which we regard as a sign of spiritual degradation, may have sprung from a poetic sympathy with nature as symbolizing the highest spiritual ideas. In other words, in this as in later modes of symbolic worship, the spiritual conception preceded the material form, which last, however, by degrees obscured the image it was intended to present.

After Osiris had ruled benignantly over Egypt for many years, and had given laws and customs to her people, he was slain by the evil Typhon, with the help of his seventy-two confederates, was enclosed in a mummy-case and thrown into the Nile. With sorrowing heart Isis sought the corpse of her brother and spouse Osiris, till she found it at Byblos on the coast of Phenicia, where the waves had tossed it. From here she carried it back again to Egypt, and buried it herself. Meanwhile Horus, their common son, had grown up, who slew Typhon, and so avenged his father Osiris; he however was not dead, but had only descended to the under-world to establish his dominion over that, and at the same time in his son Horus, as the young prince of the living, he revived to a new life and renewed dominion.

Such, in brief, is the legend of Osiris, as given by Diodorus and Plutarch. The mention of Phenicia marks the early

[1] Wilkinson, Ancient Egyptians, Vol. v. p. 317.

[2] For a full discussion of the place of Osiris in the Egyptian Pantheon see Bunsen, Egypt's Place, Vol. i. pp. 423–438. Lepsius, Ueber den Ersten Aegyptischen Götterkreis; Jablonski, Pantheon Aegyptiorum, p. 122; Plutarch de Isid. et Osir.; Schwenck, Die Mythologie der Aegypter, p. 222.

connection of Egypt with that country, and at once recalls the myth of Venus and Adonis, whose seat was in Mount Lebanon, near the source of the river of Byblus. In the Phenician legend Adonis represented the sun, as "the source of life to the physical world," whose fructifying power was destroyed by the sharp blast of winter, the "boar" of the forest.[1] After the summer solstice, Venus with her maidens bewailed the departure of her life,

> "While smooth Adonis from his native rock,
> Ran purple to the sea, supposed with blood
> Of Thammuz, yearly wounded."[2]

On the day of mourning the image of the god was buried; but on the morrow he re-appeared, and his image was disinterred and paraded with a frenzy of rejoicing. This was a type of Isis and Osiris.

The Egyptian myth was a poetic and spiritual rendering of the yearly phenomena of the Nile. *Osiris* was the fructifying river, *Isis* the earth, his fruit-bearing spouse. *Typhon*[3] was the god of the salt sea and of the parched desert, the "all-powerful destroyer and waster"; Plutarch likens him to chaos, the type of all disorder and misrule, and the source of all evil powers and pernicious things; he was the demon of drought and barrenness. *Horus* is the sun, appearing in the vernal equinox, heralding the rise of the Nile. When the scorching wind of the Libyan desert parches the land, and the flood of the Nile slackens, then is Osiris killed by Typhon, and bound up in a mummy-case. The earth, Isis, mourning seeks him, sighing for the embraces of her spouse; but the dreaded Typhon with his followers rules — the god of drought and calamity — and the land mourns over the death of Osiris. But when, after seventy-two days of fierce heat, about the middle of June, the bed of the stream fills up and the Nile overflows its banks, then Osiris is risen again;

[1] Kenrick, Phoenicia, pp. 310; Movers, Die Phönizier, Vol. i. p. 210.

[2] Milton, Paradise Lost, B. i. l. 455.

[3] Typhon or Set was the devil of the old Egyptian mythology, a powerful and malignant spirit, who from the first contested the supremacy of the good.

the young Horus, the new blessing of the year, has vanquished the god of drought and unfruitfulness.

Another rendering of the legend makes Osiris the inundation, Isis the land fertilized by the rising waters, Typhon the sea that swallows up the Nile, Horus the principle of moisture, or the cloud-making vapors which reproduce the inundation. Plutarch, who gives in full the legend and its various interpretations, says wisely: "Taking a proper view of these matters, we must neither look upon water, nor the sun, nor the earth, nor the heavens simply, as Osiris and Isis; nor must we by Typhon understand either fire, or drought, or the sea; but, in general, whatever in these bodies is irregular and disorderly, or whatever is bad, is to be attributed to Typhon; as, on the contrary, whatever is good and salutary is the operation of Isis and the image of Osiris."[1]

In brief, the death of Osiris and his return to life represent the yearly dying and reviving of the powers of nature, under the peculiar conditions of the Nile valley. It is easy to see how to reflective and poetic minds that ever-marvellous phenomenon of nature upon which the life of the land depended, would suggest a spiritual analogy of the suspension of vital powers by the withdrawal of the soul from the body; that this was not a dying but only a disappearing for a season, an apparent succumbing to an evil destiny, to be followed in the hereafter by a reunion of soul and body in a young and immortal life.[2] That such was the origin of the belief of the Egyptians in the immortality of the soul and the resurrection

[1] Plutarch de Isid. s. 64.

[2] Our Christian hymnology of the nineteenth century does not disdain a like argument, though from much feebler analogies. Thus Dwight:

"Shall spring the faded world revive?
Shall waning moons their light return?
Again shall setting suns ascend,
And the lost day anew be born?

"Shall life revisit dying worms?
And spread the joyful insect's wing?
And oh, shall man awake no more,
To see thy face, thy name to sing?"

of the body, is rendered probable by the fact that in the funereal ritual the departed soul in its wanderings through the under-world is called the son of Osiris, and uses the magic of his name as an incantation at the gates of light. Thus in the sublime apostrophe at the door of the West, the way of the setting sun. "O soul, greatest of things created! ..... He passes from the gate; he sees his father Osiris; he makes a way in the darkness to his father Osiris; he is his beloved; he has come to see his father Osiris; he has pierced the heart of Set [or Typhon] to do the things of his father Osiris; he has opened all the paths on heaven and earth; he is the son beloved of his father; he has come from the mummy, a prepared spirit. O gods and goddesses, give way!"[1] And in a later chapter the deceased himself takes up this strain.[2] He is represented in the ritual by a vignette of a man walking with a staff; and as he follows the sun through the gateway of the West he challenges for himself an unmolested passage, as the child of Osiris. "I have made my way through the darkness to my father Osiris. I am his beloved; I have come to see my father Osiris. I stab the heart of Set. I do the things of my father Osiris. I have opened every door in heaven and earth. I am his beloved son. I have come from the dead an instructed spirit. O every god and goddess, I have come along!"

Sometimes by a bold personification the deceased identifies himself with Osiris, takes his name, undergoes his conflicts, shares his victories, attains to his resurrection, and is finally crowned with his glory. "I am the inundation. Rising from the great water is my name. ..... I have come out as a spirit. I am the Osiris. I behold the forms of men forever."[3] It is difficult in certain phrases to determine whether the god Osiris is introduced as speaking through the words which the ritual puts into the mouth of the deceased, or the deceased is conceived of as transformed for the time into the divinity. "Two antagonistic beings appear throughout the

[1] The Funereal Ritual, Cap. ix., Dr. Birch's translation.
[2] Cap. lxxiii. Ibid. [3] Cap. lxiv.

ritual. Osiris and his triad, the supporters and prototype of the good or justified; and Set and his devils or conspirators, the evil principle, always endeavoring to subvert the good principle, or Osiris and his followers."[1]

The connection of the doctrines of immortality and the resurrection with the legend of Osiris is further illustrated by the funereal statuettes which were deposited with the mummy in the sepulchre, and which evidently had a symbolic meaning. These statuettes were of a uniform model, representing a person completely enveloped in funereal wrappings, with the exception of his face and hands. Now a common representation of Osiris was a mummified body freed of its outer wrapping; and this symbolic image deposited in the tomb signified that the deceased, identified with the dead and risen Osiris, would throw off that envelope, the real garment of death, and recover the freedom of his legs and arms, in order to fulfil the active phases of the life beyond the grave.[2]

The sources of our knowledge of Egyptian eschatology are few and imperfect. Among Greek and Latin writers Herodotus, Plutarch, and Diodorus Siculus, have given brief accounts of particular beliefs and ceremonies of the Egyptians concerning the dead, but no comprehensive statement of their doctrine. "The Egyptians," said Herodotus, "are religious to excess, far beyond any other race of men."[3] In his opinion they originated the dogma of the transmigration of the soul: "The Egyptians maintain that Ceres and Bacchus preside in the realms below. They were also the first to broach the idea that the soul of man is immortal, and that when the body dies it enters into the form of an animal which is born at the moment, thence passing on from one animal into another, until it has circled through the forms of all the creatures which tenant the earth, the water, and the air, after which it enters again into a human frame, and is born

[1] Dr. Birch, in Bunsen's Egypt's Place, Vol. v. p. 136.

[2] Observations sur le Chapitre vi. de Rituel Egyptian, par F. Chabas. Paris, 1863.

[3] Euterpè, 37.

anew. The whole period of the transmigration is (they say) three thousand years." [1] The Book of the Dead does not bear out this representation of Herodotus, since according to that, transmigration through various animals was a degradation inflicted upon the souls of the wicked after death, while the souls of the pure passed through an ascending series of transformations, up to the highest divinity.

"There are Greek writers," Herodotus added, "some of an earlier, some of a later date, who have borrowed this doctrine [of transmigration] from the Egyptians, and put it forward as their own. I could mention their names, but I abstain from doing so." He had reference no doubt to Pythagorus, who had preceded him in visiting Egypt, and whose doctrine of metempsychosis was probably imbibed from her priests. The doctrine of Hades, as expanded by Plato in the Phaedo, has evident marks of Egyptian origin. Plato taught a judgment after death, upon which the holy being freed from earth as from a prison, will ascend to the abode of purity above; the impure will be detained for a longer or shorter period at the Acherusian lake, and then be remanded to the earth, to pass through various forms of animal existence; while the incorrigible will be cast into Tartarus, whence they never come forth. These same distinctions are found in the Egyptian Book of the Dead.

Again in the Phaedro,[1] Plato represents the soul which is justified, after three thousand years, as taking wings and mounting to a place in the upper heaven; while the souls of the unworthy wander for ten thousand years; all which is in striking analogy with Egyptian notions.

Plutarch, in his legend of Isis and Osiris, mentions the transmigration of souls, especially the souls of wicked men, through the bodies of animals, as an article of belief with the Egyptians, founded upon the distribution of the members of Osiris under many forms.

Diodorus says expressly that Pythagorus learned from Egypt "sacred lore, geometry, the science of numbers, and

[1] Euterpè, 124; Rawlinson's translation. [2] Sec. 61.

the transmigration of souls into animals"; and that "Orpheus introduced from Egypt the greatest part of his mythical ceremonies, the orgies that celebrate the wanderings of Ceres, and the whole fable of the shades below. The rites of Osiris and Bacchus were the same, the punishment of the wicked, the Elysian fields, and all the common fictions, were copied from the Egyptian funerals." [1]

An ingenious writer has traced the poetic fancies of Empedocles concerning the pre-existence of the soul, its earth-birth through a fall, and its transmigrations on the upward journey to the divine, to Egyptian sources; or rather, he regards these affinities of belief as evidence of a world-wide religious philosophy.[2]

But the principal authority for the belief of the Egyptians concerning the future state is the so-called Funereal Ritual, or Book of the Dead. It was the custom of the Egyptians to provide a deceased relative with formulas of prayer and incantation which should serve for his guidance through the regions of Hades and his protection against evil spirits that might there assail him. These formulas were inscribed upon the sarcophagus, or written on papyrus and deposited within the mummy-case. In the general style of composition they were somewhat repetitious; yet in themes they were sufficiently various to cover all supposable conditions of the departed spirit. By degrees these formulas were collected and symmetrically arranged, and thus grew up a canon of mortuary writings, which was for the Egyptian faith what their sacred books were to other nations of antiquity.[3] At length the whole ritual came to be regarded as an inspired or Hermetic book, and was ascribed to Thoth, the god of letters or of truth. Sometimes particular chapters only of the ritual were deposited with the deceased, sometimes a

[1] Diod. Sic., B. i. ss. 96, 98.

[2] Empedokles und die Aegypter. Eine historische Untersuchung von Aug. Gladisch, Director des Gymnasiums zu Krotoschin.

[3] Étude sur le Chapitre, cxxv. du Rituel Funéraire, par W. Pleyte (Leyden, 1866), p. 3.

synopsis of the whole, and again the entire ritual, written out with care, its sections distinguished by red lines, and the headings beautifully illustrated with vignettes. In the latter form the copy was probably prepared by professional scribes, to be sold to families of wealth, the name of the deceased being left in blank, to be inserted when death should designate the subject, just as at the gateways of our cemeteries the dealers in monumental marbles exhibit their slabs, covered with certain conventional emblems, and lettered "In memory of ———." A fine example of the illustrated ritual may be seen in the *Salle Funéraire* of the Egyptian galleries of the Louvre at Paris, in which the name of the deceased is wanting, not having been inserted in the blanks prepared for it. Count Rougé is of opinion that the copyists sometimes stole back their work from the tomb, and having erased the name of the deceased, inserted that of a new purchaser in its stead.[1] This conjecture, suggested by the inspection of manuscripts, is rendered plausible by the fact that the deceased, in vindicating himself at the tribunal of justice from the imputation of the forty-two deadly sins, is made to declare, "I have not taken the bandages of the dead," or "I have not stolen from a mummy its papyrus roll, nor portions thereof." This specification shows what would be the fate of the thief in such a case; but how the two souls dependent upon the same passport would fare in their journey through the under-world, the ritual itself does not inform us. Would he who, like the pilgrim in Bunyan's allegory, had lost his scroll be turned back? Would he who had a falsified passport be challenged at the gate?

This book was first brought to notice through the French expedition to Egypt, which found in a royal tomb at Thebes a papyrus written in hieroglyphics, and illustrated with pictures of the state of the dead. Soon after, Champollion found in the Turin Museum a papyrus of the same description, but much more extended and complete. Of this text he

[1] Notice Sommaire des Monuments Égyptiens exposes dans les Galeries du Musée du Louvre, par le Vicomte Emmanuel de Rougé.

deciphered and published brief extracts with expository comments, and from the apparent tenor of its contents he designated it a "Ritual"; it was mainly by the study of this book that Champollion established the principles of interpretation which are given in his Egyptian Grammar of 1841. Dr. Richard Lepsius, then in the early enthusiasm of those Egyptian studies which have given him a world-wide fame, devoted himself to the mastery of this most important key to the hieroglyphics. He transcribed the Turin papyrus, analyzed its contents, arranged it in chapters and sections according to its subject-matter, and in 1842 published it entire under the title "Das Todtenbuch." This was "the first Egyptian work ever committed to type"; and this edition has been the basis of all later criticism of these Hermetic books. The name "Book of the Dead"[1] was regarded by Lepsius as more properly descriptive of the work than the "Funereal Ritual" suggested by Champollion, inasmuch as throughout the book it is the deceased himself who speaks and acts, and not a priest officiating on his behalf; and although there are occasional prayers for the dead, the supplications, confessions, incantations, were principally for the use of the soul in its passage through the under-world and the hall of judgment. These may also have had practical uses by way of anticipation; the soul during its earthly life committing to memory what would serve its future needs. Hence the common formula: "Whoso knows this chapter" shall have such a reward.

Pleyte describes very well the object of the book. "It was given to the dead to serve as a passport on the infernal voyage; it appeased the anger of the gods; it opened the gates to the abode of the blessed; it imparted to its possessor the faculty of assuming the desired transformations, and it confounded the fiercest enemies."[2] In all this the book leads one beyond a burial service to the condition and necessities of the departed soul.

[1] Dr. Lepsius presents anew the argument for this name in his recent work, Aelteste Texte des Todtenbuchs, p. 2.

[2] Étude sur le chapitre cxxv. p. 3.

The date assigned to the Turin papyrus is the twenty-sixth dynasty, perhaps the reign of Psammeticus, in the middle of the seventh century before Christ; and the greater number of the funeral papyri in the museums of Europe are of the same period. But the substance of the book, its most important chapters and its essential doctrines, are many centuries older. "The oldest papyri, containing portions of the ritual, have been assigned to the eighteenth dynasty, and this is probably the age of the earliest known in Europe at the present day."[1] At this period, from 1500 to 1700 B.C., extracts and representations from the Book of the Dead abound on the walls of tombs, especially the royal tombs at Thebes. But these are likewise found inscribed upon sarcophagi of a much earlier date; as, for instance, on the coffin of a Mentuhotep of the eleventh dynasty (2500 B.C.?) the most important chapters are given in full, and one of these is said in the hieroglyphics to have been composed in the reign of Menkheres, the builder of the third pyramid.

The Berlin Museum contains five sarcophagi of the period of the old empire, in a good state of preservation, and fragments of two others. One of these affords the most complete insight into the funeral customs of the Egyptians, and their conception of the state of the departed, which has yet been gained from their monuments. This sarcophagus was found in 1823 in the Necropolis of Thebes, in a carefully walled grave, several feet under ground. The dimensions of this grave are reproduced in the glass case within which the sarcophagus now stands, and where are also arranged the various accompaniments of the coffin which were found in the tomb. Chief among these are two barks, which represent the transportation of the deceased from the world of the living to the world of the dead. In the first the deceased is seen as a mummy lying on a bier under a canopy; at the four corners of the bier are figures of the four genii of the dead; at the head and foot respectively are the gods Nebthi and Isis, bewailing their dead brother Osiris, while a priest appears to

[1] Birch; Bunsen's Egypt, Vol. v. p. 130; Lepsius, Aelteste Texte.

be reading from a roll; before the priest a man is slaying a bull; and behind the bark a woman, a near relative, clad in tokens of mourning, is walking with vessels in her hands and on her head, which contain the necessary offerings. The second bark contains the sailors, steersman, etc.; then follows another female figure with the remainder of the offerings, and near by are vessels of burnt clay for holding water, a kind of black cake, the skull of the bull that had been sacrificed, and other articles of curious interest. These all are to be seen to-day in the museum in as perfect condition as when deposited in the tomb perhaps four thousand years ago. For this was the sarcophagus of Mentuhotep, whose date was earlier than the twelfth dynasty.

The Berlin museum contains a second sarcophagus of a Mentuhotep, and one of Sebakaa, likewise of the old empire. These all are covered on their inner sides with hieroglyphic inscriptions, which prove to be chapters of the Book of the Dead; and Dr. Lepsius has transcribed, collated, and published these inscriptions as the earliest known text of that book.[1]

Lepsius regards the whole book as a collection or compilation of sacred texts, in general treating of the same subjects, but without unity of literary composition, and with no ligament running through them. There are distinct redactions of particular chapters, one more expanded, another more condensed; in one the deceased speaks in the first person, in another in the third. In the earliest times there was no uniform beginning or order to the book; but the whole work contains only variations and amplifications of the two supreme moments to the deceased — his judgment, and the admittance to eternal life grounded thereupon.

A standard text of the ritual is still a desideratum; that of Turin being considered less pure than the text of more fragmentary copies. Count de Rougé has begun a superb edition,

[1] Aelteste Texte des Todtenbuchs nach Sarkophagen des Altaegyptischen Reichs im Berliner Museum, herausgegeben von R. Lepsius. Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz. 1867.

based upon a collation of the manuscripts of the Louvre with the Turin manuscript and others; but this text is not yet acknowledged as official by Egyptologers. Several sections of the book have been published independently, with notes and translations, but the first complete translation has just appeared from the hand of Dr. S. Birch of the British Museum, and that will be chiefly relied upon in this article.[1]

In the absence of a truly canonical edition of the Book of the Dead, the diversified arrangement of its chapters in different copies renders it difficult to determine whether the more usual form, of which the Turin papyrus is a conspicuous example, was casual or arbitrary, or according to some logical order of doctrinal thought. If the latter, then the Egyptians placed the judgment, the proper trial of the soul, by which its final destiny was fixed, in the distant future, after a season of detention and perhaps of purgatorial discipline in Hades. But there are indications also of a preliminary trial immediately after death, which had reference to the metamorphoses of the soul upon its way to the presence of Osiris. By following in the main the order of the Turin papyrus, we shall be able to deduce from this every doctrine in particular of the Egyptian eschatology, and possibly to construct of the whole a connected system of belief.

I. Existence after Death.

In the view of the Egyptians the souls of all men continued to exist after death. There was no suspension of consciousness; but the soul entered at once upon a journey in a new

[1] It is a striking example of the progress of hieroglyphic interpretation that in Vol. i. of his Egypt's Place, 1848, Bunsen said: "We confidently maintain that no man living is competent to read and explain the whole of any one section of the "Book of the Dead"; and Vol. v. of the same work, published in 1867, contains a translation of the entire book from the pen of Dr. Birch. This translation is so extremely literal as often to be unintelligible. Whole paragraphs, which are probably a faithful rendering of the hieroglyphics, are without form or meaning as English sentences. The translation is therefore to be regarded as tentative; yet it furnishes a ground-work for the understanding of the whole book, while particular chapters are rendered in a more lucid and idiomatic style in the versions of other scholars.

sphere of life. Though the Book of the Dead proceeds on the assumption that the deceased for and by whom its prayers are offered is a true child of Osiris, who will be justified, and will attain to "the place where is the chief of the great gods"; yet its frequent imprecations against the crocodiles, snakes, dragons, and other monsters who wait to devour the wicked, its great judgment scene, its hell, and the pictorial representations of the condemned given in the vignettes of some of the chapters, show that all souls alike enter at death upon a new phase of existence. Indeed there is ground for the opinion that in the speculative theology of the Egyptians the soul was regarded as pre-existent: its being born into the body was a dying, and death will be its liberation or its "manifestation to light." This phrase, "Manifestation to Light," or "Entrance into Day," is the caption of the first chapter or proëm of the Ritual, which is a sublime funereal hymn, to be used on the day of bearing the dead to Hades.[1] This hymn is inspired by Thoth, who, accompanying the mourners, is halted by the sun, and required to justify the deceased against his enemies, who would dispute the rites of sepulture. This being done, the hymn proceeds in a strain that recalls the twenty-fourth Psalm. "O companions of souls made in the house of Osiris, accompanying ye the soul of the Osiris [i.e. of the deceased, who is here called an Osiris] with yourselves to the house of Osiris! Let him see as ye see; let him hear as ye hear; let him stand as ye stand; let him sit as ye sit. O givers of food and drink to the spirits, souls made in the house of the Osiris, give ye food and drink in due season to the Osiris with yourselves.

"O openers of roads! O guides of paths to the souls made in the abode of Osiris! open ye the roads, level ye the paths to the Osiris with yourselves.

"He enters the gate of Osiris. He goes in with exultation; he comes out in peace."

[1] This chapter is illustrated by a vignette representing the procession to the tomb, the relations leading, followed by the funeral coffers and the bark on which rests the mummy (Rougé).

Then the deceased himself takes up the refrain: "Hail, dweller in the West! [*quere* the setting sun?] Osiris, lord of the region of the great winds; let me stand in peace at the West! The lords of the hill receive me; they say to me, come, come in peace. They give me a place where is the chief of the great gods."

To the devout Egyptian death was an apotheosis. The deceased is pictured in the bark which is to bear him through the heavenly ocean, while his bereaved family neither cry after him that mournful χαῖρε ("farewell") of the Greek monuments, nor reach out the hand for a last adieu; but regard him as Osiris himself, the just and the blessed, and bring to him offerings and alms.[1] While the voyage through the under-world is sombre, and there are many terrors on the way, the prevailing tone of the Book of the Dead is hopeful, and even jubilant.

II. Hades, or the Under-World.

At death all souls alike descend to the under-world. The good cannot escape the necessity of passing through that region of gloom and of mysterious terrors. As the sun descending toward the west encounters the fiends of darkness, and seems for a time to succumb to their power, and to be dragged by them into the realms of night, so the soul descends at first into "a land of darkness, where no light is." But if fortified by a just and pure life it cannot be vanquished in Hades. Like its great prototype Osiris, it will gain dominion over the under-world; like the sun, having traversed the twelve hours of the night, it will emerge again with the light of a new day. "The Osiris[2] lives after he dies, like the sun daily; for the sun died, and was born yesterday, so the Osiris is born. Every god rejoices with life; the Osiris rejoices, as they rejoice, with life." The chapter of the Ritual which describes this emerging of the soul from Hades is appropriately entitled: "Of coming forth as the sun, and living after death."

[1] Brugsch, Aegyptische Denkmaeler.

[2] Osiris is here, as before, put for the deceased, chap. iii.

In Hades are labors to be performed, — ploughing the fields, drawing water out of wells, transporting food, and other kinds of manual toil, — from which the deceased may escape, if duly fortified; or if "decreed for all the work to be done," by the power of evil "dragging one beneath it," he may transfer this to certain "working-figures," typified by little images deposited in the mummy-case. Numbers of these figures, in perfect preservation, may be seen in the Egyptian collections of the Louvre and the Berlin Museum.[1] They represent the deceased with his hands crossed over his breast, furnished with various implements of agriculture; most commonly a hoe and a mattock shod with iron, and a sack containing seed. Chabas is of opinion that these figures symbolized the last stage of the deceased before resuming an active life. Hence the accompanying implements may have been intended for use in the celestial fields, which are pictured at length in the vignette of the one hundred and tenth chapter of the Ritual;[2] of which more hereafter.

The Hades is a region full of perils and horrors, which the soul must needs encounter in its passage to the higher light and life, but which the good and pure spirit escapes through the means of justification with which it is fortified. The bark of the sun as it traverses the under-world — the inverted hemisphere of darkness — is assailed by crocodiles and other monsters that seek to devour it; but under the favoring conduct of Shu[3] the sun emerges at last victorious. The fiercest battle rages at the dawn, in the eastern horizon, — a battle in which the earth and sky commingle; "then comes the sun in his egg; irradiating by his orb; kindling his horizon;

[1] Through the kind attention of M. le Vicomte de Rougé and Professor Dr. Lepsius the writer had every facility for studying in detail these rich and well-classified collections. A good catalogue, however, is yet a desideratum of both museums.

[2] See in the Louvre, Salle Funéraire, Armoire A., also Comte Rougé's illustrated edition of the Rituel Funéraire.

[3] Shu or Schou is a divinity who supports the sun-bark in the nether-world; represented as kneeling, with uplifted arms, supporting the goddess of heaven stretched over him like an arch.

floating in his clouds; impatient of delay; having no equal among the gods; starting the winds by the fires of his mouth; illumining both worlds with his splendors."[1] Like the sun, like Osiris, the divinized souls descending to the west — the entrance to the region of darkness and death — must undergo a conflict with Typhonian powers, from which they come forth at last victorious, by appearing rejuvenated at the eastern gate of the heaven.

The vignettes represent the deceased in Hades in conflict now with four crocodiles, now with a walking viper, now with a serpent having a fiery head, who assails the dead from behind, now with a tortoise, now with a knot of asps and snakes, now with a snake riding on the back of an ass, and with other monstrosities of evil. He is bespattered with mud and abominable filth; vile and poisonous food is set before him; snares are spread for him; he is assailed with water and with fire; monsters with yawning jaws are thirsting for his blood — one, red-haired, born of the night, hissing with snakes; another belching forth flames; another bellowing with terrible cries; a hideous executioner, with axe in hand, watches that he may decapitate the deceased upon "the evil block"; he runs the gauntlet of all odious and frightful things, and passes through a long succession of gates, each of which is guarded by a divinity wielding two swords.

It marks the incoherent structure of the Book of the Dead, that some of the most terrible of these ordeals are encountered in passing through the gates of Elysium. "The description of these regions is in every way horrible. They are terrible to the gods themselves, not only as being inhabited by fearful demons, but in some instances as regions of fiery flames, rivalling in all their horrors the Phlegethon, or burning stream of the Greek Hades. A similar series of regions is described on the sarcophagus of the monarch Nekhtherhebi, in the infernal purgatory, into which the sun enters through the hours

[1] Chapter xvii., Comte Rougé's version; Dr. Birch renders, "who gives blasts of flame from his mouth."

of the darkened hemisphere, or region of the night. These called *karr*, or halls, are ten in number; and the groans and screams of the damned burst on the ear in a mingled chorus of agony and confusion. They howl as lions, roar as bulls, squall like tom-cats, tinkle as brass, and buzz with the incessant hum of bees. Such descriptions, indeed, belong rather to the solar litanies, like those describing the regions of utter darkness and silence, in which, in the tombs of the kings, the souls of the wicked lie deprived of the cheering beams of the solar disk, and the reviving voice of the great god, the sun. Still they give an esoteric notion of the nature of the regions of the damned, rivalling the cold Hades of Homer, or the hotter hell of a Dante or a Milton. Whether they were of a purgatorial nature, or the wicked were detained there, does not appear; but a more minute examination of the principal tombs and sarcophagi of the kings will hereafter throw a fuller light upon the nature of the Egyptian Hades." [1] It is evident, however, from this general picture, that the leading features of the Greek Hades were borrowed from Egypt.

III. The Preliminary Justification.

Although the deceased must encounter these experiences, since he can no more escape the passage through Hades than the sun can escape descending into the folds of darkness in the west, yet by appropriate prayers and processes of purification he can secure a safe transit from the western to the eastern portal. At an early stage after death the deceased, who is presumed to be free from mortal sin, has all stain of evil rubbed off from his heart, and the formula of absolution is pronounced over him, as proceeding from the divinity, in words as follows: "His great sin is not divine, or his fault complete, ... for I have corrected the injuring evil in him, the god turns the evil to truth, correcting his fault. The god Contention is then as the god Peace, with the great hold [2] (?)

[1] Bunsen's Egypt's Place, Vol. v. p. 152.

[2] In the vignette the mummy, represented as enfolded in the arms of Anubis, here receives a bath of purifying libation. Vide Comte Rougé's Rituel Funéraire.

he has in his hand. I have brought it to thee; thou livest by it; the Osiris [the deceased] lives by it; he is at rest, obliterating by it all the stain [or evil] which is in the heart."[1]

Upon entering Hades the deceased performs certain days of justification before several groups of divinities, which are classified as "the great chiefs" of the sun, of Osiris, of Heliopolis, of Abydos, of the paths of the dead, of the night of mystery, etc. At each of the groups or stations Thoth, who justified Osiris from his enemies, is invoked in like manner to justify this Osiris [the deceased], and at the close of the ceremonies a recital is made of the great chiefs before whom Thoth has maintained his cause, and the deceased comes forth in pure clothes, and so thoroughly purified that "no evil thing can approach him for millions of ages." Then follows a ceremony of peculiar interest, which seems to anticipate the Apostle Paul's triumphant appeal to the Lord, the righteous judge, for his personal "crown of righteousness."[2] The term "righteousness" as used by the apostle (*ὁ τῆς δικαιοσύνης στέφανος*) denotes, not a quality of the crown, like the epithets "living," "incorruptible," "unfading," which characterize the believer's glory, but the quality or condition of the person receiving the crown, and is equivalent to a declarative judgment in his favor, the vindication of his character or conduct, or the putting him in the position of a justified person. Such a literal crowning, according to the Egyptian ritual, follows the vindication of the deceased before the "great chiefs." The next succeeding chapter is entitled "the Chapter of the Crown of Justification."[3] It opens with an address to the deceased in these words: "Thy father Tum [a name of the sun] has bound thee with this good crown of justification; with that living frontlet; beloved of the gods, thou livest forever; Osiris, who dwells in the west, has justified thy word against thy enemies." It then narrates that the deceased is justified against Set and his associates, and

[1] Chapter xiv. [2] 2 Timothy iv. 8.

[3] Chapter xix. Chapter xx. has the same title; and is substantially a repetition.

enumerates the groups of divinities, or the successive judgment-seats before which this justification has taken place. The complete discomfiture of the enemies of the deceased is set forth in these graphic words: "The Osiris repeats this address four times; all his enemies fall down stabbed; Horus, the son of Osiris, repeats this millions of times; all his enemies fall down stabbed. He drags them, throwing them down from the place where they are, to the blocks of the east; he cuts off their heads, breaks their necks, cuts off their thighs, giving them to the great strangler forever."

In the Turin papyrus there is no pictorial representation of the subject of this chapter; but manuscripts in the museum of the Louvre, of an older date than that of Turin, have very effective vignettes of the nineteenth and twentieth chapters of the Ritual. The deceased is represented as adoring a divine person — the god Atmou — before whom is placed upon a stool, a crown dressed with leaves, or made in imitation of a wreath.[1] The ritual prescribes: "If this chapter is said over a divine crown placed on the head of a person after thou hast given fuming incense to the Osiris, it makes him justified against his enemies, whether dead or alive; he is one of the servants of Osiris; drink and food are given to him before that god; it is said by thee, praying; it is great protection in pure clothes for millions of times." Well may the deceased, thus vindicated, exclaim: "I am lord of the crown; my enemies make no injury or overthrowing of me. ..... I stood as Horus; I sat as Ptah; I prevailed as Thoth; I was powerful as Tum; I have walked with my feet; I have spoken with my mouth; I escape from him; he does not take me. ..... I went in as a hawk; I came out as a phenix. ..... A path has been made for me. Glory, glory to Osiris!"

If however he should fail of this preliminary vindication, we are left to infer that, either being swallowed by a monster or otherwise arrested in his course through Hades, he would be at once remanded to a life of wandering on earth, which is "a second death."

[1] Given in Rougé, Rituel Funéraire.

IV. The Wicked in Hades.

The distinction between the righteous and the wicked, although more solemnly declared at the great judgment scene in "the Hall of the Two Truths," is already marked in Hades. In the circle of divinities, or "great chiefs," before whom the deceased must pass in review, challenging their inspection, is a god of a mysterious nature, whose eyebrows are the arms of a balance, symbolical of justice, and who is altogether an object of terror. The gloss which describes this divinity, in the Book of the Dead, gives him various names and characters; but these mainly agree in representing him, not simply as one who inflicts evil, but as the punisher of sin. One explanation reads: "It is Horus as a hawk with many heads, one bearing truth, another sin; he renders evil to him who hath done it, justice to whom it comports."[1] Again, he is said to "cause the sinful to be dragged to his block for the destruction of their souls." This executioner of the condemned is symbolized by a sword suspended over a block. In addition to this executioner there are several guardians or watchers who prepare punishments of various kinds, from whose custody it is impossible for a condemned person to escape. These are said to have braziers in which they broil the condemned with glowing coals.[2] They emit flames from their mouths. One of these executioners has "a face like a dog, with the eyebrows of a man." He sits beside a pool of fire, eats the bodies of his victims, and then vomits them as excrement; he sits at "the place of rejection," and every one who arrives there impure, or is found "deficient," falls under his blows. Another divinity is described as seizing souls, annihilating hearts, feeding upon corpses.

These frightful monsters are not simply tormentors; they are executioners, whose office it is to punish the wicked.

[1] This is Comte Rougé's reading; Dr. Birch here gives no intelligible sense.

[2] Such braziers are represented in the funereal paintings; they remind one of the gridiron of St. Laurence: "Je crois que le mot de *creuset* [crucible] convient mieux que celui de chaudières [kettles or cauldrons] que Champollion avait appliqué au mot *ka-tu*" (Comte Rougé).

The deceased invokes the sun, as "the obliterater of sins," to save him from these destroyers; and he grounds his escape from their clutches upon his freedom from sin. "I do not fall beneath their swords, nor go to their block. I do not rest in the midst of their assemblages; I do not go to their blocks; I do not sit in their nets: nothing of a nature hateful to the gods has been done by me. ..... Things of a nature hateful to the gods are craft and malice."

From these and like passages in the Book of the Dead, it would appear that a separation takes place between the righteous and the wicked directly upon their entrance into Hades, and that the wicked are subjected to terrible judgments, whether purgatorial or altogether punitive, remains to be determined.

Comparing these representations with the Inferno of Dante, one cannot fail to recognize in the Egyptian Hades the parent, through Greek sources, of conceptions which the pencil of Dorè has now rendered doubly horrible. Thus, the red-haired, bellowing monster of Hades, reappears in the red-eyed devourer of the Inferno.

> "Cerberus, monster cruel and uncouth,
> With his three gullets, like a dog is barking
> Over the people that are there submerged:
> Red-eyes he has, and unctuous beard and black,
> And belly large, and armed with claws his hands;
> He rends the spirits, flays and quarters them."[1]

The monster that feeds upon the condemned, gorging himself with their blood, is vivified in Dante's three-faced devil:

> "At every mouth he with his teeth was crunching
> A sinner, in the manner of a brake;
> . . . . and down three chins
> Trickled the tear-drops and the bloody drivel."[2]

In the tomb of Ramses V. the hell of the Egyptians is depicted on the walls in vivid colors. The inscription, "Upon these fiend-like spirits the sun-god never shines," at once

[1] Inferno, Canto vi. p. 13.
[2] Inferno, Canto xxxiv. 55 (Longfellow's translation).

recalls the inscription Dante saw over the entrance to the infernal regions: "All hope abandon, ye who enter here." Over each division of the Egyptian hell was inscribed the sin for which the condemned suffer, and the nature of their punishment; so each canto of the Inferno describes a different offence, with its separate place and form of punishment. In the pictured hell of the Egyptians, some of the lost are seen bound to a post and flayed with swords by their red watchers; others are hung with their heads down; still others whose heads have been cut off lie in long rows. Others go with bound hands, and drag after them their hearts cut out. Others are seethed in great caldrons, together with their fans — the means of cooling and the image of rest. These horrid fantasies are reproduced in Dante's "horned demons with great scourges," who cruelly beat the condemned, and his "boiling stream," with people within "up to the eyebrows."

But Dante drew his imagery of the Inferno from the Hades of Greek and Roman mythology, whose derivation from Egyptian sources, at least as to its essential features, has already been pointed out. Dr. Brugsch locates Hades, Elysium, and other regions of the departed, in accordance with the terrestrial geography of the Egyptians, and in this respect the Natron lake, the wild desert beyond, and the oasis of Ammon in the far west, answer to the Avernus, the Tartarus, and the Elysium of later mythologies.

V. The Progress of the Soul.

The soul of the justified, the child of Osiris, "moves as the never-resting gods in the heaven."[1] Having received the crown of justification, the deceased has given him a new mouth, a new heart or mind, and in general, as Osiris was reconstructed of the scattered limbs gathered by the loving Isis, so is he now formed anew. His mouth enables him to speak the names of the gods as he approaches their regions in turn, and to recite the numerous prayers and incantations that are necessary to his safe transit. More than this, in

[1] Chapter xv.

striking analogy with the enrolment of the redeemed in heaven, the Book of the Dead contains a chapter "of giving a person a name in Hades." Among the promises of Christ to his faithful followers is this: "To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him a white stone, and in the stone a new name written, which no man knoweth saving he that receiveth it."[1] And in the ritual a divinity declares: "I have given a certain person a writing in his name in the great abode. ..... There is not a god who does not come behind the Osiris [the deceased] declaring his name then, when I say his name."[2] Or if this reading be considered doubtful, the vignette given by Comte Rougé of the speaker holding a volume before the deceased, may signify either that he is about to be enrolled in the sacred book or entrusted with the sacred words.

Thus equipped, knowing the words of the sun,[3] having a tongue more efficacious than the tongue of a scorpion,[4] with a mouth to speak, legs to walk, and arms to overthrow his adversaries,[5] the deceased goes bravely on, passing successfully the ordeal of monsters described at page 85, saying of one and another "he finds no fault in me, he does not take me."[6] So complete now is his transformation that every portion of his body — hair, face, eyes, ears, nose, lips, teeth, neck, arms, elbows, fingers and nails, belly and back, spine, phallus, thigh, legs, feet — each and every member and feature is assimilated to some divinity. "There is not a limb of him without a god." He is divinized in his whole substance, and he turns away all evil, and parries the blows aimed at him in Hades. His exultation now approaches the sublime paean of the apostle, in which he challenges all the powers of the universe to separate him from the love of God: "Men, gods, spirits, the dead, mortals, beatified spirits, illuminated, do not make any attack on him. He it is who comes out sound, Immortal is his name. He is yesterday, beholder of millions of years, that is his name. He has passed along

[1] Rev. ii. 17. [2] Chap. xxv. [3] Chap. xxxviii.
[4] Chap. xxxix. [5] Chap. xxvi. [6] Chap. xl.

the upper roads; he has been judged; he is the lord of the crown; he is in the eye and the egg. ..... Life has been given him. ..... He has escaped from all evil things."

Thus purified and preserved the deceased "cannot die again in Hades"; a vignette represents him as walking unmolested by the block of the dreaded executioner, and at the same time he escapes so much as the touch of defilement upon his sandals.[1] He eats nothing unwholesome or unseemly, but lives upon celestial food, "loaves of white corn, drink of red corn"; the gods give him to drink out of their "vases of milk and wine, new and baked bread, liquid and flesh from the divine abode of Anup."[2] Even in the dank atmosphere of Hades he catches in his sail "the delicious breath of the sun," the breath of Shu, "drawing the winds before the light to the limits of heaven, to the limits of earth, to the very limits of space."[3] He drinks the waters of the tree of immortality; and, pouring out water from a cup, he passes unharmed by the scorching flames of Phlegethon. The fifty-ninth chapter is a prayer for this water: "O Sycamore of Nu, give me the waters which are in thee."

A striking vignette illustrating this chapter represents the goddess Hathor in the top of a sycamore tree—which indeed appears to constitute the lower portion of her body—pouring several streams of water from a vase held in the left hand, while in the right she holds a platter of sacred viands. At the foot of the tree a soul, pictured as a bird with a human head, is catching the heavenly waters in a bowl; while before the tree are two female figures in mortal habiliments, who are likewise intercepting the sacred stream, and catching water in the hollow of the hand.[4]

VI. Metamorphoses or Transmigrations.

Having fully accomplished the "manifestation to light"

[1] Chapters l., li. [2] Chapter lii., lviii.

[3] Shu, the principle of light, the medium in which the sun moves, is regarded as the cause of the winds.

[4] This vignette has been published by Dr. S. Reinisch of Vienna, in his valuable work Die Aegyptischen Denkmaeler in Miramar.

and attained, "as it were, self-existence," the soul now passes through a series of transformations, which, however, are not to be confounded with the degrading and penal metamorphoses to which the wicked are subjected. The deceased is changed into a hawk, "on whose back are wings of bright green"; then into the hawk which symbolizes the god of time. In this character he flies through the universe, marking the revolutions of the heavens, with nothing to impede his course. "O sun, soul! Greatest of things created, let me come, let me see, let me pass the empyreal gate. Guardians of heaven, guardians of earth, open a path to me. Let there be no stoppage to me. I reach thy place, oh Osiris!"[1]

Next he is transformed into Tum, the sun, the oldest of the divinities: "Maker of the heaven, creator of beings, making all the generations of existences; giving birth to the gods; creating himself lord of life; supplying the gods." Under this metamorphosis he exclaims: "I rise as a god from men. ..... I am pure; I am divine; I am spiritualized; I am strong; I am become a soul; I prevail."

The next change is into light itself—a feminine impersonation, in whose womb are "the gods of dawn"—who "weaves the woof of the firmament, giving light to the hours."[2] From this form the deceased is changed into "the pure lily which comes out of the fields of the sun"; and then into the familiar form of the god Ptah, in which he again eats of spiritual food and drinks the draughts of the gods. He is now transformed successively into a phenix, a heron, a swallow, a human-headed snake, which represents the soul of the earth, and a snake with a crocodile's head. Under the form of a swallow, the deceased seems to bound into the air with the exhilaration of a life freed from the body and from sin. "I have dissipated my sins; I have destroyed my failings, for I have got rid of the sins which detained me on earth. ..... My body is embalmed. ..... I am the swallow; I am the

[1] Chapter lxxviii.

[2] Chapter lxxx. The vignette represents the deceased and Osiris with a radiating disc.

swallow. O gods, delicious is the smell of your fire which comes out of the horizon!" Unless this transformation takes place, the deceased cannot come out of Hades.

Most curious of all these metamorphoses is that into the symbol of the soul itself—a hawk with a human head. Under this form the deceased utters sentiments concerning the nature and qualities of spirit which are worthy of the most refined metaphysics of the nineteenth century: "I am created forever, lord of years, eternal ruler. ..... Lord of the earth. ..... My name is Incorruptible. ..... Invisible is my nest, never has my egg been touched. ..... I make my nest in the upper regions. ..... I am the lord of truth; I live in it daily. I am Perception, who never perishes under the name of soul. ..... My soul is from the beginning, from the reckoning of years. ..... I pass through [or enter into? permeate?] substances, making them full"; [i.e. the presence of a soul vivifies substance.] "I am the creator of perception; I hate idleness or repose. ..... I do not do anything of a nature hateful to the gods ..... who give me my shape in their society. ..... The eye of Horus made for me my soul, preparing its substance."

During this metamorphosis occurs an episode of exquisite beauty. The soul begs permission of the gods to revisit its mummy, and flies as a bird to the resting-place of the body. This is a scene often represented in the Book of the Dead, and upon sarcophagi, some fine examples of which are to be seen in the museums of Berlin and the Louvre. The mummy is sculptured upon the lid of the sarcophagus in an attitude of repose; the spirit-bird carrying the sphered cross which is the symbol of immortality, gently alights upon its breast as if hesitating to break its slumber even with the joyful awaking to an eternal life.[1] Nor does it at this time summon the body to partake of its own felicity; but having looked upon its mummy, and become assured that it is not in-

[1] In some instances this symbol represents the departure of the soul from the body under the lead of Anubis; but here it is the vignette of chapter lxxxix., whose title is "the visit of the soul to the body."

jured nor decayed, the soul flies away again to the gods. Transformed into a prepared spirit, he can no longer be detained in Hades, but goes forth as the day, thus apostrophizing himself: "O elevated, adored, chief of spirits! Soul, greatest of created beings, giving victory to the gods, crowned on his great throne. ..... I am the prepared spirit; I have made a road to wherever the Sun, Tum, Kheper, and Hathor are."[1]

VII. The Voyage to the Elysian Fields.

Having passed through all the transformations by which it becomes qualified both for fellowship with the gods and for reunion with the body, or in other words, being spiritualized and divinized, the soul emerges from Hades in the mystic boat of the sun, and gaily turns its prow toward the Elysian fields. As it quits the region of terrors it bursts into a song of victory at its escape from Phlegethon. "I have come from the scalding pools, from the flaming fields, alive from that great pool; I stand in the boat. ..... I have weighed anchor in peace. ..... I have brought the boat, I have loosed the rope, so that I have come out in it from this wretched place."[2]

Each part of the boat has a name, which the deceased is required to know and to call. He has "a supply of corn and barley, a supply of perfume and clothes; his food is life, which comes from the sun." He carries also provisions for the altars of the gods; bread of white corn, drink of red corn, grains of incense. He also invokes for himself the bread of Ptah, and "drink poured out of lapis lazuli from pure water."

The deceased must know the names of the spirits of the west, the spirits of the east, and of various gods who may accost him on his voyage. The approach to the Elysian fields is illustrated by a vignette of extraordinary size; its outer circle is the celestial Nile, its length is immense, its breadth unknown; and there are in it neither fish, nor islands, nor snakes. Within the area are lakes, a city, altars, fields; and

[1] Chapter xci. [2] Chapter xcix.

the deceased is seen now "navigating in peace," now offering to the gods, now sowing and ploughing, now reaping the white and red corn, and again treading out the corn in the threshing-floor. Thus is he in plenty and at peace. "I know the pools and lands of the fields of Heth;[1] I am in it; I prevail in it; I understand in it; hoeing and ploughing in it, mowing in it, sowing in it, rowing in its pools, approaching its lands. ..... I know the places where to plough and mow the corn, to collect the harvest in it daily. ..... I am in it like the god who is in it; filled with its waters; eating of its bread; resting in its land."

VIII. The Final Judgment.

We now approach the most impressive scene in the Book of the Dead, a scene whose quaint, almost grotesque gravity is yet more solemn and more awful than Michael Angelo's stupendous judgment scene in the Sistine Chapel, or Palma's Last Judgment in the Doge's palace at Venice. Persons who have visited Tomb No. 15 of Abd-el-Qurna, the westward cemetery of Thebes, can never forget the sombre effect of the Hall of Two Truths, depicted on the wall of the first passage. At one extremity of the picture, upon a lofty throne, sits Osiris, lord of the under-world, with a feathery crown upon his head, the little tablet of uprightness, called truth, suspended from his neck by a chain; in his hands the insignia of authority, the crook and the scourge. On the upper line of the picture are ranged in solemn row the forty-two assessors or associate judges, who are described in the ritual as the gods, or rather demons, "who are with Osiris in the Hall of Two Truths, who live by the punishment of the wicked, feeding off their blood. At the extreme end, opposite Osiris, the deceased enters the hall, veiling his eyes with his hand, and bowing reverently to Osiris. At the very entrance he encounters the goddess of truth. In the centre of the hall stands a large balance whose plumb is watched by the hawk-headed divinity Horus; advancing to this, the deceased lays his heart

[1] Heth or Hetp, peace or food; Chapter cx.

in one scale, while the jackal-headed god Anubis, places in the other as a counter-weight a little statue of the goddess of righteousness, and the ibis-headed god Thoth, the lord of the divine word, enters the result of the weighing upon his tablet. After this proceeding, the deceased advances to the judgment-seat of Osiris, to receive the sentence from his mouth.

Prior to this, however, the deceased protests in detail his innocence of each of the forty-two deadly offences, which the assessors are severally set to punish. In this enumeration we will follow Dr. Birch, adding the versions of other Egyptologers wherever these differ from him:

1. I have not privily done evil against mankind.

Hincks. I have committed no fraud or injustice to any man.

Reinisch. I have not practised lying and fraud before men.

Brugsch. I have not spoken an unjust word to any man.

Pleyte. I have not committed fraud against men.

2. I have not afflicted persons or men.

Reinisch. I have not ill-treated my inferiors [Untergebenen] that is my debtors [Schuldner].

Brugsch. I have not given vent to a haughty spirit.

Pleyte. I have not oppressed the unfortunate [les misérables].

3. I have not told falsehoods in the tribunal of truth.

Reinisch and *Brugsch* the same.

Pleyte. I have not offered untruths in the place of justice.

4. I have had no acquaintance with evil. I have not done any wicked thing.

Pleyte the same.

Reinisch. Knowingly I have committed no falsehood, perpetrated no malice.

Brugsch. I have not spoken vilely [Schändliches].

5. I have not made the laboring man do more than his task daily.

Pleyte agrees with this; substituting only for "the laboring man" the "heads" or "overseers of workmen."

Reinisch. I have not cheated men in their daily wages; I have given each what he had performed.

Brugsch. I have not enforced against any one service for the whole day; i.e. exacting labors.

6. I have not let my name approach to the boat, nor endeavored to make my name approach to the ..... nor exceeded the ordered .....

Reinisch. When one has hailed my boat, I have set him across the river, and when he has approached my table, I have offered him food.

Pleyte. My name has not approached the sacred boat; my name is associated with noble acts; I consecrate the viands or tables.

7. I have not been idle; I have not failed; I have not ceased; I have not been weak.

Pleyte substitutes for "idle," perverse, and for "failed," vile or a libertine.

Reinisch. There was no trembling before me [i.e. he did nothing to cause others to fear him; as is instanced in the following specifications]: I did not punish passionately [ich war nicht strafsüchtig]; I have done no one harm, neither have I brought any to ruin.

8. I have not done what is hateful to the gods. Here all the versions agree.

9. I have not calumniated the slave to his master.

Reinisch. I have not suffered my slave to be abused by his overseer.

Pleyte the same.

Brugsch. I have not defamed a high priest because of his greatness.

10. I have not sacrificed; I have not made to weep; I have not murdered.

Pleyte. I have not suffered any to die of hunger. The remaining clauses same as above.

Reinisch. I have not left any to hunger, etc.

Brugsch. I have not suffered any to hunger; I have not suffered any to thirst; I have not suffered any to weep.

11. I have not given orders to smite a person privily; I have not done fraud to men.

Reinisch and *Pleyte* the same.

Brugsch. I have not purposely killed any one on account of an injury.

12. I have not changed the measures of the country.

Reinisch. I have not changed the gifts in the public temples.

Brugsch. I have not consumed what was consecrated to the temple.

Pleyte. I have not cut the bread of the temple.

13. I have not injured the images of the gods.

Brugsch the same.

Reinisch. I have not made light of my bread offerings for the gods.

Pleyte. I have not deranged the offerings of the gods.

14. I have not taken scraps of the bandages of the dead.

Reinisch. I have not stolen a papyrus of the dead, nor portions of it.

Brugsch. I have not torn off the linen wrappings of the dead.

Pleyte. I have not stolen either the bread or the bandages of the mummies.

15. I have not committed adultery; I have not spat against the god of my country.

Reinisch. I have not been guilty of fornication nor self-pollution, when I was a priest of my divine city.

Pleyte. I have not committed adultery; I have not defiled with excrement the pure water of the god of my country.

16. I have not thrown down.

Champollion. I have not been avaricious.

Reinisch. I have not aggrandized.

Pleyte. I have not stolen in secret.

Brugsch. I have not stolen.

17. I have not falsified measures.

Pleyte. I have not falsified the measures of grain.

Reinisch and *Chabas.* I have not altered the prayers.

18. I have not thrown the weight out of the scale; I have not cheated in the weight of the balance.

Reinisch. I have not increased the weight of the scale, nor have I altered its plumb.

19. I have not withheld milk from mouths of sucklings.

Reinisch the same.

20. I have not hunted wild animals in their pasturages; I have not snared the sacred birds; I have not caught the fish which typify them.

Reinisch the same.

21. I have not stopped running water; I have not separated [or diverted] the water from its current.

Reinisch the same.

22. I have not put out a light at its proper hour.

Reinisch. I have not extinguished the fire at its hour.

23. I have not robbed the gods of their offered haunches; I have not turned away the cattle of the gods; I have not stopped a god from his manifestation.

Reinisch. I have not robbed the gods of their choice gifts; I have not seized one of the cattle which belonged to the divine possessions; I have not stood in the way of a god when he came forth.

These negative protestations are made collectively to the lord or lords of truth, and at the close of them the deceased exclaims five times, "I am pure!" then adds, "let no evil be done to me in the land of truth, because I know the names of the gods who are with thee in the Hall of Truth." He now addresses each of these gods by name and declares his innocence in turn of the offences which they are severally appointed to punish. These specifications are almost identical with the foregoing; but we repeat them in numerical order:

1. I have not been idle.
2. I have not waylaid.
3. I have not boasted.
4. I have not stolen.
5. I have not smitten men privily.
6. I have not counterfeited rings.
7. I have not played the hypocrite.
8. I have not stolen the things of the gods.
9. I have not told falsehoods.
10. I have not spared food.
11. I have not caused to weep.
12. I have not rejected.
13. I have not been idle.
14. I have not eaten the heart.
15. I have not plundered.
16. I have not killed sacred beasts.
17. I have not made conspiracies.
18. I have not robbed the streams.
19. I have not been deaf.
20. I have not let my mouth wander.
21. I have not robbed things.
22. I have not corrupted women or men [or the wife of another].
23. I have not polluted myself.
24. I have not caused fear.
25. I have not plundered.
26. I have not burnt my mouth.
27. I have not been inattentive to the words of truth.
28. I have not blasphemed.
29. I have not put forth my arm.
30. I have not made delays or dawdled.
31. I have not hastened my heart.
32. I have not clipped the skins of the sacred beasts.
33. I have not multiplied words in speaking.
34. I have not lied or done any wicked sin.
35. I have not reviled the face of the king or of my father.
36. I have not defiled the river.
37. I have not made length of (loud) words.
38. I have not blasphemed a god.
39. I have not injured the gods, or calumniated the slave to his master.
40. I have not made his things; I have not made his account; I have not ordered.
41. I have not augmented his ..... I have not taken the clothes of the dead.
42. I have not despised a god in my heart, or to his face, or in things.

A discussion of the moral and civil codes of the Egyptians, and of their probable influence upon Moses in framing the Hebrew codes, would be too great a digression from the

purpose of this Article. Yet we would here insist upon the fact that this apologetic or negative plea of the deceased before the tribunal of the gods, implies the existence of a code of laws, in the old Egyptian empire, based upon the fundamental principles of morality, and which covered the duties of man toward the gods and the state, toward his fellow men, toward himself, and even toward the animal creation.[1] Notwithstanding the vagueness of some of the specifications, and the repetitious style of the whole confession, it is clear that among deadly sins were sacrilege against either temples or tombs, libidinous words or acts, crimes against life, fraud in business, lying, malice, the neglect of the needy and perishing, and the oppression of the poor. Though slavery existed, to treat a slave with cruelty, or to encourage such treatment from his master or overseer, was a sin to be punished by the gods. And it marks a particularly nice point in ethical legislation that, in a country so dependent upon irrigation, any malicious or fraudulent interference with the canals or water currents would debar the offender from reaping the harvest of Elysium on the banks of the celestial Nile. Such a code of laws as is here implied argues a high degree of ethical perception, if not of public morality as well.

Having protested his innocence of any mortal sin, the deceased is pronounced "without fault, without evil, without sin, without crimes. ..... He is pure; his mouth is pure; his hands are pure; his heart is pure; his fore-part is in the pure water; his hind-part is in the distilled waters; his middle is in the well of truth."

As he advances up the Hall of Truth, every part of the structure, the sill, the lintels, the lock, the planks, the floor, each being endowed with speech, challenges him to give its name. This done, the god of the balance announces that the heart of the deceased "goes to its place in the balance complete." Thoth, who has registered the result, declares that "he has given the Osiris his heart in its place." The goddess Truth, facing him says, "rejoice in truth; thy existence is at rest."

[1] Pleyte, sur chapitre cxxv. du Rituel Funéraire, p. 10.

Then the deceased, bowing before Osiris, the supreme judge, prays: "Place me before thee, O lord of eternity! I have no sins, no perversion. Hail, dweller of the west, good being, lord of Abydos! Let me pass the roads of darkness; let me follow thy servants in the gate; let me come out of Rusta, from the Hall of Truth; let me cross the lintel of the gate." Then is he led along with the kings. He is in the service of Osiris, clothed in real linen forever.

This chapter leaves one to infer what must be the fate of a soul that fails to pass this rigid scrutiny, since the Book of the Dead proceeds upon the assumption that the deceased who uses its prayers and formulas will be justified. But in the necropolis of Thebes are pictorial representations of the soul condemned by Osiris. In the form of a pig it is placed in a boat, under charge of two monkeys, to be conveyed back to the earth; and all connection with the abode of the gods is cut off by a stroke of an axe, severing the earth from the world of the dead, at the point where the return boat touches it.[1]

The very name, "Hall of Two Truths," which Lepsius considers the equivalent of a twofold judgment, is an assertion of that great principle which runs through all Egyptian eschatology, of discrimination between the good and the bad, by a divine judgment. The references in the Book of the Dead to a "pool of the damned," and "fire that burns inextinguishably to devour the evil," show clearly that punishment was reserved for those who failed to pass the ordeal of the scales and the forty-two assessors.

The book throughout recognizes that moral distinction so happily defined by Plato between souls that arrive in Hades "unexpiated and uninitiated," and those who arrive there "purified and initiated."[2]

IX. Up to the Empyrean.

The soul which has passed the scrutiny of Osiris and the forty-two criminal judges, and has come safely out of the Hall

[1] See plate in Wilkinson, Vol. v. p. 447.

[2] Phaedo, sec. 37.

of the Two Truths, is beyond the reach of condemnation. But though thus acquitted of mortal sin, it may still have clinging to it stains of evil, which must be effaced before it can attain to absolute purity and glory. Accordingly, at the secret door by which it emerges from the judgment hall is placed a basin surrounded with flames, which Champollion called "the Egyptian purgatory." This basin of fiery jets is guarded by four apes, which are said to be "fed with truth, and to abominate wickedness," being themselves "without guile." To these the deceased now addresses himself, praying: "Extract ye all the evil out of me, obliterate ye my faults, annihilate my sins, guard ye, and give me to pass the Pylon."

They grant him absolution in words as follows: "Thou mayest go, we obliterate all thy faults, we annihilate all thy sins. Thou hast been severed from the world, we dissipate all thy sins. Thou hast severed thyself from earth, thou hast dissipated all the sin which detained thee. Come to the Rusta. Thou passest the secret doors of the west. Thou comest forth and goest in as thou wishest, like one of the spirits hailed daily within the horizon."[1]

The perfection of blessedness and glory is to be admitted into the presence of the sun; to be taken into his bark for the heavenly voyage, and to be assimilated to his image. With uncovered head, the deceased adores the gods of the two zones, praying that he may enter their recesses as one of them, and "see that god within the gate."[2] Here follows another of those hymns of welcome, which occurring at intervals in the Book of the Dead, give it the effect of a triumphal symphony. The gods of the zones or orbit of the sun, the "keepers of the gate of heaven," thus answer his prayer: "The deceased passes; open ye the gates of the gateway; prepare ye his hall when he comes; justify ye his words against his accusers. There is given to him the food of the gods of the gate. There has been made for him the head attire

[1] Chap. cxxvi.

[2] This phrase denotes the mysterious, incommunicable name of Osiris as the sun.

which belongs to him, as dwelling in the hidden place, as the image of the great waters, true soul of a created spirit prevailing with his hands and arms. The lion-gods say to them, very great is the deceased; they rejoice at him; they adore him with their arms; they give to him their emblems; he has lived. The Osiris has been crowned as the living soul of the sun in the heaven; he has made all the appointed transformations; he has been justified before the chiefs; he has passed through the gate on heaven and earth, like the soul of the sun."

The deceased responds: "I have opened the gate of the heaven and earth; the soul of Osiris rests there; I cross through their halls; they adore when they see me; I go in as I like; I come out as I choose; I go along; no defect or evil is found in me."

Here opens a new section of the ritual with "the book of vivifying the soul forever, of letting it go to the boat of the sun." The deceased enters the sacred boat, in which are two gods and a pilot. And now the whole creation makes way for his coming. "The heaven is open; the earth opens; the south opens; the north opens; the west opens; the east opens; the southern zenith opens; the northern nadir opens; the valves of the door open; the gateway of the sun opens; he proceeds from the horizon; he has unclosed the doors of the ark; he has opened the doors of the cabin; Shu has given him breath; Tefnut created him; they serve in his service.[1] The Osiris does not walk in the valley of darkness; he does not go into the pool of the damned; his soul lives forever; he does not die again in Hades. ..... His food is off the altar of the sun every day; he lives as a god."

As the deceased sails on in his heavenly bark he pays his adoration to the sun, and to each of the divinities through whose domain he passes. Among these "adorations" is the magnificent litany of Osiris; commencing "Osiris, the good being; Osiris, the living; Osiris, the living lord; Osiris, universal lord"; and after enumerating a hundred and fifty titles

[1] Chap. cxxx.

or properties of the supreme god, closing with "Osiris, in all his creation; Osiris, in all his names; Osiris, in all his disguises; Osiris, in all his crowns; Osiris, in all his decorations; Osiris, in all places."

The deceased now arrives at the house of Osiris. It has seven halls, and he must name the guardian of each as he approaches it. To these succeed the twenty-one gates of Elysium, each of them defended by a formidable divinity. The deceased gives the name of the guardian, and describes his qualities; then receiving from the god the answer, "Thou mayest go, thou art purified," he passes on up seven staircases, repeating like formulas of incantation. "Each staircase or pylon has a name written on the door; a demon inhabitant with a secret or mystical name; and a demon doorkeeper; the names of all of which it was essential for the deceased to know if he hoped to pass through them unscathed." [1] The titles of some of these doorkeepers are sufficient to inspire terror, e.g.: "Eater of Filth"; "Living off Worms"; "the Inextinguishable Fire"; "Preparing Lamentations"; "Destroyer of Liars"; "Stoneface"; "Heart-vexer"; "Stopper of the *Verbose!*" These gates gleam with felspar, and there enter into them nothing that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination or maketh a lie. But he who has passed through the Hall of the Two Truths has nothing to fear. He enters through the gates to the mystical abodes. Here corn grows to the height of seven cubits, with ears two cubits in length; here are high hills on which the heaven rests; here are palaces whose light glows like fire; here are the tables of the gods, covered with the delicious food from the fields of Hetp. But who shall describe the glory of this final abode of the beatified spirit, "the delight of the sun, who is rendered great as Osiris?" To him is given a "secret book of truth"; to instruct him in the mysteries of this inner heaven. That book! "No man sees it except a king and a priest; no slave's face looks at it. There is not known any such anywhere or ever; no men

[1] Birch, Bunsen's Egypt, Vol. v. p. 152.

have spoken it; no eye has perceived it; no ear has heard it; not any one other face has looked in it to learn it. Do not thou multiply its chapters, and do not thou let any face see it except thy own."[1] The possessor of this book is "made to live forever, and nothing prevails against him."

X. The Resurrection of the Body.

While the soul has been ascending through successive stages of metamorphosis and purification, and through immense periods of duration, the body has not been forgotten or neglected. Once we have seen the soul return to the mummy and embrace it with the kiss of peace and the symbol of immortality. Portions of the ritual are specially devoted to "the preservation of the body," especially of the heart and brain, "not allowing it to corrupt in Hades, but making its flesh and bones sound against decay." Embalmed with sacred rites, reposing in its granite sarcophagus, or in its rock-hewn sepulchre, secure from heat or moisture, the body awaits the second coming of the soul for its awakening. Not till the spirit has become completely purified and has reached the mystic abode of Osiris does this blissful summons come. Then arises the prayer: "Heaven holds thy soul, the earth holds thy form; save thou the Osiris; do not let him be captured by the devourers of souls by whom the evil-doer is borne off; make his soul in his body again."[2] Then, as from the tomb, where the sun is seen shedding his rays on the mummy as it reposes on its bier, comes the cry of exultation, "Hail, O my father Osiris or Tum! I have come; I prepare this my body; this my body does not pass away. ..... Hail, my father Osiris; thy limbs are with thee; thou dost not corrupt; thou dost not turn to worms; thou dost not rise up; thou dost not stink; thou dost not decay; thou dost not change into worms; the eye of Shu has not decayed away;

[1] How strikingly do these expressions recall the following passages of scripture, "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard," etc. (1 Cor. ii. 9). And "If any man shall add unto these things" (Rev. xxii. 18).

[2] Chapter clxix.

I am; I am; I live; I live; I grow; I grow; I wake in peace; I am not corrupted; I am not suffocated there; I grow tall; my substance is not sent away; my ear does not grow deaf; my head and neck do not separate; my tongue has not been taken away; it has not been cut out; my eyebrow is not plucked out; no injury is done to my body; it neither wastes nor is suffocated in that land forever and ever."[1]

The doctrine of immortality as conceived by the Egyptians required that the body should be protected from destruction. Hence the great care used in embalming, and the pains taken to conceal the sarcophagus in the heart of the pyramid or in the hidden and sealed mummy-pit of the tomb. For "though the soul was immortal, its happiness if not the possibility of its continuing to live, depended upon the preservation of the body. The destruction of the body consequently involved the destruction of the soul."[2] No satisfactory explanation of the process of embalming and the pains taken to deposit the mummy in a secret and durable sepulchre can be given except on the supposition that the preservation of the body had some important relation to the future of the soul. Why provide such solid tenements for the forsaken body, and why guard it so sacredly from decay or profanation, if it must remain forever lifeless and share at last in the dissolution of all organic nature? As Diodorus tells us, "the Egyptians called the abodes of the living inns [*diversoria*], because they are occupied only for a limited period; but the sepulchres of the dead they called eternal habitations."[3] Of the private houses of the ancient Egyptians not a vestige remains; but the dwellings of the dead, hewn from the native rock or built with the solidity of the pyramids, have survived all the changes of government, of race, of war, and of time, and are impressive witnesses for the faith that man can never truly die. No common instinct of affection or humanity will suffice to explain "the far-reaching care which made it the problem

[1] Chapter clv.

[2] Bunsen, Egypt's Place, Vol. iv. p. 651.

[3] Vol. i. p. 51.

of life with the living, to provide for the undisturbed rest of the corpse, for indestructible graves. The Egyptians must have imagined that the continued duration of the soul and the continued duration of the body were conjoined; that the existence of the soul would terminate with the corruption of the body; that the profanation or the disturbed rest of the body would trouble the soul in its sojourn in the fields of the sun-god." [1] In the faith of a resurrection of the body the symbolic eye was pictured upon the breast of the mummy or the mummy-case, through which the return of light would be announced to the deceased in the day of his awaking; and his tomb was decorated with the story of his own life and possessions, domestic and public, in order that the soul on returning to the body might find itself among familiar scenes.

The Egyptian romance of the Two Brothers [2] is founded upon the notion that, though the heart may be separated from the body, yet, wherever the heart is, the life of the person is indestructible so long as his heart, or any portion of it, survives. Hence the great solicitude of the deceased not to lose his heart in his wanderings in Hades.

XI. Summary of Doctrine.

It were vain to look to original sources for a didactic statement of the Egyptian faith. The reserve and mystery of the priests, of which Herodotus so often speaks, are apparent in the mystical style of the Book of the Dead. The seventeenth chapter, which is one of the oldest, and which contains nearly the whole body of doctrine, is accompanied uniformly, in the Turin papyrus and other late copies, with a gloss or interpretation, which however varies somewhat in different examples. It is Osiris-theology throughout. It cannot yet be determined whether the book, as we now have it, was arranged according to an order of thought, or simply in the historical order of composition. If the former, then it exhibits a somewhat systematic development of doctrine; but if

[1] Duncker, Geschichte des Alterthums, Book i. chap. iv.

[2] See Cambridge Essays for 1858.

the latter, it revolves about two or three ideas which are repeated under new forms. But in either case it is certain that the knowledge of these Hermetic books "assured to the soul a passage from the earth; a transit through the purgatory and other regions of the dead; the entrance into the empyreal gate, by which the souls arrived at the presence of the sun; the admission into the bark or orb of the sun, ever traversing in brilliant light the liquid ether; and protection from the various liers-in-wait, or adversaries, who sought to accuse, destroy, or detain it on its passage or destiny." [1]

Lepsius is of opinion that the great judgment scene followed soon after death; and he regards "the day" so often mentioned in the captions as *dies illa*, thus comprehending in one brief familiar term the resurrection, the judgment, and the final justification.

The same able critic regards the absorption of the soul into the supreme soul of the world as the final doctrine of the book. The deceased becomes Osiris, and as such announces himself as the one supreme and eternal god, who, existing before all time, was the original substance, the hidden one; but as the sun-god Ra he rules the ordered world of light, and manifests himself in all gods and right-living men as his own members, each of whom is but another name for himself, and each of whom at the end of his earthly course, like the sun at evening, divests himself of his visible form, and returns to him who is the original spirit, dwelling in all forms. The soul, as an emanation, being thus reabsorbed in the individual or unity, attains to the highest evolution of the divinity as pure spiritual *potentia*.[2]

Wilkinson has also pronounced this pantheistic dogma to be the foundation of the Egyptian faith. "The Egyptians considered the souls of men to be emanations of that divine soul which governed and pervaded the universe; each eventually returning to its divine origin, provided the virtuous course of life it had led in this world showed it to be sufficiently pure to unite with the immaculate nature of the deity." [3]

[1] Bunsen, Egypt's Place, Vol. v. p. 134.
[2] Aelteste Texte. [3] Ancient Egyptians, Vol. iv. p. 316.

Yet the analysis now given of the Book of the Dead hardly warrants this conclusion. After the deceased has attained to the consciousness of self-existence, he still appears under various characters, — among these the inundation. This is resemblance, not absorption; and even his highest transformation, which is nothing less than his divinization, as described in the forty-second chapter, is not an absorption into the sun, but the assumption of the attributes of many gods; and though, with Count Rougé, we regard these various divinities as themselves but personifications of the attributes of Ra, the sun-god, yet the deceased is not absorbed in him, but assimilated to him. Further on in the Ritual, the deceased is pictured walking toward a solar disc, which throws upon him its brilliant rays, a symbol of the luminous transfiguration of the justified soul; and after he has attained the highest transformations, and has appeared as the demiurge and the principle of light, he revisits the body in its earthly sepulchre. Thus the individuality of the soul is preserved throughout. Moreover, why should the body have been so jealously guarded if the blessedness of the soul would consist in the annihilation of consciousness by absorption? The book favors the notion of the restoration of the wicked, through a succession of trials covering an indefinite period. The soul which is remanded to earth in the body of a pig, may eventually come to occupy again a human form, and on passing a second time into Hades may go successfully through its scathing ordeal. There are glimpses, however, of a hell for the finally incorrigible.

There is no doctrine of redemption in the Book of the Dead; but the deceased is justified upon his own merits or by the favor of a god. Count Rougé thinks that an atonement is implied in chapter seventeen, where the violent death of Osiris is celebrated as a victory; he is addressed as the lord of blood, and his heart is mingled symbolically with the bloody sacrifices, as if to give them a greater expiatory value.[1]

[1] Études sur le Rituel Funéraire.

In summing up the belief of the Egyptians concerning the future state, one may well adopt the conclusions of Bunsen: "The Osiris-theology centres in the antitheses of right and wrong, holiness and vice. ..... According to the creed of the Egyptians, the soul of man was divine, and therefore immortal. It is subject to personal moral responsibility. The consequence of evil actions is banishment from the presence of God. Man, when justified, becomes conscious that he is a son of God, and destined to behold God at the termination of his wanderings. ..... With the comfortless symbolism of their faith were closely connected ethical ideas; those moral feelings which regulate human life and repress the outbursts of savage nature, namely, the faith in a moral government of the world, in personal moral responsibility, in a personal divine judgment." [1]

ARTICLE VI.

THE SITE OF SODOM.

BY REV. SAMUEL WOLCOTT, D.D., CLEVELAND, OHIO.

THERE is no site, ancient or modern, which combines all the elements of interest that belong to the site of Sodom and the other "cities of the plain," whose destruction is recorded in the Book of Genesis. It has attracted, of late years, much laborious and learned investigation, but it is still invested with not a little mystery. The few remarkable facts of the scriptural narrative and a few remarkable local phenomena open a wide range of speculation; but in some important points they furnish no determinate data. The few points which we shall seek to elucidate and establish are definite; and we have introduced the discussion here, not to propose

[1] Egypt's Place, Vol. iv. pp. 64 and 642.

any new solution, but mainly to examine a new theory which has been propounded in Dr. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible.

The author of this theory is George Grove, Esq., of Sydenham, England, a gentleman who stands in the front rank of biblical scholars. Of the nearly seventy eminent writers and critics, whose multifarious learning has made the Dictionary such an invaluable Thesaurus of scriptural knowledge, there is probably no single contributor to whom it owes so much as to the one whom we have named. The wonderful versatility and competency which he has shown in the discussion of archaeological, exegetical, geographical, geological, historical, and topographical questions, pertaining to the sacred oracles, have given his name authority in biblical matters. Dean Stanley gratefully availed himself of his careful revision, in the successive works which he has published relative to the Bible and the Orient; and any theory in the department of sacred history and geography, emanating from such a source, will command attention, and is entitled to respectful consideration.

Mr. Grove's Theory.

It has been the universal impression heretofore, that the condemned cities lay either in what is now the basin of the Dead Sea, or contiguous to its southern section; that Sodom especially, lay near its southern end, either on the site of its present bed, or adjacent to its shore. In opposition to this universal belief, Mr. Grove puts forth the theory that these cities were in the present plain of the Jordan, north of the existing sea. He has brought it forward in four different Articles which he has written for the Dictionary, namely, "The Salt Sea," "The Vale of Siddim," "Sodom," and "Zoar,"[1] all in the last volume of the English edition.

The reader will notice this peculiarity in these Articles, namely, that the theory is repeatedly stated without qualification, or any apparent misgiving, and yet in a subsequent

[1] The able writer of the Article "Gomorrah" accepts the old theory.

sentence the writer will seem to qualify his own belief in it. Thus in the first Article we have the following:

"Of the situation of these cities [cities of the plain] we only know that, being in the 'plain of the Jordan,' they must have been to the north of the lake" (The Salt Sea, iii. 1187).

We understand the writer here to affirm that the cities were north of the lake, and could not have been south of it. In the next Article we find this sentence:

"It should be remembered that if the cities of the plain were, as there is much reason to believe they were, at the north end of the Dead Sea," etc. (The Vale of Siddim, iii. 1308).

The positive is here softened into the merely probable — "must have been," into "much reason to believe." In the third Article we have the following:

"It is necessary to notice how absolutely the cities are identified with the district. The mention of the Jordan is conclusive as to the situation of the district, for the Jordan ceases where it enters the Dead Sea, and can have no existence south of that point" (Sodom, iii. 1339).

"From all these passages, though much is obscure, two things are clear: 1. That Sodom and the rest of the cities of the plain of Jordan stood north of the Dead Sea" (Sodom, iii. 1339).

"A more serious departure from the terms of the ancient history is exhibited in the prevalent opinion that the cities stood at the south end of the lake" (Sodom, iii. 1340).

These extracts swing us back again to the absolute, the clear, the positive, the conclusive, leaving no doubt in the reader's mind respecting the author's opinion. But we are suddenly thrown into utter confusion by a later statement in the same Article:

"It thus appears that on the situation of Sodom no satisfactory conclusion can be come at. On the one hand the narrative of Genesis seems to state positively that it lay at the northern end of the Dead Sea. On the other hand the long-continued tradition and the names of existing spots seem to pronounce with almost equal positiveness that it was at its southern end. How the geological argument may affect either side of the proposition cannot be decided in the present condition of our knowledge" (Sodom, iii. 1340).

In the fourth Article, as in the others, we are brought back again to the almost positive in these words:

"Zoar, one of the most ancient cities of the land of Canaan. [A mistake; it belonged to Moab.] It was situated in the same district with the four cities already mentioned, namely, in the 'plain of the Jordan,' and the narrative of Gen. xix. evidently implies that it was very near to Sodom. The definite position of Sodom is, and probably will always be, a mystery, but there can be little doubt that the plain of the Jordan was at the north of the Dead Sea, and that the cities of the plain must therefore have been situated there, instead of at the southern end of the lake, as it is generally taken for granted they were" (Zoar, iii. 1856).

This is perfectly clear; the cities were north of the sea; but scarcely has the reader settled down with the comfortable conviction that he now understands the writer, before he is again set afloat by a concession in the same Article which after giving some of the opposite data, closes as follows:

"They only add to the general mystery in which the whole of the question of the position and destruction of the cities is involved, and to which the writer sees at present no hope of a solution" (Zoar, iii. 1856).

Our readers are probably ready to ask: What does Mr. Grove really believe respecting the site of Sodom and its neighbor cities? We cannot answer this question with confidence, though we have faithfully searched for an answer. After carefully weighing all his statements — the positive, the probable, and the perplexed — we are inclined to the opinion that in his own mind he accepts the theory which he has broached, namely, that these cities lay in the plain north of the sea. But it being an original hypothesis, in conflict both with the current belief and with weighty testimony, he does not feel that he can confidently press it upon the acceptance of others. If this is not his exact position, we think it will be necessary for him to define it for himself. But this is a secondary question. The theory is there, and the question which invites our examination is, whether there is any good ground for adopting it.

After our examination of Mr. Grove's theory was completed, we had the opportunity for the first time of reading the Rev. H. B. Tristram's published travels in Palestine, "The Land of Israel," a work of decided merit, which has not been reprinted in this country. He has devoted special attention

to the natural history of the Holy Land, which he found almost a virgin field — to its botany and zoölogy, as well as its geology,—and has greatly enlarged our knowledge of the flora and fauna of the country, collecting and classifying many interesting specimens. He has become favorably known by his papers on these topics, some of which are embodied in Smith's Dictionary of the Bible. But while throughout his tour he was on the constant and keen hunt for "all manner of wild beasts and creeping things and fowls of the air," and fishes, and insects, and eggs, together with flowers, plants, minerals, and shells, and of all these accumulated rich spoils, he did not overlook important points of history and topography. In these departments, as in the province which was his specialty, he made some valuable observations, though his attention was mainly directed to physical history and phenomena. His large equipments would not seem to have included a compass, and even on the supposed heights of Pisgah, which were awaiting identification, he took no bearings. The basin of the Dead Sea and the adjacent region attracted his particular examination. His geological speculations respecting the pre-historic period do not, at present, concern us. On the points discussed in this paper he yields his assent to the theory which we controvert; and we were a little dismayed to find Mr. Grove, strong when he stands alone, supported by this able ally. In some essential particulars, however, the two writers differ widely, and refute each other. In the progress of the discussion we shall examine Mr. Tristram's reasonings in full.

Submergence of the Plain.

Connected with this theory respecting the site of the cities, there is another, relative to the submergence of the present bed of the sea, which Mr. Grove also advances in opposition to most of the writers who have preceded him. He holds "that neither the cities nor the district were submerged by the lake" (Sodom, iii. 1339); that no portion of the present basin of the sea was ever submerged; that "as to even the

southern and shallow portion, if it has undergone any material change in historic times, such change would seem to be one rather of gradual elevation than of submersion" (The Vale of Siddim, iii. 1308). The question of the submergence of the site of the cities, as we shall see, is distinct from that of the submergence of a portion of the valley. It is only on the latter point that we claim any clear historical data; the former is a matter of inference merely.

These two theories of Mr. Grove, though intimately connected, do not necessarily stand or fall together. In whatever way the question of submergence may be decided, the question whether the site of the cities, if they did not occupy the present basin of the sea, was north of it or south of it, might remain an open question; though the submergence of a portion of the plain, could it be ascertained, would unquestionably support the theory which Mr. Grove opposes, and discountenance that which he espouses. Its relation to the general subject renders it proper for us to devote some preliminary attention to this point.

The evidences which bear on the question of submergence are mainly of two classes, the historical and the geological. The latter we pass over entirely, leaving them to writers who are versed in the science of geology. Our own impression is, and Mr. Grove in a passage already quoted (p. 114) would seem wholly to concur in it, though in other passages he lays stress upon geological features, that the data as yet ascertained would not furnish the most scientific observer with the basis of a solid and adequate theory. It is sufficient for this discussion that no points have thus far been established by geological exploration which conflict with the historical testimony as we understand it.

The earliest historical evidence is contained in the oldest record extant: "All these were joined together in the Vale of Siddim, which is the Salt Sea" (Gen. xiv. 3). The writer here asserts that what was the Vale of Siddim at the time of the battle described, was at the time of his writing the Salt Sea. If we are to accept the unity of the authorship of the

book, it was so when the original record was made. If we may regard the book as a compilation, and the last clause of this verse as the gloss of the compiler, it was so when the compilation was made. Both theories leave us the ancient, indisputable, biblical testimony to the identity, in whole or in part, of the site of the Vale of Siddim and of that of the Salt Sea. This interpretation is sustained by Gesenius, who defines the Vale of Siddim (valley of the plains) as the plain "now occupied by the Dead Sea" (Lex. שִׂדִּים).

Mr. Grove adopts the second of the theories just named, but he places on this passage the same interpretation that we do. He rejects the translation of those who would construe the latter clause of the verse, "which is near, at, or by, the Salt Sea," and insists on the other interpretation. He says:

"The original of the passage will not bear even this slight accommodation, and it is evident that in the mind of the author of the words, no less than of the learned and eloquent divine and historian of our own time already alluded to, the Salt Sea covers the actual space formerly occupied by the Vale of Siddim" (The Vale of Siddim, iii. 1308).

This is decisive; and thus understanding the scriptural testimony, which pointedly contradicts his theory, how does he dispose of it? In a way which we venture to say not one of our readers will conjecture before reading it. His explanation is as follows:

"The words which more especially bear on the subject of this article (v. 3) do not form part of the original document. That venerable record has — with a care which shows how greatly it was valued at a very early date — been annotated throughout by a later, though still very ancient, chronicler, who has added what in his day were believed to be the equivalents for names of places that had become obsolete. Bela is explained to be Zoar; En-Mishpat to be Kadesh; the Emek-Shaveh to be the Valley of the King; the Emek has-Siddim to be the Salt Sea, that is, in modern phraseology, the Dead Sea. And when we remember how persistently the notion has been entertained for the last eighteen centuries that the Dead Sea covers a district which before its submersion was not only the Valley of Siddim but also the Plain of the Jordan, and what an elaborate account of the catastrophe of its submersion has been constructed even very recently by one of the most able scholars of our day, we can hardly be surprised that a chronicler in an age far less able to interpret natural phenomena, and at

the same time long subsequent to the date of the actual event, should have shared in the belief" (The Vale of Siddim, iii. 1307, 1308).

Do our readers understand the allusion? Do they appreciate this reasoning from the modern to the ancient, from the greater to the less? The argument without circumlocution is just this: "Inasmuch as even Dean Milman has been misled, it is less surprising that Moses (or the ancient chronicler who wrote these words) should have been mistaken also." This is not a style of reasoning which we should have anticipated from Mr. Grove, nor should we have looked for it in a dictionary of the Bible. We take it that he does not mean to impeach the integrity of the sacred canon; it is not pretended, nor is there any ground for suspicion, that there has been a corruption of the inspired text.

"The clause is found in all the ancient MSS. and versions, and in the Targum of Onkelos. Its genuineness rests on the very same basis as the other portions of the narrative. We have the same evidence of its Mosaic authorship as we have of any other part of the book" (Porter, Kitto's Bib. Cyc., iii. 801).

Any theory which may be held respecting the authorship of the book is of no consequence to our present discussion, if we have here an unblemished copy of the divine revelation. Any theory which gives us this, leaves this testimony of equal value to us. The authenticity of the record we understand to be conceded in the Article quoted; but it is alleged that the later, yet very ancient, chronicler, who compiled or annotated the original document, and gave it to us in its present shape, was in point of fact mistaken. We consider this surmise wholly unwarranted and unwarrantable, and believe the writer to have had far better data for his statement than any modern critic can possibly have for correcting him. The reason assigned for the supposed error, moreover, is irrelevant. The submergence of the Vale of Siddim, the conversion of its site to the waters of the Dead Sea, is simply a question of historic fact, the statement of which does not require a chronicler who is "able to interpret natural phenomena." — The allusion to these "annotations" in another

Article, with the remark that they "must stand or fall by their own merits" (The Salt Sea, iii. 1186) awakens doubt whether we have not placed too favorable a construction on the above; whether in fact it be not an attack, for which there is no apology, on the inspired text.

The other glosses or annotations, as Mr. Grove claims them to be, he does not hesitate to accept as valid historic testimony. He says of Zoar, that "its original name was Bela" (iii. 1856), of Bethlehem, that "its earliest name was Ephrath" (i. 201), and of Hazezon-Tamar, that it "afterwards became Engedi" (i. 764), on exactly the authority, and no other which he rejects as inconclusive here. "Bela, which is Zoar"; "the Vale of Siddim, which is the Salt Sea"; "En-Mishpat, which is Kadesh"; "the valley of Shaveh, which is the king's dale"; "Ephrath, which is Bethlehem"; "Hazezon-Tamar, which is Engedi"; annotations or glosses like these, if they are such (the first four occurring in the same narrative), are equally reliable or equally worthless. No law of interpretation will permit Mr. Grove to accept one and reject another on the ground that the writer was not a naturalist. Such a claim would rather suggest that some modern naturalist might have a theory which did not harmonize with the ancient record. Even if it were conceded, it would establish the fact that prior to the composition or completion of our Book of Genesis, the belief was current that the chasm now filled by the waters of the Dead Sea had been in part at least, a valley or plain; and then the question would remain: Whence could such a belief have originated? In attempting to withdraw from the view which he opposes the support of the ancient record, he is obliged to grant it the weight of a tradition older than the chronicler.

The sacred narrative names a single physical feature of the Vale of Siddim, namely, that it abounded with "slime-pits" (Gen. xiv. 10). These pits were wells of asphaltum, or bitumen, probably of various dimensions, "sufficient," as Mr. Grove states, either from their number, or size, or both, "materially to affect the issue of the battle." These asphal-

tic wells have disappeared; but bitumen is still found around the southern section of the sea, and it rises to the surface of the water in large quantities, in that portion of it, when dislodged by an earthquake (Bib. Res. ii. 229 sq.); and the supply was formerly more copious than now. We have modern testimony to this effect, and we have that of three eminent ancient historians in the century before Christ, and the following: Diodorus Siculus, Josephus, and Tacitus, who represent the asphaltum as rising to the surface of the water in black and bulky masses. The theory that the Vale of Siddim is covered by the southern part of the sea harmonizes the ancient record and the late phenomena. It sustains the statement that it was full of bituminous wells; it accounts for their disappearance, and it explains the occasional spectacle since, down to the present time, of large quantities of asphaltum on the surface of the water. Thus far we have a consistent, confirmed, uncontradicted testimony.

As we pass from the simple affirmation of the sacred writer, with the confirmation, in subsequent ages, of the only physical feature of the territory which he names, we leave behind us, of course, all direct testimony. The only remaining evidence, exclusively historical, is of that secondary and confirmatory kind which may be drawn from the investigations and impressions of later writers most competent to form a judgment, who have examined the subject, or who, as historians, have recorded the prevalent tradition, or the most intelligent opinion. Our earliest witness in this sense is the geographer Strabo, who was born some sixty years before Christ. In his statement, though amplified by tradition, we find imbedded the central fact implied in the scriptural narrative:

"Shocks of earthquake, eruptions of flames, and hot springs, containing asphaltus and sulphur, caused the lake to burst its bounds, and the rocks took fire; some of the cities were swallowed up; others were abandoned by such of the inhabitants as were able to make their escape" (Judaea, iii. 183, Bohn's ed.).

Our next witness, in the same sense as the previous, is

Josephus, who gives the following paraphrase (which Mr. Grove quotes) of the sacred narrative as understood in the first century of the Christian era:

"They encamped in the valley called the Wells of Asphalt; for at that time there were wells in that spot; but now that the city of the Sodomites has disappeared, that valley has become a lake, which is called Asphaltites" (Antiq. i. 9).

This is clear, positive, and unmistakable, like the record in Genesis, asserting unequivocally that the valley had been converted into a lake. It embodies the undoubted tradition of the Jewish nation. It exhibits their own interpretation of their own sacred writings. We regard the writer in Genesis as a trusty witness, and we accept the testimony of Josephus as corroborative. These authorities are our principal source of information respecting Palestine. This evidence is convincing until it is set aside by weightier; and in contravention of it, we have, as yet, nothing which can be called testimony.

We pass next to the learned Reland, a standard classic on Palestine, who with equal discrimination, candor, and conscientiousness has summed up the results of the labors of all who, a century and a half ago, had preceded him as gleaners in this field. On the point before us his critical decision is as follows:

"There is but one thing stated here (Gen. xiv. 3), that the valley which was formerly called Valley of Siddim, became afterwards the Dead Sea, a fact which I do not mean to contradict. Indeed this valley may have been flooded by the waters forming this sea, either in consequence of an increase of the Jordan, or of the gushing out of subterranean or other springs; but as no one knows how or when this has happened, nothing is gained by dwelling on this point" (Palest., i. 254).

Speculation respecting the mode may be fruitless; but this acute biblicist recognizes the passage as teaching plainly the occurrence itself.

The same conclusion was accepted by the historic judgment of the learned historian Milman, who also shared the mistaken opinion, prevalent until lately, that the Jordan flowed through the Arabah. On the question here at issue he says:

"The cities stood on a soil broken and undermined with veins of bitumen

and sulphur. These inflammable substances set on fire by lightning caused a terrible convulsion; the water-courses — both the river and the canals by which the land was extensively irrigated — burst their banks; the cities, the walls of which were perhaps built from the combustible materials of the soil, were entirely swallowed up by the fiery inundation, and the whole valley, which had been compared to Paradise and the well-watered corn-fields of the Nile, became a dead and fetid lake" (Hist. of the Jews, i. 15, 16).

Some of this, of course, is conjectural; but that a discerning writer of history should venture to construct so detailed a theory, shows at least the strength of his conviction of the literal truth of the scripture declaration on which it rests.

Professor Robinson, who brought to the solution of this question the results of a closer examination of the locality, as well as of a wider investigation of the topic than any who had preceded him, boldly propounded the theory which Mr. Grove controverts. He says:

"In view of all these facts, there is but a step to the obvious hypothesis, that the fertile plain is now in part occupied by the southern bay, or that portion of the sea lying south of the peninsula; and that by some convulsion or catastrophe of nature, connected with the miraculous destruction of the cities, either the surface of this plain was scooped out, or the bottom of the sea was heaved up, so as to cause the waters to overflow and cover permanently a larger tract than formerly" (Bib. Res. ii. 604).

These suggestions seemed to receive a remarkable confirmation in the explorations of the United States Expedition. The conclusion is thus stated by Lieutenant Lynch:

"The inference from the Bible that this entire chasm was a plain sunk and 'overwhelmed' by the wrath of God, seems to be sustained by the extraordinary character of our soundings. The bottom of the sea consists of two submerged plains, an elevated and a depressed one; the former averaging thirteen, the latter about thirteen hundred, feet below the surface. Through the northern and largest and deepest one, in a line corresponding with the bed of the Jordan, is a ravine which again seems to correspond with the Wady el-Jeib, or ravine within a ravine, at the south end of the sea" (Off. Rep. 378, 379).

The learned Professor, who was as little wedded to theory as any author whom we know, keeping his mind open to conviction and aiming to preserve an impartial judgment,

retained his views, as above expressed, after the published discoveries and speculations of the many explorers in Palestine who followed his steps; and they are embodied in his posthumous work — his last contribution to the cause to which his life was devoted — with even a more specific suggestion as to the method:

"This narrative (Gen. xix. 24, 25, 28) is readily explained by supposing that in a tempest of thunder and lightning, the accompaniments, perhaps of an earthquake or some volcanic action, or both, these masses of bitumen were ignited by the lightning, and a conflagration produced which not only destroyed the cities but also consumed and scooped out the surface of the plain itself; so that the waters of the lake rushing in, spread themselves over the once fertile tract" (Phys. Geog. of the Holy Land, 234, 235).

Ritter, our greatest name in sacred geography, assents to the theory of the combustion of the cities, and also of the great change which was wrought both in the land and in the water:

"Russegger holds that at the bottom of the sea there are far greater accumulations [of asphaltum] than along the rocks on the shores, and that these are detached from the bottom by violent earthquakes and brought to the surface. Bitumen is often found largely filled with organic remains, as well as with earthy substances. The conglomerate burns freely, emitting a great deal of smoke and a strong bituminous smell. The fire which is said to have come down from heaven may be taken literally as lightning. The rocks whence the bitumen proceeds could be readily kindled by the lightning, and the punishment inflicted by a divine hand upon Sodom and Gomorrah would be entirely consistent with the working of natural law. Russegger discovered bituminous layers in the Jura formation, some of which were from two to three feet in thickness" (Geog. of Palestine, iii. 156).

"The extremely salt character which the lake now has, may be regarded as not having been peculiar to it from the very first. What is said of the fertility of the country adjoining it, the comparison of it with the garden-like valley of the Nile, the allusions made to its attractiveness in the eyes of Lot as well as of King Chedorlaomer, would hardly be said of a country blasted by the contact of such a mass of brine as the Dead Sea now is; it could only have been true of a tract laved by fresh water" (Geog. of Palestine, iii. 162).

"I discriminate between the primitive vast Jordan fissure running from the Lebanon to the Gulf of Akaba, regarding whose formation we have no historical account, and a late and secondary modification of the same, connected with which was a great catastrophe, of which we have a historical

record, because it took place in the territory under the immediate observation of the patriarchs" (Geog. of Palestine, iii. 165).

"Daubeny has wrought this theme out with singular clearness and force, and has shown that as water was chosen as the minister of God at the time of the deluge, so volcanic agencies may have been ordained to the same mission at the time of the destruction of the cities of the plain, a conviction in which I heartily coincide, and which does no violence to the statements of scripture" (Geog. of Palestine, iii. 166).

Mr. Tristram's exposition of the mode in which the cities were destroyed is as follows:

"I think there can be no question but that the old notions of volcanic agencies about the Dead Sea were erroneous, and that many writers, like De Saulcy, have been misled by endeavoring to square their preconceived interpretation of scripture with the facts they saw around them. But setting aside all preconceived notions, and taking the simple record of Gen. xix. as we find it, let us see whether the existing condition of the country throws any light upon the biblical narrative. Certainly we do observe by the lake sulphur and bitumen in abundance. Sulphur springs stud the shores, sulphur is strewn, whether in layers or fragments over the desolate plains, and bitumen is ejected in great floating masses from the bottom of the sea, oozes through the fissures of the rocks, is deposited with gravel on the beach, or, as in the Wady Mahawat, appears with sulphur to have been precipitated during some convulsion. We know that at the time of earthquakes in the north, the bitumen seems, even in our own day, to be detached from the bottom of the lake, and that floating islets of that substance have been evolved (see Robinson, Bib. Res. i. 518), coincident with the convulsions so frequent in northeastern Palestine. Everything leads to the conclusion that the agency of fire was at work, though not the overflowing of an ordinary volcano. The materials were at hand, at whichever end of the lake we place the doomed cities, and may probably have been accumulated then to a much greater extent than at present. The kindling of such a mass of combustible material, either by lightning from heaven, or by other electrical agency, combined with an earthquake ejecting the bitumen or sulphur from the lake, would soon spread devastation over the plain, so that the smoke of the country would go up as the smoke of a furnace. There is no authority whatever, in the biblical record, for the popular notion that the site of the cities has been submerged. The simple and natural explanation seems, when stripped of all the wild tradition and strange horrors with which the mysterious sea has been invested, to be this: That during some earthquake, or without its direct agency, showers of sulphur, and probably bitumen, ejected from the lake, or thrown up from its shores, and ignited perhaps by the lightning which would accompany such phenomena, fell upon the cities and destroyed them. The history of the catastrophe has not only

remained in the inspired record, but is inscribed in the memory of the surrounding tribes by many a local tradition and significant name" (Land of Israel, 358, 359).

Ritter's notions, just quoted, if "old" are not obsolete; and a more enthusiastic devotee to fact, simple fact, a more faithful gatherer, and a more thorough digester of facts has, perhaps, never lived than the author of "Erdkunde," which, in the English dress in which Mr. Gage has presented it to us, is absolutely fascinating to all who are interested in the field which it covers, to whom fact is pleasanter than fiction. That the cities were not submerged, we admit. Whether or not "the site of the cities has been submerged," in part, at least, is a distinct question, on which the biblical record is silent, neither confirming nor contradicting the hypothesis.

In a note and appendix to one of the volumes of Ritter's great work (iii. 171–173, 350–388), Mr. Gage has given the geological speculations of Dr. Anderson of the United States Exploring Expedition, and M. Lartet, an eminent French geologist, who accompanied the Duc de Luynes' expedition, respecting the formation of the basin of the Dead Sea, relating mainly, if not exclusively, to pre-historic times. The latter writer names seven "conclusions," of which the last two may possibly refer to the historic period:

"6. At a later period volcanic eruptions have taken place, etc.

"7. Hot and mineral springs, bituminous eruptions, similar to those which accompany and follow volcanic action, and earthquakes, which are still frequent in the district, were the last important phenomena by which the basin of the Dead Sea was affected" (387, 388).

The bearing of this (if it is supposed to have any) on the scripture narrative is not explained. It is most evident that geology has not yet reached the solution of a problem which to its students must be specially attractive.

Whether the flame which kindled on Sodom and the guilty cities and consumed them, the inflammable bitumen entering largely into the composition of their walls, devoured also the adjacent Vale of Siddim, whose soil, abounding with asphalt-wells, would under a storm of fire be a magazine of quench-

less fuel, and thus burned out a chasm, which in whole or in part, now forms the lagoon; or whether some volcanic convulsion, an agency of which that region has been the known theatre, upheaved the combustible strata, exposing them to the action of fire, and thus secured the result, each supposition confirming the sacred narrative that as Abraham, from his high point of observation surveying the terrible destruction, "looked toward Sodom and Gomorrah, and toward all the land of the plain, and behold, and lo, the smoke of the country went up as the smoke of a furnace"; or whether, in connection with the destruction of the cities by fire, some earthquake-throe, such as that stupendous crevasse has more than once felt, sunk a portion of the soil out of sight, leaving the stagnant waters above as its memorial, cannot now be known. The agency which destroyed the cities was plainly igneous. The agency which converted the Vale of Siddim into a sheet of water is not stated. Any theory is admissible which consistently explains the two facts.

The submergence of the Vale of Siddim and the submergence of the cities of the plain, or of their site, are distinct questions, because the cities were not in this valley. On this point we concur with the judicious Reland:

"The inspired writer does not say that the five cities, Sodom and the rest, were situated in the valley of Siddim; on the contrary, the text (Gen. xiv. 3) leads to an opposite conclusion; since the kings of these five cities, after having collected their armies, joined together towards the valley of Siddim. Supposing the translation to be *in* the valley, the meaning is still the same. The probability is, then, that the valley of Siddim was quite distinct from the country in which the five cities were situated" (Palestine, i. 151).

We see not how any other opinion than this could have obtained currency among scholars. The vale and the territory of the cities, though distinct, were evidently contiguous and may have shared, and to some extent probably did share, a common catastrophe. The former may have been consumed with the latter, or the latter may have been depressed with the former. Neither the exact location nor extent of the Vale of Siddim can be ascertained. If it covered the whole

breadth of the southern part of the sea, the plain which borders on the south, ten miles long by six broad, was ample enough for the cities; but in all probability it was confined to a part of its width, leaving the rest for fruitful fields and walled towns, the sites of which are entombed by the sea. The vale was the battle-field between Chedorlaomer and his allies, and the confederate kings of the cities; and as the invaders apparently menaced the cities from the present point of Ain Jidy, and the kings went forth to meet them in this vale, it must have lain west or north of the cities.

If the rich vegetation of the well-watered plain of the Jordan, on whose tropical luxuriance Lot looked down from the highlands of Jordan, extended southward skirting fresh water along the site of a part of the present basin of the Salt Sea, and embosoming the Vale of Siddim with the cities which bordered it, the allusions in the scripture narrative are all adjusted and explained. This theory encounters no historic difficulty, nor any insuperable scientific difficulty, so far as is known. If there be a fatal objection to it, it lies buried in that vast, mysterious fissure, and awaits the resurrection of some future explorer. Should geology ever compel the substitution of a different theory, we may expect from some quarter the additional light which will enable us to reconcile it with the inspired record. In the mean time we rest on this hypothesis.

The Site of the Cities.

The question which Mr. Grove has raised relative to the site of Sodom and the other cities is, as we have said, distinct from that of the submergence of a part of the valley. The latter, however, touched the former, at so many points, as to impose upon us the demand of a prior consideration. This we have given it, and are now ready to take up Mr. Grove's position already quoted, "That Sodom and the rest of the cities of the plain of Jordan stood north of the Dead Sea," a position which, so far as we know, is original and opposed to universal tradition.

The argument from the scripture narrative (Gen. xiii.) is this: that Abraham and Lot, standing on some eminence between Bethel and Ai, surveyed the fruitful plain of the Jordan on the East — the region north of the sea being visible from that point, while what is now the southern end of the sea would be invisible; and that Lot selected the plain thus visible below him as his residence, and descending to it pitched his tent near Sodom, one of the cities planted amid its verdure.

The scene of the conference between Abraham and Lot is not stated by the sacred writer, but would seem to have been near the spot above named. The inference stated is also natural, and if there were no special reason to question it, it would pass unchallenged. But the location of the cities is not so definitely given as to compel us to accept the inference. Nor is it fairly implied in the narrative that Lot's view took in the whole valley; he surveyed a section of it, which in its fruitfulness represented the whole. The argument assumes that there has been no essential change in the plain and the sea since that day, except what would result in the former from disuse of the artificial irrigation which then made it so fruitful. But the phrase "before the Lord destroyed," etc., plainly indicates a marked change in consequence of the event; and there certainly is nothing in the scripture narrative inconsistent with the general belief that the catastrophe of the cities, which destroyed also "the country," wrought a great and general change in "the land of Sodom and Gomorrah," thus turned "into ashes." If the cultivated plain or valley, with or without a lake of fresh water in a part of the present bed of the sea, then extended as far as the present southern limit of the sea and adjacent plain, and the cities were in that section of it, the fact would not conflict with the sacred record. If the passage cited (Gen. xiii.) does not countenance this view, neither does it contradict it. The host of writers, ancient and modern, who have firmly held it, have never felt that this passage offered any objection to it.

We will now give in order the main reasons (some of them

involved and implied in the preceding discussion) on which we ground our belief that Sodom lay south, and not north, of the Dead Sea.

Site of Zoar.

1. Its proximity to Zoar. The theory which places Sodom in the northern plain takes Zoar along with it, and is as novel in this application as in the other. The confusion which Mr. Grove has exhibited in the discussion of Sodom, takes in that of Zoar the form of direct contradiction, as will appear from the two following extracts:

"Zoar was the cradle of the race of Lot [A mistake; their "cradle" was higher]. Although the exact position of this town has not been determined, there is no doubt that it was situated on the southeastern border of the Dead Sea. From this centre the brother tribes spread themselves" (Moab, ii. 391).

"These considerations appear to the writer to render it highly probable that the Zoar of the Pentateuch was to the north of the Dead Sea, not far from its northern end, in the general parallel of Jericho" (Zoar, iii. 1857).

The first of these positions we propose to establish in opposition to the second. We wholly concur in the statement which follows the sentence last quoted:

"That it [Zoar] was on the east side of the valley seems to be implied in the fact that the descendants of Lot, the Moabites and Ammonites, are in possession of that country as their original seat when they first appear in the sacred history" (Zoar, iii. 1857).

Zoar was a frontier town of Moab. The "burden" or wail of Moab which appears in the prophecy of Isaiah (xv.) and is repeated in that of Jeremiah (xlviii.), both possibly derived from a more ancient common source, associates the town with the territory, and Mr. Grove includes it in his list of the towns of Moab (Moab, ii. 399). The borders of Israel and Moab touched, as we know (Numb. xxiv. 3), near the southeast corner of the Salt Sea. Zoar, then, was east of the boundary, and Sodom west of it, and both were near it.

The first allusion to the spot (Gen. xiii. 10) accords entirely with the position which we advocate, and does not readily admit of any other construction. The sacred writer refers

to the extent of the watered and fruitful plain of Jordan, before the Lord destroyed the cities, "as thou comest unto Zoar." Like a later description, in which Zoar is a terminus, the reader naturally understands a reference to the southern extremity of the plain. If Zoar had been east of the Jordan, on a line with Jericho, the description would be unnatural. It might still be claimed to be an allusion to the breadth of the valley divided by the Jordan, but it would exclude the more pertinent and manifest allusion to its length. So far is this "narrative in Genesis" from seeming to "state positively" that the site "lay at the northern end of the Dead Sea," that it becomes unintelligible to us on any other hypothesis than that it lay at the southern end. And the description is perfectly natural, though the terminus was not actually visible.

The above interpretation, which Mr. Grove sets aside as impossible, he has himself put forward as unquestioned and unencumbered, and in another Article in the Dictionary it stands as his own. His exposition reads thus:

"The two Hebrews looked over the comparatively empty land in the direction of Sodom, Gomorrah, and Zoar (xiii. 10). And Lot lifted up his eyes toward the left, and beheld all the precinct of the Jordan that it was well-watered everywhere; like a garden of Jehovah, like that unutterably green and fertile land of Egypt he had only lately quitted, Even from that distance through the clear air of Palestine, can be distinctly discovered the long and thick masses of vegetation which fringe the numerous streams that descend from the hills on either side, to meet the central stream in its tropical depths. And what it now is immediately opposite Bethel, such it seems then to have been 'even to Zoar,' to the furthest extremity of the sea which now covers the 'valley of the fields' ('Valley of Siddim,' Siddim fields), the fields of Sodom and Gomorrah. So Lot 'chose all the precinct of the Jordan, and journeyed east,' down the ravines which give access to the Jordan Valley; and then when he reached it, turned again southward and advanced as far as Sodom (xi. 12)" (Lot, ii. 144).

Besides the passages in Genesis and the two in the prophecies which have been referred to, Zoar is named in but one other place in the Bible (Deut. xxxiv. 3), and that is decisive against Mr. Grove's theory. Moses had ascended "the mountain of Nebo, to the top of Pisgah, that is over against

Jericho," to take his view of the Promised Land. The Lord showed him its different sections, and among others "the plain of the valley of Jericho, the city of palm trees unto Zoar." Mount Nebo has been identified, if we accept Mr. Tristram's selection, and if we do not, Mr. Grove has stated precisely where, on the testimony of the Bible, and also of Josephus (Antiq. iv. 8, § 48) and the Fathers, it must be, "facing Jericho on the east of Jordan" (Dict. ii. 480, 879). If, now, "the Zoar of the Pentateuch was to the north of the Dead Sea, not far from its northern end, in the general parallel of Jericho," "on the east side, of the valley," it must have lain between Jericho and Nebo, near the base of the latter, a supposition which renders unintelligible the descriptive sketch just quoted, as also Mr. Grove's own declaration, that the site which, on this theory, thus lay directly below the prophet-leader, was "one of the landmarks which bounded his view from Pisgah" (Zoar, iii. 1856).

The two definite references in the Pentateuch to the extent of the plain obviously mean the same. They both describe it as seen lengthwise from northern summits, the one on the one side, and the other on the other side, of the valley. The incredible feature of Mr. Grove's theory is, that it makes Lot and Moses look across the plain of the Jordan eastward and westward on the same parallel, extending in both cases "unto Zoar," though one viewed it from the western hills, and the other from the eastern.

Has Mr. Grove considered, withal, the relation of the river Jordan to his theory? Lot was admonished not to tarry in the plain, but escape with all haste to the mountain — flee, that is, from the plain west of the river in the territory of Canaan, where Mr. Grove places Sodom, to the mountain on the further border of the plain east of the river in the territory of Moab, near which he places Zoar, crossing with his family, without any apparent facilities, the deep and rapid river.

Lot subsequently ascended the mountain and dwelt in a cave with his daughters; and thence sprung the mountain-

tribes of Moab and Ammon. The heights southeast of the Dead Sea have been the traditional seat and radiating "centre," as stated by Mr. Grove, of these "brother tribes." They pushed northward and eastward and spread over a large territory, keeping distinct, and the former were afterwards dispossessed of theirs as far south as the line of the Arnon by the Amorites, but retained their original fastnesses (Numb. xxi. 26). This natural interpretation of the sacred record is sustained by Ritter, who has sketched with great clearness the territories and courses of conquest of the "tribes outside of Canaan" (Geog. of Palestine ii. 149, 151).

The opposite view which Mr. Grove brings forward in one place is refuted by himself in another, as will be seen from these extracts:

"It is also in favor of its [Zoar's] position north of the Dead Sea, that the earliest information as to the Moabites makes their original seat in the plains of Heshbon, northeast of the lake, not as afterwards in the mountains on the southeast, to which they were driven by the Amorites (Num. xxi. 26") (Zoar, iii. 1857).

"The warlike Amorites, either forced from their original seats on the west, or perhaps lured over by the increasing prosperity of the young nation, crossed the Jordan, and overran the wider portion of the territory on the north, driving Moab back to his original position behind the natural bulwark of the Arnon" (Moab, ii. 392).

In the former of these passages, the "original seat" of the Moabites is represented to have been northeast of the sea. In the latter their "original position" is represented to have been southeast of the sea, and again, in the same Article, "the southeastern border of the Dead Sea" is spoken of as "their original seat." In the former they are said to have been driven by the Amorites out of their original seat; and in the latter they are said to have been driven by the same into their original position. This is the third distinct point, each of them an essential point in the history which we are discussing, and each of them resting on evidence distinct from that of the others, on which this eminent writer has expressed conflicting opinions while the publication of the Dictionary was in progress, in each instance denying his previous position

without recalling and renouncing it. With all his ability and affluence as a writer on biblical topics, these inconsistencies, repeatedly occurring in the same work, and unexplained, must weaken his authority on biblical questions. We accept the second interpretation quoted above as that which lies on the face of the sacred narrative, and has been received by all biblical students, including Mr. Grove until he was bewildered by his new theory. We have topographical confirmation of its truth. In the highlands above what we claim to have been the site of Zoar, are identified at this day, the ruins of the strongholds, Kir of Moab and Ar of Moab. To remove the cradle of these tribes northward is to disturb and dislocate the associations and allusions of the sacred writers, as universally understood by their readers.

Mr. Grove suggests that the locality assigned to Zoar would make it too far distant from Sodom, "assuming that Sodom was where all topographers seem to concur in placing it, at the salt ridge of Usdum" (Sodom, iii. 1340); and assuming, too, the necessity of the present circuitous route. While we recognize in the name of this singular mountain a memorial of ancient Sodom, it is not necessary to suppose that it designates the exact site of the city, nor is it certain that Zoar lay at the mouth of Wady Kerak. We only claim that both places lay not very far from a point southeast of the Dead Sea, and this we think demonstrable. We would suggest to Mr. Grove that a fugitive family might even reach Wady ed-Dra'a from near the site of Khashm Usdum with less difficulty and in less time (especially in the direct line which may then have been practicable) than they could cross the Jordan and reach the base of the eastern mountains on the parallel of Jericho.

The allusions to this site by Josephus are explicit. He says: "It is to this day called Zoar" (Antiq. i. 11, § 4). In describing the lake Asphaltites, he says: "It extended as far as Zoar in Arabia" (Bel. Jud. iv. 8, § 4) by which he plainly designates its southern point; conformably with his own definition, "Arabia is a country that borders upon Judea" (Antiq. xiv. 1, § 4).

Ritter, with his usual thoroughness, collates the early post-biblical testimony, and says:

"Zoar is the very ancient name of one of the five cities which stood on the eastern shore of the Dead Sea, and was the only one of the five which did not perish at the time of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. It can only be looked for at the southern extremity of the Dead Sea. At the time of Ptolemy, Zoar was the single remaining city of the ancient Pentapolis. Stephen Byz. states that in his time it was a large place and a noted stronghold. Jerome says of it that it is a populous city of the Moabites, bearing the usual name of Bala; that it is the smallest of the cities mentioned, whence Jerome derives the name. He says further, that now it bears the name Zoar, or Tsoar, among the Syrians, but that the Hebrews call it Segor" (Geog. of Palestine, i. 27–31).

These writers have been followed by crusaders and later historians and travellers, all concurring in placing the site of Zoar near the southeast corner of the Dead Sea.

Mr. Grove quotes two "mediaeval travellers" as apparent exceptions to this general current of testimony and belief (Zoar, iii. 1858). Only one of them wrote from personal observation, and both are nearly unintelligible. Their confused testimony, on which he lays no stress, is not worth sifting; and that it has no weight with him is evident from his admission in another place:

"It will there be shown that grounds exist for believing that the Zoar of Josephus, Jerome, and the crusaders, which probably lay where Dr. Robinson places it, was not the Zoar of Lot" (Sodom, iii. 1340).

This last point is really the issue which he raises, and he avows in this place that he does it with much diffidence. Our readers will decide whether the judgment of these early writers, Jewish and Christian, is sustained by the scriptural references which we have cited, and whether it is seriously impeached from any quarter whatever.

The cautious Dr. Robinson, who devoted a special paper to the site of Zoar (Bib. Res. ii. 648–651), speaks of it without references in his latest work as an ascertained site:

"Zoar, as we know, was in the mouth of Wady Kerak, as it opens upon the neck of the peninsula" (Phys. Geog., etc., 233).

While this may have been the exact site of Zoar, we have

no data which give us absolute knowledge, and probably never shall have. The Professor's earlier conclusion was impregnable:

"All these circumstances seem to me decisive as to the position of Zoar on the eastern side of the Dead Sea, at the foot of the mountains near its southern end" (Bib. Res. ii. 649).

This is not more positive than Mr. Grove's original statement, in which we think he will again take refuge after his wanderings, finding no rest for the sole of his foot in the Jordanic or trans-Jordanic country:

"There is no doubt that it [Zoar] was situated on the southeastern border of the Dead Sea" (Moab, ii. 391).

Mr. Tristram's Positions.

Instead of proceeding at once with the arguments, of which the site of Zoar is the first, in reply to Mr. Grove's theory, we deem this the most suitable place to take up and examine Mr. Tristram's positions on the same side, the first being in substance, identical with Mr. Grove's:

1. "First there is the uniform expression, 'the Cities of the Plain,' or plain of Jordan, Heb. 'ciccar,' i.e. the circle of Jordan, most appropriate, as all those will know who have gazed on the circle from the surrounding mountain tops, but wholly inapplicable, and one which never was and never could be, by any stretch of language, applied to the south end of the sea, where the Jordan never flowed, or, if it ever did, it must have been in a geologic epoch far remote from the appearance of man on the earth. Abraham and Lot stood together between Bethel and Hai, where 'Lot lifted up his eyes and beheld all the plain of Jordan, that it was well watered everywhere, before the Lord destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah, even as the garden of the Lord, like the land of Egypt, as thou comest unto Zoar. Then Lot chose him all the plain of Jordan; and Lot journeyed east' (Gen. xiii. 10, 11). Now from these hills it is impossible to gain a glimpse of the south end of the Dead Sea, shut off by distance and by lofty intervening mountains, while the plain of Jericho is spread almost at the beholder's feet, and the bright green oasis of Ain Sultan shines like an emerald in the dreary waste. If the two fountains of Sultan and Duk can produce such amazing verdure by their waters in their present neglected exuberance, what must not the whole plain have been when it was well watered everywhere 'even as the garden of the Lord,' seeing that its whole subsoil, to the very edge of the seas, is, as has been before mentioned, a rich alluvial loam" (Land of Israel, 360, 361).

There is no question of the ancient fertility and present productive capability of the whole Jordan valley. If Mr. Tristram can prove that the present saltness of the sea and the present sterility of its shores existed before the catastrophe of the cities, we will concede all which he states above and all which he would infer from it. But if fresh water, verdure, and fruitfulness, as described above, anciently extended through the Ghôr to its southern limit, then it is not "any stretch of language," but a natural and appropriate designation, to apply to the whole expanse the descriptive sketch of the sacred historian. That this was the ancient condition of the whole plain or valley, we hold with Ritter, Robinson, Stanley, and others, as a view not only countenanced but required by the sacred record. And we accept Mr. Grove's conclusion, that the bearing of "the geological argument" on this theory "cannot be decided in the present condition of our knowledge" (Dict. iii. 1340).

2. "Again, after the destruction of the cities, we are told that Abraham when encamped at Mamre, 'looked toward Sodom and Gomorrah, and toward all the land of the plain, and beheld, and lo the smoke of the country went up as the smoke of a furnace' (Gen. xix. 28). It is not here stated — and we mark the verbal accuracy of the scripture text — that Abraham saw, but that he looked toward the cities of the plain. From personal observation we may add that, while from the hill above Mamre the plain itself is invisible, yet the depression between the nearer hills and the distant tops of Ajlun is plainly to be perceived, which is not the case with the depression of the southern Ghôr, and that therefore Abraham could have at once identified the locality whence the smoke arose" (Land of Israel, 361).

Any hill which Abraham could have reached by an early morning walk or ride from Hebron must have been nearly opposite the middle of the sea as it now is; and if the lagoon were then land, it would be nearer that point than the other. The bed of the valley was not visible at either end, but if either section were involved in a general conflagration he could easily have "identified the locality." Besides, he had a divine intimation that the cities were to be destroyed, and knew very well "whence the smoke arose." Mr. Tristram's

explorations in "the southern Ghôr," to which we shall soon refer, throw some light upon this exposition.

3. "Again, in the account of the inroad of Chedorlaomer, we are told that the Assyrians smote the Horites in Mount Seir unto El-Paran, and returned and smote the country of the Amalekites, and also the Amorites that dwell in Hazezon-Tamar (Gen. xiv. 7). Hazezon-Tamar, we know, is Engedi. It was after this that the king of Sodom and his confederates met the invaders in the vale of Siddim, and on their defeat Abraham pursued the victors on their march home by Damascus, and overtook them in Dan. Had Sodom and the other cities been situated at the south end of the sea, it was certainly not after smiting the Amalekites and the Amorites at Engedi that they would have met the invader, but long before he reached Hazezon-Tamar. But when we place these cities in the plain of the Jordan, there is a topographical sequence in the whole story, while Abraham and his allies hurriedly pursue the plunderers up the Ghôr without delay or impediment till they overtake them at the sources of the Jordan" (Land of Israel, 362).

It is here claimed that if the cities had been at the south end, their kings would have met the invaders before the latter took Engedi. We cannot see any ground for this claim. The northern invaders, after making the distant circuit of the valley on the east and south, came up on the west and smote Engedi and secured that pass. The cities and their kings were in the deep valley below, whether north or south or opposite is wholly immaterial, so far as we can discover, in relation either to the previous route of conquest or to the subsequent "topographical sequence" of the story. Between the cities, wherever situated, and Engedi, lay "the green vale" in which the battle was fought. Did not Mr. Tristram overlook the necessity of an intervening vale in his location of Zoar?

The three points named are familiar, of course, to all who have held the old view, which they have construed them as sustaining, certainly not as invalidating. The remaining argument is in part original.

4. "Once more, in the view that was granted to Moses from the top of Pisgah, he beheld 'the south and the plain of the valley of Jericho, the city of palm trees, unto Zoar.' Now, from the summit of Nebo it is utterly impossible to behold the southeast of the Dead Sea, or the situation of the

modern Dra'a; but if we place Zoar, as it naturally would be placed according to the narrative of Lot's escape, at the foot of the hill, between Wady Dabur and Ras Feshkhah, we see that here was just the limit of Moses's view, in accordance with the record. As we gazed from the top of Nebo, the plain of Jordan seemed to run on interruptedly till it was cut off by the headland of Feshkhah, and the force and literalness of the scriptural description of the panorama came vividly home to our minds" (Land of Israel, 362).

Mr. Tristram cannot be positive that he stood on Nebo, and that his view was identical with the vision of Moses. Granting that it was, it was more extended and detailed, and meets the conditions of the scriptural narrative more fully than we had before known. No one can have imagined that the southeast border of the Dead Sea and the walls of Zoar at that point were visible to the prophet from the top of Pisgah, unless, as suggested by Mr. Melvill in his sermon on the "Death of Moses," his vision was aided by God who was with his servant on that lonely summit. The suggestion of Dean Stanley on this point commends itself to us. He says:

"It was a view, doubtless, which in its full extent was to be imagined, rather than actually seen. The foreground of the picture alone was clearly discernible; its dim distances were to be supplied by what was beyond, though suggested by what was within, the range of the actual prospect of the seer" (Sinai and Palestine, 295).

Mr. Tristram's own description is as full a confirmation of the sacred record as we had ever anticipated from a visitor who should identify the locality and describe the scene. Of this section of the view he says:

"Still turning westward, in front of us, two or three lines of terraces reduced the height of the plateau as it descended to the Dead Sea, the western outline of which we could trace, in its full extent, from Usdum to Feshkhah. It lay like a long strip of molten metal, with the sun mirrored on its surface, waving and undulating in its further edge, unseen in its eastern limits, as though poured from some deep cavern beneath our feet. Then, almost in the centre of the line, a break in the ridge, and a green spot below, marked Engedi, the rest once of the Kenite, now of the wild goat" (Land of Israel, 537, 538).

Mr. Grove proposed to place Zoar "in the general parallel of Jericho, on the east side of the valley." Mr. Tristram

proposes to place it on the west side of the valley, south of Jericho. He suggests this location without any trace of name or ruin, or any hint of history or tradition. The locality would exactly suit his theory, which is all that can be said in its favor. This he supposes to have been the Zoar of scripture; but he suggests that another may have existed on the other side of the sea. He says:

"There is no difficulty in supposing either that there were two Zoars at the same time, or that a new town sprung up in a different locality, and assumed the name of the elder. How many Kadeshes, Gilgals, or Shalems may we not find through the country, like the Newtons or Suttons of England?" (Land of Israel, 360.)

Certainly "there is no difficulty in supposing" a dozen Zoars, only we actually know of but one; and we want something more than supposition. When we "find" (mark the term) two Zoars, or half a dozen, as we do Gibeahs and Ramahs, we will note them, and decide, if we can, which is the Zoar of the Pentateuch. Even the Frenchman, whose lively fancy located all the cities of the Pentapolis, though satisfied with slightest allusions or appearances, recognized the necessity of some sort of a trace of a site. He did not build on pure hypothesis; nor is it by such a process that the map of ancient Palestine is to be reconstructed. In selecting this site, without any indication, local or traditional, Mr. Tristram sets aside without answering it, the array of evidence convincing to Mr. Grove, as to the writers of note who preceded him, which makes the Zoar of the Pentateuch a town of Moab on the east side of the valley. He escapes the difficulty in the record of Moses's view from Nebo, which is fatal to Mr. Grove's theory, but he runs into an equal difficulty on the other side, and in accommodating Moses with the vision of Zoar, he leaves Lot unprovided for. For any actual sight of the place from the highlands of northern Judea, it might as well have been a thousand leagues distant, as below the mountains which overhang the western plain, where Mr. Tristram places it.

The distinction which Mr. Grove ventures to suggest be-

tween the "Zoar of Lot" and the "Zoar of Josephus," Mr. Tristram must establish between the Zoar of the Pentateuch and the Zoar of the prophets. By no possible interpretation can the plaintive cry and panic flight, recorded in "the burden of Moab," be associated with a city off on the northwestern shore of the sea:

"My heart shall cry out for Moab; his fugitives shall flee unto Zoar, an heifer of three years old; for by the mounting up of Luhith with weeping shall they go it up; for in the way of Horonaim, they shall raise up a cry of destruction" (Isa. xv. 5). From the cry of Heshbon even unto Elealah, and even unto Jahaz, have they uttered their voice, from Zoar even unto Horonaim, as an heifer of three years old; for the waters also of Nimrim shall be desolate" (Jer. xlviii. 34.)

In fixing the site of Zoar here, Mr. Tristram has to account for the mountain near Zoar, the refuge of Lot and his daughters and the birthplace of their offspring, and his theory does not shrink from the only alternative. He says:

"We are told that Lot afterwards went up out of Zoar, and dwelt in a mountain in a cave (Gen. xix. 30). Zoar, we know, must have been near Sodom, from the short time in which Lot was able on foot to reach it; and as his offspring were the founders of Moab and Ammon, it may be argued that his place of refuge should have been on the eastern side, where those two nations afterwards settled. But apart from the fact of a Zoar on the east being invisible from Nebo, the steep faces of the mountains which overhang the western plain are studded with caves, only a portion of which have been adopted by the hermits for their troglodyte dwellings, and in some of which may have been the safe refuge of Lot. That Moab and Ben-ammi should have afterwards settled on the opposite side of the Ghôr is not surprising, when we recollect that Western Canaan was thickly inhabited, that 'the Amorite was then in the land,' and there could be no difficulty in their crossing the river, as is continually done by the inhabitants of the eastern side to the present day" (Land of Israel, 360).

This suggestion, unsupported by any fact or hint, has been answered in advance by Mr. Grove, in a passage already quoted. These tribes first appear in history on the eastern mountains as their original seat, and Mr. Tristram's transportation of them thither, bodily, from the western side, is quite gratuitous.

We have now given Mr. Tristram's arguments, and have only to notice his concluding suggestion. He says:

"It is very possible that some of the cities of the Pentapolis may have been on the east side of the river, in the plain of Shittim, which is quite as luxuriant, and as abundantly watered as the western plain of Jericho. On that side, likewise, there is the broad belt of desolation, like the sulphur-sprinkled expanse between er-Riha and the sea, covered with layers of salt and gypsum, which overlie the loamy subsoil, literally fulfilling the description of holy writ, 'Brimstone and salt and burning, ... not sown nor beareth, nor any grass groweth therein' (Deut. xxix. 23). 'A fruitful land turned into saltness' (Ps. cvii. 34). 'No man shall abide there, neither shall a son of man dwell in it' (Jer. xlix. 18)." (Land of Israel, 363).

There are desolate tracts, once fertile, in the Jordan valley, caused by the lack of artificial irrigation, "now barren, but merely so from neglect"; "all that is required to restore fertility is the utilization of the abundant fountains," as Mr. Tristram elsewhere says, and the former culture would make the whole plain fruitful as before.

Mr. Tristram, after converting the only Moabite city of the Pentapolis into a Canaanite, here proposes to pass some of the other four, which were Canaanite, through a similar transformation, disregarding both his own allusions to Shittim as Moabite territory, as well as the scripture designations (Numb. xxxiii. 50, 51; Exod. xvi. 35; Josh. v. 2; xxii. 11), and Mr. Grove's definitions:

"Canaan; a name denoting the country west of the Jordan and the Dead Sea" (Dict. i. 246).

"The four cities [Sodom, Gomorrah, Admah, and Zeboim] are first named in the ethnological records of Gen. x. 19, as belonging to the Canaanites" (Dict. iii. 1338).

"Shittim; it was in the Arabah or Jordan valley, at that part of the Arabah which belonged to and bore the name of Moab" (Dict. iii. 1296).

If the passages which Mr. Tristram quotes as "fulfilled" on the east side, describe the site of Sodom, as expressly stated by the sacred writers, he, like Mr. Grove, is under the necessity of getting the fugitives from it across the Jordan, only passing them the other way, hastening them, not to the eastern mountains, but to the distant hills west and south. After Mr. Tristram's experience in fording and swimming the Jordan (520 seq.), a theory which takes the women of the fleeing household across the stream in either direction, afoot and

without animals, would seem to leave them dependent on the kind offices of the attendant angels.

Our readers can now form a complete estimate of Mr. Tristram's arguments and speculations on this topic. It might well strengthen Mr. Grove's confidence, faltering at times in his theory, that a writer and observer of such ability and discernment should so promptly give in his adhesion to it. But the conflicting views and inherent difficulties which it has developed, incline us to the opinion that the new theory gains, on the whole, no real support from its first convert, and we suspect that its author will think the same. We now resume our direct argument in reply to Mr. Grove.

Further Arguments in Reply.

1. The site of Zoar determines that of Sodom, which was so near it that it could be reached by flight between the early dawn and the broad daylight after the sun had risen over the mountains, and it was exposed to the same catastrophe, being saved by special interposition. If Zoar was in the district in which we have placed it, Sodom was south, and not north, of the sea. But on this point we offer further and cumulative evidence.

2. The names suggestive of identity with the original sites which adhere to the localities around the southern end of the sea, and of which we have no certain traces around the northern end. Mr. Grove concedes the force of this fact, and instances such names as Usdum, 'Amrah, Dra'a, and Zoghal (Sodom, iii. 1340).

3. The existence and peculiar features of the salt mountain south of the sea, with no corresponding object north of it. This, too, Mr. Grove acknowledges as "perhaps the weightiest argument" against the theory which he proposes, and refers particularly to the tendency of the mountain "to split off in columnar masses, presenting a rude resemblance to the human form" (*Ib*). If not more weighty than some other reasons, the fact named is certainly remarkable in connection with the sacred narrative, and irresistibly associates the flight of Lot and the fate of his wife, with this locality.

4. The living fountains and streams of fresh water which flow into the plain south of the sea, correspondent with its original features, if it was the southern extremity of the plain of Jordan which Lot surveyed, "well-watered everywhere, before the Lord destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah, even as the garden of the Lord, like the land of Egypt, as thou comest unto Zoar" (Gen. xiii. 10). This is a feature which Dr. Robinson specially noted:

"Even to the present day more living streams flow into the Ghôr, at the south end of the sea, from wadys of the eastern mountains, than are found so near together in all Palestine besides" (Phys. Geog. 234).

Mr. Tristram's observations of the soil below the surface, both at the foot of Jebel-Usdum, and in the salt marsh, confirm the theory that the whole region was once fruitful. He says:

"We collected specimens of the soil at the depth of two feet from the surface, where it is a rich greasy loam, but strongly impregnated with salt." "At the depth of eighteen inches in the plain, the soil was a fat, greasy loam" (Land of Israel, 322, 335).

Before this rich alluvial soil was covered with the saline incrustation of the marsh and water of the lagoon, we have an image of the fertility and beauty of the whole expanse, in Mr. Tristram's description of the present luxuriance of the oasis on the eastern border:

"All teemed with a prodigality of life. It was, in fact, a reproduction of the oasis of Jericho, in a far more tropical climate, and with yet more lavish supply of water. ..... For three miles we rode through these rich groves, revelling in the tropical verdure and swarming ornithology of its labyrinths" (Land of Israel, 336).

5. The testimony of unbroken tradition, ancient and modern. Strabo, Josephus, Tacitus, Galen, Jerome, Eusebius, "mediæval historians and pilgrims, and modern topographers without exception," — is the formidable array which Mr. Grove proposes to turn aside by an interpretation, plausible in itself, of a single passage of scripture, which offers no bar to their unanimous verdict, and which seems to us even to require it.

Strabo, whom we have quoted in part, places the country containing the cities, "the capital of which was Sodom," "near Moasada" (Judea iii. 183); and as the site of Masada is unquestioned, this compels its location in the southern part of the valley.

Josephus, besides the testimony which we have already given, in describing the mountain range which overhangs Jericho, says:

"It extends itself to the land about Scythopolis northward, but as far as the country of Sodom and the utmost limits of the lake Asphaltites southward" (Bel. Jud. iv. 8, § 2).

This is decisive respecting both points, showing unmistakably (and he represents the national belief) that the reputed site of Sodom was not north near Jericho, and that it was south near the southern limits of the sea. In his account of the overthrow of Sodom he says:

"But Lot's wife was changed into a pillar of salt, for I have seen it, and it remains at this day" (Antiq. i. 11, § 4).

The remarkable salt-mountain and its singular pillars, one of which was sketched by Lynch, would seem to restrict this allusion to the southern end of the sea.

The testimony of Tacitus, which will soon be given, is introduced in a connection which makes it evident that he is describing the country adjacent to the south end of the lake.

The testimony of Galen, referring to the salt gathered at the Dead Sea is:

"They call it Sodom-salt, from the mountains adjacent to the lake, which are called Sodom" (de Simp. Med. Fac. iv. 19).

The reference can be no other than to Jebel-Usdum, south of the sea. The phrase "Sodomitish sea" (2 Esdr. v. 7) probably has a similar origin.

The later testimonies are in the same direction, and need not be given in detail. The whole series, of course, does not amount to positive proof, but it is so universal and unvarying that it has not a little value as corroborative evidence.

6. There remains a combined topographical and historical

argument which to us appears conclusive. No event has perhaps occurred on the globe more fitted to leave a permanent scar on its surface than the conflagration of the cities of the plain and the plain together. Of no recorded occurrence except perhaps the deluge, might we reasonably look for clearer traces. It was a catastrophe so dire that it became a standing comparison for signal and overwhelming destruction, and would naturally leave a perpetual mark on the valley which bore it. This impression, which every reader would receive from the original narrative, is confirmed by every succeeding notice of it and of the locality. The event occurred about nineteen centuries before Christ, and the fertile and populous plain was at once made desolate and tenantless. This is the record:

"Then the Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven; and he overthrew those cities, and all the plain, and all the inhabitants of the cities, and that which grew upon the ground" (Gen. xix. 24, 25).

About four and a half centuries later, Moses, warning the Israelites against apostasy, admonishes them that the judgments of God for idolatry would make their country so desolate that a visitor would find its condition portrayed in these words:

"And the whole land thereof is brimstone and salt and burning, that it is not sown, nor beareth, nor any grass groweth therein; like the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah, Admah and Zeboim, which the Lord overthrew in his anger and in his wrath" (Deut. xxix. 23).

The above is a picture of the site of Sodom as it appeared at that period. About seven centuries later the prophet Isaiah illustrates the destruction of Babylon by the same comparison:

"And Babylon shall be as when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah. It shall never be inhabited, neither shall it be dwelt in from generation to generation; neither shall the Arabian pitch tent there; neither shall the shepherds make their fold there" (Isa. xiii. 19, 20).

A little more than a century later the prophet Jeremiah uses the same historic standard to measure the doom of Edom:

"Also Edom shall be a desolation; every one that goeth by it shall be astonished, and shall hiss at all the plagues thereof. As in the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah and the neighbor cities thereof, saith the Lord, no man shall abide there, neither shall a son of man dwell in it" (Jer. xlix. 17, 18).

This passage, like the preceding, exhibits the region as still desolate and deserted. The same century the prophet Zephaniah brings the future of two other nations to the same comparison:

"Surely Moab shall be as Sodom, and the children of Ammon as Gomorrah, even the breeding of nettles, and salt-pits, and a perpetual desolation" (Zeph. ii. 9).

These phrases are descriptive of the appearance of the site of Sodom, through the Old Testament history. In one of the apocryphal books we find Assyria brought to the same comparison:

"Wo be unto thee, Assur; remember what I did unto Sodom and Gomorrah, whose land lieth in clods of pitch and heaps of ashes" (2 Esdras, ii. 8, 9).

And in another apocryphal book, Wisdom of Solomon, we find this reference:

"When the ungodly perished, she delivered the righteous man, who fled from the fire which fell down upon the five cities; of whose wickedness even to this day the waste land that smoketh is a testimony, and plants bearing fruits that never come to ripeness; and a standing pillar of salt is a monument of an unbelieving soul" (Wisd. x. 6, 7).

The geographer Strabo, giving "the common tradition of the natives," speaks of "rocks having the marks of fire; fissures in many places; a soil like ashes; pitch falling in drops from the rocks; rivers boiling up and emitting a fetid odor," etc.; and allowing that these, like most traditions, are exaggerations, the question remains: Of the features of what locality are they the least exaggeration?

The testimony of Josephus bears on this point as on others. After describing the lake he says:

"Adjoining it is Sodomitis, once a blessed region abounding in produce and in cities, but now entirely burnt up. They say that it was destroyed by lightning for the impiety of its inhabitants. And even to this day the

relics of the divine fire, and the traces of five cities are to be seen there, and moreover the ashes reappear even in the fruit" (Bel. Jud. iv. 8, § 4).

The Roman historian, Tacitus, gives the following sketch of the country in his day:

"At a small distance from the lake lie those plains which tradition says were once a rich and fruitful country, abounding with populous cities, but long since destroyed by fire from heaven, and now a barren desert. Amidst the ruins which still remain, we are told that the marks of celestial vengeance may be clearly traced, and that the soil, consumed and parched, has lost the power of vegetation" (Hist. v. 7).

In the New Testament we find the apostles Peter (2 Pet. ii. 6) and Jude (7) setting forth the doom of Sodom and Gomorrah as a perpetual example and warning, implying, though with a fuller meaning, all which is expressed in the references of the Old Testament. No historic proof can be more clear and complete, than that the site of Sodom, from the time of its destruction to the Christian era, and subsequently, was a blasted region, an utter desolation.

With these historical and physical delineations before us, it is only necessary to call attention to the aspect of the two sites which we have been discussing, to settle the question of identity. The south end of the sea and its surroundings present at this day such an appearance as the scriptural statements above cited would lead us to expect. The entire southwest coast and adjacent territory from above Sebbeh round to the fertile border of the Ghôr es-Sâfieh on the extreme southeast, relieved at a single point by the verdure of the small oasis of Zuweirah, is, and has been, from the time of Sodom's destruction, the image of enthroned desolation. The sombre wildness and desolateness of the whole scene; the tokens of volcanic action, or of some similar natural convulsion; the Sodom mountain, a mass of crystalized salt, furrowed into fantastic ridges and pillars; the craggy sunburnt precipices and ravines on the west; the valley below Usdum, with the mingled sand, sulphur, and bitumen, which have been washed down the gorges; the marshy plain of the adjacent Sabkah, with its briny drainings, "destitute of

every species of vegetation"; the stagnant sea, with its border of dead driftwood; the sulphurous odors; "the sterility and death-like solitude" (Robinson); "desolation, elsewhere partial, here supreme"; "nothing in the Sahara more desolate" (Tristram); "the unmitigated desolation" (Lynch); "scorched and desolate tract" (W.); "desolation which, perhaps, cannot be exceeded anywhere upon the face of the earth" (Grove); "utter and stern desolation, such as the mind can scarcely conceive" (Porter); these and the like features impress all visitors as a fit memorial of such a catastrophe as the sacred writers have recorded. Whether we accept or not certain localities as particular sites, the *tout ensemble* is a most striking confirmation of the narrative.

The more detailed explorations of the region confirm the impression which its general appearance conveys. Mr. Tristram, who bestowed upon the whole locality a careful scientific examination, thinks that he discovered in the deposits of the Wady Mahawat, a broad deep ravine at the north end of Jebel-Usdum, traces of the agency which destroyed the cities. He says:

"There are exposed on the sides of the wady, and chiefly on the south, large masses of bitumen, mingled with gravel. These overlie a thin stratum of sulphur, which again overlies a thick stratum of sand, so strongly impregnated with sulphur that it yields powerful fumes on being sprinkled over a hot coal. Many great blocks of the bitumen have been washed down the gorge, and lie scattered on the plain below, along with huge boulders and other traces of tremendous floods. The phenomenon commences about half a mile from where the wady opens up on the plain, and may be traced at irregular intervals for nearly a mile further up. The bitumen has many small water-worn stones and pebbles embedded in it." "Again, the bitumen, unlike that which we pick up on the shore, is strongly impregnated with sulphur, and yields an overpowering sulphurous odor; above all, it is calcined, and bears the marks of having been subjected to extreme heat."

"I have a great dread of seeking forced corroborations of scriptural statements from questionable physical evidence, for the sceptic is apt to imagine that when he has refuted the wrong argument adduced in support of a scriptural statement, he has refuted the scriptural statement itself; but, so far as I can understand this deposit, if there be any physical evidence left of the catastrophe which destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah, or of similar occurrences, we have it here. The whole appearance points to a shower

of hot sulphur and an irruption of bitumen upon it, which would naturally be calcined and impregnated by its fumes; and this at a geologic period quite subsequent to all the diluvial and alluvial action of which we have such abundant evidence. The vestiges remain exactly as the last relics of a snow-drift remain in spring — an atmospheric deposit. The catastrophe must have been since the formation of the wady, since the deposition of the marl, and while the water was at its present level; therefore probably during the historic period" (Land of Israel, 354–357).

Our only surprise is, that the intelligent observer who finds these probable tokens "of the catastrophe which destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah" in the very locality near which on other grounds we think these cities must have stood, should himself place them full fifty miles distant. He has proved to his own satisfaction that the smoke which Abraham saw ascended from the northern end of the sea; but if his interesting discovery is reliable, there must have been some "smoke," as well as "extreme heat," at the southern end. If in these and similar features we have not physical evidence of the visitation which destroyed Sodom, we have just such material phenomena as we should naturally look for in a territory which had been the theatre of such a catastrophe, and whose subsequent condition had been described in the passages which have been cited.

We turn now to the other proposed site, the country north of the sea, and we find neither names of the places nor traces of the events embraced in the scriptural record. Instead of a territory scathed as by hot thunderbolts, we find a district teeming with all the elements of fruitfulness. In the very year that Moses describes the site of the destroyed cities as brimstone and salt and burning, Joshua brings the hosts of Israel to the territory which Mr. Grove proposes as the site of these cities, and finds there forests of palm and fields of barley, "old corn and parched corn," supplies of grain and fruit for the multitude, which enable them to dispense with the manna. Through the succeeding centuries important cities stood on this territory. It was here that the assembled nation, with sacrificial offerings and rejoicings, invested Saul with the kingdom (1 Sam. xi. 15); and here were gathered

schools of the prophets (2 Kings ii. 5; iv. 38). Josephus gives glowing descriptions of the exuberant productiveness of this very district, speaks of the variety of its trees and herbs, and refers to the revenue which it yielded (Antiq. xv. 4, § 2), describes it as the garden of Palestine, and even calls it a "divine region" (Bel. Jud. iv. 8, § 3). This plain or valley is now marked by a belt of luxuriant vegetation along the sweet waters of the river, while the interval between it and the highlands on each side, though arid in the dry season from the great heat, and presenting from this cause broad, desolate strips, is yet susceptible of irrigation and high cultivation. Not a token do we find here either of the awful catastrophe in which the guilty cities, with the plain on which they stood, were consumed, or of the perpetual desolation which subsequently brooded over the scene. We find the opposite; and in contrast with the descriptions which we have given of travellers who have visited the district south of the sea we quote the expression of the latest visitor to the district north of it who refers to "the verdant meadows on each side" (Porter, Bashan, etc., 112).

Can there be a question which of these two sites is, and which is not, that of the historic Sodom? This combined topographical and historical argument against the pretensions of the new site, and in favor of the identity of the old, appears to us as conclusive as it well could be with reference to an event which occurred nearly four thousand years ago, decisive in itself, and jointly with other proofs potent enough to silence discussion.

ARTICLE VII.

THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY TOWARDS THE PROMINENT FORMS OF ASSAULT.[1]

BY REV. S. C. BARTLETT, D.D., PROFESSOR IN CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE book we call the Bible occupies, materially, a narrow space. Its life of Christ is among the shortest of biographies. Compared with Kant or Mill, its utterances of truth make a very humble show. We do not learn that a written word ever emanated from its chief personage, except as we read, in a disputed passage, that he once wrote with his finger on the ground.

But that volume has been the seed-grain of libraries and literatures, the spark of intellectual life and strife, the battle-field of the world's intellect. That system has stood like a huge lodestone among all other systems, as in their attractions or repulsions they have pointed towards it or away. And from his early tomb that personage has perpetually raised himself up through the wreck of empires and the oblivion of ages, and he calmly faces the world to-day with those memorable words: "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me."

Eighteen hundred years of assault, culminating now, have spent their strength upon Christ and his gospel. Every joint and rivet of the celestial armor have been struck. If there are accumulations of force or of reasoning, of science, wit, or scoffing, of philosophy, history, or criticism; if there is keenness of intellect or breadth of learning which have not yet shot their shaft, who will tell us in what shape or from what quarter they can come? At this stage of the conflict, therefore, I propose to take a brief survey of the field, that we may

[1] An Address delivered before the Porter Rhetorical Society of Andover Theological Seminary, July 31, 1867.

make some estimate of the present attitude of evangelical Christianity towards the prominent forms of assault.

By evangelical Christianity, I mean the system which asserts the supernatural interposition of God through Jesus Christ, as recorded in the sacred scriptures, and of which those scriptures are a part, for the recovery and forgiveness of sinful man.

The scheme of redemption includes alike the mission of the Word and the mission of the Spirit. A series of grand historic facts became the germ of a mighty living power. The visible fruit in the present tells of the unseen root in the past. But for the fact of redemption, our assurance of forgiveness is a dream; but for the outstanding promise of a divine help, our hope of perfect union to God, but a mocking mirage. The work of the living Christ rests evermore on the work of the dying Christ. For a generation past it has been quite fashionable to disparage the "evidences" and apologetics of Christianity. But it is well to remember that from Coleridge to Baden Powell, the men who are "weary of the word 'evidences'" invariably at some point show themselves weary of the thing "doctrine." And for the apologetics, it will be full soon to abandon our defences when the enemy abandons his attack.

If we exclude from our consideration those systems which would supplant Christianity by a flank-movement of incompatible principles, we find the course of assault to have been somewhat in this order: to suppress its working power; to disown its chief personage; to dispute its peculiar facts; and finally to disavow its records. I commence, then, with the topic which lies nearest to our times.

I. Christianity has vindicated to the world the integrity and originality of its essential documents.

We have our sacred writings. Have they come down uncorrupted; and do they extend back to the persons and the events?

The first of these inquiries was once a far more anxious question than ever the second has been. But the hopes and

the fears that in the days of Anthony Collins hung tremulous over the text of our scriptures have been laid finally to rest. It is difficult for us now to comprehend the trepidation once awakened by the simple collation of manuscripts. When Brian Walton, in his Polyglott, gave a summary of various readings, he was assailed by John Owen for undermining the faith of the churches; and Mill's thirty years' labor upon the text met the same welcome from Whitby. Bengel declared himself to have been "horribly tormented" by these investigations. Wetstein was not suffered to publish his critical results in any part of Switzerland.

In the earlier stages of the textual controversy Romanism was for once upon the right side, and Protestantism the wrong. The former, in the interest of the Vulgate, denied, and the latter long maintained, the complete verbal integrity of the Jewish scriptures. For ten years the Reformed churches suppressed the Critica Sacra of Louis Cappell. The Swiss churches even enacted that no man should be licensed to preach the gospel who should not publicly declare the Hebrew text, as then printed, in its letters and points, to be divine and entire; and, in far-off echo to the European uproar, Cotton Mather, in his Master's oration at Cambridge, maintained "the divine origin of the Hebrew points."

The hopes of Collins and the torments of Bengel have passed away. A line of illustrious scholars have bestowed a hundred and fifty years, at least, of continuous toil upon the text of the New Testament alone. The Fathers of five centuries have been hunted through; ancient versions accumulated; every nook and corner of Europe ransacked for manuscripts; while Scholz and Tischendorf have pushed their search to the Lybian desert, the mountains of Arabia, the shores of the Dead Sea, and all between.

The results I need not detail: variations seemingly numerous, such as they are, though scarcely more in those thousand (972) manuscripts than are sometimes found in three or four manuscripts of a classic author; fewer far than could be found in King James's version, similarly treated; seriously

affecting the sense of fewer passages of the entire New Testament, so it is said, than the important and disputed readings of any one of Shakespeare's thirty-seven plays. "Nineteen of every twenty are to be dismissed at once," says Professor Norton, "as palpable oversights"; and "of the remainder the great majority are entirely unimportant," rising perhaps no higher than a question of spelling, of collocation, or of grammar; often too slight to be indicated in translation. In the total result Orthodoxy loses nothing, — scarcely even the famous text of the "three heavenly witnesses"; for that did not appear in the first two editions of Erasmus. We part, perhaps, with one and it may be two of the texts in which Christ is called God (Acts xx. 28; 1 Tim. iii. 16), and possibly receive another in their place (John i. 18);[1] while all the passages that ascribe to him the works, attributes, glory, and worship of supreme God remain unmodified. We gain for our controversy with the annihilationist a declaration of the eternal sin of the lost (Mark iii. 29). We are relieved of one diffi-

[1] In 1 Tim. iii. 16, the reading *ὅς* is quite generally adopted by modern critics. So Tischendorf, Tregelles, Lachmann, Wordsworth, Alford, Ellicott, Meyer, supported by manuscripts ℵ, A, C, F, G. See Ellicott's important note on A. In Acts xx. 28 the case is different. The reading *θεοῦ*, though not received by Tischendorf and Tregelles, is supported by ℵ, B, G, H, the Vulgate, and many Fathers. Alford, after once rejecting, restored it before seeing the Sinaitic text, and still defends it. In John i. 18, *μονογενὴς θεός* is found in ℵ, B, C, L, the Peshito, Coptic, and Ethiopic (Rom.) versions, Theodotus, Clement (Alex.), Epiphanius, Didymus, and, as we judge, others of the Fathers. Three of the four oldest manuscripts, one of the two oldest versions, two (if not all) of the three earliest Fathers cited favor the reading; while the mass of the later manuscripts and Fathers favor the reading *υἱός*. See Alford (last ed.) and a full statement by Ezra Abbot in the Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct. 1861. While the last-named Article gives the facts quite fully, we do not in all cases accept its decisions, nor its final summing up as conveying a correct impression of the full force of the evidence. It is fallacious (e.g.) to argue that because Irenaeus twice uses the expression "only begotten Son," and once "only begotten God," therefore his testimony is against the latter phrase. The former occurs elsewhere in the scriptures (John iii. 16, 18; 1 John i. 9), and its origin can be explained without this text; but the use of the phrase "Unigenitus Deus, qui est in sinu Patris, ipse enarravit," is hardly to be accounted for in its boldness, unless sustained by the scripture itself which the writer appears to quote. But the subject is too broad for a note. Tregelles reads *θεός*. But the case is very doubtful.

culty connected with the appearances of the risen Saviour (Mark xxviii. 9); we solve one or two questions of geography; we clear the miracle at Siloam of a seeming excrescence. We reach some uncertainty, to whom we shall refer the last twelve verses of Mark's Gospel and the first eleven verses in the eighth chapter of John; and we miss the doxology of the Lord's prayer; we dispense with some repetitions, explanations, and superfluities, while we often gain a nicer perception of the connections and shadings of apostolic thought.[1]

These are the most considerable changes wrought hitherto by the criticism of the text, and little more can be looked for. The field is confessedly explored. The rationalist Eichhorn long ago admitted that the results did not pay for the toil. "The text," says Davidson, in 1865, "is substantially in the same condition in which it was found seventeen hundred years ago." And while the caviller turns away in disgust, the Christian scholar clings with fresh gratitude and wonder to the volume that has passed the ordeal of ages so nearly intact. For he knows that he reads not alone the same precious truths that cheered the early saints in the Roman catacombs, among the hills of France and of Palestine, in the ports of Asia Minor and the great cities of Africa, but in the very words that met the eye of Justin and Clement and Irenaeus and Tertullian. So wholly satisfactory has been the result in the Greek scriptures, that we only wish we might go back of the Masorites and do the same thorough work for the Hebrew; assured that many of its present difficulties, — obscurities, supposed anachronisms, and numerical puzzles — must melt away.

But behind the integrity of the text lies another grave question — the originality or genuineness of the writings. Did they emanate from their accredited sources, — contemporaries; the actors and the witnesses? Here recent scepticism has marshalled all its forces, and as we humbly conceive has found both its Gettysburg and its Richmond too. It is indeed

[1] The above statement, of course, was not intended for a complete enumeration (which the occasion did not permit), but for a fair, general account of the case.

a peculiarity of logic-warfare that a dismembered warrior can swing his sword and shout "victory," and one who is himself shot through the heart can still fire away from behind a bush. Nevertheless it can be shown that the attack which began upon Isaiah, Daniel, Zechariah, and the Pentateuch, and at last came down upon the citadel — the Gospels and the Acts — now lies before the judgment of reason and truth, in its last onset, routed and scattered to the winds.

And first, scepticism approached the whole question of our Gospels with an open pre-judgment of the case. Strauss frankly declares in his New Life of Jesus (i. 33), in explanation of his position, that "the contradiction between the supernatural accounts and the natural element which alone is historically available, could not be reconciled so long as the Gospels, or even a single one of them, was taken as truly and fully historical." With equal frankness Mr. F. W. Newman, in the "Radical" for April, declares: "It is evident that we must either quite disown the Gospels, or admit that Jesus regarded men as impious who did not bow before him as an authoritative teacher." Such a man argues as Paul Jones was said to fight, — with a halter round his neck. There is a dire necessity. It is not the shout of loyalty to the truth we hear, but the gunpowder-and-whiskey shriek of the rebel.

Scepticism, again, opened its argument with a postulate that begged the whole question, and ruled out all the distinctive testimony in the case. Thus in the sentence next following the one we have quoted, Strauss proceeds: "This they could not be" [i.e. received as truly historical], "for the simple reason that they contain supernaturalism." Here we have the simple and celebrated weapon — the genuine Samsonian bone — with which so much fact and so many witnesses have been slaughtered. It wrought valiantly upon the Old Testament, chasing every miraculous event into a legend or a myth, and hewing every prophecy down to a foreboding. The key-note of De Wette's introduction is that an account of miracles cannot be contemporary with the events; and Davidson echoes that these elements in the Pentateuch suffi-

ciently prove a "post-Mosaic age." The secondary reasons for dismembering Isaiah can all be fairly answered but for the fundamental assumption that a distinct prediction of the distant future is inadmissible; and the arguments for the later date of Daniel have very little force aside from the radical position of Hitzig, that the contents of the book are irrational and impossible.

Such is the proposition, the postulate — not implied but avowed — from which modern assaults on the genuineness of the Gospels set out. Said Parker, in his day, — forgetting that he was a deist, and not an atheist or a pantheist: "I do not believe there ever was a miracle, or ever will be. Everywhere," says this man, or this god, who had travelled immensity and eternity, "everywhere I find law." Renan finds it evident that the Gospels are "in part legendary," "since they are full of miracles and the supernatural." The great leader of this modern warfare lays down, as the very basis of his discussion, the maxim that "when a narrative is irreconcilable with the known and universal laws which govern the course of events" it cannot be "historical," nor consequently contemporary. And this grand maxim he swings with so wide a sweep as to mow down not alone all superhuman, but all troublesome human events at his pleasure. Everything falls flat before these magic words, "impossible," "inconceivable," "improbable." This is certainly the chief burden of his whole destructive argument. Proof thus against all proof, he proceeds to the mockery of weighing evidence, after the style of that practical joker who once tested the heat of boiling water by the insertion of his cork leg. Now, to come to the so-called investigation of events whose very claim and point lies in their supernatural character, with the coolly assumed test that the supernatural itself is not merely improbable, but impossible, — and that, too, in presence of the marks of a personal God inscribed on the human soul, and of abrupt and mighty interpositions written deep among the rocks, — this is to abjure the very functions of judge and jury, and to own one's self an outlaw from the broad domain of

reason and truth. And thus all testimony to the authorship of the Gospels is to be set aside by an inference from an arbitrary assumption. Superhuman occurrences cannot be true; therefore the men who relate them cannot be the men they are declared and declare themselves to be. This is the argument in its shortest form.

But again, the positive testimony to the authorship is set aside in a manner most arbitrary and iniquitous. The father of myths despatches the express declaration of Papias concerning Matthew by a mistranslation or more than doubtful translation of one word (λόγια), though his own rendering does not carry his conclusion; and that concerning Mark by the wholly arbitrary interpretation of another (ἐν τάξει). The concurrent testimony of Irenaeus, Clement, and Eusebius to Mark's authorship is rejected because, while they agree on the fact, they seem to differ on the circumstances. Luke is assailed with a bold denial that the writer claims to trace his narrative from "any exclusive source like the teaching of an apostle"; although Luke distinctly asserts that the facts came directly ("to us") from "eye-witnesses and ministers of the word." And here again the statement of Papias is overborne by a "supposition." Quotations from the Gospels in 1 Cor. xi. 21, 23, Heb. v. 7, are asserted to come reversely from the Epistles into the Gospels; and the citation in 2 Pet. i. 17, is remanded to the end of the second century. The apostolic Fathers, some of whose writings are and must be accepted by scholars,[1] are approached with the indiscriminate remark about their "doubtful authenticity." But as they will not down at this bidding, their numerous citations and

[1] Among them Clement's first Epistle to the Corinthians, three (and probably seven) of Ignatius's Epistles in the shorter recension, Polycarp's Epistle to the Philippians. The main objection to the Epistle of Barnabas was found in its mystical interpretation, but was pronounced untenable by Gieseler long ago. The discovery of the Greek text in connection with the Sinaitic Bible has strongly aided its general reception, and Tischendorf unhesitatingly refers it to the last decade of the first century. The Shepherd of Hermas has received a similar support, but probably falls into the early part of the second century. The Epistle to Diognetus is also assigned to a period from A.D. 117 to A.D. 133.

allusions, a hundred or more from the four Gospels alone,[1] are summarily dismissed as oral traditions. When in two instances "scripture" is cited, we are told that the passage, "Many are called but few chosen," came not from Matthew, but, there is no doubt, from the apocryphal book of Esdras, which unfortunately reads in quite another mode;[2] and that the word "scripture" applied to the statement, "I am not come to call the righteous but sinners," only proves the late origin of the epistle that so cited it [2d Clement]. When Justin Martyr abundantly and literally quotes our present documents, calls them the "Gospels," "memorabilia of the apostles," and declares them to have been written by the apostles and their companions, and to be habitually read in Christian assemblies with the writings of the prophets, Strauss still quibbles that Justin "does not say that these were our Gospels or any of them"; and the highest conclusion he can reach is, that in view of certain amplifications of statement found in Justin, but never cited by him from the "memorabilia," the Gospels of Matthew and Luke then existed among a kind of chaos of "different versions" of "evangelical legendary poetry." When Irenaeus, a little later, with his wide acquaintance throughout the churches, bears testimony to the existence of the four, and only four, Gospels in his day, and when he compares them in this fourfoldness to the four quarters of the earth, the four winds, and the fourfold form of the cherubim, this remarkable testimony to the solitary pre-eminence of our Gospels is wholly passed by to expatiate on the unintelligent and uncritical spirit of the comparison and the argument. After this manner it is that all testimony in what is a simple matter of testimony, is broken down by an arbitrary force.[3]

Again, the sceptical investigation of the contents of the

[1] The entire number from the four Gospels, as given in the Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct. 1866, p. 599, is one hundred and eighteen. The entire number from the whole New Testament, four hundred and two. But this list cites from the Shepherd of Hermas, the Epistle of Diognetus, and the whole seven of Ignatius.

[2] "Many are born, but few shall be saved" (2 Esd. viii. 3).

[3] Strauss' New Life of Jesus, Introduction, Sections 10 and 11.

Gospels is equally opposed to all the principles of judicial dealing. I cannot here give you the counter arguments that fill a score of volumes. It has been most abundantly shown that those very varieties in unity which in every legal investigation best prove the independent truthfulness of the several witnesses, are here reversed to establish a general falsity; and that the methods adopted for this purpose would not only overthrow all history and testimony, but would hoist the inventor with his own petard, making Strauss himself to be but a myth.

That this class of writers have brought a marvellous patience of labor, an immense mass of materials, and a singular skill in the "art of putting things," and that they have placed some real difficulties in a very strong light, is not to be questioned. But in them all — Strauss, Baur, Schenkel, Renan, and the like — there meets you at every turn the constant sense of perversion. The thing they give is like your gospel, as like as a monkey is to a man. You weary with interminable quibbles; with endless contradictions found where all is palpably clear; with confusions of things different, and separations of things identical; with artful turns and designs found in the most artless narratives. You grow restive at hearing a writer's silence continually cited as counter evidence. You find it a little tedious to be constantly having three writers pitted against one on some side issue, to break him down on the main fact, or two against two in like manner to destroy the testimony of the four, or one against three to override the three, or the whole four summarily ruled out as "unhistorical." There is a dreariness of sophistry in being so constantly reminded by Strauss of a "suspicious element," an "air of mystery," "the evangelist's favorite manner," that a circumstance is "mentioned by one author alone," "this evangelist is ignorant of it," it is "scarcely conceivable," or it "could not have been uttered by Jesus." Renan's bold fabrications of history, and Schenkel's flat and dogged contradictions of any statement whatever in the narratives at his sovereign pleasure, cease at length to seem

amusing. You are treading your way through a thicket, a jungle, of presumption and prevarication.

It is still further to be mentioned that the writings that are necessarily accepted are fatal to the theories by which others are denied. The Pauline Epistles which Strauss admits, involve all essential elements of the Gospels he rejects. The fundamental position on which Baur would break down the Book of Acts — a smothered antagonism of doctrine and principle between Peter and Paul — is positively contradicted by the letters to the Corinthians, and especially to the Galatians, which he receives.

And further still, as in other conspiracies often, so here the accomplices themselves turn state's-evidence or confess. In truth, the Christian community greatly over-estimate the magnitude and the cohesion of the party that deny the genuineness of our sacred books. The Tübingen school and their abettors are but a clique. They occupy much the same relation to the whole world of scholarship, as do those worthies to the world of English literature, who maintain that Shakespeare's plays were written by Lord Bacon. But they do not stand firm nor stand together. The effect of their several arguments, judged in turn by men of the loosest views, is futile. Baur himself made the sharp criticism on the first "Life of Jesus," that there must certainly be some historic platform to work from, whereas Strauss had used John to invalidate the synoptics and the synoptics to put down John; a process of mutual annihilation not to be paralleled out of Germany, or Ireland. Renan, a scholar of high order, boldly accepts the four Gospels as veritable productions of the first century and of the men whose names they bear; of whom "Matthew," he says, "as regards the discourses, clearly deserves unlimited confidence."[1] In reference to John's Gospel — the chief point of attack — as Bretschneider formerly denied and then retracted, so Strauss himself denied and recanted and then fiercely denied. Schenkel freely declares that "it must be admitted that the exter-

[1] Renan's Life of Jesus, p. 34 (Am. ed.).

nal evidences are not so unsatisfactory as they who dispute John's authorship represent them." [1] Ewald, that venerable anatomist of scripture, in 1857 declared it "wholly certain" that John was the author of the fourth Gospel.[2] De Wette, whom even Ewald names "the universal doubter," before his death fell back strongly to its defence; while Meyer openly asserts that "all attempts which the critical perversity and blindness of the age, with its worn-out arguments, may still make to wrest from the apostle his Gospel, and from the church its most original evangelic jewel, will and must end in utter defeat." [1] Let us add that Strauss' own recent "change of base," after the lapse of a generation, from the unconscious myth to the conscious theologic tendency and imposition, which, as he more than implies, may extend to Christ in person, is as much an acknowledgment of defeat as ever was the transfer from the Pamunkey river to the James. The first effort at construction involved his old edifice in destruction.

In addition to all this superfluous amount of refutation, it has well been shown how alien was that age from the fabrication of mythic histories in spurious books — the age of Tacitus and Livy; and how the interval from Christ's death to Paul's admitted epistles, rendered a mythic history as impracticable as a legendary life of Walter Scott in England to-day. Of the "great multitude" (multitudo ingens) who in Nero's time went at Rome unflinchingly to death for Christ, every one who had passed the age of thirty-five was a contemporary of the Lord. The style of criticism employed against the Gospels, has been by various reductions *ad absurdum* — Wurm on Luther's life, Norton on Caesar's death, and even Theodore Parker on the Declaration of Independence — proved to involve the destruction of all history and biography.

Meanwhile, in every part of the scattered church we trace our consentient records coming down entwined and incorpo-

[1] Schenkel's Character of Jesus portrayed (Furness' Transl.) Vol. i. p. 37.
[2] Ewald's Geschichte von Israel, Vol. v. p.127.
[3] Kommentar über Johannes, Preface to fourth edition, 1861.

rated with that vast volume of Christian life of which they form artery and nerve and brain and heart, and with that mighty ocean-stream of history, inundating the nations, of which they are the ever-gushing fountain; and so we follow back the vital writings and the living workings, reciprocally and inseparably transfused, to the very point of departure. The multitude of elaborate manuscripts, the wealth of citation by Fathers of world-wide renown, are, after all, as nothing to the now silent multitudinous voices that they represent, of the myriads and the millions who with "life and fortune and sacred honor" bore their concurrent testimony; they are but bubbles floating on the great ocean of Christian life and witness, rolling underneath. And yet how even those superficial testimonies multiply. There are manuscripts older by centuries than those of classic authors, and outnumbering them almost a hundred to one. We trace back the stream of citation to find that within five centuries of the death of John, the whole New Testament, except perhaps a dozen verses, could be replaced from the writings of the Fathers; yea, within one century, in Irenaeus, Clement, and Tertullian we swim in a very sea of scripture, laving Lyons and Alexandria and Carthage. At this last point of time we learn from the patriarch of Lyons that the four Gospels are as settled a fact as the four points of the compass; and Carthage joins Lyons in asserting their apostolic origin. Back of these, and towards the middle of the century, already lie two great versions, still extant, made in Italy and Syria — the West and the East; and while the canon of the Peshito comprises all our books but the Apocalypse and four short epistles, the fragment of Muratori enumerates apparently every one. At this same point we listen to the Pagan Celsus, quoting the same Gospels as writings of the disciples of Jesus; and Justin Martyr, on the other hand, declaring the same books to be publicly read on Sunday in the various churches. Already had Tatian and Theophilus composed their harmonies of the four Gospels; earlier yet, within twenty or thirty years of the last apostle, had the heretics Heracleon in the West, and Basilides in the

cast, written commentaries upon these books of ours. With the quotations, still extant, of the heretics Valentinus and Basilides, from Luke, Paul, and John, we press close upon the death of the last apostle; the presuppositions of the so-called Gospel of Thomas and the Acts of Pilate carry us quite there; and with the genuine letters of Clement of Rome, Polycarp, Ignatius, to say nothing of Barnabas, we stand fairly looking within the apostolic age, upon our sacred books. Irenaeus closely welds the chain of evidence, as he vividly remembers the very look, manner, and speech of the venerable Polycarp, recounting from the lips of John the words and deeds of Christ "in strict agreement with the scriptures." And, providentially, to meet and resist the more and more desperate strainings of modern scepticism, every fresh discovery only adds new rivets to the chain of evidence. Clement's letter to the Corinthians and the Alexandrian manuscript first came to light in the time of Walton; the Fragment of Muratori in the time of Bengel; and now, in these last few years, the original Greek of Barnabas, the Homilies of Clement, the Philosophumena of Hippolytus, the oldest of the Syriac manuscripts (Cureton's), the Sinaitic Bible, and Tischendorf's supposed discernment of a text-history older than all.

And so all antiquity concurs with word and act, with literature and life and perpetual ordinance, with written record and living epistles, by the mouth of representative men and of the great cloud of concurrent witnesses. From that cluster of cities that hug the Mediterranean, spreading forth from central Rome to Corinth, Smyrna, Ephesus, Antioch, thence by Palestine to Alexandria, Carthage, Lyons, bound together not alone by the constant intercourse pulsating round the heart of the empire, but by the closer bonds of Christian charity, correspondence, travel, and missionary labor, there comes down one united voice. Manuscripts, versions, harmonies, commentaries; Christian Fathers, heretics, heathen, — all, with open mouth, stand shouting that these writings came from the immediate disciples of Christ. And while they who with a dash of the pen would wipe out the writings of eight New

Testament authors and three or four early Fathers have undertaken a work a hundredfold less facile than to obliterate the authorship of Cicero, Caesar, Virgil, Horace, Strabo, Ovid, Livy, Seneca, together with Pliny, Tacitus, and Suetonius, — who left no followers and no vast historic life to keep their memory perpetually green, — their whole attempt stands to-day thoroughly discredited and repulsed, not alone by the "historic consciousness" of the living church, but by the general judgment of sound scholarship. The conspiracy has been overwhelmingly refuted by fair argument; it has been sadly damaged by the confessions of accomplices; and the chief culprit has virtually confessed judgment.

II. Christianity stands fully sustained in the fundamental facts of its origin. The genuineness of the writings would sufficiently carry the truth of the facts. For the old argument is ever new and forever true: that in the artless testimony of such men, with such opportunities, to such facts — testimony written out in characters of purity through lives of sacrifice, and sealed with martyr-blood, bound up indissolubly with countless other lives and deaths in solemn attestation, and so transmitted along the electric line of kindred hearts and hands in heir-loom love to us — we have the highest testimony, in kind and degree and amount, that man, yea, that humanity transfigured, or rather that God through humanity, can give. Hence the desperate attempts to detach the documents from the men.

But our very foemen are forced to tell our tale. The contemporary Jew, in copies never deviating, and in phrases well accredited after all reasonable deduction, — accredited even by Renan,[1] — tells of the wisdom and the wonderful works of Jesus, of his many followers, Greek and Jew, his accusation by "our first men," his execution by Pilate, the constancy and continuance of his followers. The most conscientious of all classic historians tells of the time, the residence, the fate of Christ, the self-denying, unpopular cast, and yet the suc-

[1] Life of Jesus, pp. 13, 14. See on the passage Giesceler's Note, Church Hist. Vol. i. pp. 68, 69 (ed. H. B. Smith).

cess of his religion; and in thirty years from the crucifixion lets us look in upon the great multitude of its votaries at Rome. Vespasian left no tokens of his state and character above ground in the imperial city half so vivid as the rude sculpturings of contemporary Christian faith and love driven to the catacombs below. While John still lives, Trajan sits on the throne, and Pliny rules in Asia Minor; and before the apostle slept two years in his neighboring grave the favorite confers with the emperor what to do with the crowds of Christians who have made the temples solitary; and with clear colors and sharp lines he paints their purity and constancy, their set day and solemn assembly, the covenant and the sacrament, the song of praise, and even the great central fact and doctrine of their history — their worship of "Christ as God." In calm response to Adrian's bloody edict, we read to-day the epitaph of Adrian's martyrs carved on their subterranean crypts. A few years later comes the scoffing Lucian to describe their worship of a "crucified sophist," their guileless fraternal love, their discipline, union, benevolence, and their bright hopes of immortality. Celsus the philosopher appeals to the sacred books, repeats well-nigh the whole life of Christ, and recognizes even the miraculous deeds.

Indeed, it is remarkable and beyond dispute that for some centuries even the supernatural facts of Christianity, except the resurrection, were fully admitted by the adversaries. Down to the time of Julian, and including the subtle emperor himself, the heathen called them magic. In perfect demonstration of what Christ's contemporaries were compelled to do, and in full confirmation of the Gospel statement, the Jewish writers, so late as the Sepher Toldeth Yehsu, admitted his miracles, and ascribed them to his use of the secret ineffable name.

But this admission was seen at length to be fatal. So modern scepticism leaped over a chasm as broad as the lapse of time from Porphyry to Spinoza. Then began the perpetual shifting of positions. The deism of England, with

Herbert, first asserted chiefly the sufficiency of natural light. It soon had to wage war with Christian evidences; found it needful to deny the proof of miracles; but reached no safe shelter till, with Hume, it denied the possibility of proving them. In that "Age of Reason" it was, perhaps more natural than politic for Paine to call the prophets "liars," the Gospels a record of "glaring absurdities, contradictions, and falsehoods," and the apostle Paul "a fool." However legitimate the deduction from the premises, the world had not yet reached that plateau of moral light and life which enabled Paine to receive it. French Encyclopaedism, indeed, accepted it, and wrote it out in letters black and red.

Germany tried the Rationalist solution: admitted the records, and resolved away the supernatural facts. But the process of abrading and dislocating clear speech, so as, for example, to convert the walking across the Sea of Galilee into a walk along its banks, in the hands of Paulus became ridiculous, and was hooted out of Germany.

Still, how to escape those facts with their tremendous power and pressure? One only chance remains: to sever the cord that binds the narrative to the writer, and so scatter the writings to the winds. Far-off, and by instalments, began the process. It was first tried upon the distant Pentateuch in the form of a disintegration. But in the tediousness of the toil, it has been forgotten that to infer from the use of documents that Moses was not the author, was wholly a non-sequitur. Anachronisms were sought, yet could not certainly be found, save one, perhaps, and that a name naturally explained in its place as a reviser's gloss.[1] History was then pitted against Moses; but Egyptian monuments were weightier than Von Bohlen's assertions. Geology turned against Genesis. But at length we reached the point, where, if we waive the word "day" and concede the narrative to be, as it reads, phenomenal, not a declaration can be proved out of harmony with science. A universal deluge

[1] "Dan," Gen. xiv. 14. Ewald admits the chapter to be of the highest antiquity.

was objected to. But the fact of a deluge lay branded into the memory of the nations; and clear tokens are not wanting in the narrative itself that its demands are satisfied by a catastrophe as wide as the race of man. Bunsen came with his immense antiquity of the race; but, granting the biblical chronology to be in some respects unsettled, his reader — so it seems to us — finds in those wearisome and vaunted demonstrations of Egyptian chronology little more than laminated moonshine.[1] Then came the flints of Devon and Cornwall, the Swiss lake dwellings, and the mingled bones of men and pre-historic animals. But under the analysis of the London Quarterly the Swiss dwellings with the "Stone Age" descend to a "period strictly historical," with Celts for their occupants, and a range of one or two thousand years before Christ; the "flint-flakes" of Devon and Cornwall are plausibly traced by Mr. Bate to the epoch just anterior to the entrance of the Romans into Britain; and strong probabilities are adduced to show that the time of the cave-bear may come down, and not the age of man go up.[2] In like manner Babylon and Nineveh and Susa came to the defence of Isaiah and Jonah and Daniel. And after all conceivable efforts to dissipate the prophetic element from the ancient scriptures, two solid fixtures still remained: those scriptures complete, even in the Septuagint version, two centuries before Christ, and a nation roused by their teachings so as to be watching for the Christ when he came.

But the time came at length for the sword which had fleshed itself on the Old Testament facts to try its edge on the New. Behold then the theory of myths: a religious

[1] This opinion, formed after a careful examination of "Egypt's Place in the World's History," I am glad to find fully confirmed by Rev. E. Burgess in the Bibliotheca Sacra for October, and also by a recent critic in the London Review.

[2] See an Article on the Swiss Lake Dwellings in the London Quarterly, and another on the Flint Flakes by Spence Bate, F.R.S., in the Popular Science Review, republished in the Eclectic Magazine during the past year. The German archaeologist Pallmann and the Swedish antiquarian Nilsson also bring down the date of the Swiss lake dwellings, the former nearly to the Christian era, the latter to a period not earlier than 1000 B.C.

idea spontaneously clothed in historic form, and presented, of course, in spurious books. The destructive criticism by which these facts were to be invalidated, though gathering up the cavils of ages, constantly confesses itself unable to bear its own weight. For its denial of common historic facts is continually bracing itself against assumed "impossibilities." Thus, for example, it was necessary to deny the watch at Christ's tomb, and therefore the predictions of the resurrection; and this falls back upon the "impossibility" of such anticipations.[1] In a similar mode the utterances of Simon and John the Baptist become "unhistorical," because predictions of a suffering Messiah could not have been uttered.

And here again, that impossibility of the miraculous — the ultimate resort — not only rests on the assumed non-existence of a personal God, but conveniently forgets or never knows such facts as the fifteen extinctions and new creations of animal life found in one geologic day.[2] When we add to this the baseless denial of authorship, we find this modern mythology to resemble and yet differ from the old Hindoo cosmogony, in that its earth rests on a lame elephant, standing on a broken-backed tortoise, and that, indeed, on nothing.

But aside from the inner confession of weakness in its criticism of history, and aside from the sophistry and perversity of its interpretations, the whole mythical theory has been positively and effectually demolished. It has been shown that no such religious idea of a Messiah pervaded the Jewish nation, but of one coming with sword and purple; that if a miracle-working Christ was expected, then none who did not work miracles could have been received; that the Gentile converts — soon the great mass — had no clear Messianic expectation at all; that the gathering of these traditions around the person of Jesus — the marvellous fact — is left entirely unexplained; that the actual origin of that wonderful power, the church of Christ, is wholly unaccounted

[1] Strauss' Life of Jesus, p. 654 (Am. ed.).

[2] Prof. J. J. Dana, Bibliotheca Sacra, Jan. 1856, p. 120. See also Dana's Geology, pp. 397 seq.

for; that the Gospels and the luxuriant growth of Christian literature, soon choking out all other growths, are made a tree without a root; that the admitted faith of all the first disciples in the miracles, and especially the resurrection, becomes the darkest of enigmas; and, above all, that the essential character of the church from the earliest times, in its "consciousness of man reconciled to God," remains unsolved, unattempted. The author of the scheme after thirty years has confessed his defeat, by changing his ground, and slyly substituting for the myth of spontaneous growth the notion of a "tendenz," or conscious design. And the old theory of imposture meets us once more.

But here again there remains, by confession of Strauss and Baur, after all their alchemy, a residuum of facts that breaks the crucible. The chief Pauline Epistles and the Apocalypse, which the worst of them receives, involve all the preternatural claims of Christ; while the unanimous testimony of Christian, heathen, and heretic is, that on those very pretensions, and nothing else, was the system founded and the blood of the martyrs spilt. In his last utterance Strauss affirms that "the church was built upon the foundation of the doctrine of the future advent, and without that expectation not a Christian would have come into existence."[1] Nay, all the objectors are drifting and driven toward the position of Renan, that the source of this persuasion was no other than the overpowering influence of Christ himself.

Chief among those pretensions of his, the pivot of his work, claims, and promises, the central fact too of apostolic testimony and martyr hope, was the resurrection of Christ from the dead. And behold the long line of pitiful and shallow evasions among modern rejectors. The Wolfenbüttel fragmentist, Reimarus, asserts with the sanhedrim, a theft of the body and a fabricated story. Paulus, a reanimation by cool air and spices, to which Schuster adds the benign influences of lightning and earthquake. One writer holds that the linen

[1] New Life of Jesus, Vol. i. p. 322.

clothes were first mistaken for angels, and afterwards, doubtless from the vividness of their expression, for Jesus. Greg thinks that some passing individual was taken by the disciples for their beloved Lord. Schenkel finds it historical that there was an empty grave. His translator is "compelled to admit that a living person was actually there," and is "free to confess that it is out of my power to resist the conclusion that this unknown person was no other than Jesus himself alive"; but he handsomely apologizes for his feeble powers of resistance, by declaring roundly that "as to the manner and purpose of his return to life, we can only make the feeblest of guesses"; and "the fact" must be "profoundly natural." Renan philosophically declares that the "passion of a hallucinated woman gives to the world a risen God." Strauss resolves all the manifold appearances into "an experience of visions" affecting — very naturally of course — whole assemblies of five hundred men at once. Both he and Schenkel, however, admit that the apostles and all these persons were persuaded that they had seen their Saviour; and thus they who had spent some years, day and night, in his company, and had been separated only from Friday night till Sunday morning, lost all knowledge and proof of his identity.

So scepticism, like some rebel army, has often had its transient jubilee, and made its short-lived panic. But step by step it has abandoned stronghold after stronghold, and seems now to be looking more and more diligently for the "last ditch." It stands confessing our main facts, or denying them on principles that are suicidal. The men that push these marauding expeditions stand out but as a fraction and a faction in the world of criticism, whose own sympathizers reciprocally often wash their hands of the folly. Strauss hacks away at Paulus and some better men; Baur makes Strauss wince; Renan strides over both; Schenkel hints at their disparagement of evidence; and Schenkel's admiring translator spends his chief strength in disputing his inferences and denying his statements.

The general complex of events that constitute the origin of Christianity, as a mere historic question, is no more to be doubted than the existence of the old Roman empire. Nay, the marks to-day are broader and deeper beyond comparison. The Lapidarean gallery shows the rude memorials of the persecuted, side by side with the monuments of Roman pride and luxury. The churches of Helena have survived the palaces of Constantine. The New Testament lies embalmed in a thousand ancient manuscripts ; each classic writer in ten or twenty. A Christian literature sprang up at once, and spread onward, vast, ever-growing, and all-absorbing. Under and around it a Christian life, broader and deeper, steadily moved on. The young giant force in three centuries strode over empire and emperor ; mastered the northern hordes ; grew strong while the empire shrivelled and died ; moulded those fierce hordes to clemency and culture, till now in regions, not where Roman fortress, or wall, or road, or theatre no longer can be traced in ruins, but where the Roman helmet never glistened for an hour, thousands of spires are pointing to the risen Christ, and millions of loving hearts, in deathless sacraments, commemorate the grand event of history. Let Trajan, Adrian, Aurelian, Antonine, Augustus, and the long string of names that once sounded through the world, and are now dead names, be proved myths or sagas at our pleasure. But it is idle to contend against the existence or the superhuman potency of the influences that have transformed humanity and revolutionized human history. The business world to-day on every bill and bond and note and check and invoice inscribes the date of Christ's birth ; and scepticism, after the lapse of eighteen hundred years, is compelled to write and rewrite octavo lives of Jesus.

Even the minor difficulties of the gospel are steadily diminishing. Thirty years ago, Coleridge, when arguing against plenary inspiration, summarily called them "some half-score discrepancies in the chronicles and memoirs of the Old and New Testaments." And Tholuck more recently was puzzled to support his theory of partial inspiration except by instanc-

ing variations in reported discourses, three so-called misapplications of the Septuagint (Heb. ii. 6, 12, 13; x. 5; xii. 26); three questions of names (Mark ii. 26; Matt. xxvii. 9, 10; xxiii. 35); and one of numbers (1 Cor. x. 8). But while there still remain some points of real difficulty, we are seeing the old perplexities melting one by one away. The proconsulship of Cyprus, which once stumbled Beza and changed his version, has been cleared up by the coins and a better examination of Dio Cassius. Smith's investigation of Paul's voyage and shipwreck has added singular confirmation to the minute correctness of the Acts. The old stumbling-block of Cyrenius and the taxing has disappeared before the inquiries of Zumpt. The Vatican and Sinaitic codices remove a slight inconsistency from the account of the last supper (John xiii. 2; γινομένου). The Sinaitic solves one of Tholuck's difficulties, by dropping the name of Barachiah (Matt. xxiii. 35). The inquiries of Thomson and the older manuscripts help us to settle the vexed question of the Gergesenes. Renan records of his travels in Palestine, "the striking accord of the texts and places, the wonderful harmony of the evangelical ideal with the landscape which served as its setting, were to me as a new revelation. I had a fifth gospel before my eyes." And while no discovery for a century, it is believed, has created any new perplexity in the New Testament narrative, a multitude of explanations and confirmations have dawned upon the world, till at no time since the days of Julian have sceptics found their task so desperate, and Strauss was fairly driven from the work of destruction to the fatal one of construction. That task has risen now to the gloomy toil of abrogating the laws of evidence, erasing the literature of centuries, extinguishing the fountain of the mightiest flow of history, and reconstructing the present status of the world.

In view of the records and the facts,

III. Christianity has conspicuously asserted the exalted character of its chief Personage. Things have changed in eighteen centuries. From the contempt of townsmen and

the unbelief of brothers, in an obscure town of a despised race, he has come forth to be the theme of the world's debate.

His claims were the highest. The clear image that lies photographed with sunlight alike upon the tablet of profane and of sacred history, is of one who asserted supreme authority over nature and over man; and who stamped that image with tremendous potency upon the age and the ages. Who and what was he?

To the age in which we live the question comes with an urgency that will not be refused. He who baffled his foes of the first century confounds the enmity of the nineteenth also. The same excitement of the people, the same agitation of learned opponents, the same helpless uncertainty of extrication. Then he was, at first, but the carpenter's son; yet "never man spake like this man." He was a demagogue, the friend of sinners; but the sinners became saints in the contact. He was a deceiver of the people; but chief priest and Sadducee drew back confounded. From a Samaritan that had a devil, he grew to be the ally and superior of the prince of devils. And when baffled bitterness made its last issue, even the heathen soldier saw the Son of God. The "crucified sophist" against whom Lucian sneered, Porphyry wrote, and ten emperors contended, rose over the sneering and the learning and the imperial power.

The later sceptics have been sadly puzzled how to deal with Christ. The older English deists maintained a cautious reserve. Those writers of the last century who asserted gross imposture, now occupy before the world the eminence which in our boyhood we have seen in some honest farmer's cornfield, of a dead crow suspended on a pole.

In our own day the force of the records and the stringency of historic facts furnish a problem before which doubt either wisely stands speechless, or, if it opens its mouth, stammers and breaks down. Goethe could name Christ the "divine man," and "the holy one"; but he could make no clear utterance on his whole career and character. Carlyle names him "the greatest of all heroes"; but though challenged by

his own admirer to show the "incredibilities" with which he "somehow got mixed," he has not yet found leisure for the showing.

The mythical theory was advanced to evade the issue. Pushed at length to an historic basis and a positive deliverance, its author, after thirty years incubation, hatches a moral monstrosity. He presents a "beautiful nature from the first," full of "indiscriminate benevolence," "conscious of harmony with God"; yet a "fanatic" who declares himself "the being that will come in the clouds of heaven to waken the dead and hold judgment"; a compound of the purest love to God and man and of the most unbounded and "unallowable self-exaltation."[1]

The learned and lively Frenchman succeeds no better. His Jesus was "great and pure," "an astonishing genius," "with the highest consciousness of God which ever existed in the breast of humanity"; "a revolutionist of the highest stamp," teaching "the most beautiful code of perfect life"; "mighty in word and work, having felt the truth, and at the price of his blood made it triumph." He produced maxims, "which, thanks to him, were to regenerate the world." "In him was condensed all that was lofty and good in our nature"; he "reacted against his age and his race," "produced the principles on which society has reposed for eighteen hundred years," founded a "universal and eternal religion." Yet in the same breath this "sublime" person is checked in his development by John the Baptist, and but for Herod's summary disposal of the latter he would have remained an unknown Jewish "sectary"; he imposed on his followers and himself with the notion that his knowledge of them was "a revelation from on high"; the kingdom he strove to found was a "Utopia," and the early Christian life an "intoxication"; he was "overwhelmed and carried away by the admiration of his disciples," forced "in spite of himself"

[1] Strauss' New Life of Jesus, Vol. i. pp. 280, 282, 331. In the following quotations from books well-known, it has not been thought necessary to cumber these pages with references.

into the attitude of a pretended miracle-worker and thaumaturgist, if not into the tricks of a common juggler. His kingdom of God has been realized only by means of the "sublime vagueness" which covered his own illusion; his demands of his followers "lost all bounds," "despised the wholesome limits of human nature," and "shattered life," till he went "totally beyond nature," lost his gentleness, became "rude," intolerant of opposition, irritated by obstacles; and it was time that death should release him from "a way without exit." And while, if left free, Jesus would have exhausted himself in a hopeless struggle for the impossible, the unintelligent hatred of his enemies determined the success of his work, and "put the seal upon his divinity." This absurd picture is hardly so much as the human head joined to the horse's neck; it is rather a lion's head with the body of an ass.

Schenkel, though at his own caprice he asserts and denies so as to make another apocryphal gospel, involves himself in a similar labyrinth. "To a pure will, in which the greatest strength was united with a consummate wisdom," he adds "a consciousness of God infinitely higher and deeper than that of the prophets"; but upon it "is cast one dark shadow" — his miracles. He is forced to see that the miracles will not away from the living and otherwise consistent picture of the synoptic Gospels, and that therein "the acts of Almighty power confront us." His only solution of "this one great enigma" is the ridiculous hypothesis that the sober and circumstantial narratives of Jairus's daughter, the widow's son, the feeding of five thousand, and others like them, are but circuitous and hyperbolical statements how through Christ "they had been refreshed with living water, fed with the bread of heaven, and awakened to an undying life."[1] If this be solution, then what is defeat?

Parker, and a host of others who disavow his conclusions, are driven to the monstrous inconsistency of declaring Jesus to be the "highest ideal of human excellence," and yet find-

[1] Character of Jesus, Vol. i. pp. 25–27.

ing in his mouth those superhuman voices, "Come unto me all ye that labor"; "I am the light of the world"; "I am the way, the truth, and the life"; "I am the resurrection and the life"; utterances which in the mouth of mere man were a blasphemous stealing of the glory of God. So long as the text of the Gospels stands vindicated, Jesus can be rescued from the attitude of a madman or a blasphemous impostor only by the recognition of his true divinity. No patronizing epithets can gloss over the fact of his startling claims. The sharp Lessing long ago put it well: "If Christ is not truly God, then Mahomet would indisputably have been a far greater man than Christ, as he would have been far more veracious, more circumspect, and more zealous for the honor of God, since Christ by his expressions would have given dangerous occasion for idolatry; while on the other hand not a single expression of the kind can be laid to the charge of Mahomet." And Schlegel well says: "If Christ were not more than Socrates, then a Socrates he was not."[1]

Yet Pantheism itself has had to grant at length not alone the historic reality of Christ's person and life, and that life shining out from the early records; but more also, that it was the brightest reality of beauty, truth, and goodness that ever dawned on this world. Here then we stand upon these mountain peaks of solid fact,—a wonderful birth and growth of historic forces; a contemporaneous record; a central personage with unbounded claims;—and we see every theory but one melt away around like a morning mist. No other solution but explodes with its own inconsistencies. Every half-way admission is but a place of unrest. There is a "friendly letter" of Theodore Parker to his brethren that has not been and will not, because it cannot, be answered. The one solution that, like the New Jerusalem, "lieth foursquare" upon the Gospels, includes the divine character and the superhuman work of Christ. For I add only and briefly,

IV. Christianity has demonstrated its overmastering power. That illustrious Personage has also crowned his utterance

[1] Schlegel's Philosophy of History (Bohn's ed.) p. 279.

with performance. He has made the modern, as well as the ancient, Scribe and Sadducee feel that when he spoke those claims, he spoke with authority. A distinguished advocate of "our liberal Christianity," so-called, has lately declared the "chief glory" of that system to be, "as yet, the barren distinction of a triumphant denial"; while "the deep-seated want of a positive, life-giving faith is not met."[1]

That glory we do not claim to share. Our Christ has asserted, is asserting, his supreme ascendency, his divine potency. Recall the time when Augustus sat on the throne of the world, and Jesus lay in a Jewish stable; and ask where now is the empire, and where is not the church? He who declared "I am the light of the world," and staked his name as Jehovah or a madman, has proved his words the words of truth and soberness, and himself divine. He has been the light of nations and the light of men. What multitudes of renovated souls are clinging to his work and person —to his alone. How he has gathered round his track, at last, all the high art and science and philanthropy, and now marshalls the heavy battalions. How he rose over the empire and conquered its conquerors. How for fifteen centuries at least, the nations collided round the cross, till those that followed the cross closest, now lead the world. How Christ has brought woman up and slavery down. How through ages of conflict he has cheered his friends and agitated his foes. How he has more and more stood forth into the centre of literature and thought, till all the scholarship of Germany starts up to answer that stupendous question: "What think ye of Christ?" and the waves of that commotion dash over the shores of England and France, and spread across this Western Continent. And how, through the very toilings of his opponents, that loud question is now pushing through all the ranks of society, and knocking at every man's door, "What think ye of Christ?" And under the pressure of his presence now on earth, the evil spirits, as of old, are

[1] W. H. Furness, D.D., Introduction to Schenkel's Character of Jesus, pp. 4, 5.

constrained to confess. The father of myths declares that among those who have exalted "the ideal of humanity, Jesus stands in the first class," "making predominant those features of patience, goodness, and charity," which are the germ "of all we now call humanity"; imparting to that ideal "a more lofty consecration," and "the most vital warmth"; and, by "the religious society which he founded, providing for this ideal the widest acceptance among mankind."[1] Schenkel pronounces his life "a phenomenon the most exalted and the richest in consequences in the history of the world."[2] Schenkel's American translator affirms that "he turned the whole mighty current of human history."[3] The English hero-worshipper must term his life and death "the most important transaction that has occurred or can occur in the annals of mankind."[4] The French scholar and sceptic avers that "he still presides each day over the destinies of the world."[5] And for the deathless force which radiates through all times and lands from his person, it fell to the world's greatest military genius to bear witness — him whose personal presence on the battle-field was equivalent to fifty thousand men — when he lamented that his own magic influence could never pass beyond his person, and pronounced that undying reign of love that space cannot limit nor time exhaust, which binds the men of all generations to his bosom, till "their soul with all its faculties becomes blended with the existence of Christ," to be the grandest of all his miracles, and the standing and absolute proof of his divinity.

And a pleasant thing it is when the voice of cavil turns consciously to confession; when he of the Inquiring Spirit pronounces his glowing eulogy upon the word that "finds him more," and "at greater depths of his being, than all other books together"; when the great anatomist of Roman history

[1] Strauss' New Life of Jesus, Vol. ii. p. 437.
[2] Character of Jesus, Vol. i. p. 2.
[3] Character of Jesus, Introduction, p. x.
[4] Carlyle's Miscellanies, Vol. iii. p. 4.
[5] Life of Jesus, p, 375.

in his advancing years "will have none but the God of the Bible" and "my son shall be taught to believe in the letter of the Old and New Testaments" with a firm "faith in everything which I have doubted";[1] and when the "universal doubter," heart-sick over the woes of his country, in his last commentary uttered that one firm voice: "Only this I know, that in no other is there salvation, except in the name of Jesus Christ the crucified; and that for the human race there is nothing higher than the God-man realized in him, and the kingdom of God planted by him."[2] Nor are there many sadder things on record than the closing career of brilliant John Sterling, when he had said: "Adieu, O church," "Heaven bless you, O Carlyle." What is more dismal than the picture which his great friend has painted of that meal at Knightsbridge; that, as it were, last supper of the three kindred spirits — Sterling, Carlyle, and Parker: "One of the saddest dinners," writes the great Scotchman; "all was so haggard in one's memory and half-consciously in one's anticipations"; "like dining in the crypt of a mausoleum," "the conversation waste," Sterling's "silent sadness painfully apparent through the bright mask," and "a certain sternness of mood unknown in his better days, as if strange gorgon-hues of earnest destiny were more and more rising round him, and the time for sport were past." Then came that most pathetic letter to the great friend, "for remembrance and farewell," with its confession: "On higher matters there is nothing to say. I tread the common road into the great darkness." "Certainly there is none." "If I can lend a helping hand there that shall not be wanting."[3] Next came, one day, the evening shadow, with the groping, and the asking for "the old Bible which I used so often at Herstmenceux among the cottages";[4] and then the great darkness settled down. Of helping hand from poor John Sterling, we read no record.

Even so from ancient times does our Christ assert his

[1] Niebuhr's Letters. [2] De Wette, in die Offenbarung, Vorwort, p. vi.
[3] Carlyle's Life of Sterling. [4] Hare's Life of Sterling.

divine authority over the consciences of his apostates, the fears of his foes, the lives of his regenerate, and the whole sweep of history. To explain the rise and growth of that unearthly influence, without admitting all its heavenly claims, is infidelity's unsolved, insolvable problem — the leaky sieve of the doomed Danaides; to stay its progress through the nations, the endless, hopeless toil — the ever-rebounding stone of straining Sisyphus.

In concluding this outline of the situation, one or two thoughts thrust themselves sharply upon our notice.

It is a most important lesson for the young preacher of the gospel to learn that scepticism will not become extinct when it is overthrown by argument. The refuge of lies must indeed be swept away, but the lie still lives when the refuge is gone. As unbelief never had its birth, so it will not have its death, of reason alone. Its conclusion is foregone; the only question is of method. And when all other methods fail, it postulates its conclusion in its premise. Driven from one stronghold, it plants itself in another; driven from them all, it swings the circle and begins anew. The form that was slain in one generation is alive and brisk in another. And though Strauss has warped his theory into wholly a different shape, doubtless the "Parker Fraternity" of Boston will prate of "New Testament myths" as long as the voters of "upper Coos" continue to ballot for the dead Jackson, or the ancient politicians of Massachusetts go for the "constitution as it was." Strauss and Baur virtually return to the place of Voltaire and Diderot. The process is ever old and ever new. And while the "Radical" clamors for a Christianity without Christ, others will not be wanting in all ages to try Mill's suggestion of a "religion without a God." And thus as we look back upon the past to see the same slaughtered errors come up from the battle-field where they fell, and rush again to the onset, so we look down through the long future to see the same Cossack host rising in each age, a spectral army renewed forever from the bottomless pit; the same

banners float on the breeze, the same battle-cries ring out on the air, till the enmity of the human heart to the gospel is all slain by the grace of God. For we remember how he foretold it all; and how he said: "Light is come into the world, and men have loved darkness rather than light."

A still more important lesson is that all fears for our gospel are groundless. We sometimes look out on this scene of religious commotion, with its strifes and heresies, its learned infidelities and scientific atheisms, like Peter on the Sea of Galilee, and the enemy's loud shout comes round us like the "boisterous winds." We are tempted to feel, surely never was the church so tossed and threatened, so beleagured and endangered. But we may spare our solicitudes. There were worse scandals in the churches that Paul founded. There were stranger heresies in the post-apostolic times. The attack has been sorer when the defences have been weaker. There were times when giants Pope and Pagan wielded the sword as well as the tongue. It has long ceased to be a time of Elijah in the wilderness, or Athanasius against the world. And these predictions of speedy overthrow have a very ancient sound. Fifteen hundred years ago, in Augustine's day, the enemies set the very time for the church to expire.[1] She has been slow of dying. Paine whimpered, "should the Bible and the New Testament hereafter fall, it is not I that have been the occasion." He was spared that great grief. Strauss spoke of the life of Jesus as "critically destroyed"; and Parker vowed that "this New England orthodoxy" should "come to the ground." But alas for the days of miracle and prophecy. Strauss drove the sharp wedge that split Hegelianism in twain; and Parker but dropped a rough stone on the clay toes of that Nebuchadnezzar's image called "Liberal Christianity." And when the valorous North American recently announced that "the churches are failing," he doubtless dreamed of the closing of the Music Hall and the ceasing of those prayers to the "infinite mother." And now that in the neighboring capi-

[1] Civitate Dei, Lib. xviii. cap. 54.

tal of literature and of liberalism the lance is exchanged for the lancet, the too fervid arguments of departed Doctors of Divinity for the icy sneers of lively Doctors of Medicine disguised as Guardian Angels of hazardous maidens; we remember how the boasts of the rebel capital too were never louder than just before her great leader adorned himself with female attire.

Gentlemen of the Porter Rhetorical Society, as you go forth to your labors in the ministry of the Word, let no solicitude annoy you. Fully recognize the fact of a wide-spread scepticism, bold, clamorous, aggressive, and boastful. But though their shout fills the heavens, be sure that the heavens are not falling. Know that the chief dangers of the church are always from within; and even here she has the promise of his presence. Cling to the Word. Those ancient psalms that have uttered the praises of three thousand years contain some germ of eternity. Those deep sayings that have spoken rest, holiness, and life to myriads of souls unto this present hour, are brimful of blessing still. The Holy Spirit is not yet obsolete; and the living Christ can maintain the cause of the dying Christ. You have but to press home those pungent truths with the patience of hope, the labor of love, and the prayer of faith; and you may even despise every assault from without, as he that sitteth in the heavens for eighteen hundred years has laughed at them, and had them in derision. You may point to him that once hung upon the cross, and say: O Celsus and Julian, O Voltaire, Paine, and Parker, Strauss, Baur, and Schenkel, BEHOLD YOUR MASTER.

ARTICLE VIII.

GERMAN CORRESPONDENCE.

It will, I imagine, be of interest to your readers if I give you in the present number some account of the principal theological quarterly, monthly, and weekly journals now published in Germany. I shall limit myself almost solely to the more scientific periodicals, for the simple reason that the others are too numerous for our space, and of too little weight to deserve it.

All know of the "Studien und Kritiken," which was established in 1828. Its original editors were Drs. Ullmann and Umbreit, both Professors at the University of Heidelberg. The present principal editor is Dr. Riehm of Halle, a pupil both of Hupfeld and Umbreit. Collaborators have been Rothe (recently deceased), Hundeshagen (now of Bonn), Drs. Nitzsch, Müller, and Beyschlag. It has always been the organ of the orthodox Schleiermacherians, though its pages have been open both to freer and stricter theologians. Latterly, many Articles have been remarkably brisk, particularly those written by Drs. Riehm and Beyschlag. In a general way it inclines to heaviness, though it always contains valuable material. There are or have been few theologians of note in Germany who have not at one time or another contributed to the "Studien." — Most nearly resembling the "Studien" is the "Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie," founded in 1856, and ever since edited by Drs. Dorner, Ehrenfeuchter, Liebner, Palmer, Landerer, and Weizsäcker. Various elements are represented in this journal: orthodox and free Schleiermacherianism, the positive theology of Dorner, Schellingism, and to some extent the theosophy of Baader and Oetingen. It is decidedly the most interesting theological journal of Germany. The idea of one of its founders, Dorner, was to make it a medium through which Anglo-American theology might become more known here; and not a few Articles in this direction have appeared. For example, Dorner published a valuable review of the Mansell-Maurice controversy. A capital feature of the "Jahrbücher" is the quarterly notices of new books by men of ability in the respective departments. It differs from the "Studien" in not introducing exegetical Articles, and in being almost exclusively devoted to theology proper, critico-theological questions, and apologetics. — The next quarterly I have to mention is the "Zeitschrift für historische Theologie," published continuously since 1832, first under Prof. Ch. I. Illgen, and then under Dr. Niedner, and now by Dr. Kahnis of Leipsic. Its Articles are mostly monographies on special points in church history, such as on the Culdees of the sixth and seventh centuries, by Dr. Ebrard; on the Sects of the Reforma-

tion, by Nippold; on Julian the Apostate, by Dr. Philip Schaff; and others. It is very thorough and learned. — Distinguished for its strong Lutheranism, latterly too for its advocacy of the separation of church and state, is the "Zeitschrift für die gesammte lutherische Theologie und Kirche," edited from 1840 to 1862, by Drs. Rudelbach and Guericke; since that date, when the first-named died, by Drs. Delitzsch and Guericke. It furnishes Articles on all the various subjects in dogmatic theology, church history, apologetics, exegesis, and the like, and contains numerous notices of new books, some of them in length resembling the sermons of our old Puritan Fathers. I scarcely need say that it does not in any sense take neutral ground. Its contributors, however, are not all of the stiff Lutheran kind. — In this last respect it differs both from the "Kirchliche Zeitschrift" of Drs. Kliefoth and Dieckhoff, and the "Dorpater Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche," which are so pure in their Lutheranism, that they might possibly satisfy your Buffalo (or Wisconsin) Lutherans, who seem almost inclined to excommunicate our rigid Prussian Lutherans. The former was founded in 1854 by Dr. Kliefoth, sometimes called the Pope of Mechlenburg, and Dr. Meyer. Since 1860 the latter has given place to Dr. Dieckhoff. In its views of the church and the pastoral office it approximates to Romanism. The "Dorpater Zeitschrift" (1859) is edited by the theological faculty of Dorpat, Kurtz, von Oettingen and others; many pastors also are contributors. It, too, is strongly Lutheran. — The "Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für englisch-theologische Forschung," published since 1862, by Dr. M. Heidenheim (a converted Jew, who formerly lived in London, now Professor or Privat-Docent at Zürich, a man of considerable learning and positive Christian tendencies), is a nondescript affair. As nearly all the Articles are written in German by Heidenheim himself, it must be called English on the *lucus a non lucendo* principle. Occasionally a brief English Article is published. The contents chiefly relate to Oriental subjects. Many fragments of Syriac and other ancient writings are printed and translated. The journals hitherto mentioned are in the main Orthodox, or, at all events, their general aim is the furtherance of the faith once delivered to the saints, though several of them open their pages to expositions of critical views, which would almost ruin any of our orthodox Anglo-American quarterlies. — The only really important quarterly whose tendency is avowedly what is technically, though rather falsely, called *critical*, is Hilgenfeld's "Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie." It is the continuation, under a different name and editorship, of Baur and Zeller's "Theologische Jahrbücher," which ceased to appear in 1857. The general run of the contributions are of the tendency indicated by the title of some written by Dr. Holstein, "Die Christus *vision* des Apostels Paulus"; and by the name of David Friedrich Strauss, who occasionally writes for it; but orthodox Articles are also admitted. Hilgenfeld himself was originally more Baurian than Baur, but has gradually receded from

many of the master's positions like Ritschl of Göttingen. He is extraordinary Professor at Jena, and is said to be a disappointed man. — Another Jena Professor has recently established a quarterly which is to be almost exclusively devoted to Old Testament questions. — For the last two years there has also been published under the editorship of Pastor Wilhelm Hanck, the "Theologischer Jahresbericht," the design of which is to give brief notices of all the new German theological publications, year by year, as they appear. Such a publication ought to be very useful. The present one seems to me, however, to labor under the following defects: The notices are often out of proportion to the nature and importance of the works, small books having sometimes long notices, and large books short ones; the contents of the books are not always clearly enough indicated; and lastly, too much space is devoted to the enormous mass of sermons that are published. Still it meets a lack that is met by no other journal. — The "Beweis des Glaubens" is a monthly apologetical magazine, which is designed to defend the Christian faith in a popular way. The Articles are frequently very good, but seldom really popular, and I fear the magazine is very little read by the people who most need to be convinced of the folly of unbelief. Its editors are Pastors Andreae and Brachmann, who act under the direction and with the co-operation of Professors Zöckler and Grau, both men of ability. — A monthly magazine of mixed character is Professor Gelzer's "Protestantische Monatsblätter." It was first published in 1852, has had for collaborators some of the principal men of Germany, as Dorner, Hagenbach, Lange, Schlottmann, and others; and furnishes Articles on historical subjects: Catholicism, Hierarchism, and anything that tends to illustrate the inner tendencies of German life and thought, and to combat evil and error. Not unfrequently, too, are there valuable Articles on the course and state of things in other countries Holland, France, America, England. On the whole its spirit is free and positively evangelical. — The Erlangen "Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche," established by Professor Dr. Von Harless, the author of the "Christian Ethics," now in Munich, has hitherto, though the organ of the Bavarian Lutheran theologians, kept free from the rigidity of others I have referred to. Indeed it opposes the Romanizing tendencies of Pastor Löhe and men of his school. Its present editors are the Professors Von Hofmann, Schmid, and Scheurl. In consequence of its defence of the free views of Von Hofmann on the subject of the atonement, one of the principal editors, Professor Thomasius, broke off his connection with it.

The foregoing are the principal Protestant journals of a predominantly scientific character. Of those which pursue mainly practical ends, Dr. Hengstenberg's "Evangelische Kirchenzeitung," is the oldest and most celebrated. It was first published in 1827. During the first twenty-five years of its existence its general tone was unionistic, with a strong smack of the Reformed church. About 1852 it became the advocate of the Con-

fessionalistic Lutheran party in Prussia, whose organ it has been ever since. It has immense influence, not only on the orthodox Lutheran pastors of Prussia, but on those in Hessen-Cassel, Hessen-Darmstadt, Hannover, and other parts of Germany. It is the shibboleth by which very many of them swear; it is their oracle. Its contents are mainly Articles on theological and practical questions which happen to have a special interest at any particular time; on important works in general literature, on great men who pass away. I have read excellent Essays on Shakespearean characters in it. Little space is devoted to news, and the news is generally very Lutheranly adorned. Its papers on practical subjects strike me mostly, as excessively unpractical. But however much one like myself may find to except to in Hengstenberg's "Zeitung," its merits are undeniable, and its services to the cause of evangelical truth at a time when it stood rather alone, worthy of all recognition. — Next in importance and influence comes Professor Messner's "Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung," founded in 1858 by the Evangelical Alliance, and to the present day considered the organ of its friends in Germany. Its theological and ecclesiastical colors are unionistic; it is free in tone without being latitudinarian; broad in sympathy without being characterless, and orthodox without being narrow. Among its contributors it has numbered many of the best men of Germany — Tholuck, Dorner, Hofmann, and others of the same school. As a general rule each number contains brief papers on some important question of the time; short, pithy notices of new books, and what we should call news of the churches. It is about the only journal which has a good word for the Baptists in their sufferings. One may almost tell a pastor's tendency beforehand by ascertaining whether he reads the New or the Old Evangelische Kirchenzeitung. There is no journal so well fitted as that of Professor Messner for keeping foreigners *au courant* of the movements in Germany.[1] The circulation of the latter is not so large as that of the former; but it is increasing. — A third Zeitung, occupying a position distinct from both the last-mentioned ones, but more akin perhaps to Messner's, is the Darmstadt "Allgemeine Kirchenzeitung," founded in 1832 by E. Zimmermann. It was intended to be a repertory of historical and statistical facts relating to the church. It has gone through a good many changes of tendency, as even the names of its successive editors or co-editors alone would indicate. Under its founder it was thoroughly rationalistic; under Bretschneider (whose name, "Sawyer," Hengstenberg would consider significant or ominous) it taught rational supernaturalism; under Palmer and Schenkel it became unionistic and positively evangelical; and its present editors, Lechler of Leipsic, and Prelate Zimmermann of Darmstadt, are in the main orthodox. They admit contributions, however, of a freer tendency than their own. — As a supplement to the Allgemeine, as it is

[1] I am indebted to it for many of the details I have here communicated.

for brevity's sake termed, appears the "Literaturblätt, which contains longer and shorter notices of a considerable number of the new theological and philosophical publications; but it is marked neither by completeness nor special vigor. The Allgemeine seems to be suffering from the decrepitude of old age. — Much more ably conducted, and altogether more interesting, is the "Protestantische Kirchenzeitung," edited by Dr. Krause of Berlin, and now about thirteen years old. It is the organ of the left wing of Schleiermacher's school, as the names of some of its principal contributors indicate: Dr. Lydon of Berlin, Dr. C. Schwarz of Gotha, and Dr. Alexander Schweizer of Zürich, Dr. Hase of Jena, and the late Professor Weisse of Leipsic were occasional writers. Its contents are generally essays on questions of the day, longer and shorter reviews, and ecclesiastical news. Its general tendency is negatively critical, though it does not go so far as Strauss. It is said to have a considerable circulation and to exert a strong influence, especially on the Protestant clergy of Austria. The rationalistic clergy of Germany, particularly of Prussia, who are by no means so small in number as is sometimes said, regard it as their organ, and treat it as their oracle. Far as we are from agreeing with its tendency, we must say that it is attractive in form, well edited, and any one wishing to know all sides of German church-life ought to read it along with Messner and Hengstenberg. — Since 1860 Dr. Schenkel of Heidelberg has published a journal of his own, under the name "Allgemeine Kirchliche Zeitschrift," intended by him to be the organ of all who aim at the democratizing of the church in the Baden sense. The late Dr. Rothe was an occasional contributor. The principal co-operators are Professors Holtzmann and Lic. Hausrath of Heidelberg. It is the principal organ too of the so-called "Protestant Association." of which Schenkel himself is one of the chief actors. As may be imagined, the theological character of the Zeitschrift is that of its editor and founder — to wit, rationalistic. While it is always denouncing the orthodox, no sooner does an orthodox journal attempt to criticise its positions, than the cry is raised, "persecution! persecution!" I have often been disgusted by the despicable tone of its remarks and judgments. Occasionally an orthodox man contributes an article or review; but this is a rare occurrence. It deserves however the praise of being convenient in form, clearly printed, methodically arranged, and well and piquantly edited. I wish the others would take a leaf out of its book. — The last I can mention is the "Kirchenblatt für die Reformirte Schweiz," edited by Hagenbach of Basel, the tendency of which is naturally unionistic in theology, and evangelical in practical church questions. It represents the better elements of German Switzerland, in opposition to men like Lange of the Zeitstimmen who is more akin to Strauss and the Freie Gemeinden than to any others. On another occasion I may refer to the smaller journals, and to the Roman Catholic monthlies and quarterlies, some of which are very ably conducted.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF JUDGES.[1] — The Book of Judges is one of the most interesting books of the Old Testament; and yet no book is perhaps more neglected both by commentators and ordinary readers. No book of the Bible is supposed to be so full of difficulties, especially of an ethical character, and yet as we regard it, the book bears on it distinctly the stamp of the divine mint. It is one long series of exciting dramatic scenes and poetical interludes, which reveal in the most marvellous manner the character of man and the principles on which God deals with him. What material for meditation is furnished by the stories of the assassination of Ehud and Sisera; by the history of Gideon; by the strife between Abimelech and Jotham; by the triumph and vow of Jephthah; by the strange life of Samson; by the account of the Levite; and by numerous matters of detail. How wonderful that through all this variety one golden thread should run, reminding us of God and his judgment of human ways! The key to all is contained in two passages: "Every man did that which was right in his own eyes"; and "The anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, because they transgressed the covenant which he commanded their fathers." In the series of commentaries published by Keil and Delitzsch, and in that by Lange, is one on Judges. Dr. Bachmann's promises to be marked by great thoroughness; we say promises, because the present volume extends only to the end of the third chapter. It comprises prolegomena on the compass and limits of the period of the Judges; on the position and significance of this period in the history of the old covenant; on the political and religious condition of Israel under the Judges; on the office and functions of the Judges; on Israel's political relations during this period; on the religious and moral state of the people; on the chronology of the period; and a full commentary on the first three chapters. So far as we have been able to examine, Dr. Bachmann seems to have done his work with thoroughness, reverence, and impartiality. We trust the rest of the commentary may soon appear.

STEINMEYER'S SERMONS.[2] — The number of sermons published in Germany is so great, that generally we cannot notice them for want of

[1] Das Buch der Richter. Mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Geschichte seiner Auslegung und Kirchlichen Verwendung erklärt. Von Dr. Johannes Bachmann, Professor der Theologie zu Rostock. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. 1867.

[2] Beiträge zum Schriftverständniss in Predigten. Von Dr. F. Steinmeyer.

space. Considering how few and weak the links are in Germany between the church as represented by the clergy and the people, we have often wondered where the immense numbers of sermons annually published find purchasers. But the sermons of Dr. Steinmeyer, Professor of Practical Theology at the University of Berlin, are not of the ordinary run. His colleagues speak of them as strong meat, and we can well imagine that ordinary hearers should find them hard to follow. Each sermon is devoted to the working out of some one prominent idea; and in carrying out his plan he often evinces great subtilty — sometimes perhaps, too much subtilty. The present volume is styled "Contributions to the Understanding of Scripture." Among the subjects treated we may mention the following: The Way of Peace (Heb. xii. 14); The Meaning of Trouble (John ix. 1–3); Divine News (Mark viii. 31–33); Two Swords (Luke xxii. 38); Obedience and Sacrifice (1 Sam. xv. 22). Dr. Steinmeyer very often surprises by the unanticipated turns he gives to his texts, and by the unexpected, though natural, meanings he draws from them. We can recommend the volume heartily. Those who can read German will find it full of suggestion and quickening. We have never read a more striking and profoundly evangelical sermon, than the one on divine views of things as opposed to human views.

The Higher Schools of Prussia.[1] — The work whose title we have given below is a classified collection of the laws and regulations relating to the higher schools of Prussia, that is the Gymnasia and the Real-Schulen. It is edited by Dr. Wiese, whose position as head of this department of public instruction in Prussia, eminent abilities, and genial mind, fit him in an unusual measure for performing the task entrusted to him. We shall serve our readers best, however, by briefly indicating the nature of the contents: It is divided into ten sections and an Appendix, with the following headings: 1. The Legal Basis of the Higher Schools — articles of the constitution relating thereto; 2. The Different Sorts of Schools — the inspecting authorities and their duties; 3. The Establishment and Support of the Schools; 4. The Instruction given in the Schools — its general plan, its special plan; 5. Education and Discipline; 6. Various Arrangements and General Rules for the Higher Schools; 7. Examinations of Pupils on Leaving the Higher Schools, with the Testimonials given — in Gymnasia, in Real-Schulen; 8. Value of the Testimonials in Public Relations — civil matters, military matters; 9. Public Boarding Schools — Protestant and Roman Catholic (like Schul Pforte); 10. Specimens of Documents rela-

Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. 1866.

[1] Verordnungen und Gesetze für die höheren Schulen in Preussen. Herausgegeben von Dr. L. Wiese. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben; London: Asher and Co.; Trubner and Co. 1867. Price, 50 sgr.

ting to Individual Institutions and Transactions, Statutes, Instructions for Inspectors, Form of Vocation of Directors and Teachers; School Laws in various parts of Prussia. The Appendix relates to ladies' schools. This brief summary will give our readers an idea of the interesting nature of the contents of Dr. Wiese's book. So far as the practical spirit and worth of the Prussian School system can be deduced from its laws and regulations, this work affords ample materials for making the deductions. At a time like the present, when so much is written about education, and when the extraordinary success of the Prussian military system last year is drawing attention to its institutions, we think it desirable to have this work brought to notice. We may add that there are few men in Europe more competent to give a sound judgment in educational matters than Dr. Wiese.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

Row on Inspiration.[1]

"According to the statements of our common histories, when Queen Elizabeth entered London on her accession to the throne, she was presented with a copy of the New Testament. This gift she thankfully received. In addition to this gift, there was presented to her a petition purporting to come from four supposed prisoners, — Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, — praying that their imprisonment, which they had been suffering, might be brought to a termination. The Queen replied that before she complied with the prayer of the petition, she would consult the prisoners themselves, and hear from their own mouths whether they desired their liberty which was sought for them. This determination was certainly not unreasonable. In the same manner, before we assume that the writers of the New Testament have written under the influence of this or that particular mode of inspiration, it seems no less reasonable to ask the writers themselves under what degree and particular mode of inspiration they assert that they have actually written. It would be absurd to assume for them an inspiration which they may fervidly disclaim. Such an inquiry we purpose addressing to the writers of the New Testament" (p. 3). In agreement with this introductory remark, the most prominent aim of the present volume is to show that the writers of the New Testament claim for themselves a special divine, but not a distinctively verbal, inspiration; and that their assertions in regard to themselves are inconsistent with their regarding themselves as inspired for any other teaching than the teachings of religious truth.

[1] The Nature and Extent of Divine Inspiration, as stated by the Writers, and deduced from the Facts of the New Testament. By the Rev. C. A. Row, M.A., of Pembroke College, Oxford, and late Head-Master of the Royal Grammar School, Mansfield. 8vo. pp. 439. London: Longman, Roberts, and Green. 1864.

In many particulars Mr. Row does not differ from the standard theological writers so much as he appears to differ. He often speaks confidently where he should speak doubtingly. His statements are often categorical where they should be hypothetical. He frequently concedes more than he ought to concede. Thus he says: "Although then, we are ready to admit that the moral attributes of God are not infinite but perfect, and consequently that it would be more correct to say that God is perfectly (not infinitely) holy, or that he is perfectly (not infinitely) good, yet we must not overlook the fact that these attributes are the perfect attributes of an infinite being" (p. 10). His definitions are sometimes infelicitous. Thus he says: "Now what do we mean when we assert that the scriptures have been composed by the aid of supernatural inspiration? We intend by that expression that there is an element in them which the unassisted powers of the human mind never would have produced by the simple exercise of its natural powers" (p. 16). If we were to interpret this tautological sentence as an insulated one, we should suppose Mr. Row to believe what he evidently does not, that every Christian is inspired so far forth as he is born of God and sanctified by the Spirit. He defines a miracle to be "a deviation from the ordinary law of the Creator's acting" (p. 38); "God ceasing to act in the ordinary mode of his operations, and acting by a new instrumentality" (p. 151); "It is the very essence of the nature of miracles that they should be 'a deviation from the ordinary law of the Creator's acting'" (p. 38). What then is the distinction between a miraculous and a supernatural phenomenon? Mr. Row insists on various propositions which he does not and cannot prove to be correct. He often says that "God would not communicate the same truth to man by two methods wholly and entirely distinct" (p. 54); "What man can do by himself God does not do; but what man cannot do God does" (p. 158); "God will not communicate to man by inspiration the knowledge which he has already given him ample means of acquiring by the exercise of his natural powers" (p. 52). Does it not illustrate the peculiar grace of God that he gives men a supernatural revelation of those great truths which are taught in the volume of nature, but which men "did not like to retain in their knowledge?"

While many of Mr. Row's statements are too sweeping and unqualified, he makes many wise and profound remarks. He is particularly cogent in his proof of a supernatural interposition of God in the inspiring of the writers of the New Testament. Theirs was something more and higher than the natural inspiration of Homer and Shakespeare. It differs in kind as well as in degree from the enthusiasm of lofty genius. There is always danger of confounding the *natural* with the *supernatural* inspiration of men; the manner in which *Milton*, with the manner in which *Isaiah* was inspired.

God's Word Written.[1]

This work is "reprinted from the London Religious Tract Society." It is valuable for its minute references to the Biblical texts which have been supposed to be inconsistent with the theory that they are inspired. It is also valuable as containing a condensed statement of the arguments for the inspiration of the Bible, and a condensed reply to the objections of the unbeliever. The special aim of the volume is to defend the theory of verbal inspiration. We do not think that the author always adheres to his own definition of this ambiguous term. Some of his opponents would accept his definition, and criticise him for deviating from it. The following is his statement: "There was a concurrence of the act of God with the act of man. First, he endowed the man with these particular gifts, and chose him to be his instrument. Secondly, he guided his mind in the selection of what he should say, and of the revelation of the material of his writing where such a revelation was made necessary through the defect of human knowledge; Thirdly, he acted in and on the intellect and heart of the writer in the act of committing the words to writing; not only bestowing a more than human elevation, but securing the truthfulness of the thing written, and moulding the language into the form accordant to his own will. To sum up the whole, verbal inspiration simply amounts to this: that while the words of scripture are truly and characteristically the words of men, they are at the same time fully and concurrently the words of God" (p. 282). That the supernatural elevation of the minds of the sacred writers affected their words is admitted by many opponents of what is distinctively called verbal inspiration. It is also admitted by these divines that the sacred writers taught accurately all which they intended to teach, and that they were permitted by the Holy Ghost to use just such words as they did use. But the opponents of the distinctively verbal inspiration deny that all the words of the sacred penmen were selected by the Holy Spirit, and that it is wise to make the doctrine of inspiration stand or fall with the theory that all these words are in agreement with the teachings of secular science, or with those portions of history which are merely secular. Mr. Garbett writes in some passages as if he supposed that all the opponents of verbal inspiration denied altogether the inspiration of the biblical penmen in their historical teachings. But this is untrue. Many of the historical teachings of the Bible are strictly religious, and are in reality doctrinal as well as historical. To deny their inspired authority is virtually to deny all inspiration. Some of the most decided opponents of verbal inspiration admit that all the biblical narratives which involve religious

[1] The Doctrine of the Inspiration of Holy Scripture explained and enforced. By the Rev. Edward Garbett, M.A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Surbiton. Boyle Lecturer for 1861, 1862, and 1863; Select Preacher to the University of Oxford in 1862 and 1863. 12mo. pp. 358. Boston: American Tract Society.

truth or are essential to the right religious impression, have the divine approval, and are therefore entirely reliable; also, that all the historical statements of the Bible which involve in themselves no religious truth, and are essential to no religious impression are expressed by the inspired writers in the style which was best for them in their circumstances, and were therefore permitted by the superintending Spirit. It is obvious that no small part of the controversy on the inspired character of the Bible results from the fact that the controversialists misunderstand each other.

Curtis on Inspiration.[1]

Professor Curtis aims to show that the inspiration of the Biblical writers is not infallible, either in reference to science or secular history or religious doctrine or impression. His theory, however, is qualified by some very peculiar statements. Sometimes he seems to confound the infallibility of the Bible with the infallibility of our explanations of it. Thus he says: "Even mathematical truths have their degrees of uncertainty, because, however absolutely true in themselves, our minds are fallible, and may err in working them out, so that we never feel perfectly sure from a single calculation that the result is correct. Can we then say that any instruction we may draw from the Bible possesses absolute and infallible authority? This will not be asserted of the *English* Bible, which is only a translation; and very few would declare their *own* translation of the Hebrew and Greek infallible. Much less so can be the opinions of any commentator, learned or unlearned, as to its meaning. So that to each man in this life, the authority of what he derives from scripture can only be probable, not absolute or infallible in any case. In questioning the absolute infallibility of scripture then, we do not thereby destroy its practical authority, when if its letter were ever so perfect, our minds and understandings of it must necessarily remain imperfect. Everything to *us* must have its own *degree* of authority, nor can anything be practically infallible, we being fallible" (p. 251).

Again, he seems to qualify his theory by asserting, that on all the great vital matters of Christian faith the Bible is practically infallible. Thus he says: "There is no infallibility in the natural sciences; repeated and careful experiment is there the only basis of any fair degree of certainty. No man dreams of infallibility in any experimental knowledge, yet sufficient is obtained to enable us practically to rely and act just as if our knowledge were absolute. There are laws of the expansion of steam and of air, of winds and storms, so imperfectly known at present, that the most skilful mariner can only act on the best light in each case, and leave results with

[1] The Human Element in the Inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures. By S. F. Curtis, D.D., late Professor of Theology in the University of Lewisburg, Pa. 12mo. pp. 386. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1867.

Providence. But there are other laws of winds and storms and the expansion of steam so well known, that he relies on them as infallible, and pledges the lives of hundreds daily, and all most dear to himself, on that practical knowledge. It is just so with Christian truths. Some of these we may not be sure that we rightly understand; some of the records of the past we may suppose to a certain degree imperfect and fragmentary. But on all the great vital matters of Christian faith, each step is so confirmed by experience as to leave the whole practically infallible for our daily guidance, and there is just that measure of evidence which is adequate for the present stage of our development, constantly growing upon us" (p. 252). In allusion to the promise, "It is not ye that speak, but the spirit of your Father that speaketh in you," Dr. Curtis says: "There were times when the inspiration rose within them, and became verbal and prophetic; there were others when the human element became more conspicuous." ..... "For the practical guidance of the church, rightly received, the New Testament is the same thing as infallible, and yet speculatively, there must ever be allowed owing to the human element, room for vast exceptions" (pp. 219, 220).

Further, the theory of Dr. Curtis is modified by his assertions, that the present text of the Bible is not, absolutely, free from error. Often when he seems intent on proving that the writers of the Bible made a mistake, he cites passages of the Bible in which he admits that there may be a corruption of the text. Why should he endeavor to prove the fallibility of the writers by citing texts which are not as the writers left them? We think also that he exaggerates the importance of the variations in the sacred text. He says: "The case is briefly this: So long as the Hebrew language was a spoken tongue it was written without vowels, or any letters being doubled. This is just the way our short-hand writers now take down speeches, and is generally sufficient to remind the reporter of a speech, the ideas of which have been distinctly and recently understood. Some years ago a friend undertook to learn short-hand. Hessian boots were worn in those days with little tassels, one in front of each. Going out hastily, this gentleman discovered that a tassel was torn off one of his boots, and to show his proficiency in the new art, he wrote to his teacher in another room to ask: 'Have you an old boot tassel?' The vowels being all omitted, and also the doubling of the letters, signs were made for the following letters: 'Hv y n ld bt tsl,' which his friend not unnaturally read thus: 'Have you an old boot *to sell?*' But why his pupil could want to be buying an old boot from him, required more explanation than short-hand could well give. Now the difficulty of the ancient Hebrew without points is just this: that although where persons are very familiar with the subject and language, this style of writing was ordinarily sufficient at least to guide the priests, and remind them of the law, so that they could explain it to the people; yet there would always be left many

cases where the meaning was extremely doubtful, without the aid and authority of tradition" (pp. 170, 171).

Professor Curtis is doubtless well aware of the fact that by far the largest part of the variations in the Hebrew text are utterly insignificant, and that in the most unfaithful translation of the Bible the great doctrines of the evangelical system are clearly and distinctly taught. We have no idea that he consciously makes an effort, but it seems that he inadvertently does so, to set out in bold relief the difficulties suggested by our present biblical text, and to keep in the shade the important fact that errors in numbers and dates must be made with peculiar ease, and are peculiarly unimportant.

We think, moreover, that Dr. Curtis is more confident than he has a right to be in regard to certain scientific theories, and gives less prominence than he should to certain methods of reconciling those theories with the Bible on the supposition that the theories are true. Thus he says: "Instead of six thousand years, it is probable man has been on the earth at least two hundred thousand." "What already appears certain, must render any theory of inspiration which suspends our whole faith in Christianity upon the literal and infallible accuracy of Genesis increasingly mischievous." "Professor Agassiz, indeed, suggested several years ago, that there is no necessary contradiction between the Book of Genesis and the supposition of the race of man having been on the earth for any number of thousands of years; provided we are willing to consider the account of the creation of man on the sixth day in Gen. i. distinct from and prior to the other account of the creation of Adam and Eve given in the second chapter" (pp. 165, 166). If science should prove that man has existed on the earth two hundred thousand years, and if there be a method of reconciling the Bible with this theory, when it shall have been proved, how can we say that the biblical representation is false? Dr. Curtis leaves the impression that there is a contradiction between the Gospel of John and the Synoptical Gospels, but still admits that this contradiction need not interfere with the common views of the plenary inspiration of these books. But why does he leave this impression if there be no necessary interference? He says: "A close study of the four evangelists, comparing them in this light, will show the human element of inspiration in a striking point of view. Perhaps the most important apparent discrepancy which is found between the Synoptical Gospels and John, is this, that from the former it is quite certain that Jesus and his disciples partook of the feast of the Passover on the night on which he was betrayed, while from the latter (John) it would appear as if the Passover was not celebrated by the rest of the Jews until after sentence against him by Pilate. Robinson has very ably attempted to reconcile the difficulty by supposing that John is speaking of the Passover festival of unleavened bread, after the supper had been eaten. He supposes, therefore, that the Saviour partook of the paschal supper on

the same night as the rest of the Jewish nation, and that they had already partaken of it when he was betrayed. Perhaps it cannot be said that this view is absolutely irreconcilable with the language of John, as many have thought, and yet there are so many passages which seem to imply that *no part* of the festival had commenced when Judas went out of the supper room (John xiii. 1, 29; xviii. 28), and the Passover was part of it, that the appearance certainly is that of an anachronism on the part of John" (pp. 229, 230). Dr. Curtis immediately adds: "Nor should it here in fairness be forgotten that there is a similar appearance of mistake in John xviii. 3, where Judas, with a band of men and officers, is represented as approaching Jesus in the garden, with lanterns and torches as well as weapons" (pp. 230, 231). Yet Mr. Curtis admits that: "We cannot say certainly whether the night was clear or cloudy; that in the early part of the evening the rays of the moon might have been kept somewhat from the garden of Gethsemane, by the shadow of the Mount of Olives behind which it would rise" (p. 231). What if "it seems difficult to conceive the necessity of torches and lanterns at the full of the moon." What if it is not "easy to see how either clouds or mountains, shadows or trees, could have made artificial lights useful, as some have suggested" (pp. 231, 232). Have we a right to affirm that a contemporary historian commits an error because he says that Judas Iscariot and his accomplices performed an act which does not appear to us useful?

We are not satisfied with Dr. Curtis's use of the terms "inspiration" and "supernatural" on pages 50, 51, 248, 249. We think that he misstates the argument for the inspiration of the Old Testament, when he says that it depends in some measure on the inspiration and absolute infallibility of the New Testament (p. 201). We need not prove that the New Testament is inspired before we attempt to prove from it that the Old Testament is inspired. We cannot see any objection to the inspiration of a passage because a passage is repeated. Isaiah ii. 2–5, compared with Micah iv. 1–4; Psalm xiv. compared with Psalm liii.; Psalm lxx. compared with Psalm xl. 13–17; Psalm cviii. 6–13 compared with Psalm lx. 5–12; and Psalm cviii. 1–5 compared with Psalm lvii. 7–11, present no objection to the theory that these reiterated passages are inspired. One writer may felicitously quote from another writer, and also from himself. Dr. Curtis says, "that the whole of Psalm cviii. is obtained from two previous ones, the parts differently put together" (p. 178). Many a modern hymnist has repeated his own stanzas in different hymns, and many an ode is composed of two other odes. The repetition and combination are sometimes peculiarly effective.

We have other objections to this work of Dr. Curtis, which we will not state; at the same time we freely admit that he writes in a good style, with a good spirit, and is evidently a sincere, honest, truth-loving, and learned man.

Lechford's Plain Dealing.

Thomas Lechford describes himself as "a student or practiser of law." He came from England to New England in 1638. "Almost from the hour of his landing at Boston he was regarded with distrust by those whose influence prevailed in state and church." There were two grounds for this distrust: first, he was a lawyer, and "the exercise of the profession of an attorney" was then discountenanced in Massachusetts. Secondly, he could not adopt the religious opinions which prevailed in the colony. After a lengthened series of contentions with the clergy and the courts, he sailed from Boston, August 3, 1631. "On the 16th of November he was once more an inmate of Clement's Inn," and had returned humbly to the church of England. The present volume he published in 1642, and a new edition of it appeared in 1644. It is now republished, with a valuable introduction and notes, from which we have gleaned the preceding facts. Only two hundred and eighty-five copies of the book are printed, and these are published in admirable style. The orthography and punctuation of "the first Boston lawyer" are faithfully preserved. We do not intend to make any remarks on this important volume, but we simply quote the account which the dissatisfied lawyer gives of some ecclesiastical procedures. He writes as an opponent of our civil democracy and of our church polity, as a penitent monarchist and an honest Episcopalian.

In his preface he inquires whether it be the safer method to govern the church according to the Episcopal standard, which is "if not of absolute divine authority, yet nearest and most like thereunto, and most anciently here embraced"; or according to the Presbyterian standard; or according to that of Congregationalism, which he describes as "an independent government of every Congregationall church ruling it selfe, which introduceth not onely one absolute Bishop in every Parish, but in effect so many men, so many Bishops, according to New England's rule, which in England would be anarchie and confusion" (p. 5).

"Now that the government at New England seemeth to make so many church-members so many bishops, will be plaine by this ensuing discourse: for you shall here find that the churches in the Bay governe each by all their members unanimously, or else by the major part, wherein every one hath equall vote and superspection with their ministers; and that in their covenant it is expressed to be the duty of all the members to watch over one another. And in time their churches will be more corrupted than now they are; they cannot (as there is reason to feare) avoid it possibly. How can any now deny this to be anarchie and confusion?" (p. 6).

"If the whole church, or every congregation, as our good men think,

[1] Plain Dealing; or News from New England. By Thomas Lechford. With an Introduction and Notes, by J. Hammond Trumbull. Boston: J. K. Wiggin and Wm. Parsons Lunt. 4to. pp. 211. 1867.

have the power of the Keyes, how many Bishops then shall we have? If every Parish or Congregation be so free and independent as they terme it, what unity can we expect?" (p. 145).

Mr. Lechford is particularly interesting when he describes the manner in which a Congregational church is formed, a minister ordained, a member admitted. He writes:

"A Church is gathered there after this manner. A convenient or competent number of Christians, allowed by the generall Court to plant together, at a day prefixed, come together in publique manner, in some fit place, and there confesse their sins, and professe their faith, one unto another; and being satisfied of one another's faith and repentance, they solemnly enter into a covenant with God and one another (which is called their Church Covenant, and held by them to constitute a Church). Whereby they are called the Church of such a place, which before, they say, were no Church nor of any Church except the invisible. After this they doe at the same time or some other, all being together, elect their own Officers, as Pastor, Teacher, Elders, Deacons, if they have fit men enough to supply those places; else as many of them as they can be provided of. Then they set another day for the ordination of their said officers, and appoint some of themselves to impose hands upon their officers, which is done in a publique day of fasting and prayer. When there are ministers or elders before, they impose their hands upon the new officers; but where there is none, there some of their chiefest men, two or three, of good report amongst them, though not of the ministry, doe, by appointment of the said Church, lay hands upon them. And after the said ordination, if there are any Elders of other Churches present (as of late I have knowne divers have been present, under the names of the Messengers of the Churches) they give the new Officers the right hand of fellowship, taking them by the right hand, every one severally, or else sometimes one forraine Elder in the name of all the rest, gives the right hand of fellowship, with a set speech unto them. Notice is given in divers Churches or other places, beforehand, of the gathering of every Church, divers weeks before, and so also of every ordination. And some Ministers or others as Messengers from other Churches, are usually present at such gatherings of Churches and ordinations; for sometimes Magistrates, Captains, gentlemen, and other meaner brethren are made Messengers of Churches, for those and other purposes, never having had imposition of hands: and at planting of a Church or gathering as they terme it, one of the Church messengers of forraine Churches examines and tries the men to be moulded into a Church, discerns their faith and repentance, and their Covenant being before ready made, written, subscribed, and here read and acknowledged he decerns [Latin, *decernere*] and pronounceth them to be a true Church of Christ, and gives them the right hand of fellowship, and all this in the name of Christ, and of all the Church-Messengers present and their Churches;

so did Master Weld at the founding of Weymouth Church, or to this effect. And the generall Court will not allow of any Church otherwise gathered" (pp. 12–16).

"When a man or woman cometh to joyne unto the Church so gathered, he or shee cometh to the Elders in private, at one of their houses, or some other place appointed, upon the weeke dayes, and make knowne their desires, to enter into Church fellowship with that Church; and then the ruling Elders, or one of them, require, or aske him or her, if he bee willing to make knowne unto them the worke of grace upon their soules, or how God hath been dealing with them about their conversion; which (at Boston) the man declareth usually standing, the woman sitting. And if they satisfie the Elders, and the private assembly (for divers of the Church, both men and women, meet there usually) that they are true beleevers, that they have been wounded in their hearts for their originall sinne, and actual transgressions, and can pitch upon some promise of free grace in the Scripture, for the ground of their faith, and that they finde their hearts drawne to beleeve in Christ Jesus for their justification and salvation, and there in the ministerie of the Word, reading, or conference; and that they knowe competently the summe of Christian faith. And sometimes though they be not come to a full assurance of their good estate in Christ. Then afterwards, in convenient time, in the publique assembly of the Church, notice is given by one of the ruling Elders, that such a man, or woman, by name, desireth to enter into Church fellowship with them, and therefore if any knowe any thing or matter of offence against them, for their unfitnesse to joyne with them, such are required to bring notice thereof to the Elders; else that any who know them, or can say anything for their fitnesse, be ready to give testimony thereof, when they shall be called forth before the whole Church.

"If there be matter of offence, it is first heard before the Elders, and if the party satisfie them, and the offended in private, for private offences, and promise to satisfie in publique, for publique offences; then upon another day one of the ruling Elders calleth forth the party by name, in the publique assembly of the Church, and before strangers, and whomsoever present, most commonly upon the Lord's Day, after evening exercises, and sometimes upon a week day, when all the Church have notice to be present.

"The party appearing in the midst of the Assembly or some convenient place, the ruling Elder speaketh in this manner: Brethren of this congregation, this man or woman, A. B. hath beene heretofore propounded to you, desiring to enter into Church fellowship with us, and we have not since that, heard anything from any of you, to the contrary of the parties admittance, but that we may goe on to receive him: therefore now, if any of you know anything against him, why he may not be admitted, you may yet speak. Then, after some silence, he proceedeth. Seeing no man

speaketh to the contrary of his admission, if any of you know anything to speak for his receiving, we desire you, give testimony thereof to the Church, as you were also formerly desired to be ready therewith, and expresse yourselves as briefly as you may and to as good hearing. Whereupon, sometimes, men do speak to the contrary, in case they have not heard of the propounding, and so stay the party for that time also, till this new offence be heard before the Elders, so that sometimes there is a space of divers months between a parties first propounding and receiving: and some are so bashfull as that they choose rather to goe without the Communion, than undergoe such publique confessions and tryals, but that is held their fault.

"But when none speaketh to the contrary, then some one, two, three or more of the Brethren speak their opinions of the party, giving instances in some godlinesse and good conversation of his, or some other recommendation is made, and that they are willing (if the Church thereto consent) for their part to give him the right hand of fellowship.

"Which done the Elder turneth his speech to the party to be admitted, and requireth him or sometimes asketh him, if he be willing to make knowne to the congregation the work of grace upon his soule; and biddeth him, as briefly and audibly, to as good hearing as he can, to doe the same.

"Whereupon the party if it be a man speaketh himselfe; but if it be a woman, her confession made before the Elders in private is most usually (in Boston church) read by the Pastor who registered the same. At Salem the women speake themselves for the most part in the Church; but of late it is said, they doe this upon the weeke dayes there, and nothing is done on Sunday, but their entrance into Covenant. The man in a solemne speech sometimes a quarter of an houre long, shorter or longer, declareth the work of grace in his soule, to the same purpose as that before the Elders formerly mentioned.

"Then the Elder requireth the party to make profession of his faith; which also is done either by questions and answers, if the party be weake, or else in a solemne speech according to the summe and tenour of the Christian faith laid down in the Scriptures, defining faith, etc., etc." (pp. 18–23).

Wonder-Working Providence of Sion's Saviour in New England [by Captain Edward Johnson, of Woburn, Massachusetts Bay]. London, 1654. With an Historical Introduction and an Index. By William Frederick Poole, Librarian of Boston Athenaeum. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1867.

This is a fac-simile reprint of a work which was first published anonymously, in London, in 1654. It is a narrative of events connected with the settlement of Massachusetts Bay from the year 1628 to the year 1652. Its author, whose name now appears in the title-page of his book, has been

styled "minister of Woburn." But this was a mistake. In the earliest colonial records he receives "the honorable title of 'Mr.'" Prince styles him Captain. In early manhood, there is some reason to believe, he was a shipbuilder. At the time of his first visit to this country (in 1630), he was a thrifty farmer and trader, possessing landed estates near Canterbury, England, of considerable value. He came over, apparently, for traffic, and probably returned to England the following year. In 1636, controlled now by religious motives, he emigrated with his family to the Bay, took up his residence at Charlestown, abode there till the settlement in 1642 of Woburn, where he resided until his death in 1672. Throughout his life here he was a man of affairs, wise, energetic, much confided in, and personally conversant with nearly everything of public interest in the history of the Bay colony. His narrative covers a deeply interesting portion of this lengthened period of service. From its author's training and tastes as an enterprising man of business, it is naturally replete with information respecting the secular affairs of the colony. Yet with equal naturalness, because he was in genuine sympathy with the motives predominant with the early colonists, his book is a most valuable contribution to the ecclesiastical and religious history of New England. In a style homely, and even awkward, but honest, often graphic and racy with touches of quaint humor and vigorous common sense, and vitalized throughout by the earnest religious spirit of the Puritans, he gives an account of the formation of some thirty churches and towns, from Springfield round about unto Haverhill; of the Synods of 1637 and 1646; of the polity of these churches as "Independent, or rather Congregational"; of the learning of their ministers, "so experienced in the scriptures, that some of them could tell you the place, both Chapter and Verse, of most sentences of Scripture which could be named unto them"; of the origin of Harvard College, and why Newtown "being then under the Orthodox and soul-flourishing Ministry of Mr. Thomas Shepheard," was chosen as its site, and "named Cambridg"; of trouble from the barbarous Indians, and the union of the four colonies, and the organization in 1644 of the Massachusetts militia "to be ready upon all occasions"; what charges the immigrants were at; how many ships it took to bring them over, and though so many, only one was lost; how many goats, sheep, kine, and horses were soon to be found in certain towns, and how many acres of orchards and tilled ground; how this "remote, rocky, barren, bushy, wild-woody wilderness became a second England for fertilness"; how manufactures sprang up and advanced; what hardships the first settlers encountered; how they lived on clams and muscles, and "with Fish, wild Onions, and other Herbs were sweetly satisfied till other Provisions came in," and were "many times graciously provided for, even at the last cast; "how they chose not the place for the Land but for the Government of Christ, both in Churches and Commonwealth"; and what a faith was in them that "the Lord Christ intends to atchieve greater matters by their

little handfull than the world is aware of," and that their whole history was wrought out under the special guidance of the wonder-working Providence of Sion's Saviour for the promotion of his kingdom on the earth. Of all this, and much besides, no more authentic and interesting a narrative can be found than this sketch left us by Captain Johnson. It so happened that our first perusal of this book was in connection with the reading of Sir Ferdinando Gorges' "Briefe Narration," a manly and straightforward document, which does credit to its author as a man of comprehensive political and commercial views and great enterprise. It is pervaded also by a certain humane and religious spirit. But its author's main reliance for success in his multifarious schemes to "advance Plantations into the parts of America" is, avowedly, "that which all hearken unto, and that forsooth is profit." Captain Johnson knew the power of this motive. He appears to have visited this country first as a trader. But it was neither the love of traffic nor adventure which induced him to relinquish the comforts of his home at Herne Hill, and subject himself and his family to the hardships of emigration to these inhospitable shores. It was not profit that *founded* colonies here — colonies which rapidly grew into commonwealths, and in which were set, at the beginning, the germs of empire. The principle which was strong enough to overcome all obstacles was a religious one. The ruling motive, the primary aim, was the advancement of the kingdom of Christ — a work, Johnson tells us, "not to bee laid aside because of difficulties." It may be well to erect a memorial in honor of Captain Popham, and we will not object if the monument which marks his grave is silent as to the hopes that were buried with him. The Pilgrim and Puritan Fathers of New England need no such monument. They sought first the kingdom of God. A wonder-working Providence has cared for their fame; all things have been added.

This edition of Captain Johnson's narrative is admirably edited and printed. It is an exact reprint, page for page, line for line, word for word, of the edition of 1654. A carefully prepared index follows, in which errors in the original text are judiciously corrected. The whole is preceded by an elaborate introduction, in which the history of the work is recited, its authorship established, and the free and unacknowledged, and in one instance fraudulent, use which other writers have made of it exposed. To this is added a faithful and spirited sketch of Captain Johnson's Life. While all of this introductory matter is interesting and valuable, students of our early history and archaeologists will be particularly attracted to the keen discussion of the Gorges' Tracts. Mr. Poole has put this enigmatical compilation in a new and clear light.

This edition, designed to reproduce and thus preserve the original imprint, is limited to about two hundred and fifty copies. These, we presume, will be taken up at once. But so valuable a work ought to have a much wider circulation. With Governor Winthrop's Life it brings us face to face

with the men who here laid the foundations. We see them, not merely as they appear in graver histories, but in their homes and in the transactions of daily life.

The Divine Comedy of Dante Olighieri. Translated by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow:

> "I follow here the footing of thy feete
> That with thy meaning so I may the rather meete."—*Spenser.*

It is late to notice critically or with the hope to guide opinion, this learned, modest, and beautiful work to which our honored poet has brought so much conscientious labor, and which the publishers have brought out in so rich a style. For more than five hundred years has this "Divine Comedy" been singing itself through the world, and it seems just as fresh as at the beginning. Dante represents the learning, the philosophy, the art, the religion of his day, with a fulness that no other writer aspires to. But he does much more than this, and gives us that which belongs to no time nor country, that which is common to the heart of the race, that which repeats itself under different forms in every generation. We regard it as a great honor to the literary spirit of our country, that amid

> "The tumult of the time disconsolate,"

as Mr. Longfellow says in one of those exquisite sonnets with which he prefaces his work, there should appear two independent translations of Dante (we refer of course, to Dr. Parsons's as the second), unlike each other, yet both so sincere, so earnest, undertaken in so beautiful a spirit, so scholarly, and so poetical.

Many, perhaps most, of those who read Mr. Longfellow's translation, may experience a disappointment that so complete a master of the music of our speech has been contented with words so plain, and a verse which so literally follows the original. But none can help being struck with the entire self-abnegation which marks the whole of the work. Himself, the translator, you never see. He follows most exactly and humbly "the footing of *his* feet" whose meaning he desires to present precisely as it stands. In this we are not sure but he attempts an impossibility, and that he would really have given us a truer copy of the original, had he suffered himself more freedom in the transcription. So much in the impression of a poem depends on other things than the bare meaning, so much on the thoughts suggested, on the collocation of the words, and their sound even, that a literally correct translation may fail entirely to awaken the feelings. To borrow Lord Macaulay's familiar illustration, "it is crying 'open wheat,' 'open barley,' to the door which will obey no sound but 'open sesame.'" In the stanza of the fifth Canto, for example, which speaks of the infernal hurricane which without rest "hustles the spirits onward" as Mr. Longfellow has it, in what other language than the Italian can we give the full

force of the words "voltando and percotendo?" Their very sound, in the original, strikes on the ear like the solemn toll of a great bell.

But whatever changes in the method or idea of this translation might be desired by one or another, we may be sure that nothing came here at haphazard, nothing without long reflection and deliberate judgment, and from such judgment one would not hastily dissent. The more deliberately we read, seeking for the thought of Dante, the better are we satisfied. And we have no doubt that with its ample notes, its wealth of illustration — illustration not of the text merely, but of the history and vital movements of the times, and its beautiful scholarly spirit, it will not only give a new impulse to the study of the great mediaeval poet, but give us also a higher idea of the poet's function, and stand in the permanent literature of our land, as a lesson, an authority, and a model.

Language and the Study of Language. Twelve Lectures on the Principles of Linguistic Science. By William Dwight Whitney, Professor of Sanscrit, and Instructor in Modern Languages in Yale College. 12mo. pp. 489. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1867.

The Science of Language is now more than formerly appreciated as essential to a complete system of theology and metaphysics. There are various questions in this science which are perhaps indeterminable, but it is important to discuss them. There are in it rival theories, all of which involve some degree of truth, and neither of which can be adopted to the entire exclusion of the others. These theories ought to be thoroughly discussed, and the truths involved in them will be ultimately combined in some statement more accurate and comprehensive than has yet been given. Professor Whitney has treated the Science of Language in a scholarly and masterly style. His treatise abounds with accurate and acute remarks. It may very usefully be studied in our colleges and theological seminaries, and deserves the careful attention of clergymen, and indeed of all literary men.

Life of Josiah Quincy, of Massachusetts. By his son Edmund Quincy. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1867.

To one whose personal recollections reach back to the early years of the present century, and vividly reproduce some of the more important scenes and personages of that formative period of our national history, this "Life" is an invaluable acquisition. It will enable him to compare his early impressions and judgments, formed in juvenile years, and for the most part from the one-sided, partizan views, which governed the judgment at that early day, with the ampler development now spread before him — the broad, thorough working out of problems of government — then only seen in a state of embryo. If one brought up under traditional influences entirely favorable to Jeffersonian democracy, and who can readily recall

the opinions cherished by him, more than half a century since, will now candidly sit down by the light which volumes like this throw upon that distant period, to revise his own earlier conclusions, and thus mature a more righteous judgment from the due weighing of both sides of the contesting parties, it cannot but prove an excellent and most improving exercise, both for the intellect and the heart. How much that once seemed so certain will now appear very doubtful; and how many men and minds then condemned or eulogized, will either now change places entirely, or have to submit to very considerable modification in the estimate we formed of them. Such has been the influence which a careful perusal of the Life of Quincy has had on us, enlightening and correcting many misconceptions of our crude and prejudiced juvenile judgment, and giving broader, truer views of men and principles, of policies and precedents, which have shaped our national career to the present time. Besides this incidental and personal benefit which such a publication as this yields, the admirable skill and masterful compression and clearness with which the events of chiefest interest in our national policy for more than three-fourths of a century are here presented, give the highest claim of the compiler of the volume, to be reckoned a public benefactor.

There are spots in the sun, however; and we cannot but regard as such an one the needless attempt to revive in this connection a controversy between the elder Quincy and the historian Bancroft on a point which the latter had thoroughly examined and sufficiently verified, in his treatment of John Clark; where the truth of history compelled his justification against the perversions of Mr. Graham, misled no doubt by the bitter opponents and persecutors of Clark and his Rhode Island brethren of that early day. In the fifteenth volume of the Christian Review, p. 191, this matter is truthfully presented, and scarcely deserved the reviving which the son has here given to one of his father's more generous than judicious attempts to sustain the mistake of Mr. Graham. R. B.

German Rationalism, in its Rise, Progress, and Decline, in relation to Theologians, Scholars, Poets, Philosophers, and the People; a contribution to the Church History of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. By Dr. K. R. Hagenbach, Professor of Theology in the University of Basle. Edited and translated by Rev. Wm. Leonhard Gage and Rev. J. H. W. Stuckenberg. 8vo. pp. 405. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co; Dublin: John Robertson and Co. 1865. — This is the best history of Rationalism which we have seen in the English language.

Meditations on the Actual State of Christianity, and on the Attacks which are now being made upon it. By M. Guizot. 12mo. pp. 390. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. — All who have read the first series of Guizot's Meditations will desire to read the present volume, which includes the second series. They have an intrinsic value, and in

addition have an historical value, as emanating from so eminent a statesman.

History of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in the United States of America. By Abel Stevens, LL.D., author of "the History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century, called Methodism," etc. 12mo. Vols. III. IV. pp. 570, 522. New York: Carlton and Porter. 1867. — A graphic and fascinating history, indispensable to a full knowledge of Methodism in the United States.

The Works of President Edwards, in four volumes; with valuable Additions and a Copious General Index and a Complete Index of Scripture Texts. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1868. — The Messrs. Carter have laid the theological public under signal obligations for a multitude of valuable books; but among all their publications there is none which may be of greater service to the cause of truth than the present edition of Edwards's works.

Grammatical Synthesis. The Art of English Composition. By H. N. Day, author of "Logic," "Rhetorical Praxis," etc. 12mo. pp. 356.

The Art of Discourse; a System of Rhetoric adapted for use in Colleges and Academies, and also for Private Study. By Henry N. Day, author of "Logic" etc. 12mo. pp. 343.

The two works named above have been recently published by Charles Scribner and Company, New York. They are compact in style, and scientific in thought and arrangement. Professor Day deserves great credit for his faithful labors in the cause of education.

The Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels. By Andrews Norton. Abridged edition. Boston: American Unitarian Association. 12mo. pp. 584. 1867. — This abridged edition of Professor Norton's well-known work is very carefully edited. All his writings give signs of his extensive learning and scholarly candor.

The Old Roman World; the Grandeur and Failure of its Civilization. By John Lord, LL.D. 8vo. pp. 605. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. — Dr. Lord's writings abound with graphic sketches and lively pictures. He has devoted his life to lectures on history, and the present volume is one result of his extensive research.

The History of the Church of God during the Period of Revelation. By Rev. Charles Colcock Jones, D.D. Part I. The Church during the Old Testament Dispensation. 8vo. pp. 558. — It is expected that the second part of this history will be issued soon, and "will be accompanied by a general index." The two volumes will contain the substance of the lectures delivered by Dr. Jones as "Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Church Polity in the Theological Seminary of the Synods of South Carolina and Georgia in Columbia."

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

FREE COMMUNION.

BY REV. SERENO D. CLARK, SECRETARY OF THE CONGREGATIONAL BOARD OF PUBLICATION.

PART II.—THE SPECIFIC PRINCIPLES AND CANONS OF SCRIPTURE PRESCRIBING AND REGULATING CHURCH FELLOWSHIP.

SECTION II.

THE law of Free Sacramental Fellowship has its foundation not only in the spirit of the gospel, is not only demanded by the controlling principles of Christianity associated, as we have demonstrated in preceding Articles, but it strikes its roots into and grows out of the radical element of the visible church itself. This will appear if we consider what is its simple but comprehensive element; that which constitutes its vital function, without which the church dies, and with which, whatever its defects or maladies, it lives and is cherished by the Head as his own body.

The etymology of ἐκκλησία (church) is significant. Its root is ἐκκαλέω, meaning "to call out." Signifying church, it means called out of the world and united to Christ (Bib. Sac. No. 95, p. 509), implying that her members constitute "a body corporate," separated from the carnalities of human affinities, are God's "peculiar people," one in spirit with Christ their Lord, who is not of the world. This call of God to the soul, summoning men out of the world, is internal and

external. There is a consciousness of the call and a profession of it. The visible church is composed of the called by profession. They are mutually known as the acknowledged servants of the Lord. They live with other men, but are distinct from them. Hence they constitute a brotherhood. All cannot meet in one place. Distinct societies must be formed in every part of Christendom; but this does not destroy their identity; they are a fraternity still — Christ's visible army, mustered under him for the conquest of the world. The holy supper is given to the keeping of each particular church, and yet the congruity of reciprocal love between the churches demands that it be held free to them all. This is free communion, and it flows directly from the very nature of the visible church, as the great company of the professedly called of God.

We reach the same result from the nature of the visible church by another process. The simple end which the Saviour has in view in relation to the individual Christian, is to bring him into communion with himself, and thus into communion with all resembling himself, till the perfect unity of the Redeemer and the redeemed is consummated at the Father's right hand.

The distinctive design of the church is not to hinder or interrupt, but to promote, this individual communion with Christ and with the brethren. Hence, communion with Christ, and the union of believers in him, is the governing idea of the gospel church. It is the body, the outward symbol of her inner life. The church is at once the expression and excitant of this spiritual unity. All in whom this unity of spirit dwells are attracted to each other. In accordance with this principle of mutual attraction Christ has organized his churches for the purpose of strengthening it by reaction on itself, and of combining the whole power of the life of faith in one visible body, both for reciprocal nurture and for the concentration of progressive force.

Justifying faith, the life of the individual Christian, is thus the associated life of the church. This is to tower far

above all differences of opinion incidental to national peculiarities; to the varieties of mental structure; to the degrees and forms of education; to habits of thought and modes of philosophizing; to moral and aesthetic proclivities,—suffusing the whole with its own light. "Ye are one in Christ Jesus."

This central element of the church demands that any body of believers manifesting an operative faith, who are united in covenant and in the celebration of the ordinances and public worship according to present light, and prayerfully studying the scriptures for further light, should be recognized as a part of Christ's visible body, and therefore embraced in our sacramental fellowship.

This law of sacramental fellowship is evolved in the history of the first founders of gospel churches, both in their instructions with regard to church discipline and orderly walking, and in their practical method of composing differences, especially the great controversy of the apostolic age, the variance between believers of Jewish and of Gentile origin. The grounds of this controversy were briefly these: the Jewish Christian conceiving the Levitical law to be still in force, cherished a strong attachment to its ritual practices; the Gentile Christian believing it abrogated or fulfilled in Christ, rejected its claims. The former conscientiously observed the round of Hebrew solemnities; the latter esteemed every day alike. Both Jews and Gentiles held that partaking of the victim offered in sacrifice was partaking of the altar, or devoting one's self to the deity to whom it had been sacrificed. Among the Gentiles the flesh which remained unconsumed was given, part to the priests, and part to the offerer. It was either served up in a feast in the temple, taken home for domestic use, or sold in the market. To partake of this meat in any connection was deemed by weak brethren among the Gentiles, and especially by the Jews, as savoring of idolatry. Hence, "circumcision" and "meat offered to idols" formed the central points of this fierce conflict, which painfully divided the early churches, and which the apostles sought so earnestly to compose.

Their principle of action in this respect may properly be denominated Christian expediency. Before entering therefore on the discussion of this topic, we need well-defined ideas of this doctrine of expediency on which the apostles acted in composing differences among the professed followers of Christ. In a single sentence, it is the working of an enlarged charity, the intelligent exercise or wisdom of Christ-like love. This is always the import of *συμφέρει* when expressing social action (see John xi. 50; xvi. 7; xviii. 14; 1 Cor. vi. 12; x. 23). Hence the derivative *τὸ συμφέρον* signifies advantage or profit. The apostolic doctrine of expediency is therefore resolvable into the law of Christian forbearance or charity. It is the outgrowth of unity in Christ. It is the dictate of the holy heart, and consequently the expression of broad and far-reaching views of disinterested love or holiness. It is the noblest principle of human action. It must be carefully discriminated from worldly policy, from the working of a selfish or partizan spirit. The first is from heaven; the last is "of the earth, earthy." Expediency always belongs to one class or the other. There is no middle ground for it to occupy. The moment we step from that which Christ's spirit of love and holiness requires of every intelligent Christian, we enter upon a course of worldly policy inseparable in principle from the chicanery of Rome. There may be differences in degrees, but it is the same ignoble spirit. The distinction between the two is just as wide and decided as between the renewed and unrenewed heart, though it may be difficult for men sanctified but in part, and warped by denominational zeal, to see exactly where the line is drawn. Paul includes this distinction in his statement of the law of sacramental fellowship (Rom. xv. 7). The ultimate end is to be the divine glory, not partizan or selfish interests. The divine glory is always secured by our acting in harmony with the spirit of the gospel, never otherwise. It is therefore never expedient to act with any other spirit, and consequently only in agreement with the law of Christian unity (see Bib. Sac. No. 83 p. 462).

I. The council at Jerusalem, convened to allay animosities originating in the controversy above alluded to, establishes this apostolic law of church fellowship. Its origin and history is this. Certain Judaizers came to Antioch, who insisted that the Gentile converts should be circumcised after the manner of Moses, affirming that otherwise they could not be saved. Paul and Barnabas resolutely resisted the opinion. The contention became so sharp that it was decided to send a deputation of brethren, who, together with Paul and Barnabas, should go up to Jerusalem, the mother church, to consult with the brethren there. The apostles and elders, together probably with the body of the church, assembled for deliberation. Peter, Paul, and Barnabas spoke in favor of the Gentile Christians, and testified to the gift of the Holy Ghost imparted to them, entitling them, equally with the Jews, to the privileges of the Christian church. James then proposed a method of composing the difficulties between the contending parties, which was cordially approved as the dictate of the Holy Ghost. It was, that the Gentile converts should abstain "from pollutions of idols, and from fornication, and from things strangled, and from blood." These prohibitions, while they touched not the life of Judaism, bore on practices which were extremely offensive to the Jews, and which, therefore, prevented their cordial coalescence with the Gentiles. They were proposed, not as permanent laws, but purely as a measure of accommodation between contending parties. Circumcision was not imposed on the Gentiles, because, being the determinative rite of Judaism, its requirement, in the circumstances, would have struck at the very vitals of the gospel. On the other hand, circumcision was not forbidden the Jewish Christians. As a mere external act, while it was not a symbol of the Judaizing spirit, or of righteousness by works, it was deemed harmless, and therefore permitted as a thing indifferent.

Thus two things aimed at by the council were accomplished: 1. The allaying of animosities which had pervaded both branches of the church, and the removing of unnecessary

scruples which, owing to Jewish prejudices, interrupted cordial Christian co-operation. 2. The establishment of the principle that evidences of faith and of the reception of the Holy Spirit were sufficient ground of church fellowship, whatever differences of opinion relating to outward services might exist. By this method of composing this first outbreak of contrarieties in ritualistic views and preferences among true Christians was forever settled the question, how such differences are to be healed; not by seeking conformity in externals, but by penetrating into the heart of Christianity, and there planting ourselves on the deeper unifying principle of Christian consciousness.

II. Paul's last visit to Jerusalem (Acts xxi. 27–36). This incident of apostolic history indicates:

1. The extreme bitterness and violence which the controversy between the Jewish and Gentile Christians had assumed. This is apparent from a glance at the narrative. The fact that the zealots from Ephesus led on the tumult does not change the impression. The passions enlisted in it had evidently become greatly strengthened since the council at Jerusalem. Several causes, fitted to aggravate human passions, contributed to this result. Taking it in its various aspects and relations, it was doubtless one of the most violent controversies that has ever disturbed the Christian church, all originating in diversities of sentiment respecting rites and ceremonies.

2. The perfectly free spirit of Paul, his great indifference respecting the mere forms and usages of the church, provided Christ was trusted and adored.

3. The apostle's strong desire to compose the controversy, the chief design of his visit. He shows a willingness to do anything consistent with the maintenance of justification through the atonement of Christ — the life of the gospel church — to gratify those against whose opinion, when carried so far as to trench on that essential truth, he had long been contending. It is delightful to see "Paul, the aged," the war-worn soldier of Christ, the dauntless champion of his

truth, retaining the childlike love and simple fervor of the convert still fresh in him after years of conflict, and welcoming to his heart those who through extreme attachment to modes of worship and church order had manifested great hostility toward him. The language of the whole narrative is, "manifested faith in our common Lord constitutes a sufficient bond of fellowship between those divided on ritualistic grounds, while they continue to practise without restraint their respective forms."

The feelings and views of Paul respecting the principle of Christian fellowship expressed at the council at Jerusalem before, and those manifested in his last visit to that city after, he had written many of his controversial epistles, will help us more clearly to understand his principles of sacramental fellowship as therein discussed.

III. Paul's principles or canons for composing the difficulties between the Jewish and Gentile Christians as evolved in his discussion of the subject in his epistles. These principles and canons of church communion were defined and inculcated in circumstances the most favorable for their clear elucidation and enforcement. We have occasion to thank God for what caused the spiritual warriors of the times immense hardships and heroic achievements.

It is a remarkable fact that God permitted this severe conflict about external observances, or between ritualism and *spiritualism*, in church organization to be waged at the first unfolding of the gospel dispensation; so that the divine teachings defining and defending the privileges of the latter might not only be unequivocally set forth, but recorded in the inspired scriptures as the authoritative and final settlement of the question. To this apostolic discussion the church in all ages may therefore resort, to find the principle on which all disputations concerning external observances are to be adjusted. Appealing to this is appealing "to the law and to the testimony."

Some had carried the requisitions of the council at Jerusalem to extremes, and demanded that abstinence from meat

offered to idols should be deemed indispensable to Christian fellowship. While others, harassed with lingering ideas of the power of the heathen gods, and with superstitious fears of their malign influences, were disquieted with apprehensions lest by partaking unknowingly of flesh sacrificed to idols, they should come into some injurious fellowship with them. Others, swollen with a vain conceit of their superior knowledge respecting the liberty of the gospel, went to great lengths in the opposite direction. Paul, therefore, takes up the question in its new aspects.

1. We will consider the question as discussed in 1 Cor. viii. 10: The Gentile Christians at Corinth belonged to the last class named. Their motto was: "All things are lawful." *Γνῶσις*, *ἐξουσία* (knowledge, privilege) became their watchwords. They went so far as to comply with invitations to join in festal entertainments in honor of heathen gods, in open defiance of the feelings of others. Such license was exceedingly scandalous to Jewish Christians. Hence, Paul begins by showing the superiority of charity to mere intellectual attainments. The essential element in the safe conduct of life is always holy love. "We all have knowledge"; but knowledge is insufficient. It may lead to great practical errors. It must be regulated by love, or a regard to the good of others. Besides, they were contending about that which is in reality of little moment. Neither eating meat nor abstaining commendeth to God. In itself it is a matter of indifference. But either act may be so related as to injure others. Then it must be performed, or abstained from, as the law of love directs. He therefore says: "If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth." This is the apostolic law of expediency.

In x. 16 he resumes the subject. He first asserts that in partaking of the Lord's supper they showed their oneness with Christ and with those who partook with them. They, therefore, in the estimation of Jewish brethren, do the same thing by feasting in idolatrous temples. While the idol, in a sense, is nothing, it is the representative of an idea of fearful

significance (v. 20). Such being the opinion of the Jews respecting sacrificial feasts in heathen temples, to partake of them is to wound the feelings of Jewish brethren; in the view of many, even to sanction idolatry. True, the act may be right in itself, but the higher law declares it wrong in its relations. Nevertheless, we would not have you sanction the extreme view of your opponents, who maintain that to eat the meat of victims offered to idols under all circumstances is wrong, thus binding the freedom of the gospel in the fetters of Jewish ritualism. "Whatever is sold in the shambles that eat, asking no question for conscience' sake" (v. 25). If a neighbor invite you to a feast in his own house, go, if you are disposed, and eat without scruple. But if one who has such scruples "say to you, this is offered in sacrifice unto idols," abstain, out of respect to his conscience who stated the fact, and thus fulfil the law of love. "Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." The apostle thus teaches that in all contrarieties and hostilities among brethren in Christ, growing out of outward observances, the law of love rises above every other consideration, and becomes the ultimate ground of adjustment. He would not that differences of knowledge, of judgment, or ritual practice, should cause a rupture between brethren, so long as the purpose to glorify God was the actuating principle of life.

2. Paul discusses the same subject with some slight modifications in Rom. xiv., xv. The great object of this epistle is to establish the doctrine of justification through faith as the vital principle of the church. When he had completed his argument substantiating this his main doctrinal position, which forms the basis of the practical precepts he wished to inculcate, he says (xii. 1): "I beseech you, therefore, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service;" i.e. let this faith, which purifies the heart and subjugates the whole being to Christ, have full dominion over you. This constitutes a subjective oneness among all his followers (vs. 4, 5). At the commencement of the fourteenth chapter he opens the

discussion relative to certain ascetic notions imbibed by a portion of the church. The argument is in brief this: if the vital element in the soul of the Christian remains intact by the external observance; if love to God and faith in his Son are not abated or impeded in their exercise, the eating of meat or the abstaining from it is matter of indifference. "Him that is weak in the faith," whose conceptions are not clear and decided, "receive ye." The precise import of "receive ye," προσλαμβάνεσθε, xiv. 1, xv. 7 is important to the appreciation of the apostle's argument. Προσλαμβάνω is a stronger word than λαμβάνω. And yet the last is used in the New Testament to express the most intimate relations (John i. 12; xix. 27). Seemingly to avoid all suspicion that "receive" in our text was to be taken in a weaker sense than when designating the relation between Christ and his followers, the apostle uses προσλαμβάνω, which signifies to take to one's self, into one's society, or fellowship. Conybeare and Howson render it "receive into your fellowship"; Bloomfield, "receive into Christian communion"; Alford, "give him your hand, count him one of you"; Hoge, "take to yourselves as a Christian brother."

Not that the weak brethren should be received "to doubtful disputations," διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν, not for the discrimination of thoughts or opinions, not for disputations with a view to settling debated points, but as a token of Christian love. He then proceeds to show the unimportance of the controversy between them. Both were conscientious, both were received of God. Therefore they should not judge or condemn one another. All must soon stand before the judgment seat, where all differences would be settled. While waiting and preparing for that solemn scene they should mutually seek for peace. Thus arguing, he reaches his conclusion, the *fixed canon* of fellowship in the gospel church: "Wherefore receive ye one another into fellowship, as Christ also received you to fellowship to the glory of God" (xv. 7).

IV. Paul inculcates the same principle of communion in Philip. iii. 15, 16. In the opening of the chapter he warns

them against Judaizing teachers. He had once been a staunch advocate of their doctrines, but he had seen their insufficiency, and renounced them. He now sought righteousness alone through Christ, and was determined to press forward till he should gain its full realization on the soul. He then subjoins the text. Let all who have become mature in evangelical knowledge be earnest to win the prize of eternal life secured in Christ; and if any are otherwise minded, are not thus earnest in securing the righteousness of faith; if they have obscure or confused notions of justification through the blood of the cross, and of their freedom from the Levitical law, let us not denounce them or separate from them. God erelong will unfold to them his truth more fully. In the meantime let us treat them as brethren; let each act up to the light he has, harmonizing present practice with present knowledge. By adopting this rule we shall soon find ourselves so far agreeing as happily to walk together in the endearment of Christian communion. Gal. vi. 16 is exegetical of this passage.

V. The rule of Christian love and forbearance which Paul so earnestly inculcated on others he declares to be his own principle of action (1 Cor. ix. 19, 22). This is a noble utterance. It discloses a heart penetrated with that profound charity which gives birth to true catholicity of sentiment. It is the expression of that deep inner life which constitutes gospel freedom, that spontaneity of a loving, obedient heart, which not only obscures the importance of external observances, but delivers from all servitude to them. Swayed by it, Paul affirms that when among the Jews he "became as a Jew," observed the Jewish rites and ceremonies, and permitted others to observe them without molestation, provided they trenched not on the vitals of Christianity. But when among the Gentiles, those who were "without law," he abstained from Jewish forms and customs, freely adopting that course concerning them which promised most usefulness.

His variations of conduct, ever adapting itself to the circumstances and character of those among whom and for whom

he labored, at times almost betraying a want of principle, or vacillation of purpose, while showing his inflexible attachment to the essentials of the gospel, sets his indifference to its mere outward forms or the mode of its rites in a strong and convincing light. We will mention a few instances.

a. The design of the Epistle to the Romans is to prove the doctrine of justification by faith in a generic sense, as applicable to all, Jews and Gentiles alike. Judaism evidently existed at Rome in its milder form. Its advocates had not reached the point of insisting on its claims as indispensable to salvation. They were merely weak brethren. Paul would therefore have them treated with consideration and forbearance. So long as they observed appointed days and seasons with proper motives, merely laboring under some misapprehension concerning them, it was matter of indifference whether they observed them or not. The life of Christianity was not injured by either course.

b. The Galatians stood in a very different relation to the inculcation of Judaism. Its advocates were not, like those at Rome, weak brethren, but determined proselytors. The object of Paul therefore in his epistle to them was not generic, but specific — to substantiate the doctrine of justification by the blood of atonement in opposition to Judaism, which, in its position and relations, had become a soul-destroying error. Hence he gives no indulgence to its legalizing influences (Gal. iv. 9, 10, 11 ; v. 1–8, 12). With all the influence of his character and eloquence he here resists submission to Judaism, because it was turning the Galatians from Christ as the only ground of justification. His earnestness in reprehending the error assumes even the tone of severity.

The Colossians were situated similarly to the Galatians in respect to the teachings of the Judaizers. He therefore (Col. ii. 16, 17) inveighs earnestly against any attempt to bring the Colossian Christians under the bondage of the Jewish ritual. In the circumstances submission to it would be in open conflict with salvation by grace.

c. He circumcised Timothy with the view of conciliating

the Jews, and thereby of increasing his influence over them. But Titus he would not circumcise, because, in the circumstances in which his circumcision was requested, it would sanction the claims of the Judaizers, and strike a death blow at the vitals of the gospel scheme. We have no evidence, however, that while Paul refused to circumcise Titus, he refused sacramental fellowship with "the false brethren" who urged it; certainly we have no proof that he would have done it had they given satisfactory evidence of union to Christ. The wish, almost malediction, recorded Gal. v. 12, by no means indicates this.

d. At his last visit to Jerusalem — where some years before he had gone up for the express purpose of resisting the encroachments of Judaism, — Paul consented, in company with four other members of the church there, to discharge publicly a vow in the temple, performing the ceremonies and offering the oblations suitable to the occasion, for the sake of showing the Jews who were prejudiced against him that he walked orderly and kept the Mosaic law (Acts xxi. 17–26).

e. When Peter visited Paul at Antioch, and at first ate freely with the Gentile converts, regardless of Jewish customs, but after "certain came from James" separated himself from the Gentiles, "fearing them which were of the circumcision," thereby exerting an influence against the freedom of the gospel, carrying away many, even Barnabas with him, and thus strengthening the hands of the Judaizers, Paul felt constrained to reprove him publicly (Gal. ii. 14). In view of these facts no one can fail to see Paul's great indifference to mere ritual forms, provided the essentials were retained and the heart was right.

VI. The fact that those whom Christ appointed leaders in organizing his churches agreed entirely with Paul in tolerating the observances of the Mosaic ritual among the Jews, and justified its neglect among the Gentiles, demonstrates their free sentiments regarding church communion. The apostles, at least as early as the vision of Peter and the council at Jerusalem, had pretty clear views — some doubtless more

clear than others — of the fact that the ceremonial law had its consummation in Christ, and was consequently no longer obligatory (see Dr. Hackett's exposition of Acts x. 35; also his analysis of the arguments of Peter and James before the council at Jerusalem, Acts xv.). The remarks of Neander on these portions of scripture are of similar import (see also Gal. ii. 13, with Ellicott's and Alford's expositions).

True, some of the apostles, for instance, James, who was a strict observer of the Mosaic ritual, believing that the life of Christianity could best flourish in connection with the Jewish culture, felt that the practice of its ceremonials was more important than did Paul and Barnabas; yet all were agreed in the opinion that such differences ought not to be ground of alienation or rupture between them. But they were far from hurrying every one who embraced Christianity into the practice of this liberty. They proceeded with moderation; they evinced a large Christian common-sense; they knew that Christianity had lived and thriven under Jewish culture; their own Christian life had originated and matured while observing the ceremonial law. Consequently, their own experience taught them to believe that the inner life of the gospel church might develop itself in connection with Levitical institutes. The practice of these institutes was therefore left optional. They acted on the principle that the holiness of faith working in the centre of the moral activities, gradually pervading the several faculties of the soul and making them the organs of its own manifestation, would silently and irresistibly modify individual opinions, and through individual opinions mould the outward usages of the church to itself; and that thus the spiritual worship of the gospel would succeed without commotion to the ritualism of Moses, as the sap working in the trunk and limbs of the tree develops itself in fruitage without observation, but with infallible certainty (1 Cor. vii. 18, 19).

The apostles therefore presented the gospel to the Jew in a form harmonizing with the peculiar modes of religious thought engendered by his theocratic culture; while to the heathen, to whom a religion from God was now first revealed,

it was published in the beauty of its own free spirit, undeformed by cumbersome ceremonials.

Hence different apostles were appointed for these respective departments of labor (Gal. ii. 7, 8). Peter, John, and James, who had received Christ as Jews, and been instructed by him to observe the Mosaic rites, were designated specifically to labor among their brethren according to the flesh. James, who from the strictness of his religious life was afterwards called "the just," and whose mental constitution led to a rigid exactness in all the outward forms of religion, was assigned the presidency of the church at Jerusalem. Paul, on the other hand, who had proved by his own experience the insufficiency of the law to free from the condemning power of sin, and whose large heart, beating, when renovated, with every noble sentiment, received Christ with such fervor that he enjoyed fellowship with all who evinced a similar fervor, was sent far hence to the Gentiles (Rom. xv. 16; xi. 13), and taught them to worship God in spirit and in truth, and to observe the simple rites of the gospel in the spirit of its Author.

Hence arose in the apostolic church the Pauline and Petrine or Jacobean parties (1 Cor. i. 12; iii. 22).

Some of the latter, as we have seen, became the violent opposers of Paul. They affirmed that obedience to the Levitical institutes was essential to salvation, and even pronounced Paul an imposter. They went as propagandists of their Pharisaic notions to the various churches planted by him among the Gentiles, subverting their faith. They endeavored by every shift of argument and art of persuasion to undermine his influence with his converts; and were even transported to such excess as to trench on the very life of the gospel. Yet Paul gave the right hand of fellowship to James and to the church at Jerusalem; and Peter, James, and John extended the same to Paul and to the churches he represented (Gal. ii. 9; Col. iv. 11).

Indeed, we find in the writings of the apostles no authority for withdrawing fellowship from a church, or from the mem-

bers of a church, because they observed, or failed to observe, mere forms and ceremonies. If any passages in the epistles seem at first glance capable of such interpretation, as Gal. v. 12; Philip. iii. 2, on closer investigation we find that if Paul actually did recommend the exclusion of those of whom he speaks thus severely, it was not because they practised Judaism, but because in propagating Judaism they evinced a spirit irreconcilable with the charitable conviction of their vital union to Christ. Consequently, the fact stands out on the page of apostolic history, authenticated by the most decisive testimony, that the observance of the Mosaic ritual — a practice tending in its ultimate bearings to subvert the very foundations of the gospel — was freely tolerated by the existing authorities of the primitive churches; and that all disputations concerning it were to be adjusted by turning the attention of the combatants from the outward form to the inner life.

The principles of sacramental fellowship taught by the apostles are thus in perfect harmony with the central element of the gospel church — justifying faith. Subjective unity manifested was with them sufficient ground for objective unity.

The application of apostolic argumentation and practice on this topic to Pedobaptist errors or misconceptions may be satisfactorily shown. But before entering on the discussion of this point, we will premise:

a. The sacramental fellowship of the Jewish and Gentile Christians, recommended on the ground of Christian consciousness, is either an isolated case, never to be repeated in adjusting difficulties springing out of diversities of opinion regarding external rites and usages, or it is the development of a principle on which professed Christians in all ages are to settle their dissensions with reference to matters falling within its limits. To deny that fellowship on grounds recommended by the apostle covers a principle, is, (1) Taking a position in regard to the practical teachings of the scriptures contrary to their usual method, which is the enforcement of general principles by individual facts and incidents. Indeed,

to affirm that the practice of the apostles continued for years, a practice persisted in and enforced on others in councils, in preaching and in writing, involves no principle, is an absurdity. (2) It is a position overthrowing the arguments of strict communionists, as they are based entirely on precedent. To admit that apostolic practice enjoined by a direct precept teaches a principle is the only reasonable course.

b. We do not deny that the apostolic doctrine of expediency, or the intelligent exercise of Christian love, may in certain circumstances justify the suspension of either the law of baptism or of the eucharist, as the law "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" requires, in its widest application, the apparent abrogation of the sixth commandment But our argument does not require us to press such an inference.

The present controversy is solely between strict communionists and orthodox Pedobaptists, those who mutually defend and obey the scriptural law of baptism as they severally understand it. All we desire to substantiate is, that these apostolic principles free the church from the necessity of adhering to exactitude or precision of mode in external ordinances; that while the gospel demands the *substance* of her rites, she leaves their *accidents* to the decision of individual conviction of duty; and consequently that they release brethren in Christ from the obligation of insisting on the precise mode and relative position of rites as terms of sacramental communion. This is all we care to substantiate.

Should it be said, If the spiritual idea, the design, the essentials of rites only be necessary to their validity, then baptism may be performed "with sand," and the sacramental supper "with potatoes and milk,"[1] we reply, this is trifling as well with arguments as with divine appointments. Water in baptism, and bread and wine in the eucharist, are the materials of the rites, the essentials, inseparable from them. To draw with ink a line required to be drawn with chalk is not meeting the requirement.

[1] Curtis, p. 91.

c. We do not argue from the free principles of the apostles that we are to receive all accredited believers to our distinctive churches. To make this plain two or three points must be discriminated.

(1) There is a distinction between inviting to the Lord's supper and admitting to our denominational churches. Without maintaining that intellectual agreement between Christians is essential to sacramental communion, we affirm that in so far as they do concur in religious sentiments they can enjoy Christian communion. Our opponents agree with us concerning the nature of prayer and divine worship, the condition of the sinner, the divine method of salvation, and the importance of extending its knowledge through the world. In these respects we can and ought to enjoy Christian fellowship. On this point our Baptist brethren are very decided. Equally true is it that we are so far agreed as to the design and significance of the sacramental board as to be capable of enjoying it together. There is nothing to disturb our holiest sensibilities in the service. With respect to some important elements in the institution and administration of the church we differ. We might not, perhaps, fully sympathize in church relations. It might therefore be inexpedient for Baptists and Pedobaptists to come into the same church organization.[1] Christian love and harmony might not be so well secured by such an attempted union as by their assembling generally in separate bodies for attending upon the word and the sacraments. Were they fixed in one church under one pastor, even truth might be fettered, and ordinances become obsolete.

Allowing even that some Baptists and Pedobaptists, individuals of free natures, who are as willing to tolerate the opinions of others as to defend their own, may work harmoniously together in church relations, and that, in certain circumstances, it may be expedient for them thus to unite, we believe nevertheless, for Christians of usual mould, and as at present educated, to attempt such a union would be very undesirable. But while admitting this, we are far from

[1] Bibliotheca Sacra, No. xcv. p. 503.

maintaining that it might not be highly expedient for members of different denominational churches occasionally to commune together at the table of the Lord in token of their oneness in him. Indeed, the sympathies of Christian oneness can never be fully realized without it (See Bib. Sac. No. xcv. p. 529). This distinction in the application of our argument ought, in fairness, to be kept in view. We would not prove mixed communion, but free communion.[1] The latter, we believe, may be enjoyed without the resultant evils, real or imaginary, attributed by our opponents to the former. One may therefore be expedient while the other is inexpedient.

(2) There is a distinction between inviting to our sacramental boards members of evangelical churches and those who have made no public profession of their faith; also between inviting members of those Christian societies who have entered into public covenant with God, who believe and practise gospel ordinances according to conscientious convictions, and those who discard all obligation to practise external rites of any kind. Christian expediency might permit us to commune with the former of both of these classes, while it would not with the latter of both.[2] The right to commune with the former of both is all we contend for as authorized by the free principles of the apostles.

The question, therefore, whether it is expedient to invite to our sacramental feast Quakers, Unitarians, or Roman Catholics is one we do not propose to settle by our present discussion. The fact that we may not fellowship with Christian societies which are not acknowledged by evangelical Christians generally to be churches of Christ, is no proof that it is inexpedient to fellowship those which are so generally regarded; and the fact that we may not fellowship with churches whose light has gone out, is no proof that it is inexpedient to fellowship those whose loins are girded, and whose lights are burning, notwithstanding some defects in their ceremonial practices.

We will now proceed to the application of the free princi-

[1] Bibliotheca Sacra, No. lxxxiii. p. 466. [2] Ibid. p. 462.

ples of the apostles respecting mere external forms to the subject in debate.

1. We argue the applicability of the apostolic reasoning and practice to Pedobaptist errors and misconceptions, or to the accidents of gospel rites, because such applicability is in agreement with the spirituality of the gospel. This agreement is proved:

a. By the leading and ultimate end of Christ's mission and work. This was to form a kingdom of priests who should "offer spiritual sacrifices" (1 Peter ii. 5). In it, not ceremonies, but the hallowed emotions which prompt or breathe through them, can alone constitute suitable worship, or reciprocate the divine sympathies so freely extended to all its subjects.[1] Precision in mode and form of outward service can have no inherent value, no appropriateness, in such a kingdom fully developed. Is it said that the Jewish church was a part of the holy kingdom which Christ died to gather out of this world, not less than the gospel, and that he did in the former institute modal rites? True; but these were only shadows, tokens, or pledges, that the finished form of the kingdom would one day be set up (Heb. iii. 5).

In ceremonials which were typical of some glorious reality, and which were designed to strike the senses even of the most uncultivated, precision in mode, in place, and arrangements, exactly answering to the pattern shown in the mount might be appropriate. But when these typical indications are all superceded by the actual appearing of the glorious reality; when he who is the only Mediator between God and man has actually established his kingdom in its finished form, and sympathy of soul with himself is alone the essential of worship, we see no propriety in ordaining rites whose very substance is modal.

Besides, reason teaches us to look, at some period prior to the closing of the world's history, for a dispensation of the mediatorial kingdom, exhibiting before mankind its true spiritual character; not a scheme of rites and ceremonies,

[1] Bibliotheca Sacra, No. lxxxiii. pp. 471, 473.

but of spiritual communion and spiritual life, instinct with the unearthly sympathies of its holy Author. In such a dispensation of the kingdom of our Lord, reason can see no place for precision in form and order of outward services. Partaking of the nature of the dispensation of which they are integral parts, they must live and move with its own free spirit.

Now this anticipation of reason is realized in the gospel church. It is the visible organization of the kingdom of Christ standing before the world arrayed in the simple beauty of her spiritual character. This Christ declares (John iv. 20–24; Gal. iv.).[1] In it we approach God as an affectionate father with the same filial love and familiarity with which Christ approaches him (Eph. iii. 12). Thus what reason anticipates relative to the kingdom of Christ, its manifestation to the world in its finished form, the scriptures declare to be true. The reason is also equally harmonious with scripture, affirming that in this finished form, ritualism, properly so called, has no place.

b. In harmony with this leading aim of Christ's mission is the radical distinction between the churches of the old and new dispensations indicated by "bondage" (*δουλεία*), and "freedom" (*ἐλευθερία*). These determinative characteristics the apostle most earnestly insists upon. Civil bondage is the state in which one acts, not according to the free exercise of his own judgment, but follows the dictates of another. The term is used tropically in the New Testament to designate the condition of those subject to the dominion of sin. It denotes that the dispositions of the heart are so strongly bent towards forbidden objects, that every decision of the will is in accordance with their dictation. It becomes their slave. Without losing its natural freedom it is held fast in bondage. This is the dominion of sin (Rom. vi. 12, 14, etc.; John viii. 34; 2 Peter ii. 19).

This reign of sin usurps dominion over every department of the soul. The reason is darkened by it, and becomes its willing instrument. The conscience, yielding obedience to

[1] Bibliotheca Sacra, No. lxxxiii. p. 471.

the reason, becomes equally bewildered and ensnared. In this condition it is easily blinded by the fumes of superstition, and enthralled by false convictions of duty. When disturbed by the whispers of guilt, it readily falls into the belief that the claims of religion may be discharged by external services. The Judaizing Christians and certain weak believers in the time of Paul were so far in this state of mind that they over-valued outward observances. Their conviction of obligation to regard them were so strong, that if they deemed them not necessary to salvation, they considered their observance highly acceptable to God. Their consciences were enslaved to these convictions. Hence, Paul denominates their attachment to Judaic institutions, bondage (Gal. ii. 4; iv. 9, 24; v. 1).

This view is corroborated by the fact that the state of the Jews under the Levitical law is represented as imprisonment (Gal. iii. 23). "We were kept under the law" (*ὑπὸ νόμον ἐφρουρούμεθα*); Alford "kept inward," as Chrysostom, *ὥσπερ ἐν τειχίῳ τινί* (Ellicott and Bloomfield). The office of the law was that of a jailor. This bondage to ceremonial observances Paul also teaches by the expression "elements" or rudiments "of the world" (Gal. iv. 3; Col. ii. 20). This expression includes all outward observances of whatever kind, whether of Jewish or of Gentile origin. "Elementary lessons of outward things" (Conybeare and Howson, endorsed by Alford). Natural religion is the result of the natural conscience. Such a conscience enveloped in the darkness of heathenism, when oppressed with guilt, develops itself in superstitious observances. These usually assume definite shape. Exactitude and precision are constitutive elements of them. The history of heathen superstitions, of Judaic ritualism, of Mohammedism, and of lapsed Christianity, each and all, proves this. They who are under the dominion of such ritualistic notions, of whatever character or origin, are in complete bondage to them.

But the gospel delivers from all such bondage. Faith in Jesus, as the sufficient ground of acceptance with God, frees

from all slavish regard to mere ritual forms. This characteristic or status of the gospel church, in contrast with the bondage of Judaism, is denominated freedom (ἐλευθερία). Its radical idea, as used by Paul, is the free working of sanctified love. It is the condition of a soul reposing on Christ, and breathing forth to God our reconciled Father, the spirit of adoption. It is a manly independence of all outward forms in worship; the humble and reverential, yet free communion of the renewed spirit with the Father of spirits.

In its primary sense, therefore, as used in the gospel, it is the reverse of bondage to sin, the freedom of holiness, that with which Christ makes his people free. In its perfection it is brought to view (Rom. viii. 21) τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς δόξης τῶν τέκνων τοῦ θεοῦ, — "the freedom which belongs to the glorification of the sons of God" (Conybeare and Howson). It is deliverance from all sinful biases that hinder the free workings of the law of Christian life in the soul. As the bondage of sin sways the reason and the conscience, so this freedom emancipates every power and tendency of the mind from the tyranny of sin. Hence, Paul uses freedom, in a restricted sense, to designate deliverance from ritual and superstitious observances. Even Christians may fall partially under bondage to these. To designate freedom from this bondage ἐλευθερία is used (2 Cor. iii. 17; Gal. ii. 4; v. 1, 13). A conscience emancipated from such servitude also acts freely under the influence of love in respect to things indifferent (1 Cor. viii. 9; x. 29).

Let it be borne in mind that Paul employs the terms "bondage" and "freedom" to mark the determinative characteristics of the Jewish and gospel churches. This is evident from Gal. iv. 4, 5: "When the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his Son ..... to redeem them that were under the law," — to buy them off from "the bondage to the elements of the world," or to Jewish ritualism, mentioned v. 3. This passage also brings to view the fulness and endearment of the freedom which distinguishes the church of the Christian dispensation. "That we might receive the adoption of sons"

(Gal. iv. 6; Rom. viii. 15). This is the distinguishing glory of the gospel church. The relation of an affectionate father and a confiding, loving child is the purest and most tender. It is also the freest. Mutual love and confidence banish all rigid adherence to forms. Laws there may be, and strict laws, but no unyielding external forms in which they must, at all events, be obeyed. A fulness of filial love will satisfy the parental heart. Besides, this fellowship with the Father, implied in adoption, exalts every believer to the dignity of the priesthood, "to offer up spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God" (1 Pet. ii. 9). Neander says: "Since Christ has forever accomplished that which the priesthood and sacrifices in the Old Testament prefigured, — all who now appropriate by faith what he effected for mankind, stand in the same relation with one another to God, without needing any other mediation, — that they are all by communion with Christ dedicated and consecrated to God, ... and thus their whole consecrated activity is a true spiritual, priestly cultus; Christians forming a divine kingdom of priests." Dr. Wayland expresses the same sentiment in his Principles and Practices of the Baptists: "We have ever held to the universal priesthood of believers." What more decisive testimony do we need to convince us that not only the Judaic ritual, but its very spirit has passed away.

Now taking into consideration the fact that the freedom advocated by the apostle bears entirely on outward observances; that it is represented by the highest social freedom imaginable — the spirit of adoption; and by the most precious intimacy with God — the royal priesthood; loyalty to the word of God demands that we dispassionately inquire what bearing, as a principle of action, the freedom of the gospel has on the rites of the gospel. We agree with all evangelical denominations that it by no means implies exemption from ritual observances. But it does unequivocally imply three things: (1) That Christian obedience to them has no taint of a slavish spirit; (2) That the conscience is delivered from all superstitious scruples concerning them; (3) That acceptable

obedience to them is to be the spontaneous working of holy love. Can it then imply less than that while the substance of the rite is observed, its form and mode may be left to the free determination of individual judgment regulated by Christian love? Does it not release the believer from all obligation to insist on exactness in mode.

c. This conclusion is confirmed by the radical difference between the Jewish and gospel rites. The spirit of the gospel church being the spirit of holiness, all the emotions and affections which the gospel demands must be exact, in full measure. The freedom of the gospel gives no indulgence to sin But it does affect the rites of the gospel, while it affects not the spirit of obedience to them. The new and better covenant is a system of heart religion. It has modes of profession; but they are the outgoings of the heart. All their acceptableness lies in the warm affections which give them birth. In their spirit and import there is a decided difference between them and the rites of the Jewish church; a difference which needs to be thoroughly understood for the full elucidation of our subject.

The ceremonial law was a system of rites and ceremonies; which the Hebrews were to perform as media of communication with God. They were designed to designate them as God's peculiar people and to preserve them to be the depositaries of the true religion till he who was foreshadowed by them as the Head and Foundation of the church, should abolish them, by answering their end in his own expiatory sacrifice.

Its peculiar characteristics were:

(1) National. The distinction between the civil, the judicial, the moral, and ceremonial laws in the Sianitic code is not definitely drawn. All were religious; all were civil. Every ceremonial precept had a civil element. Every religious observance sustained a politico-religious character.

(2) Piacular. This was a conspicuous element of the code. Witness the day of atonement; the sin and trespass offerings; the various purifications, etc. (Lev. i. 4; Heb. ix. 13. See

Watson's Theol. Inst. Vol. ii. p. 151; Magee on the Atonement, Vol. i. pp. 26, 264).

(3) Typical. All the ceremonial law was, in a sense, such — a figure for the time then present (Heb. iii. 5; ix. 9). But some of the leading rites were so pre-eminently such that they gave character to the whole (Heb. x. 1; Col. ii. 17). Therefore,

(4) Ceremonial holiness was a predominant characteristic. As the Levitical rites were designed to mark the Hebrews as a peculiar people, a holy nation, they were, in a sense, the ground of visible acceptance with God. They removed uncleannesses and made atonement for the people, though the hearts of multitudes were unregenerate. Submission to one rite qualified them, while utterly destitute of holiness, for the privileges of another, as circumcision for the passover, which is the very essence of ceremonial holiness. Taken together, they form a complete system of ritualism — a method of serving and worshipping God by outward ceremonies. The religion of the Hebrews was doubtless subjective; but all that was esoteric was so imperatively required to be expressed in the visible, that objectivity was its distinctive characteristic. Ceremonial holiness was its governing feature.

The rites of the New Testament have none of these characteristics. They are not national, not piacular, in any sense, have no ceremonial holiness, no acceptableness aside from the spirit and intention. He who is not actuated by holy motives in receiving baptism is an alien from the true church. He who partakes of the Lord's supper unworthily "eateth and drinketh damnation to himself."

The nature and design of a gospel rite are therefore radically different from the nature and design of a rite in the Sinaitic church. The rites of the Jewish church may be distinctively denominated ritualistic; the rites of the gospel church spiritualistic.[1] Exactness in form and mode is essential to the former, corresponding to the nature of the church of which they are exponents. Their substance, spirit, or

[1] Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xxiv. p. 473.

design is alone essential in the latter; equally corresponding to the nature of the church of which they are exponents.

Now, from the spirit of the gospel as evinced, (*a*) in the leading end of Christ's mission — the royal priesthood of believers; (*b*) by the difference between the Jewish and gospel churches as expressed by bondage and freedom; (*c*) by the radical difference between the nature of the rites of the two dispensations, — it is a just inference that the freedom of the gospel church extends to her rites, and moulds them. If the spirituality and freedom of the gospel church exist anywhere, they exist in her rites; and, inversely, if they exist not in her rites, they exist nowhere. It is an absurdity to say that the gospel church is distinctively spiritual, but still enjoins ordinances distinctively ritualistic, like those of Judaism. There is, therefore, what may be properly called a ritual liberty. Every gospel ordinance has an element of freedom. In what does that freedom consist? If gospel liberty permits not exemption from its rites, leaves nothing to choice in regard to their substance, and still allows a free exercise of judgment, to what does that judgment relate? It can relate to nothing less than to the mode and order of the rites. It sets them in a looser frame than were the Levitical; gives them pliancy; permits them to assume any shape or attitude consistent with their substance. It teaches that the Head of the church will accept the honest intention of obeying them for obedience; treat those who conscientiously misapprehend their accidents as if the ordinances were homogeneous with the church of which they are exponents.

Were Paul now permitted to address the Baptist and Pedobaptist churches, we believe he would say: He of you who regardeth immersion alone as baptism, regardeth it unto the Lord; and he who regardeth sprinkling as baptism, to the Lord he doth regard it. He that practiseth infant baptism, practiseth it to the Lord, for he giveth God thanks for the privilege; and he that practiseth it not, to the Lord he practiseth it not, and giveth God thanks. Let not him that immerseth despise him that immerseth not; and let not him

that immerseth not despise him that immerseth, for God hath received him. Let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind; for none of you liveth to himself, but to God. Why then dost thou judge thy brother; or why dost thou set at nought thy brother? Do it not. Rather let every one of you see that he put no stumbling-block, or occasion to fall in his brother's way.

Strict communionists, while they agree with us in according the element of freedom to all the other institutes of the gospel, refuse to accord it to baptism. With them baptism is an invariable physical act, having all the immutable elements of a Jewish ordinance, standing in the field of the Christian's experience like an upright stake marking ownership of lands, or like a guide-post indicating the turn in our journey. There it must stand in its unalterable position, with its unbending rigidity, always of the same shape, size, and height. No prayerful purpose to celebrate it scripturally can be accepted in lieu of its precise form. They acknowledge that it is the rite of a purely spiritual church; and yet it partakes not of its spiritual nature, its form being just as fixed and essential as the foundation of the church itself; so that the least alteration of the form undermines and lays in ruins the latter; which, to our conception, is emphatically ritualistic bondage in the apostolic sense.

2. We argue the applicability of the apostle's reasoning to Pedobaptist misapprehension or to the accidents of gospel rites because the supposed errors of either the Baptists or Pedobaptists are no more incompatible with personal love to Christ, no more detrimental to the power of the visible church, than were the apprehended errors of the Jewish and Gentile converts. If the errors or misconceptions involved in the present controversy sustain substantially the same relations to individual character and to the efficiency of the church, there is no reason why they should not be adjusted on the same grounds. That this is the case, a few considerations will render sufficiently evident.

a. In apostolic times every one knew precisely the nature

and design of baptism, its obligation and form. The word "*βαπτίζω*" belonged to a living language; its classic, or Hellenistic sense, or its sacred use, as designating the rite introductory to the Christian church, was distinctly understood. He who refused to submit to the ordinance would have been deemed a wilful violator of a known law. Now the word designating the rite is differently situated. It is no longer part of a living language. The import of the rite, especially its form, is involved in obscurity. The right solution of the subject before us demands the distinct apprehension of the intensity of this obscuration. This can be done only by taking into view the vast amount of argument adducible disproving immersion, especially a peculiar manner of immersion, alone to be baptism.

(1) There is obscurity in the signification of the word designating it. We know the Baptists maintain unflinchingly that "*βαπτίζω*" has but one meaning — *immersion*. More than this, not a few of them maintain that it signifies not merely wetting the entire body, but wetting it in a particular way. Dr. Carson affirms that the word does not mean the state of being under water, but being put under water. Hence the rite consists in the entire body being put under water. For one to lie down in a baptistry and be flooded with water would not be baptism; but his entire person must be plunged into the baptistry by the administrator — a philological position very difficult to prove, at this hour of the world, to the apprehension of the multitude who compose the bulk of our churches. Besides, that "*βαπτίζω*" signifies invariably modal immersion, or immersion in any manner, is denied by many of our best scholars and ablest theologians. See Dr. Robinson's Lexicon; Liddell and Scott's Lexicon; Dr. Miller; Dr. E. Beecher; Dr. Peters, p. 23; Dr. G. D. Armstrong, pp. 70–74; Moses Stuart; James W. Dale, pp. 235, etc., and O. Fowler, who says (pp. 19–25): "I have now given you the opinion of sixty eminent men and distinguished Greek scholars, lexicographers, critics and theologians; men who have lived during seventeen centuries, and with united

voice they declare positively and explicitly that the original primitive meaning of "baptizo" is affusion, as well as immersion."

(2) There is obscurity also growing out of circumstances connected with the history of the primitive instances of its administration. See Dr. Griffin's Letter to Deacon Hubbard on Close Communion; Dr. Dwight, Vol. iv. p. 349; Dr. Woods, Vol. iii. p. 449; Bible on Baptism.[1]

(3) There is obscurity growing out of another point: Christ in selecting "βαπτίζω" to designate the inititatory rite to his church, may have given it an entirely religious sense — a sense synonomous with "καθαρίζω," signifying a symbolical purification or consecration. Strong arguments, drawn from the New Testament, and from contemporaneous and patristic literature, may be adduced to substantiate this position — arguments which have been sufficient to convince many acute and candid minds.

The arguments for infant baptism, particularly those derived from the identity of the Abrahamic and gospel covenants, are in the estimation of multitudes equally conclusive; and have been, even to the profoundest minds, the most accomplished scholars, and devoted Christians, for centuries. These can be found in the various works on the subject, such as Peter Clark's, Wardlaw's, Woods's, C. Taylor's, S. J. Cassel's, and others.

A new question concerning baptism, and sacramental fellowship as growing out of it, has therefore arisen. It has been earnestly discussed. Parties have been organized. The visible body of Christ has been divided. It is a difference of opinion never raised in the time of the apostle. Had it been, we admit it would have deeply implicated character. Now it has not the least appreciable effect on the religion of either the heart or the life. The Christian graces shine forth with equal loveliness in those who immerse and those who sprinkle; in those who believe infant baptism and those who deny it. The daily deportment of both thus testifies that their respec-

[1] Published by the Congregational Board of Publication.

tive practices entrench on the vital elements of personal character as little as did the respective practices of Jewish and Gentile Christians in the age of Paul.

b. It cannot be proved that the alleged errors of the Pedobaptists are more detrimental to the spirituality and efficacy of their churches than were the errors of the Jewish or Gentile Christians to their respective churches. To estimate fairly the evil influence of Pedobaptist misconceptions, we must consider them by themselves, separated from all other hurtful errors. The comparison should be instituted between Baptist churches and such Pedobaptist churches as hold essentially the same doctrines of grace. To compare them with those Pedobaptist churches which combine with their supposed errors other important aberrations from truth would be doing the latter great injustice. Let the comparison be made between them and the Calvinistic Congregational churches of New England, and we have no apprehension that by the closest scrutiny, the least evidence can be found showing that the Pedobaptist errors are not as innoxious to their churches as were the ritualistic errors of the Jewish or Gentile converts to their churches. As a vitalizing power in the church, immersion, taken by itself, has no perceptible superiority over sprinkling as such a power; nor the denial of infant baptism over its conscientious practice.

c. The conscientious convictions of both Baptists and Pedobaptists in regard to their respective tenets concerning baptism are no more decided than were those of the Jewish and Gentile Christians. That both the Jewish and Gentile Christians were decided as to the scripturalness of their respective positions, there can be no question. Each had such supposed evidence on his side, and was therefore conscientious. This is evident from their respective intellectual points of view. It is also confirmed by Rom. xiv. 3. Hence, when required to fellowship the Gentile Christians, the Jew was required to fellowship those who, in his judgment, were neglecting a plain command of God. Consequently, he might have said as conscientiously as the Baptist now says: "God forbid that

I should violate, or sanction the neglect of the commands of God."

On the other hand, the Gentile Christian fully believed that the Hebrew form of worship was not binding. In submitting to it he felt that he was submitting to the rites of an obsolete dispensation — to human tradition, not to the command of God; and when required to fellowship those who practised them, he might have said as conscientiously: "God forbid that I should sanction unscriptural rites." In like manner, the Pedobaptist believes that immersion is not binding, and that to require it of him is to require him to submit to a human invention. He no more believes that obligation to immersion can be found in the Bible than that obligation to the Levitical law can be found there. The conscientious convictions of the Jewish and Gentile Christians regarding the external rites in debate were, therefore, precisely the same as the conscientious convictions of the Baptists and Pedobaptists concerning the mode of the rite in dispute between them.

This new relation of the baptismal question to our intellectual apprehension gives it an entirely new relation to our Christian regards. On no grounds of Christian, or even common equity, can the supposed errors be treated as they might or ought to have been in the apostolic age. The position of Robert Hall on this point is perfectly sound, and can never be battered down by artillery brought either from the armory of the scriptures or of common equity.

We are therefore required to seek for the settlement of this new disputation on different ground from what those living in the apostolic period would have been required to settle it, had it then risen. The ground of adjustment must, however, be thoroughly scriptural. But to decide the question aright on scriptural grounds, we must not only take into view the specific precepts of the gospel, but its great underlying principles, which often modify its specific rules. With these changeless principles rendering the gospel the great vitalizing and unifying power of the world, with Christ

its holy Author and the glorious Head of his people, and the eternal ages of fellowship they are to enjoy in heaven, before us, we ought honestly to inquire, on what scriptural principle shall this new difference be composed? When a new planet is discovered, astronomers at once decide that its orbit and motions are regulated by the laws governing the other planets, on the ground that the laws of the planetary system are uniform. So this new question of fellowship must be decided on the same principle on which questions similarly situated were decided by the apostles two thousand years ago. That, undeniably, was recognized Christian consciousness.

3. From the foregoing discussion it is demonstrable that the principle on which the differences between Jewish and Gentile Christians were adjusted equally applies to the differences between the Baptists and Pedobaptists. It should be particularly observed that Paul intimates no desire for the disputants concerning rites in his time to surrender their respective views; he only contends that there was common ground on which they should meet in sacramental communion, while they maintained their distinctive opinions and practices. That common ground was faith in atoning blood. If the ceremonial error stand in such relation to vital godliness as to separate from Christ, his followers should separate from those involved in the error; otherwise not.

No one will pretend that Pedobaptist misapprehensions separate from Christ. All disputations respecting them must therefore be adjusted, so far as sacramental fellowship is concerned, on the apostolic principle. As Paul virtually said to each party in his time: "What you regard as wrong in those from whom you differ is without; they are substantially right within; therefore receive these outwardly erring brethren on the ground of this internal rightness — on the same ground that God receives them;" he might now say to those contending concerning baptismal misapprehension: "What you mutually deem wrong in your opponents is outward; they are essentially right within; receive them on the footing of this inward rightness. This is the principle of sympathy

between them and Christ; it should be between them and you around his table."

4. The Christian reason calls for the adjustment of the baptismal controversy on the principle on which the apostles advocated the settlement of similar controversies. It sees that multitudes of learned and devoted men have been arrayed for three or four centuries, as the Baptists aver for fifteen centuries, one against the other in fierce conflict for the victory. Contemplating this embittered controversy through the weary centuries, seeing neither party nearer a victory than when it commenced, and calling to mind the rankling wounds inflicted on the purest Christian sensibilites; the reproach cast on the Redeemer's name; and the souls lost by this conflict respecting the non-essentials of a bare rite, it sighs for a cessation of hostilities on other grounds than victory. With the deepest yearnings of Christian sympathy she exclaims: Is there no method by which this fruitless dissension may be composed only by one triumphing over and humbling the other? Must this crimination and recrimination, this jarring of Christian feelings, this destruction of souls be prolonged through centuries to come, as it has been for centuries past? Seeing no probability of agreement on grounds of positive law, she searches earnestly through the broad domains of charity for some principle on which mutually acknowledged Christians, at variance in regard to the modes and applications of rites, may harmoniously celebrate their oneness with the Lord in the supper expressly instituted to show it forth. She hails with joy the conclusion, that the apostle's argument in regard to external observances is applicable to the difficulties under review. She rejoices that charity has claims higher than positive requisitions — has marked out a shorter road to union with brethren beloved in Christ than the long weary process of convincing their reason on disputed questions.

Besides, it is the dictate of reason pervaded and enlightened by the spirit of the gospel, that Christ, in his instruction to his churches, would have inculcated some principle by which

professed Christians, contending about points not forfeiting confidence in Christian character, should without yielding their peculiar views, or laying aside their peculiar practices, fellowship each other in the memorial of their common union to him. The application of Paul's principle of church fellowship to the controversy between us and our opposers meets this anticipation of the Christian reason, and is just such as, judging from the genius of the gospel, we should expect to find for the guidance of the church militant.

This argument for the application of apostolic indifference respecting rites to baptistic misapprehension, cannot be invalidated by the position,

1. That those to whom Paul wrote were not guilty of omitting a Christian precept, or one then in actual force; he only desiring them to tolerate the ceremonies of an abrogated dispensation; rites which they were under no obligation to observe, but which were permitted as matters of indifference. This is acknowledged. But is it not as offensive to God to add to his word as to take from it — to prescribe new unbidden forms of worship as to neglect those he has taught? So thought John Milton. So thought all the Puritans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. So believe the strong champions of Baptist doctrines — Drs. Wayland, Howell, and Arnold — of the present day. The scriptures are very explicit on this point. Is not the prescribing of forms and ceremonies additional to those enjoined in scripture one of the sins of Romanism? Were not the Judaizers guilty of the same sin? On no just principle of reasoning can adding to the word of God be deemed a sin less flagrant than neglecting a mere positive precept.

2. It is not invalidated by the position that the Jewish observances authoritatively tolerated by the Gentile converts were "allowable" or "discretional," not "imperative"; were "matters in regard to which there was no inspired direction one way more than another." The fact on which this position rests is questioned. After the coming of Christ and the setting up of the gospel church the forms of the ceremonial

law were either in accordance with God's legal will, or they were not. They were unquestionably in accordance with that will so long as the Mosaic system of worship, pointing to a coming Messiah, continued. When that had its fulfilment in his advent and death, it passed away, and all the ceremonials connected with it. They had afterwards no truthful significance (Heb. vii., viii., ix., x.; Col. ii. 14–17). They were no longer actual laws, nor in accordance with God's will of law. They had accomplished their purpose, had reached their termination, were virtually repealed. They were no longer "allowable," as expressive of God's legal will. If they were "allowable," they were so merely on grounds of indulgence for the weakness or ignorance of those who practised them. This conclusion is in agreement with the declared sentiments of the apostles. See Acts xv; 10, 16, 17, Hackett's note. Certainly, subsequent to the council at Jerusalem it can be urged with very little propriety, that their practice was "allowable" on grounds of supposed agreement with the divine will of law. Would a Baptist brother now think it "allowable" for him to submit to circumcision, or to circumcise his child? The bare suggestion would be an offence to him; and, as he would allege, because it is forbidden. But it is no more legally forbidden now than when the apostolic epistles were written. Besides, to allow the observance of Jewish rites to be continued after they had no truthful significance, as pointing to, and having their end in, a coming Messiah, would be virtually declaring that he had not come; and consequently a real falsification. Could such an act be "allowable" agreeably to God's legal will? Plainly the Jewish customs were not "allowable" because of the indifference of God's legal will respecting them, nor because the truth respecting them had not been revealed; but purely on grounds of charity.

3. It is not invalidated by the position that Paul requires us to tolerate only those who are "living in compliance with all the revealed will of God in regard to the points as to which special forbearance is urged" (Curtis, pp. 219, 242).

The reply to the last objection is a sufficient reply to this. Besides, there is an apparent contradiction in its statements. Christian forbearance implies moral defect. What forbearance can one be required to exercise toward those who are living in compliance with all the revealed will of God, etc.?

4. It is not invalidated by the position that Paul argued the reception of "the weak" only as those "who believe and obey the gospel." This position rests alone on the assumption that Pedobaptists disobey the law of baptism — an assumption resting entirely on another assumption, viz. that immersion alone is accepted by Christ as baptism.

5. It is not invalidated by the position that Paul only advocates the reception of those whom God "receives, who are conscientious, and whose peculiarities are not subversive of any existing divine law." This position implies that the practice of the Pedobaptists is subversive of the law of baptism. This assumption is sufficiently met by facts. To subvert is to overthrow; and to overthrow a law is to annul it. Now, has the practice of Pedobaptists subverted or annulled the law of baptism, or had any tendency in that direction? We affirm fearlessly that no facts can be adduced proving the Pedobaptists less attached to the law of baptism than the Baptists. They themselves may be judges. Witness the long catalogue of Pedobaptists whom they are in the habit of chronicling as maintaining the indispensible necessity of baptism to the eucharist; such as Doddrige, Wall, Baxter, Dwight, Griffin, etc. Does this position of leading minds in our churches indicate that the sense of obligation to submit to baptism is weakened? And where among the laity can those who disregard baptism be found? Dr. Howell affirms: "Between our own and the several Protestant Pedobaptist denominations, there is ..... an agreement on this subject..... We all concur in maintaining that the candidate, to qualify him for the sacred supper, ... must have been baptized." We may appeal to the consciousness of Pedobaptists on this point. Not one in a thousand of them probably ever dreamed that he undervalued the law of baptism, or deemed it not an

unequivocal command of Jesus Christ. We should rejoice to have the existence of this consciousness in the Pedobaptist churches tested by actual observation. If dispensing, in extreme cases, with the rite altogether, according to Robert Hall (a course not yet extensively tried), is subversive of the law of baptism, dispensing with its accidents certainly is not subversive of the law.

But the errors of the Judaizers were subversive of the gospel. Dr. Hackett says, in his note on Acts xv. 2: "The heresy became so prevalent as to endanger the safety of the entire church; see Gal. ii. 11 sq." Andrew Fuller observes: The Galatians, "being perverted by certain Judaizing teachers were, contrary to the apostolical decision, circumcised, and subjected themselves to the yoke of Jewish ceremonies. They were brought to consider these things as necessary to justification and salvation, which was subversive of the doctrine of justification by faith in Jesus Christ." Of this we have abundant testimony. The entire Epistle to the Galatians proves it. But these errors were to be tolerated notwithstanding their subversive tendencies. Therefore, *a fortiori*, much more are errors of the Pedobaptists, which have no such discernible tendency, to be tolerated within the limits of the apostolic argument.

6. It is not invalidated by the position that the conclusion of the apostle's argument, "For the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost" (Rom. xiv. 17), includes baptism; "righteousness" implying obedience to all duties, external as well as internal. In confirmation of this wide sense of "righteousness" it is argued that Christ, referring to his baptism, said "It becometh us to fulfil all righteousness." "Righteousness" here, it is maintained, in like manner includes the righteousness of baptism. But this is assumption. The "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost," in this passage, are mentioned as internal states or affections, in distinction from external obedience. See Calvin, Bloomfield, Stuart, Tholuck, Trollope, S. H. Turner, Turretin, Tom. iii. p. 32, and Nean-

der's Planting of Christianity, Vol. i. 291. True righteousness of soul will lead to the performance of all duties. But here it has no reference whatever to external acts, it being used in direct opposition to them.

7. It is not invalidated by the position, that to receive Pedobaptists to our communion because they have submitted to what is equivalent to baptism, is really receiving them because they believe themselves baptized, that is, on the ground of sincerity; and to receive them on the ground of sincerity we must, to be consistent, receive those involved in grossest doctrinal errors who are sincere. We reply: (1) We do not advocate receiving the sprinkled to sacramental communion simply because they believe themselves baptized, or because they are sincere, but because we believe Christ, regarding their baptism as valid, receives them as Christians in covenant with himself and with each other; and because they do believe the essential truths of the gospel. (2) The principle of toleration vindicated by Paul can, with no fairness, be extended to doctrinal unsoundness. His argument related exclusively to ritual observances. This is seen by a glance at the foundation on which he erected his argument. That foundation is the essential principle of the gospel, the glory of God as the great end of our being — justification and acceptance by faith — which must by all means be maintained (Rom. xiv. 8; 1 Cor. viii. 13; x. 31).

8. It is not invalidated by the position that baptism involves a profession of the Christian religion, and that this is symbolized scripturally and adequately only by immersion. That baptism involves a profession of Christianity is admitted; but that immersion is so essential to the symbol that all profession of Christianity without it is invalid is not so clear. A profession is a declarative act — a publication of our sentiments, convictions, or purposes of life. A profession of religion is a publication of our adhesion to Christ. Baptism, considered as symbolizing such a profession, merely declares to the world our acceptance of Christ and dedication to him.

Is it said that "Baptism is more than a profession of faith

in a purifying Saviour; it is also a profession of faith in a Saviour dying, buried, rising from the dead"? But is the thought materially advanced by the last sentence? "Dying, buried, rising," only indicate the process by which he became the purifying Saviour. The thought might have been as well expressed thus: "Baptism is more than a profession of faith in a purifying Saviour; it is also a profession of faith in the process by which he became a purifying Saviour." But faith in the process by which Christ became a purifying Saviour adds nothing material to the simple idea of faith in a purifying Saviour. The essentiality is faith in his atoning efficacy. A purifying Saviour is identical with an atoning Saviour; and faith in an atoning Saviour is faith in the death and resurrection by which he became such. Granting, therefore, that immersion is the most appropriate and striking symbol of redemption from sin through Christ — if you please the most scriptural — may not the essential thing, the radical idea of profession by baptism, be symbolized by affusion or sprinkling in such a sense as to constitute a valid scriptural profession?

We know that great stress is laid on the importance of immersion in baptism, because it represents the death and resurrection of Christ, and our death to sin and resurrection to spiritual and eternal life.[1] But the resemblance of a symbolic sign to the act or spiritual state symbolized is not an essentiality. Biblical signs are not uniformly of this character. The rainbow had no physical resemblance to the world's preservation from another Noachian deluge. The circular cutting in circumcision had no resemblance to the process of crucifixion or redemption thereby obtained. The pillar of which Isaiah speaks, to be set up in the border of Egypt, bore no resemblance to the deliverance and salvation of which it was the symbol. In general, the significance of a sign is simply what the parties appointing and acknowledging it agree to give it. A symbol may be entirely arbitrary, and

[1] Baptism a Symbol. By G. D. Boardman, D.D. Philadelphia: Baptist Publication Society.

not the less significant. But allowing that resemblance be important to a symbolical sign, Pedobaptists claim that they have, in the use of water, a most appropriate resemblance to the spiritual idea. The quantity used neither adds to, nor takes from, its symbolic force. The few drops of blood shed in circumcision as decidedly symbolized cleansing by the sacrifice of Christ as all the blood in the child's veins. Indeed, sprinkling is the most common use of water in the Old Testament as a sign of purification. It most fitly symbolizes the cleansing by the blood of Christ and the baptism, or shedding down, of the Holy Spirit in its sanctifying power.

Besides, facts prove that sprinkling or affusion, as a sign of professing our adhesion to Christ, impresses the heart and conscience of the Christian Pedobaptist as profoundly as immersion does the Christian Baptist. The former feels as decidedly that he is no longer his own, but is entirely and forever the Lord's. No quantity of water would at all increase the solemnity of the consecratory act, or intensify his sense of obligation to purity of life.

Sprinkling, likewise, equally with immersion, publishes one's devotion to his Lord. Impenitent men believe as decidedly that Pedobaptists by their sprinkling have made a profession of religion as that the Baptists have by their immersion. They may think the Baptist more of a Christian, but they never suspect him to be more of a professor. The forms of baptism as a symbol of professing Christianity may therefore be reckoned among the non-essentials, and fall within the circle of the apostle's principle of sacramental toleration.

9. It is not invalidated on the ground that as Paul acted on the principle of expediency with reference to Jewish rites, so those believing immersion and disbelieving infant baptism may, on the same principle, reject from their communion tables those acknowledged Christians who differ from them on the baptismal question. But Paul's acting on the ground of expediency with reference to effete rites, being uniformly guided in his practice relative to them by its effects on the doctrines of grace or vital godliness, does not prove that we

may abrogate or alter an essentiality of either of the positive institutions of the gospel on the same principle. Our Baptist friends deny most earnestly that Paul's doctrine of expediency has the remotest bearing on the law of baptism. For the same reason it can have no bearing on the law of sacramental communion. This law is just as explicitly taught in the New Testament as is the law of baptism. If the uniform precedent of the apostles teaches that baptism is invariably to precede the Lord's supper, their uniform precedent teaches just as incontrovertibly that all true Christians making a creditable profession of piety are to be admitted to the privileges of the Lord's supper; and that none are to be excluded but for unchristian deportment. Not an instance of deviation from this law of sacramental fellowship can be named in the New Testament. But if Paul's principle of expediency touching Jewish rites did not affect the revealed law of baptism, how can it affect the revealed law of the eucharist? If it gave no authority to suspend or modify the former, it gives no authority to suspend or modify the latter. Paul's principle of expediency, therefore, is just as good a weapon for us as for our opponents on their own ground. But while we allow it affects neither the essentiality of the baptismal law nor that of the eucharistic law, it may affect the importance of the modes of both; these being their mere outward forms, not touching their vitality. This is all that we contend that the free principles of the apostles prove. It is for our opponents to demonstrate that they do not teach this much.

10. It may be said infant baptism is so injurious in its tendencies, is so clearly a "Part and Pillar of Popery," has so plainly worked the extinction of vital piety in many of the Protestant churches of Europe, is now so undeniably exhausting the life of the English church, and once so nearly quenched the light of the Puritan churches of New England, that we cannot, even remotely, sanction it; and we believe Paul's principles of expediency justify us in excluding from our sacramental boards all true Christians who practise the hurtful rite.

Our reply to this objection is,

a. It is freely admitted that infant baptism may be so perverted in its idea and practice as to become the inlet of immense evils to the churches. The same may also be said of perverted or inadequate apprehensions of any gospel institution. But the fact that wrong views of a gospel institution work injurious effects, is no proof that correct views of them, left to their natural developments, tend to evil. Because in connection with mistaken notions concerning the eucharist and the relation of the church to the state, infant baptism became the occasion by which Stoddardism came upon the New England churches, palsying their spiritual life, it is not safe to conclude that true scriptural ideas of the rite, working in harmony with just apprehensions of the sacramental supper and of the relations of the church to the state, necessarily and legitimately produce unhappy results. Indeed we regard such demonstration in the present instance impossible. There is certainly no proof of this evil tendency in the present Puritan churches of New England, nor has there been since the baleful influences of Stoddardism passed away. But till infant baptism, by is own inherent tendency, is demonstrated to be an element of death in the churches practising it, Paul's principle of expediency cannot be claimed as furnishing ground for precluding them from the table of the Lord.

b. We are slow to believe that the scriptural idea of infant baptism ever "hatched Popery," ever "broke down the original liberties of Christ's church, or paralyzed their vital functions." We believe that on a thorough analysis of the causes of ritualistic error in a gospel church, it will be found invariably to have been preceded by some doctrinal error, some dimness of vision respecting the true spirituality of the gospel system. We demur therefore to the conclusion of our Baptist brethren that "one error" is the mortal poison which has struck with death the Protestant churches of Europe.

c. We believe those errors alleged to have arisen from

infant baptism may have been quite as much occasioned by wrong views of the institutions and functions of the church, of the ministerial office, and of the Lord's supper, as by infant baptism. The individual and relative influence of each ought to be carefully weighed and accurately estimated before all the mischief is charged on the last. When some thoroughly historic mind, acute and comprehensive, capable of grasping and analyzing the complicated web of causes which have worked these terrible results, shall arise to the task, and demonstrate that infant baptism contains within itself, aside from all concurring causes, the destructive element, it will be soon enough to lay the blame of the fearful darkness which is now enshrouding the Protetstant churches of Europe at the door of infant baptism. Till this is done, we are confident that the wisdom of Christian charity does not justify, on this ground, the preclusion of living Pedobáptist churches from the holy supper.

d. The accusation, that Pedobaptists agree with Romanists in relying on traditions or ecclesiastical history as their only or sufficient proof for infant baptism, and thus, in this respect sanction an anti-Protestant principle, we deny. We rely on the scriptures of the Old and New Testament combined for proof of the rite, and on tradition or ecclesiastical history only as corroborative testimony. Is this wrong ? Do not our Baptist brethren resort to ecclesiastical history for proof that infant baptism was not practised by the apostles? Do they not rely entirely on profane writers for the meaning of *βαπτίζω*, and thus for their doctrine of immersion ? (John viii. 7.)

e. The conclusion that infant baptism has an inherent tendency to palsy the churches is erected on a partial and therefore inadequate induction. Innumerable facts may be adduced showing that God has owned the institution in furthering his holy kingdom.[1] Thousands who have been brought up on the covenant can testify to the power of parental instruction based on covenant obligations and privileges.

f. There are unanswered arguments, and which we regard

[1] Practical Uses of Infant Baptism. Boston: Massachusetts S. S. Society.

as unanswerable, proving that infant baptism is a rich legacy to the gospel churches. See John Calvin, Vol. ii. p. 437; Christian Knapp, Vol. ii. p. 534; Witsius, Vol. iii. p. 413; John Dick, Vol. ii. p. 379; Woods, Vol. iii. p. 431, etc; Pond, p. 675; Wardlaw, etc.

g. On the ground that infant baptism is practised on the sharp distinction between being in the church and being in covenant, or on the idea that baptized children are not strictly members of the church, but children of the church, or children of the covenant — a position practically held in New England, and which is becoming more and more the theoretical opinion of theologians, — it cannot be proved that the rite has the least tendency to corrupt the church by introducing into it an unregenerate or worldly element.

h. But admitting that infant baptism is inherently evil, and necessarily tends to eliminate from a church all its life and spiritual efficiency so long as these pernicious influences are kept in abeyance, and the church is earnestly doing the work of Christ, and is furnishing some of the rarest specimens of experimental piety and heroic labor for the spiritual renovation of mankind, it is plainly contrary to the apostolic principle of ritual freedom to exclude its members from sacramental fellowship. Actual life is Paul's ground of sacramental communion. If this is manifested in conduct, "receive him as one with whom Christ communes" is his direction. See Bib. Sac. No 95, p. 483; also Rom. xiv., xv.; 1 Cor. x. 14–33; Phil. iii. 15, 16.

11. It may be objected, while we admit the distinction between inviting to the Lord's supper and receiving to our denominational churches, we do not see how, if we welcome members of all truly spiritual churches to our sacramental boards as occasional communicants on the ground of apostolic toleration, why we shall not be sometimes compelled, if consistent in carrying out the principle, to receive to our churches those who differ from us, and thus expose ourselves to all the evils of mixed communion.

a. The distinction is clearly practicable. It is observed

by Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Methodists, Free-will Baptists, Dutch Reformed, and other evangelical churches. They spread sacramental tables free to each other, and no perceptible evils result. The lines of division between them are not thereby shaded into each other. It occasions no compromise of doctrines or of ritual practices. Each maintains in full its own distinctive sentiments. They experience none of the evils which are alleged to grow out of mixed communion. We believe, therefore, there is just ground of free communion lying between the dogmas "Terms of salvation, terms of sacramental fellowship," and "Communion only with members of Baptist churches"—a ground on which the evils of mixed communion may be entirely avoided. It is the plan we defend in these sheets, the free interchange of all evangelical denominations in sacramental fellowship.

b. The reality of that Christian fellowship between all believers in Christ which ought to exist, which our Baptist brethren so well and so earnestly advocate, which Professor Curtis says should be one of our "strongest and most powerful feelings," "rendering us willing, if need be, to lay down our lives for the brethren"—a delightful fellowship, linking them together in heavenly communion, when fully experienced, would effectually prepare the way for this sacramental fellowship between evangelical churches. While it might allow denominational distinctions, it would destroy all sectarian spirit, all disposition to proselyte or to gain undue advantage over other branches of Christ's family; and, as a natural consequence, the seeming difficulties in the way of such fellowship would vanish.

The following method, among others, of securing this reciprocal sacramental followship between evangelical churches without the alleged evils of mixed communion, is suggested:

1. Let each church or denomination have a clearly defined creed.

2. Let its ministry be thoroughly educated in the principles which the denomination conscientiously believes; and let every pastor be required to preach boldly and with Christian

love his own views and the views of the church of which he is the accepted teacher.

3. When a candidate presents himself for examination and admission let him be kindly and frankly told the leading doctrines and principles of the church. If he dissents, let him, if disposed, be put under the instruction of the pastor; let him be urged to re-examine his belief prayerfully and earnestly; let him be frequently conversed with, as a brother beloved; and let the church wait. If, after delaying and giving him suitable time to reconsider his views, he still persist in his previously expressed opinions, let him be affectionately advised to join another church with which his sentiments are more accordant. If he now prefer to join the denominational church of his first choice, and if he give the brethren adequate evidence of piety, notwithstanding his supposed errors or misapprehensions and his persistency in them, receive him as an exceptional case, and let the church be so informed when he enters into covenant with them. But let it be understood that the doctrines and ritual practices of the church will be distinctly inculcated, and that no truth will be withheld on his account. Let it be also understood that he is not received for "doubtful disputation," but as an act of Christian love; and consequently he will not be expected publicly to complain of exhibitions of truth from which he may dissent, or advance his own views wherein he differs from the church in a way to create division or trouble. Let this or a similar course be pursued with Christian fidelity and charity, and we have no apprehension of those destructive evils so vividly portrayed by our Baptist friends as flowing from free, because it must terminate in mixed, communion.

We only suggest this plan. Others may be deemed preferable. However this may be, we are confident that the Christian fellowship advocated by our Baptist brethren realized in the churches, can and will devise some method by which evangelical Christians creditably professing union to Christ shall, at least occasionally, enjoy together the supper

commemorative of their common salvation. For, as we have shown in a previous argument, Christian fellowship inevitably leads to sacramental fellowship, or logically culminates in it. See Bib. Sac. No 95, pp. 496, 498.

Section III.

The orthodox Pedobaptist churches are true churches, and are therefore to be fellowshipped as such.

We are now prepared to discuss this part of our subject according to the principles of apostolic toleration, and indifference to the mere forms and modes of rites. It concerns us to prove the genuineness of evangelical Pedobaptist churches so far only as to meet the claims of strict communionists. They hold orthodox Pedobaptist churches to be defective only so far as their doctrine of baptism is defective:

1. We argue that Christ accepts orthodox Pedobaptist churches as true churches because he accepts their baptism as valid. Of this the previous discussion is ample proof. It will not be disputed that, if the only objectionable irregularity of a church subsists in the defects of her initiatory rite, and if Christ accepts that rite notwithstanding defects, then he accepts the church. Consequently, if Christ accepts the baptism of the orthodox Pedobaptist churches as answering its scriptural intent, he accepts the church as scriptural. The acceptance of the one binds to the acceptance of the other. This is conclusive within the limits of the present controversy. But the genuineness of Pedobaptist churches stands on independent evidence, a part of which we will briefly consider.

2. We argue their genuineness from the design of the organized church to be "the ground and pillar of the truth" (1 Tim. iii. 15). The implied thought is, that divine truth, in this world hostile to its holy Author, needs the support of associations of holy men — visible churches. That Christian association, therefore, in covenant with God and each other, which is built upon the essential truths of the gospel; which is animated by them, and, by the experimental knowledge of

them, becomes their living manifestation in holy zeal and devout worship, is a well authenticated church of Christ. Judged by this criterion the orthodox Pedobaptist churches furnish most decided proof of being churches of Christ. *a.* By their baptism of the Holy Ghost, causing pure revivals, and thus demonstrating that God is dwelling in them, working out by them and through them his redemptive scheme,—that unmistakable mark of a true church (Acts ii.). *b.* By raising up within them a host of powerful champions to defend his truth and to extend a knowledge of his salvation; and with whom Christ has dwelt during the successive Christian ages, imparting energy and success. *c.* By their doing the specific work which Christ appointed his churches to accomplish. See Bib Sac. No. 95, p. 523.

3. Prophecies of the Old Testament relative to the gospel church under the name of "Zion," "Jerusalem," "Israel," or "Jacob," fulfilled in the Pedobaptist churches confirm their claim to the consideration of true churches. *a.* It was foretold that the Spirit should be poured out upon Zion or Jacob in gospel times (Isa. xliv. 3–5; Ps. lxxxvii. 5). *b.* That the Lord would be mighty in the midst of Zion, and rejoice over her with singing (Zeph. iii. 17); would make her his habitation and his rest (Ps. cxxxii. 13–15). *c.* Would give efficacy to her priests (vs. 16). *d.* Would write his law on the hearts of her members (Jer. xxxi. 31–33). *e.* Would pour upon her a spirit of grace and supplication (Zech. xii. 10). That these and similar prophecies relate ultimately to the gospel church will be admitted; and we have the most unequivocal testimony that they have been fulfilled effectively in the evangelical Pedobaptist churches, placing upon them the seal of God's recognition.

4. The Pedobaptist churches possess the essential elements of a Christian church — faith in atoning blood; the acceptance of Christ in all his offices; a oneness with him in interest and object of life; that fellowship with the Father and with his Son which John in his first epistle (i. 3) maintains as the determinative characteristic of the Christian church; and an

habitual desire to observe the ordinances as they conscientiously understand them.

5. In Christian zeal and devotion they therefore evince the same decisive marks of true churches as do the Baptist. Impartial witnesses will testify that they are as zealous in promoting pure revivals; in evangelizing the heathen; in sending the gospel to the destitute in our own country; in efforts to convert the Indian, the African, the sailor; in undermining Popery and infidelity; in a word, in promoting every benign influence bearing on the physical, spiritual, or immortal interests of man. They thus give as indisputable evidence that they are "the ground and pillar of the truth," are moulded and animated by it; that they are baptized by the Holy Ghost; that the Lord is mighty in them, rejoices over them, and makes them his habitation, and is clothing their priests with salvation.

Now, the orthodox Pedobaptist churches are true churches, or they are not. There is no middle ground. In fact, they are either churches, or they belong to the world (John xv. 18, 19). There is no other scriptural division of mankind. No nondescript bodies of Christians in covenant, hovering between churches and the world are once spoken of, or even hinted at, in the New Testament, on which Christ as Intercessor bestows the distinguishing blessings promised to Zion. The close communionists alone recognize such abnormal creations.

The strict communionists, by disowning Pedobaptists as churches, involve themselves in absurdities. 1. If Baptists are exclusively true churches the great part of believers for ages have not belonged to the church, but visibly to the world. 2. Christ called the church the light of the world. But if Pedobaptists are not true churches the principal light of the world has eradiated from other bodies than the church. The church has been represented "beautiful as Tirzah, comely as Jerusalem, and terrible as an army with banners"; that is, a spiritual power moving on to the conquest of the world. But if Pedobaptists are not churches the great spiritual

power subduing the nations to Christ has had its form and habitation outside of the church. 3. From Matt. xxviii. 19, 20 it appears that the preachers of righteousness, the great defenders and heralds of the gospel, were to belong to the church; they were to grow up within her, and, as the exponents of her spirit, were to become the promoters of her cause. But if orthodox Pedobaptist churches are not true churches, the greater part of those who, for centuries, have been most distinguished in extending the knowledge of Christ have belonged to the world, and grown up in the bosom of the world; many who have been the strongest pillars of the church have never belonged to the church. 4. If Pedobaptists are not true churches, then many of the most spiritual and devoted Christians, who lived near to Christ and longed for endeared communion with him, such as Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Baxter, Edwards, Payson, Harriet Newell, Lady Huntington, and Mrs. Graham, who fancied that they enjoyed sacramental fellowship with their Lord, have gone up to heaven and found that all their imagined sacramental communion was a delusion; and have there for the first time "drank of the fruit of the vine." 5. If evangelical Pedobaptist churches are not true churches, then those master spirits summoned to the great work of the Protestant Reformation, who suffered the "loss of all things" in resistance to the man of sin, even laid down their lives in defence of the church, were, with the exception of the Anabaptists, never members of the church. Even the heroic band of Pilgrims, of world-wide renown, was not a Christian church; nor was there a church at Plymouth, as millions have thought, for nearly two centuries after these noble exiles had there planted the tree of ecclesiastical liberty, from which the nation has plucked the fruit of life, and which will give vitality and strength to thousands of unformed churches in coming ages.

With this independent testimony to the genuineness of orthodox Pedobaptist churches, in addition to that drawn from the free principles of the apostles respecting forms and

ceremonies, and the evidence thence accruing that the Head of the church accepts the substance of gospel rites when the accidents are conscientiously omitted, it seems to us impossible for any impartial reasoner to deny to evangelical Pedobaptists the consideration of true churches. Certainly, to disprove their claim to such consideration is no easy task. It is not enough to prove them defective or irregular; it must be proved that Christian societies in covenant, possessing every constituent of a church — not excepting baptism, but excepting immersion — are not churches accepted by Christ. The ground must be taken and established, that the difference between sprinkling and immersion is the ultimate distinction between the church and the world; that the bare absence of immersion from the full circle of essential constituents is sufficient to prevent its enrolment among God's covenant people.

This point cannot be justly waived. Strict communionists may not assume that they "are not called to settle the question" whether the orthodox Pedobaptist churches are true churches or not. They are called upon to settle it. Both scripture and reason demand of them the decision. Robert Hall truthfully remarks: "The controversy hinges entirely on that point." The first step cannot be taken in the support of strict communion without denying — in face of the great underlying principles of the gospel as a scheme of associated religion; in face of every precept of Christian fellowship laid down for the guidance of individuals and churches; in face of the most indubitable testimony which God is giving the Pedobaptist churches of their acceptance — that they are true churches. Every argument for restricted communion stands ultimately on this denial.

Inferences.

1. If Pedobaptist churches are Christian churches they are entitled to all the privileges of Christian churches, and consequently to the Lord's supper, on two grounds admitted by our opponents. (1) They maintain that the Lord's supper

is exclusively a church privilege. Hence if Pedobaptist churches are Christian churches they have the right to the Lord's supper, which is the symbol of such relations. (2.) Our opponents in maintaining that baptism is an essential prerequisite to the Lord's supper admit that all baptized churches, not defective in other constituents of Christian churches, are entitled to the communion. If, then, Christ, in accepting the baptism of Pedobaptist churches accepts the churches themselves, it is demonstrable that they have a scriptural right to the Lord's table.

2. If Christ accepts Pedobaptist churches and their baptism as valid, he communes with them as true churches. For it is an absurdity to maintain that Christ accepts a Christian society as a true church, but refuses to commune with it as such. Admitting the genuineness of Pedobaptist churches is, therefore, admitting that Christ receives them into sacramental communion.

3. If Christ communes with Pedobaptist churches as visible churches, then his followers, who are ever to imitate his example, are obligated to commune with them as visible churches. Otherwise, they must defend the absurdity that Christ communes with societies of Christians as visible churches while he forbids his followers to commune with them as such; which would be a practical denial of the sacramental canon of Paul (Rom. xv. 7). There is no rational method of avoiding the conclusion that Christ's disciples should commune sacramentally with those churches with which the Master thus communes — a principle which Dr. Howell himself admits, when he says: "We commune with them [Pedobaptists] to the full extent of their communion with Christ."

4. If Christ communes with Pedobaptist churches as visible churches, and his disciples in imitation of him are required to welcome them to communion, the main position of our opponents in repelling the arguments of free communionists, that Christian communion is allowable with Christians as such, but that sacramental communion is allowable only with visible churches organized in such a manner as to be accept-

able to their Head, so far forth as it relates to accredited churches, must be given up. For if Christ has received evangelical Pedobaptists to sacramental communion his disciples are under obligation to receive them to the same, in agreement with the decision of a learned opponent, which he prints in italics: "*We hold with them* [Pedobaptists] *the same kind of communion which we suppose him* [Christ] *to do.*"

Objections.

I. It is objected that while a church has a right to invite to her communion-table churches of the same denomination, she has no right to invite churches of other denominations. The principle implied in this objection is, that denominational lines are fixed and immutable barriers which may never be passed for purposes of sacramental fellowship. Can this position be proved?

a. As the sacred writers have nowhere stated the amount of discrepancy in scriptural views which may properly constitute a denominational line, denominational lines are drawn entirely by men. The apostles formed churches and described their character. But they never formed denominations or sects, nor defined their limits. These are entirely the works of men. Hence men, not Christ, determine what churches any individual church may invite to her sacramental board, and what churches she may not invite. Besides, men differ very materially as to what may justify a society of Christians in becoming a denomination. Even in drawing a map of the present religious world they would differ widely as to the proper limits of existing denominations. Are the several sections into which the Presbyterians are divided denominations? Is each section of Christ's family designated Baptist a denomination? Or do all which are described by that appellation compose one denomination, whose churches may properly pass, on invitation, from one to another to enjoy reciprocally the supper of their Lord? Who shall decide? The principle must involve endless controversy. See Bib. Sac. No. 95, p. 519.

b. It treats all denominations, evangelical and unevan-

gelical, outside of one's own, alike. It overlooks Christian character, or only so far as it lies on the right side of the denominational line; and consequently disregards the feelings of Christ towards the excluded; for he accepts a portion of them as a part of his visible body, and communes with them as such. But on the supposition, Christ forbids his true churches to commune with them sacramentally; virtually saying: "While the duty is explicit, 'Imitate my example,' here is an exception; you may never imitate me in sacramentally fellowshipping any church lying beyond the limits of your own denomination. It would violate an essential law regulating the administration of my supper."

c. The position involved in the objection defeats the very end for which the theory of which it is a modification was started. Professor Curtis states this end to be "to establish a principle," "instead of attempting to defend a rule." The principle is, "that the Lord's supper is a symbol of church relations between those who unite in its celebration." But the essential idea of the objection reduces this principle of close communion to a mere rule — the denominational line.

d. The principle destroys the authorized distinction between sect and denomination. If a class of Christians, for any reasons, whether affecting Christian vitality or not, decide that it is expedient to form a church distinct from all other churches, and thus become a denomination, they are compelled to become a sect, to cut themselves off from all other professing Christians at the most vital point — the table of the Lord.

e. The position wants scriptural proof. Our opponents will not pretend to any verbal declaration teaching it; and where is the principle implying it? It certainly is not in the apostolic view of ritual freedom. How incongruous would it seem, if along side one of Paul's arguments for fraternal forbearance in respect to forms and ceremonies, or one of his sublime expositions of the doctrine of the unity of believers and earnest persuasions to act accordingly, we should find the record: "When any Christians, for whatever reason,

become a denomination — as I foresee all professing Christians will be divided into denominations in the nineteenth century — no denomination may partake of the Lord's supper with another denomination. The difference between some may be very slight, not at all implicating character, or retarding Christian growth or Christian efficiency; yet it is so great that Christ forbids any passing from one to the other for the purpose of communing together in the elements of his dying love." Is such a law of communion "from heaven, or of men?"

2. It is objected that the churches are independent bodies, and, as such, every church has a right to determine its own principles and rules of communion (Arnold, p. 62; Curtis, p. 173). We admit the fact, but deny the inference.

a. The independency of the churches gives no right to violate the primary law of their being, which is the combination of believers for mutual edification and progressive force; that by mutual interest and co-operation they may be drawn closer together, and present a more solid front to the powers of sin.

b. The gospel has not guaranteed to the churches, as independent bodies, the right to adopt different principles of sacramental communion. These are essentially the same, and unalterable for all. The scriptures certainly have not given this right by any explicit declaration. It is equally certain that it is not deducible from the grand principles of the gospel. Is it found in Christ's last prayer with his disciples, or in his last address connected with that prayer; in his repeated commands of mutual forbearance and brotherly love; in the representations of the oneness of Christians and the identity of the church with his body? How and where is it taught that Christians have the right to divide off the kingdom of Christ into ecclesiastical provinces, each determining its own principles and rules of sacramental fellowship, with the privilege of excluding at pleasure any or all other churches who, in common with them, have publicly avouched the Lord Jehovah to be their God? We

know of no such right. The same great laws of reciprocal kindness which bind Christians together as individuals bind them as churches in a sisterhood of churches.

c. While the independency of the churches gives to each the right to examine the scriptures for themselves, and come to their own conclusions, it gives them no right to misinterpret the scriptures. No infidel has a right to reject them; no errorist has a right to deny a doctrine or precept which they teach. No more right has a church to misinterpret the scriptures. The strict communionist has no right to misconstrue the laws of Christ relative to communion.

d. Hence, while the independency of the churches guarantees to them the right to determine what constitutes a company of believers a true church, it does not guarantee the right to decide that church not to be a church which Christ accepts as such. Nor does it give the right to ignore or to undervalue the evidence of its acceptableness. We are as much required to judge righteous judgment relative to churches as to individuals. Nor does church independency accord the right to refuse fellowship with a church which Christ owns and fellowships. Our Baptist brethren cheerfully admit the duty to recognize an individual as a believer who gives evidence that Christ receives him as such; and equally the duty of extending to him Christian fellowship. But does not scriptural evidence that Christ communes with a church sacramentally as decidedly bind all other churches to commune with it sacramentally? While it is true therefore that the churches as independent bodies — not outsiders — have the right severally to decide who shall commune with them, it is not true that they have the right to reject from their communion those churches with whom, in the judgment of charity, Christ communes as such. It is the glory of orthodox independent churches, that they live because Christ liveth in them; that they are members of "Christ's body, of his flesh, and of his bones," and are therefore members one of another. "What God hath joined together, let" no church in its independency "put asunder."

3. It is objected: "We regard the Baptist churches alone as regular, or formed in accordance with the New Testament model, and we commune sacramentally only with regular churches" (Curtis, pp. 118, 144).

Reply. *a.* Where is it said in the New Testament that irregular churches, those deficient in some of their constituents, are not to be fellowshipped by those who regard themselves as regular? Where is it said that regular churches may commune with irregular churches, or not, at their option? To claim such a prerogative involves the claimants in the absurdity of having a higher regard for the order of the churches than Christ himself has. It is virtually saying: "We grant that Christ accepts them as true churches, but we have such a regard for his positive institutions as exactly fitted to promote the highest purity of the churches, that we cannot accept them as such." The alleged principle of action involving such an assumption is certainly equivocal. The only proper inquiry is not: Is a church a regular church? but, Has Christ accepted it as a true church? If he has, we must, and commune with it accordingly.

b. Who is to decide that a church is regularly formed? Every denomination or sect in Christendom will of course decide that its churches alone are in all respects regular. Consequently, the limits of communion on this plan are nearly, if not quite, identical with denominational limits, and therefore the same objections lie against the principle.

4. It is objected that the Lord's supper is the symbol of the church relations subsisting between those celebrating it, and can be appropriately celebrated only by those between whom this relation subsists. The unscripturalness of this theory was sufficiently shown in Part II. Sec. 1. We will only add, that viewed in connection with the free principles of the apostles, it appears still more unscriptural and absurd.

5. It is objected that membership in one church is not membership in all churches (Arnold, p. 61; Curtis, p. 88). This is based upon the last objection, combined with those

growing out of the independency of the churches. Their refutation is the refutation of this. We will add:

The objection in the form in which it is stated is freely admitted. The implication that the fact constitutes a barrier to the free interchange with other churches in sacramental fellowship we deny. The real question between us and restrictionists on this point is not: Are members in one church members in all? but, granting that the churches are separate, independent bodies, each regulating its own affairs under the laws of Christ, and interpreting those laws for themselves: Has one independent church of Christ the right to preclude the members of another acknowledged church of Christ from its communion table? On the contrary, does not the law of Christian unity require them to invite the members of other acknowledged churches to unite with them in celebrating the supper, memorial of their common Saviour? With Paul's teachings in view, we unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative. Oneness with Christ inevitably leads all true churches to embrace each other in one indissoluble sisterhood. Had a member of the church at Rome or Colosse or Ephesus visited Corinth, bringing accredited testimonials of membership, would the church there have been under no moral obligation to invite him to partake with them at the sacramental board? If, after residing with them for months, and giving the most indubitable evidence of Christian character, he had requested the privilege of communing with them in commemorating their common interest in the Saviour's blood, would they have had any right, based on their oneness in Christ and church independency, to refuse him?

Suppose we had found it recorded that the Philippian church had replied to certain applicants from the church in Thessalonica for sacramental communion with them: "We have adopted certain principles of fellowship which we deem scriptural, but which we understand you do not; we must therefore exclude you from the feast commemorative of Christ's redeeming love, of which he commanded all his followers to partake, and in which we acknowledge that you,

as members of Christ's body, have as deep an interest as ourselves. We can commune with you spiritually, but we cannot sacramentally. You have no occasion to complain of this. You know that membership in one church does not imply the right to commune in all. Besides, you have the same right to adopt certain restrictive principles of church fellowship that we have. We cheerfully accord to you the right to exclude us from your fellowship. It will 'not trouble us at all.' 'It is no concern of ours.' 'To your own Master you stand or fall.' We recognize you as Christians, but we must exclude you from that highest token of fellowship which our deepest Christian consciousness prompts us mutually to enjoy, for you are not qualified. Be comforted with the fact that we shall all commune together in the presence of the Lamb when we drink of the fruit of the vine in our Father's kingdom." Would not such a record seem exceedingly incongruous to the whole tenor of apostolic teaching and practice? Would it not be treating a theme as tender as the sorrows of Gethsemane too lightly?

6. It is objected that it is the special mission of the Baptist churches to preclude from their sacramental communion evangelical Pedobaptist churches as a "consistent and perpetual protest" against their errors (Arnold, pp. 94, 105).

a. That it is right for a church to lift up its voice against any scriptural error and protest against its reception is unquestionable. Nor will the right to form denominational churches for the sake of bearing testimony against errors, such even as are not essential to salvation or to the lustre of Christian character, be questioned. But whether when formed they have a right to exclude churches truly evangelical and earnest in the work of the gospel from the memorial supper of Christ's death, the central and centralizing ordinance of the Christian dispensation, as a protest against errors or misapprehensions held without diminution of piety or religious zeal, is decidedly questionable.

b. Is such a protest consistent with the admitted oneness of the Baptist and Pedobaptist churches in Christ, with the

fullest Christian communion which the former affirm they hold with the latter, a communion which is to grow stronger and purer till consummated in glory? Do the broadest views, the most intelligent exercise of Christian expediency demand the exclusion of Pedobaptists from the holiest symbol of that oneness as a protest against their mere misapprehensions, while their excluders heartily acknowledge that Christ communes with them sacramentally as well as spiritually?

c. Has the protest, in the connection in which it is made, sufficient potency or importance to warrant a schism in the visible body of Christ? The connection is this: They acknowledge many Pedobaptists to be pre-eminent Christians, and as pre-eminently receiving the benediction of heaven; they cordially exchange pulpits with them, enjoy with them the social prayer-meeting, engage with them in efforts to promote revivals, in tract distribution, in work to overthrow Catholicism, to put an end to intemperance, Sabbath violation, gambling, war, oppression; indeed, in every enterprise to advance humanity and Christian civilization. They go with them hand in hand till they reach the sacramental board, then exclude them from it as a protest against their errors as so offensive to Christ that they may not overlook them, even though he himself may overlook them. What is such a protest worth? Beside the free principles of the apostles, seems it not trivial, even absurd?

ARTICLE II.

THE NATURAL THEOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.

BY REV. JOHN BASCOM, PROFESSOR IN WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

No. III.

VALUE AND NATURAL AGENTS.

In proportion as order becomes complete, and the forces through which it is secured fundamental, the mass of men cease to be greatly impressed by it. There is required too much reflection and breadth of vision for its easy, instant apprehension, and thus an ingenious conjunction of very limited things close at hand more impresses them than laws undergirding the universe, and reaching, like cables of steel, back through the entire precincts of time. While the effects of God's greatest works are thus in a measure lost to the common mind, they are often in a still higher degree wasted on the scientific intellect. Principles of order, so pervasive, so permanent, so inflexible, lose their personal character, become a nature of things, and wholly separate the mind of man from God, or interpose between us and him immeasurable stretches of secondary causes, hopelessly cutting us off from his providence, and leaving us afloat on an ocean of forces, so broad as to put its nearest shore beyond our faith and hope. Secondary causes thus come to assume a form so necessary, so independent, so imperturbable, as to make an inquiry into them the sole office of thought, and their contemplation the entire range of the spiritual eye. Such a feeling of the remote, intangible, impossible character of the spiritual and the divine may consolidate itself into a system, become a dogma of the intellect, settle down around the soul like a cold and cloudy sky, cutting it off forever from the light and warmth of the Divine presence, and those reaches of infinite power in which the universe itself is held.

We need, therefore, constantly to be on our guard against

those personified abstractions which the mind is ever setting up in such words and phrases as "nature," "law," "the forces of nature," "the nature of things." These are the giants of the mist which the mythological imagination of science — in its way as superstitious as any poetic fancy that has gone before it — conjures up, and with them hides from itself the only Self-sufficient One. Men give an efficiency, eternity, and wisdom to matter which they deny to mind, to the creature, which they withhold from the Creator.

So little are we possessed of creative power, so inseparable is the association in our minds between what is, what we everywhere find, and what must be, that we overlook the wisdom of the divine plan in its supposed necessity, and come to think order indigenous because it is so pervasive and perfect. Not, therefore, till our weak wits can contrive some other possible way in which the world might be made, or its events arranged, are we willing, by the contrast of schemes, to give to God the glory of his work. In the natural world ofttimes, therefore, the perfection of the scheme and its execution dazes and blinds the eye, and we believe nothing possible but the exact thing which God has done, and conclude, with strange dullness and perversity of thought, that to such a creation there was no alternative, and hence no merit either of wisdom or of grace.

In treating of the conditions and laws of the moral world something of this impression will be lost. These might more obviously have been varied, and there is present so much manifest imperfection that thought is required even to justify to us all the ways of God. This state of things may at least induce in us a greater willingness to attribute God's work to himself, and thus prepare us to honor him in the wisdom we find in it. The judgment of God upon Adam, which is but a statement of the facts of the world, assumes the form, not of a state of things inherently necessary, but of a specific provision in reference to a special end. When, therefore, we find that out of this peculiar adjustment of things, those conditions of the moral problem expressed in the words,

"Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground," — there spring up laws which rule man, check him in descent, and impel him in ascent; which hold him firmly in a state of probation, and reserve him for the moral influences that God, from time to time, employs; which constantly accumulate powerful impulses, fresh motives, treasured in history, gathered into the organic structure of the race, consolidated in its works and acquisitions, for new stages of progress more hopeful than those which have gone before; when in addition we find that these inferior forces and laws, working as they may, can only give the conditions of good, and not the actual good itself; can only begin and can never complete the work, aiding without guiding it, and quickly driven from every vantage ground till fortified there by a moral force, till built and established there by the kingdom of grace, we see, at once, the disciplinary plan under which we are trained, impelled, perplexed, baffled by forces futile in themselves, waiting to work up into, and be completed by, that holier and more perfect law which Christ reveals, when, the insufficiency, vagaries, and dangers of every other method being experimentally exposed, man, in the fulness of time, is prepared for it.

To these secondary and provisional laws we now turn.

The economic interests and actions of men concern values. By an easy figure value is transferred to those things which possess it, this being in economic science the only quality we have occasion to consider in them. We thus speak of values, though value has no substantial, independent, or even permanent existence, but is a more or less transient quality of many things. Value is purchasing power, and implies, therefore, at least two things possessed by different individuals, and ready to be exchanged for each other at certain rates. The things thus waiting barter may be either services or products, present labor or the results of previous

labor and appropriation. That in the individuals which gives rise to barter, are desires and difficulty in obtaining the objects necessary for their gratification. This difficulty is due both to the nature of man and of the world in which he is placed. He extorts his bread from a soil that is cursed, and does it by the sweat of his brow. These difficulties constitute at least the enhanced, bitter, and pungent causes of labor, and the values which spring from it; and give to the traffic of the world that eager, grasping, acrimonious character which imparts to it the power of a great constitutional incentive, and enables it to awaken the indolence of men, and impose the laws of production on their actions. Without this deepening of motives, this more stringent excitation of desire, the forces impelling action would, in the state induced by sin, have been found insufficient to contend with the sluggish and wayward tendencies of man. Hence he is now compelled both to make and keep the garden.

The incentives, therefore, to create values, are strong desires inspired both by the necessities, enjoyments, and indulgences of life, and the serious obstacles to their attainment. Desire, like a flowing stream, can only accumulate its full force and make itself formidable as it meets some barrier, and is thereby deepened, broadened, set back upon itself. A right balance between these two elements, desire and difficulty, is very essential for the best development of national and individual character. The broad belts of the temperate zones, embracing most of the historical regions and races afford this. Effort is imposed and rewarded. Desire is made firm and powerful by industry; and values, great by the labor that is in them, and abundant and varied through the generosity of nature, stimulate the most intense activity. As we pass to warmer and more prolific regions, desire becomes passionate and irregular, feeling too little the presence and restraints of necessity. In the far north, on the other hand, we have great patience, but the reward is too slight to call forth or sustain enterprise.

Desire is the efficient cause of value, while difficulty of

attainment is the condition under which it must find play in order to the actual creation of value. The power lies in the water, but can only be developed as this is enclosed. Moving freely, its force remains latent; hemmed in by the stone reservoir and the iron tubing, its presence becomes sensible, and it sends up a jet whose height is proportioned to the constraint it has suffered. But as the column of water will not rise in the pipe beyond a certain point, so the desire cannot be forced to every exertion by an indefinite increase of difficulties. These may over-match it and thus deaden the feeling they were designed to call forth. We shall have the highest values in those things which elicit the most desire, and whose acquisition is attended with kindred difficulty. These two conditions of high value can only be met in a civilized community, that is, among men in whom the social, economic forces have long acted, inducing habits of thought, and phases of desire generally prevalent, and therefore proportionately strong. In savage life we shall have neither that depth of feeling, that consolidated passion, nor that patient effort which are requisite for condensed value. Not only cannot the products of fine art, but even furs, precious metals, and gems will not possess any such value for men in the forest as for the occupants of cities. Indeed, the larger and more commercial the community, the more, by crowded, intensified, and competitive life, it has developed the love of acquisition, and made the desires which feed on values strong, will certain rare products, like laces, shawls, and diamonds, bear a price that in other stages of society would be deemed fanciful and absurd. Thus in civilized nations, the people of the country criticise those of the cities, and, half in derision, half in envy, make a mock of their fineries.

In God's economy, a stronger stimulus is called for to restrain and impel masses of men — the congregated life of great marts — to act on the lower, to incite the higher, and it is furnished in this natural and necessary deepening of desire in view of multiplied elegances, and multiplied eyes whose

admiring gaze feeds the vanity of the possessor. The force becomes intense as we approach the centre of the vortex, and though the movement is more rapid, it is even more certainly than ever faithful to the orbit assigned it. In great cities where values are most fluctuating, and oftentimes seem most extravagant and factitious, they, nevertheless, obey most perfectly the natural forces at work, and rule most completely the swaying population in search of the last fiction of vanity and novelty of fashion. The madness of luxury is yet the frenzy of law.

It is these quickened, enlarged, and endlessly diversified forms which desire assumes in connection with production and commerce that supply an increasing momentum, carrying the community once started, rapidly on in the pursuit of wealth. In this stage of growth the movement is toward the perihelion, and is each moment accelerated. Tyre, once a commercial city, quickly becomes queen of the seas.

While desire is the efficient force, it is difficulty of attainment that marks the exact point at which this can find gratification, and therefore the amount of value in each case to be given. Difficulty of attainment is of two kinds. It may arise either from the labor to be undergone in securing the things sought for, or from their scarcity. The first is by far the most common occasion of value, including the necessities and most of the luxuries of life; the second chiefly governs those products sought for by cultivated taste and refined vanity. The labor to be undergone is the great obstacle to production, and the most immediate and constant measure therefore of value. At first sight this might seem to give a sufficient measure, a scale in which all the products of the market could be readily and rapidly weighed with each other; so much for so much. A little observation and reflection, however, show us that this is far from being true, and that rarely, and then by accident, are things exchanged according to the amount of labor they contain.

We cannot compare with precision, labor with labor, even of the same kinds. I give two men at work in my field or

at my forge the same price per day, and yet I am aware that the services of the one are much better worth the money than those of the other. Though time and circumstances shall weigh the men in juster scales, for the present they have an equality of advantage, and I cannot discriminate. Much more is the difficulty increased when the exertion varies in kind as well as in degree; when I compare a day's labor in one calling with the same period in another; labor of the body with labor of the mind. Here even the semblance of measurement seems lost. Comparison avails us little except between exertions of the same kind, and then only secures approximate justice.

But it may be thought that when we come to products, the amount of labor these contain is more susceptible of estimation. Yet even when comparing articles of the same kind, carpets with carpets, carriages with carriages, horses with horses, the faithfulness and skill of the work are so diverse, that the difficulty re-appears in a slightly different form. The value of no two products of any complexity can be determined with perfect precision, while the mass of estimates remain of the roughest character.

In addition to these causes which prevent comparison of labor is another quite as serious. Persons are in possession of very diverse advantages for the performance of any task. One has a natural power or an acquired skill for its perfect and easy accomplishment; another, a positive aversion and inability, making treble the amount of labor requisite for the same results. For certain forms of production, one has a favorable situation, near the sources of material, or close to the market, or with ample means of conveyance; while another is deficient in one or all of these. One is in possession of a powerful natural agent, — a fine waterfall, a fertile farm, a favorable climate, — and thus mingles with his labor the peculiar quality and efficiency of a force not his own. He evokes in his behalf not the genii of the brain, but of air, earth, and water.

This finds its most marked illustration in produce. To

the same market may be brought vegetables, grains, and grasses from the mellow interval, from the slope of the mountain — more exacting of labor, less liberal of reward — and from the barren summit, a stingy paymaster of the hard tillage bestowed on it. These products secured with such diverse amounts of toil, must bear essentially the same price; if any have the advantage it will more likely be those which have grown to full maturity and been well ripened in the valley. The rugged laborer of the hill-top will find that with a dull tool he has put to the more strength only to reach a result inferior to that of his neighbor. There is great diversity and variety of advantage given us of God, both in our own powers and the powers he places at our disposal, and this serves still further to prevent a comparison of labor, and introduces into its reward a new element not at all dependent on the intensity of exertion.

We may now have gone over to the other extreme, and come to regard difficulty of attainment as expressed by labor as no measure whatever of value. We should thus be not so near the truth as before. Each individual in estimating his own powers and opportunities, chooses that trade or calling in which his labor will, he thinks, be most productive, with the least unpleasant exertion to himself. If, therefore, the products of any one art come to demand a high price, there is an immediate and strong inducement for all in the least adapted to it to fit themselves for it. Thus by increased competition, this form of production is quickly cheapened. The equality, therefore, of products is not maintained by any estimate made in the market of the labor they respectively represent, but by the effect of the price they bear on those engaged, or about to engage, in the several kinds of employment. Any inequality between the exertion and the reward will, acting on the minds of those who are to undertake the one and enjoy the other, and who are, therefore, the only proper judges of labor, soon turn the stream of effort from pursuit to pursuit, checking it at this point and enlarging it at that, till results approximately equal and just are arrived at.

So far as there is no natural monopoly, like that of talent or of the best lands, this force left to itself, unchecked by trade laws, will nearly equalize the results of labor, and give to extra exertion and irksome toil a reward approximately correct. For the partial and fluctuating adjustment of values to the labor they respectively contain, we are to look to the commencement of the process and not to its close. Once in the market, the products are at the mercy of quite other forces. As the needle moves slowly in the region of the North Pole, rather than actually rests at it, so values, while feeling the constant effect of the labor they contain, seldom if ever actually express it. No sooner, however, do they seriously depart from this measure, than there is brought into action a strong force to restore them to it; though, like the needle deflected by the hand, they may at first pass to an opposite extreme, and at length rest at a point to the right or the left of the true one. Nevertheless, this is the most important and evenly influential of all the forces that govern values. Without it, all would be fluctuation and confusion; with it, fluctuation finds an orbit, and confusion a calculable limit.

The second form which difficulty of attainment assumes is that of scarcity. A good illustration of value as affected by this element, are ancient coins, manuscripts, curiosities, situations prized for their beauty, and, in fine arts, the works of masters. With the price which these bear, labor has very little or nothing to do. The difficulty of attainment is so great that the watermark of value is determined alone by the height to which desire can be driven. He whose desire exceeds that of any other person will, if able, purchase the curiosity, the painting, the choice locality, at a price just transcending that fixed by the desire of him who stands second in the rank of competitors. All, therefore, which serves to inflame feelings and make competition lively, will enhance the value of the product affected thereby. The emulation of an auction often secures a price which cooler judgment does not justify.

These two elements of value, desire and difficulty of attainment, are inseparably blended in prices, now the one and now the other being predominant. If the difficulty of attainment is one of labor merely, then this settles approximately the point in value at which gratification can be obtained. If, on the other hand, the difficulty of attainment is one of scarcity, desire may sweep to its full height, and fix a price at the point at which it stands at equilibrium with, or rather slightly transcends, the desires of others. To return for illustration to our figure, the water representing the desire will rise in the pipe to the first orifice, or opportunity of indulgence; or, this closed, to the second; or, all closed, to the height secured by its own pressure.

Though the number of products whose value depends chiefly on labor is much greater, and the classes to which they belong much more important than those affected chiefly by scarcity, the former are rarely sold for a price determined by labor, while the latter fluctuate constantly, and only under the demand occasioned by desire. If products were capable of immediate multiplication to meet any demand, then the labor they contained would very nearly and very generally define their value; but as considerable periods must usually intervene before the present supply of any article can be increased, while the desire for it is more or less urgent, every product is affected by the state of the market, the present relation of the supply to the demand, that is, by the scarcity-element of value. This we shall term, in contrast with the labor-element, the quantity-element, since the principle is precisely the same whether the price be affected by a quantity offered for sale greater or less than the demand.

Owing to this intervention of time between the beginning and completion of production, all values are affected by supply and demand. While a few of secondary consequence are solely determined by it, the mass of products exchange for each other under the influences of both elements, labor and quantity; the one affecting values by anticipation, the other through the present position of forces, the balance of

desires with their means of gratification. The two forces operate, as it were, at the two extremes of the process of production. At the commencement, we compare the labor to be undertaken with the values to be realized. At the conclusion of our work, and once in the inexorable market with our products, these are compared as to quantity with the desires of the purchasers, and we are compelled to accept the price finally fixed by this consideration. The anticipatory and substantial element is labor; the last and determinative one, stamping the bullion into coin, the product into price, is quantity.

Which of those two forces so acting shall have the chief influence at the actual sale will depend on the nature of the product. If this is of a permanent character, a subject of very general desire, and capable of being replaced in a brief period, the accidents of the market disappear, neither much enhancing or reducing its value. If it lacks any of these qualities, if it is liable, like fruit, to speedy decay; or, like a rare book, if it is sought eagerly by a few; or, like grain, if it cannot be replaced under several months, then the price will fluctuate violently according to the conditions of the sale, sinking to the worthlessness of a surfeit, or rising to a famine value. The quantity-element knows no law but that of appetite and passion, and when dominant, therefore, rules without mercy, pressing the price up or down as the vanities or wants of men may enable it, selling jewelry in pounds, and buying labor in pence, quenching some vagrant frenzy of the eye at a cost that would feed the hungry poor of half a city.

We may represent the action of the forces which determine the value of two products when exchanging for each other, or its price when either is exchanged for gold by a mechanical illustration. Suppose two springs of different material pulling against each other. At their point of attachment one to the other, let an index hand be placed ready to play in both directions along a scale graduated from the centre toward either end. Suppose these two springs to be very

unequally affected by a change of temperature, the one rapidly relaxed under heat like rubber, the other retaining its elasticity like steel. Let the index at a mean temperature rest at the middle or par point of the scale. From this position, under the variable and uncertain element of temperature, it would play in either direction to the left as the heat decreased, to the right as it advanced, passing over to the steel coil. The two springs tugging against each other express the forces of labor contained in the two commodities; in a mean or normal state, holding the index or price at par. The effect of temperature illustrates the action of the element of quantity, relaxing in different degrees the energies of labor which struggle to adjust the value, suffering one product to draw the price toward itself, thus passing above par, while the other correspondingly sinks below par.

Bearing in mind that value is thus wholly relative, its loss in one commodity indicating a corresponding gain in other commodities; and that the more remote, permanent element of value is that of labor, and the more immediate and fluctuating element, that of quantity, giving opportunity for the irregular play of desire, we have the facts of value sufficiently before us to see their moral relations, and the kind of government which they exercise over man.

It is in the first place plain, that it becomes the interest of every one to gratify with the products which he offers the strongest existing desire, since this will be ready to pay the largest price. Men will not thus work at cross purposes, but find their own interest in mutually and in the most discriminating manner, consulting the pleasure of others, as by this method only can they draw the index of advantage toward themselves. It is also evident that those who provide for the more permanent wants of men, best escape the fluctuations and risks of business, and find compensation for the slowness of gain in its certainty.

While, however, society thus works together harmoniously under commercial law, we mark also how far this order falls below that of love. The trader feels that he has no occasion

to inquire as to the absolute utility of that which he sells, but only as to the estimate which the buyer puts on it. If the commodity be intoxicating drink, he is only surer of larger profits, and commercial law has no adequate restraint or censure for the transaction. So too, the tradesmen, who by the ever-changing varieties of fabrics and styles, quicken the wheel of fashion into rapid revolution, play off their goods at advanced rates on the morbid vanity of their customers, making the fickleness and extravagance of others net them a neat profit. Thus while traffic seeks the immediate pleasure and repose of the parties who engage in it, it is pervaded by no moral strength, giving tone to character and force to manhood, but often quite the reverse. The more honest and heedful observance of the real wants and well-being of the purchaser which love enjoins is indeed found ultimately in highest harmony with trade; but the mere trader, as a trader, is slow to discern this, and does not feel it obligatory upon him to watch the expenditures of his neighbor, except as an aid in forming an estimate of his ability to pay for further purchases. The real concord of society is blindly approached from below, and only revealed and felt from above. Selfishness may indulge itself, and the social law is elastic and variable enough to quicken all parties thereby, and hold in reserve a rebuke for the evil-doer.

Again, this relation of values leads each to make the most of that which is peculiar to himself either in powers or circumstances. It watches over the development of the individual as carefully as over the peace of society. Competition is the great reducer of profits, — a disadvantage as to quantity one of the worst detriments that products can suffer. But in proportion as each individual gives play to his individuality, or husbands the opportunity of position or circumstance which nature may have bestowed on him, is he made most free from the severe tyranny of a market, crowded with a mob of common and indifferent things. One who has to sell his services or his products in a surfeited and closing

market, under the contemptuous phrase, "For what they'll fetch," is not in the way of wealth. Nothing is more abundant than simple, brute force; and he whose labor is chiefly of this character finds himself in competition with the lowest among men, with brutes, and even with the inanimate agents of the world. These last two classes were doubtless intended to furnish the simple, naked force of manufacture and husbandry, and he who sinks to this field of labor must accept that parsimony of provision which belongs to the mere animal. Like the horse, he must live that he may work. Let there begin to be the first efforts of separation, of individualism; let the laborer gain skill in any direction, become a gardener or horticulturist, and the price of his services rises. Let there be a further separation, as by peculiar power in the branch of mechanics he has accepted, and there is a further rise of value. Thus it becomes the immediate, urgent interest of each to excel, and that he may excel, to canvass carefully his own aptitudes and advantages. A fertile field in possession, a good trade in hand, a father's professional friends, may all take the place in part of peculiar, native talent. To keep aloof from the mob, and cultivate one's powers, becomes a cardinal consideration in enhancing values.

Thus also society by the necessity laid on each individual in securing his own gain, comes into possession of most manfold, diversified, and skilful powers. Each individual is a new organ of social life, adds to its aptitudes at a new point, and becomes a fresh avenue of strength and pleasure. A completely productive community is possessed of the most abundant resources and versatile faculties. The very impulse of gain makes the individual watch closely his own opportunities, and develop his peculiar powers, yet thereby best fits him to play a part in that organic whole of which he is but a single member. Yet now, no more than before, will these economic take the place of the moral forces. The shrewdness of the lawyer will bring its price, whether he sells justice or sustains it.

As a third result of the laws of value, we draw attention to the scope and variety of economic action, the wide range between certainty on the one side and fortuity on the other; between plodding diligence and bold, brilliant speculation. Mercantile exigencies strike from manhood now the dull red spark, and now bright flashes of light, flaming up like a conflagration, setting the sober world on its feet, running after a new meteor of success.

As a greater or less period intervenes between the commencement of the processes of production and their completion, action must be based in agriculture, and yet more in manufacture and commerce, on a future, an anticipated, condition of the market. The forces at present or prospectively at work to effect prices must be forecast, and immediate effort, both in its kind and degree, be made to conform to a demand yet future. The necessity for this anticipation of results, still remote, is very different in the several branches of production. In the larger part of them, simple industry and patience are sure of their reward, while in others a wider reach of thought, a bolder stroke of prophecy, will secure a signal reward.

It is also true that the greater risks fall almost uniformly to capital, and especially to capital in its heavier investments. Simple labor which can bear little, runs small hazards, wages returning at short intervals; while capital with greater strength enters the field of mechanical enterprise and commercial exploration, compensating the risk of heavy loss with the hope of rapid gain. While every one reaps the fruit of his wise or of his fortunate thoughts, none can escape the results of his mistakes or throw their burden on to others. The value of a commodity once in the market is not governed by the labor or the price it may have cost the unfortunate holder, but only by its immediate relations to labor and to demand. If a new invention has lessened the cost of its production, the holder must suffer its depreciated value; or if any want of skill on his part has added to its cost, he must bear the results of his error.

In the labor-element and the quantity-element, standing respectively at the extremes of the process of production, we find occasion for the introduction both of calculation and skill, and also of good fortune, chance, into the problem of wealth. Unexpected turns in events, unanticipated states of the market, are inevitable, greatly enhancing or reducing profits. Herein we have an exact counterpart of that discipline which meets us everywhere in life; events so ordered, that while industry and forethought have great and certain preponderance in the struggle for success, yet vicissitudes and fortuitous effects constantly intervene to modify the measure and form of results. A boldness, freshness, a fascination, and a breadth of discipline are thus given to life more provocative of enterprise than the perfect calculability of all results.

As the chances of commerce enter in connection with the changing conditions of the markets, there has arisen a speculative branch of trade which rests solely on purchase and sales made in anticipation of the rise and fall of products. The speculator converts exchange into a game at hazard, and bringing to it either more skill or more recklessness than belongs to others, prospers or fails with the rapidity of a gambler. This element of risk will, from time to time, in connection with an undue extension of credit, an expanded currency, or some startling discovery inflaming the fancy with the possibility of sudden wealth, so far gain the ascendancy over sober industry as to bewilder and intoxicate the public mind, and refuse arrest except by those sudden and wide-spread losses which are sure to follow. Enterprise which has not a sufficient basis of virtue in patience, industry, and honesty is certain, sooner or later, to run so largely into insecure and speculative transactions as to meet with overthrow, and be forced back to a more sober method. The sluggish are quickened, the rash are checked, and the varieties of character find each fitting incitements and restraints.

Without the balance-wheel of virtue, however, the movements of commerce, though active and disciplinary, are

violent, irregular, and unsafe, compensating partial successes with great discouragements and severe losses.

The prevalence of purely speculative purchases always indicates a feverish and excited state of production, either springing from some unsafe condition of the commercial instruments, currency and credit, or sure to induce it. The naked fact, however, of speculation — a purchase with the intent to sell in a future and better market — violates no law of trade, and when separated from all effort to influence prices, no law of morality. Indeed, a measure of such transfers tends to equalize gains by taking goods from a sluggish and introducing them again to an active market, thus stimulating the first, and quieting the second.

When speculation assumes the uncertainty and extravagance of gambling, inflaming the public mind, debauching the individual, and bringing dissatisfaction and contempt to ordinary industry, it is a fever possessing the whole economic body, to be cast off only by that thorough treatment which shall restore the health and tone of the constitution, which shall limit the facilities of purchase, deepen the sense of honesty, sober the desires, and increase the willingness to labor.

There arises here one of those striking illustrations which show the relations of commercial and religious law, and that the first, while laying the foundations of order, cannot supplant the second, but must be complemented by it. The presentation of it involves the fourth moral office of values, that in their transfer they define the limits between justice and benevolence. So far as the laws of simple traffic and commercial obligation are concerned, there can be no doubt that the trader has the right to avail himself fully of the condition of the market, provided always that its fluctuations have not arisen by design, by misrepresentation, and falsehood. The range of prices, the advantages of a sudden demand, are as much elements in the harvest of trade as the fertility of soil or favorable seasons in that of agriculture. We have no more right to complain of the one advantage

than of the other. Yet it is evident that this rule will sometimes lead to extravagant profits, and, what is of more moment, to great severity and hardship in the treatment of the poor and the unfortunate. A needle-woman may find the pittance the market price of wages allows her hardly sufficient to support life, and the bankrupt bringing the remnant of his fortunes to a forced sale, may see them unmercifully underrated, and scattered among bidders as hungry and heartless as the waves that break in pieces and devour the stranded vessel.

According to their several habits of life men feel, or fail to feel, this rigor of commercial law. The farmer, standing at the beginning of production, and estimating value chiefly by labor, will often experience some compunction at receiving an unusual price, and will not unfrequently say, you may have the grain for less, for it is all that it is worth, meaning thereby that his labor finds full compensation in the sum mentioned. The merchant, on the other hand, operating constantly in the market, where the element of labor is kept more out of sight, and the last efficient force in setting the price, and the one constantly under observation, is the demand, the quantity, readily and inevitably adopts the maxim, "A thing is worth all it will bring," and buys goods at half-price as composedly as at reasonable profits. Now while few would be disposed to call such purchases dishonest, most would nevertheless feel that there was somehow a nicer moral discrimination and more sensitiveness to the interest of others in the first than in the second transaction. Commercial law is, however, as well satisfied with the one as with the other, and has no censure to bestow on him who, with ingenuity and forethought reaps with steady and relentless sickle the gains of the market.

The laws of honest trade arise from nature, that is, from the natural circumstances and conditions under which man is placed, and define justice — the claims we have one against another — under these conditions, ordered by neither party, but common to them both, and ready to deal the same meas-

ure to one as to another, as skill or fortune shall shift the advantage. The most wretched human being has no claim, either under economic, civil, or moral law, as against the most affluent for a higher rate of wages than the market allows him. Here are the boundaries of justice, where obligation ends and benevolence begins. The market settles wages and prices; there is no other force to settle them. It is the exact office of this force to define constantly these rates of exchange. We might as well rebel against the thermometer, and say that it should range higher as long as the poor are unclothed, as to require prices to assume the work of benevolence, and bend to the necessity of the purchaser. As hard-handed a miser as ever lived can be strictly honest, bringing remorselessly down on the weak, ignorant, and degraded the last screw of extortion which the state of the market puts in his hand; and he shall still find an image for his cruelty in the biting cold of winter; an extenuation of his unscrupulous rigor in the greater forethought and providence which it begets; and a sentiment wherewith at least to disguise his action in an unqualified scorn of the whining, pusillanimous spirit of those who have not the courage and industry to face the conditions of a life under which God has placed them.

We should rest this claim of commercial justice, to buy as cheaply as an open, free market will allow, on the simple fact, it is a law of trade, a law of nature, a result inevitably developed by the forces at work, and thus ultimately a law of God, had not Ruskin recently attacked it, strangely blending religious and commercial obligation. Observe, then, the consequences of the claim, that products should always exchange for each other according to the labor they respectively contain. The opportunity and motive of careful adaptation in the kind of products and services offered to the wants and wishes of men would be removed, — the opportunity, since the fixedness of the price would disguise the state of the market; the motive, since the returns of labor are not made dependent exclusively on its character and

fitness. One demand more should be made to complete the false philanthropy of the first — that we should not only pay the price for the product indicated by the labor expended on it, but buy the article whether we wished it or not. Indeed, without adding this requisition, the first would mainly miscarry. If we were compelled to give more than the state of desire, that is, than the demand required for any given commodity, or to go without it, we should, in most cases, decline the purchase, thus leaving the market more than ever choked with the unsalable product. Not only would the silent, unthought-of adaptation of labor to the wishes of men, which is now secured by the fluctuation of prices, be arrested, but the vexations of scarcity and danger of famine would be left to steal upon us unawares. No increase of value would occur to check consumption and call forth supply, and not till we had struck full against the barrier of absolute want would there be any arrest of speed. The result would be, that, instead of trifling delays and partial suffering, we should experience an entire suspension of industry, or the devastation of famine and pestilence on occasions intrinsically slight. Price is the self-adjusting mechanism of society by which expenditure is adapted to the facts of production. We might as well, in the engine, close the safety-valve or detach the dampers, and then leave the machinery to itself, as to destroy the self-regulation of the market, and wait results. Let the full flow of opportunity steal unchecked over the desires, and these, burning with a steady heat, will, in times of scarcity, eat up the narrow supplies of production, and, filling all hearts with the blind cravings of appetite, like hissing steam hungering for air, blow into fragments the commercial fabric tampered with by ignorant philanthropy.

Yet everyone must feel that with this law of traffic alone human society would soon sink, under whatever forms of civilization it might abide, into a most savage and remorseless state; one of entire selfishness and heathenism, such as we find approximated, in the East, in the social life of China and Japan. Each takes to himself the opportunities which

society has given him without compunction, or endures the suffering it imposes without hope. Here, then, the religious law of love comes in to clothe this naked, hard granite with verdure, to implant in the heart of the producer and trader a new spring of action, and impart a new law of life. By as much as grace surpasses justice, love, self-love, and the generous affections, the morose passions, will this new law excel that of commerce, calling into full, diversified, grateful play, our higher sympathies and holier impulses. A crystalline force is something, but a living power is more, in building up the world. Interest lays foundations of society, but love alone can build thereon homes and temples.

In showing the government which the fact of values and their relation to each other exercise on society we have but one further point to present — the range of value, the things that fall under it, and the suggestion we meet everywhere of something higher, nobler, than commerce.

Value finds its most regular and calculable application in the field of manual industry, in the things which secure physical well-being, the necessities of life; and is most irregular and wayward in elegances and indulgences, the freaks of vanity or the extravagances of taste; while purely intellectual and moral qualities, though often enhancing the value of things and greatly adding to that of services, do not themselves come under the measurement of price, unless in these exceptional cases, abnormal to trade itself, in which slavery traffics in the souls of men.

The great department, then, of value is that of industry called forth by the curse of God on a sterile earth, everywhere interposing obstacles more or less formidable to the possession of her treasures, and occupation of her powers. Here, therefore, is universal and inevitable discipline for all men, conjointly and singly, vanquishing the difficulties before them, and with toil entering into the necessities and blessings of life. In proportion as a skilful hand and thoughtful mind are brought to this task is the reward increased. A stroke of invention casting the load of toil from the shoulders of

man and laying it on the untiring wheels of machinery, reaps an immediate reward. But as if God would have the higher work of the mind, more free and largely serviceable than that of the body, the returns of invention are liberally scattered through the community, and the fortunate inventor, in the very effort to realize his own advantage, by increased facility of production and the fall of prices, confers a greater and more permanent gain on others. The labor of the body can be coined, stroke by stroke; the drudgery of toil is laid upon us only at a price; but the mind, more spontaneous, cheerful, and beneficient in its action, is of necessity more generous, and only shares those gains which it liberally confers. Indeed, so little has nature protected the labor of the mind, that society has found its interest in devising further rewards, and by patents increasing the returns of the inventor. As this right to the products of thought is not provided for and enforced by nature, but rests exclusively on legislation, it is evident that the interests of society alone are to determine its conditions and duration, and that when sufficient returns have been realized to reward and stimulate invention, the public may then, as residuary legatee of the powers and gifts of nature, enter, without compunction, into the vast and increasing benefits of ingenuity and discovery. The utmost merit of invention and inquiry cannot forestall the gifts of nature or appropriate her powers. The discoverer is rather put at the mercy of his fellows in the division of the spoils, though he alone may have unlocked the chamber of secrets and of wealth. A Columbus cannot stand door-keeper to the continent he has opened, and often receives but too meagre a share of its gains.

In the value which attaches to luxuries it is a matter of small moment that fluctuations are extreme and prices exorbitant. Vanity is as pleased with extrinsic as intrinsic merit, and finds, therefore, as much pleasure in the rareness and cost of the article as in its excellence. As long as there are those who wish to make an exhibit of wealth in French laces, jewelry, and India shawls, it is a small matter that there

are crafty tradesmen willing to facilitate the folly by the largeness of the price. So long as vanity finds play in prices, the largest price serves the best purpose. These wandering values are the eccentricities, the meteors, of the system, which startle fools, but leave its stability unaffected. They are only portentous when they indicate to the commercial world, rushing through a whole belt of them, the wildness and delirium of speculation, the breaking up and explosion of some planet, some settled principle of order.

When we pass to the highest range of human products, we find these least subject to value. Virtue is not marketable, and truth is scarcely so. The one we can buy without money, the other we buy so cheaply that we may well buy and sell it not. The light and breath of our spiritual, like those of our physical, life are given us. The book that contains truth is made no dearer thereby; and, though incidentally we pay a nominal price for wisdom, it is for that whose intrinsic worth is above rubies. In this higher realm freedom proportionately prevails, and the doors of opportunity are not locked or unlocked with a golden key. We more and more leave behind us the hard labor and sordid estimates of the market as we enter into the wealth and freedom of the sons of God. We bear with us, indeed, the ideas and language of the lower field, but permeate them with a higher meaning. The treasures of the spiritual and heavenly world are incapable of transfer or of loss.

In these relations of value, we see the bending of motives to the sordid and selfish heart, the primal government which is introduced into a chaotic moral world, the probationary travel and discipline of the race; yet, amid all, the introduction of the elements of a better wealth, more personal to the possessor, more generous in its law of transfer, more certain in acquisition, more secure in holding, more blessed in expenditure, laid up in that kingdom of heaven which our Saviour assures us is found in the hearts of disciples.

A prominent and weighty point in natural theology has always been the adaptation of the world as a whole to man. Indeed, as this is the most comprehensive of adaptations, giving value and fitness to every other; as it consists not merely in details, but embraces the grand outstanding features of the entire plan, it is best of all fitted to impress the mind with the scope and thoroughness of God's providence, and the disciplinary and moral nature of the training to which man is subjected. That the world is given to man is as plain in fact as in revelation, is a conclusion confirmed as distinctly by the reason of man as by the word of God.

The language of the gift recognizes the result as following close upon the powers conferred. And God said: "Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat. And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I have given every green herb for meat; and it was so." Indeed, the gift of government is involved in the powers of governing the world, and the power is the ratifying seal of the gift.

The world has something for man in every part of his nature. It is a book as copious and complete as the necessities of the pupil require; and there is nothing in mind which does not find a counterpart in matter, food, stimulus, and nurture in the world about us. Here man's grossest want is supplied and his most subtile thought finds reflection; here the body feeds in the whole circuit of its senses and appetites, and the soul finds facts and imagery discoursing to it of its most evanescent and intangible feelings, opening a vista through visible things to invisible not otherwise approachable. We may live as within the four walls of a house, eating and sleeping, revolving in a daily circuit of comforts, as the earth on its axis; we may live as on the eyry of the universe, the mind feeding on the vast ranges of thought; or we may translate all this visible language and love of God

into the tokens of his immediate presence, and live and move and have our being in him. If the earth is surprising in its physical adaptations, it is not less so in its intellectual, nor yet less so in its spiritual. Man comes slowly to his latest conquest, lives by food long before he can live by faith — by every word which proceedeth from the mouth of God; sees the wisdom of the world quicker than its love; is hemmed in and barred about by the immutability of law, before he can substitute for this figment of the brain the firm hand of God, and is made aware of the supersensible, as it ebbs like water beneath the sensible and floats it, or rises like air above it, and gives that which the soul can inhale and live.

But the adaptation to which we must now draw attention, is that of the earth to the economic and industrial wants of man. The gifts of God to production are natural agents. These are of two kinds — those which furnish material, and those which furnish power. Of the first class are lands, mines, and fisheries; fisheries, however, though of exceeding utility in themselves, are often incapable of appropiation, and, hence, value attaches to their products exclusively through the labor expended in securing them. The ocean, chafing at man's dominion, has always befriended the poor, takes to itself its sons, nourishes in them something of its own rough, wayward moods, and gives them bread. Lands and mines, on the other hand, capable of easy appropriation, have become powerful agents in the hands of individuals and nations; yet, usually, with such expenditure of labor and skill as to make them the rewards of enterprise, the premiums of industry and sagacity. In an economic point of view, among the chief adaptations of lands is found the diversity of their products. The forest growth is most varied, and through each variety subserves some fresh mechanical purpose. From rosewood, ebony, and walnut, to oak, linden, pine, and palmetto; from the richest ornament to the severest use: through all the qualities of fragrance, strength, hardness, lightness, softness, toughness, elasticity, inflexibility, durability; unchangeableness by heat, moisture, water, insects, oils, ranges the native

growth of the woods, meeting every new demand of art with a fiber that withstands the shock of mechanical force; or turns back the corrosive, penetrating tooth of fluids; or furnishes a perfect, inflexible surface for the polished instrument; or adorns our houses with a rich net-work of veining.

Nor is the variety of fruits, constantly increasing and capable of indefinite multiplication, less remarkable. The palm, apple, and banana, each in their several climates, furnishing the centres of cultivation, around which gather, from shrub and tree, produce of less diversified use, but constituting in its various seasons, in its larger and lesser forms, as melon, fruit, nut, or berry, a rich repast, as appetitive and inviting to every sense as can easily be conceived. The flush of the peach, the gold of the apple, cherry red, the fragrance of the plum, the luxuriance of the grape, the melting pear, the early richness of the strawberry, are witnesses near at hand of the untold wealth of fruits reserved in the various climates, soils, and undeveloped varieties of the globe. We find, also, the same completeness in garden vegetables. A changing, wholesome, and nourishing table can everywhere be spread largely from this resource. The skill of the horticulturist quickly develops so many and valuable varieties, that he is at a loss what part of his treasures to retain, and what to reject as breeding the waste of superfluity. When, however, we come to the staples of agriculture, we find a needed limitation of the prodigality of orchard and garden, less specific and more general adaptations, greater value in less bulk, and increased ease of preservation.

While each country and climate must rely chiefly on themselves for the luxuries of the table, for the transient returns of the fruit-yard, and the vegetables of the season, they may seek the produce of the fields, the staples of husbandry, in every quarter of the globe. Wheat, corn, oats, and rice, easy of transportation, with a wide range of climates and soil, constitute, and will more and more constitute, the bread of every meal in every civilized land. A loss of variety and specific adaptation thus becomes a great gain, enabling the several

quarters of the globe to feed each other, and cheaply and perfectly compensate the fluctuations of crops in different countries and seasons. The grain vessels of Egypt, the earliest instruments of commerce, will find successors to the end of time.

The adaptation of fruit to soil and climate — the more dry and durable to the colder, the more succulent and prolific to the warmer — seems so natural, so inevitable, as to lose the power of impressing us. The provision is not sufficiently mechanical, sufficiently an afterthought, to awaken attention and, to the dull mind of man, indicate a specific purpose. But the much wider range of the grains, the fewness of kinds, their durability and diversity of use, ought to impress us as by no means necessary, as giving peculiar fitness for the end they are intended to subserve.

The same is true in a yet higher degree of the products of mines. Not only are the metals, minerals, and amalgams, so numerous and possessed of such a variety of qualities, as to meet all the exegencies of the arts with a peculiar property, a reciprocal power — brass, copper, quicksilver, iron, lead, each falling into and filling its own place; but those which have the more general application, and are relatively the indispensable conditions of progress in the arts, are the most abundant and widely scattered, while those of less general utility and more peculiar office are less abundant and more local.

Nor can we fairly say that the fact establishes this, their relation to the arts; that the plentiful metals for this reason find a wide circle of uses, while the rarer product is correspondingly limited in its employment. No multiplication of gold could make it take the place of steel, or rareness of lead cause it to supply the want of platinum. We might lodge emery in every quarter of the globe in place of the many coal mines, and limit these to the few localities in which the first mineral is found, but we should not thereby change the offices of the two, nor capacitate either of them to play new parts in the arts corresponding in utility to those they now

discharge. Coal and iron and lime, the most useful of minerals, are the most widely scattered and abundant, while secondary services of great moment are adequately discharged by minerals of less frequent occurrence, and in some instances, as in the case of gold and silver and precious stones, all the better discharged, because of the rareness of the product.

It is not our purpose to dwell on these marvellous resources of the rocks, soils, waters, of the vegetable and animal life of the world; these adaptations belong to natural history. We have passed them in rapid survey as the produce of those natural agents that play so leading a part in production. They are capable of appropriation through an appropriation of the soil with which they stand connected, and furnish the entire material on which the mechanical industry of the world is employed. So far as their possession is reached without the ownership of the land, it is because that ownership is imperfect, a potential and partial rather than an actual and complete occupation. Thus wild fruits and game remain open to all as long as appropriation is incomplete, either through the extent of the territory owned, or the lax laws of custom fortifying possession. As civilization progresses, however, the bands of ownership are contracted and strengthened, till the mere crossing of land becomes a trespass.

The second class of natural agents is those that confer power. The chief of these are animals fitted for draught and carriage, wind, water-power, and steam. They are all, with the exception of wind, as used in commerce, connected with the ownership of the soil; steam slightly, water completely. Though we locate our engine where we please, it yet requires a location; and the best location often brings a high price. The availability, therefore, of this power is connected with the possession of the soil. The water privilege, on the other hand, is as strictly located, appertains as closely to the soil as the fertility of a farm. While the produce of agriculture, of mines, and quarries, give the

materials of production, the power-agents furnish the chief, and as civilization progresses will furnish almost the entire, strength for their manufacture. Indeed, civilization consists largely in shifting the laboring oar into the hands of natural agents, leaving the helm with man. Thus has it been in the department of labor whence the figure comes. The paddle was unshipped and sails spread to the winds. Men ceased to heap bank upon bank of oars, and stretched sail above sail, a mimic mountain of canvas. Later, this force, as often tedious, uncertain, or adverse, was replaced with steam, and men now hold a power which, with its dark trail in the air and white trail in the sea, bears them with alacrity and certainty to all quarters of the globe. Between the row-boat and ocean steamer lies one of those long reaches which the race has made in substituting for its own the strength of nature.

We have, then, a vast array of forces put at our disposal in connection with the soil; forces that give the material of industry, and the powers wherewith we shape it to our purpose; forces which, when owing their efficiency to our skill and industry, are yet the indispensable centres about which labor must gather. The ownership of the soil is the appropriation of its powers, is making ourselves possessors of the gratuities of nature, is the securing of an advantage which might otherwise accrue to a fellow. These gifts are unequally united to different soils and localities, and determine, by the preponderance of advantage they offer, the centres of population and emigration. Egypt became the granary of the world by the will of God, expressed in natural adaptations, rather than by the will of man. While, however, the most accessible and fertile soils and favored climates, affording the easiest hold to industry, reward man's first efforts, it cannot be doubted that later difficulties, though greater in themselves, are often relatively less, the powers to overcome them rapidly enlarging with the extension of culture. The land taken later under cultivation, though inferior in quality or oppressed with unusual obstacles to occupation, may, never-

theless, owing to improved methods of agriculture and the nearness of markets, afford a larger return of profits than soils intrinsically more favorable, and hence earlier occupied. The great discrepancies of advantage which the later stages of civilization reveal, as seen in city and village lots, in rich interval when contrasted with rugged uplands, slowly arise in connection with that expenditure of skill and industry which completely uncloses the usually frugal hand of nature, and makes the gains conferred on her favored children seem extravagant.

But, notwithstanding these two considerations equalizing the gifts of nature, — that the increase of skill may make poorer soils more valuable than she alone has made the best; that enterprise and commerce develop great values, and spread them broadly in unexpected places, — the appropriation of the soil, of the opportunities offered by its best fertility and localities, confers most important and permanent advantages on the occupants, and constitutes a monopoly of nature and pre-occupation of the world.

This being the relation of the soil, with its diversified forces, to production, it would seem that some rule resting on justice ought to regulate its possession. The earth is evidently the common capital of man, the undivided inheritance of equal heirs. A community of faculties and a similarity of position as regards the world, indicate our equality of rights, and make the productive resources of the globe the property of mankind, awaiting just, impartial division. Such a partition with proximate accuracy would seem possible, if a single generation were to enter alone upon their rights, and were disposed equitably to determine them, and to protect each other in their enjoyment. But even the partial justice capable of being reached under this arbitrary supposition would quickly disappear again. The rights of succeeding generations are not to be forestalled or cancelled by the actions of previous ones, and, therefore, at the close of some definite period, a new division and distribution would become necessary. Otherwise a portion of the race, by the improvidence

or misfortune of parents, would find themselves permanently deprived of their part of the earth, — heirs with nothing to inherit, men with no lodgement or lot in the gifts of Providence. But it is plain that a redivision in successive generations, would occasion far more injustice than it would remedy. Men do not march into the world in long, unbroken lines, once in thirty years, ready to inherit and occupy that whose occupation has been yielded, they steal in and out every moment, and require for theoretical justice, therefore, a constant recognition of rights, and a perpetual shifting of ownership. An accurate adjustment would begin at once to lose precision, and would hold the rights of many parties in abeyance for half a lifetime.

Still more, injustice would arise on the actual redivision. Labor so incorporates itself with the soil, so adds itself to it in buildings, trees, and permanent improvements, as shortly to occasion a large share of the value which attaches to natural agents. This inseparable part of the worth of land is private wealth, and can neither itself fall into the common stock for equal division, nor suffer the loss of that land on which it depends.

Some, like Herbert Spencer, seeking an actual and perfect equality of possessions in the earth, have thought that the ownership of land should rest in the state, and that it should be held in convenient lots for yearly rental to the highest bidder, the rent accruing to the community. Overlooking the complexity of this scheme, so great as to make it totally impracticable, we should find it impossible by any such method to reach the coveted good of general prosperity. The plan would result in a dismal equality of poverty, a common and complete loss of wealth. Property in constant transfer would gain none of those improvements so necessary to its development, get to itself few of those snug comforts and adornments which so largely impart value. Ownership, permanent and complete, is necessary to progress. No truth is settled by a broader and more undeniable experience. If this impossibility of constant transfer is plain in farm-lands,

where the nature and fertility of the soil constitute so large a portion of the value, how much more obvious is it in village and city lots, where the land is often but an insignificant fraction of the value. The greater part being due to the edifices built thereon.

Theoretical equality, therefore, is evidently impracticable, if all parties were disposed to seek it. So far from being contemplated in the formation of society, it is rendered forever impossible by a constitution of things incapable of modification, unpliant to the most cunning devices of equalization. The prosperity these are instituted to secure, soon evaporates under them, and division ceases with the disappearance of that which is to be divided.

A petty perfection of parts, a scrupulous tithing of mint and anise, an exact equalization of advantages, a rolling up in recipe-pellets, each for each, at such and such an hour, of the good and gifts of the world, does not enter into the plan of Providence. It is the dicipline of great movements, permanent principles, and fluctuating chances that God seeks; and out of these he develops for all most goodly opportunities. The world, neither moral nor physical, rests on minutiae. Its laws sweep outside of accidents, and bring order out of this or that form of confusion. The highest and lowest, the fortunate and unfortunate, change places, and it is the slow gravitation of time that settles events. Heaven's justice is not the ounce and dram measure of a police-court, but the noble, unequal, abounding liberality of parental love. Such is it in industry and in grace.

But because absolute justice is a chimera, it does not follow that that proximate justice which is attainable, which is allowed by the interests of society, and demanded by those of the individual, should not be carefully provided for. Indeed, we herein have the true criterion of justice, that which the interests of the individual require, limited by the kindred interests of others. Justice, attainable, practical justice, lies at the point of reconciliation; as for absolute justice there is no such thing. Justice is that adjustment

and balancing of claims which respects all in the highest possible degree, and so abridges all that they are mutually consistent. Justice does not secure to the individual an equality of opportunity, but simply leaves open to him the natural avenues to good, except so far as already closed by the kindred liberty of others. A diversity of opportunities is inseparable from a diversity of powers and positions, and to strive to remedy the inequality of gifts which God working through nature has bestowed, is chimerical, is mistaking good for evil. The freest possible play of native powers, that play which is consistent with a like play in others, and with the general well-being, is all that the individual can claim. If one faculty curbs another, one right limits another, and one gain restricts another, it is the duty of wise men to choose between them. It is not possible that the individual should secure the full advantage of personal labor, and society maintain an equal division and redistribution of land, or even of its proceeds. As the first, however, is the fundamental right, the immediate and constant incentive to production, it must suffer the least possible abridgment. That ownership of property must be maintained, which is consistent with the highest development of industry, since this, and this only, is for the ultimate interest both of society and the individual.

The general good must overrule individual good, since the last is included in the first. A member cannot set up a claim as against the whole body, as that which ruins this destroys that. If a liberty of which I am in the exercise does not conflict with a kindred liberty in others, yet this joint liberty, lying in the sphere of law, conflicts with a healthy social state, common restrictions are admissible and called for, as the remedy of a public evil. Society is so far organic that it may regulate and restrict action that does not interfere with equality of rights, but does interfere with social progress. Society may do what it can do for its own good, and the justification of the measure is its wisdom. Success is a sufficient defence of many acts, a sufficient guar-

antee of their fitness. Equality of rights is but a negative guide to legislation. The highest social well-being, skilfully harmonized with individual liberty, and springing out of it, is the goal of law. A civil polity that bows instead of bends private rights, therein destroys itself; but not less does one which leaves wayward action, recklessly confronting the public good, uncurbed. The common weal must give the form, and individual liberty the substance, of national prosperity; the two inseparably organized into a perfect social constitution.

While absolute equality of ownership in natural agents is a condition impossible to industry, equally is a disregard of the rights of each individual to acquire land incompatible with prosperity. Society may easily, justly, and wisely set limits to the possessions she will suffer in this direction to fall into the hands of the individual, and by her authority maintain them. Large estates when so extended or so retained in families as to destroy the fluency of landed property, and cut off a large share of the community from the possibility of its acquisition, become an injury to society, and rob it of that free and equal development which is possible and natural to it. It may, therefore, most rightfully refuse its protection to claims which are made against its own best interests, and disallow titles which pass the limits set by the general good.

Much more may society decline to transfer an ownership prejudicial to itself from generation to generation, thus transforming transient evil into permanent mischief, and instituting a class with superior hereditary rights. Complex entail and inheritance by primogeniture — creatures of civil law, the act of society itself — none, certainly, can justify in opposition to the interests of the many. These laws needlessly and injuriously close opportunities which nature has opened for the redistribution of natural agents. The hand relaxed by death has no ownership, no power, physical or moral, and the inheritance which society steps in to establish and secure ought obviously to be that which best facilitates

the acquisition and transfer of land, at least so far as the motives to industry are quickened thereby.

Indeed, death is God's silent, constant, universal agent of distribution, breaking up the compact estate, scattering by settlement and sale landed property, and enabling a new generation, as fast as the old gives way, imperceptibly, yet certainly, to enter on its rights, with a fresh adjustment of titles, and a new balance of opportunities. All, therefore, in law which makes natural agents of easy passage from hand to hand, responsive in the market to the highest price; all that breaks down the barriers which the pride of families or greed of classes is struggling to maintain, which refuses execution to a will establishing a permanent entail, lies in the direction of liberty, and, without serious abridgment of the rights of ownership, opens them to the largest number. Indeed, these are the precise interests to be at this point balanced, the largest enjoyment of ownership with the freest participation therein by the greatest number. A rental system would well-nigh ruin the first; primogeniture and kindred laws greatly limits the second. Freedom of sale with equal division among like heirs best reconciles the two, and secures that proximate equality which is all that God seems to design, or, in the ordinances of nature, to allow.

In the actual distribution of natural agents, justice, at the outset, found little place. The question was one almost purely of force. Each took what he was able to take, and held possession by the same title of strength. As between nations might has made right, so within nations force has laid the foundations of order, the principles of law and justice slowly emerging from institutions which, in the beginning, had very partial dependence on them. Indeed, not only have the few seized the patrimony of the many, they have often reduced the weaker to slavery, and made them bondsmen on their own lands. With one stroke of tyranny they have sequestered both the owner and his possessions, subjecting each to their pleasure. But society cannot exist with general, unrestrained violence. Supreme authority

must have support, and that it may have it, must impose some restraints on itself. Between a portion of the community at least, there must of necessity, in the protection of common interests and in the pursuit of kindred ends, spring up claims to be respected and duties to be enforced by the conjoint strength. A measure of right thus finds entrance between the upper classes, and therewith arise the pregnant and inexhaustible questions of the claims of the individual, and the conditions under which he shall yield support to the authority over him. Runnymede is a germ of liberty, though the lords that are bold against their king are equally defiant against their serfs and slaves.

A discussion of the principles of order and prosperity finding entrance, even in the limited circle of leaders, cannot suffer arrest. The mechanical and mercantile classes, developing skill, wealth, power, brought into close contact with each other, and placed in circumstances favorable for combination, soon in turn institute and maintain their claims, and in free cities lay the foundations of a broader liberty. The farming class, on the other hand, though usually the most deeply wronged, are the least able to assert their rights, and to obtain that personal freedom and equitable distribution of natural agents which belong to them. Yet the interests of production, the laws of economic action, steadily press on the public consideration questions of ownership, of the inheritance of land; and, if the agriculturist is the last to feel the movement toward liberty, he at length proposes the most radical inquiries. He not only claims his own powers, but a share of the common powers of nature. Large landed property, passing from father to son in the midst of a swarming, destitute population, so propounds and presses the question of the ultimate grounds of distribution of common gifts between man and man, that it cannot remain forever unanswered. Thus, not mere liberty is demanded, but the advantages of liberty as well, — freedom to enter on the inheritance that God has granted the race.

Thus we have a striking verification of the remark, "that

force and right govern the world"; force till right is ready. We start with force, because the principles of right are not so in men's minds, have not been so painfully and faithfully developed by experience, so fretted into them by lash and spur, as to be an efficient power of combination, resistance, action. When force, with its evils and partial order, has educated man to the right, then it, ready to reign, establishes and is able to maintain supreme authority. In this long transition from force to right, from the unrestrained action of the one to the ballanced action of all, the laws of production play a most important part, the love and pursuit of wealth urging men to that justice which best stimulates and rewards the exertions of all. At no point can society tarry in its growth without shortly finding itself at war with economic interests, and that production will suffer permanent arrest without liberty, intelligence, opportunity, in its agents.

It is, then, in the interests of men that is found in large part the power that transfers society from the reign of force to that of right, and lays the foundation of that justice which religion completes and adorns. Generosity, the liberal giving of lords and kings, may seek to embellish tyranny; but the true play of these virtues is not found till the claims of justice are met, and there remain only those inequalities instituted by nature and not by man. Thus, in the very relation we sustain to natural agents, the productive and mechanical powers of the world, we find a school of liberty pressing home upon us, in the conflict of daily interests, the comparison and determination of our rights with those of others, as before a common Heavenly Father. No discipline is more severe, more patient, yet none more perfect than this, by which the right first reigns in the mind, and on that condition alone reigns in the world; by which a law, sternly just, is established as the precursor of a kindly intercourse; by which we are emancipated from the patriarchal tenderness of rulers to their fear and respect; from a kindness whose open hand holds the spoils of our labor to a good feeling which starts from the bounds of justice. First law, then love — Sinai, then Calvary — is everywhere the line of growth.

Agriculture, we have said, remains longest unaffected by the progress of liberty. The mechanical arts more immediately quicken ingenuity, sharpen the mind by intercourse, and make their agents more compact and formidable. The labor of the field, on the other hand, leaves the workman isolated, may be performed in a careless, clownish way, and, by its severe, rough character, confirm the boor in his ignorance and stolidity. It has always, therefore, been the last refuge of slavery, and presented it in its most revolting forms. By compensation for this disadvantage, a peculiar importance attaches to agriculture, and a peculiar law of development. The mechanical arts must ultimately rest for support on the cultivation of the earth. Hence comes their material, and hence that produce that is to feed and clothe their agents. The prosperity of agriculture, therefore, must underlie all other prosperity. There can be built no substantial edifice without this foundation. Special attention must, thus, sooner or later, be turned to this branch of production, and its development be pushed as preliminary to further progress.

But the law of this growth is peculiar. Manufactures advance with easy increase. As capital enlarges in these branches of industry, profits are multiplied even more raipdly. The large operator secures a better command of machinery, of workmen, of the market; a more complete and complementary combination of processes, and division of labor in each; an increased economy of material, and a shorter period of production. The agriculturist, on the other hand, expends his labor with increasing disadvantage. He can neither indefinitely enlarge the same kind of labor on the old ground, nor carry it to new ground without loss. The centre of operations becomes more and more remote from the extremes. Labor, crops, manure have further to go. The remote field, with no advantage over the field near at hand, suffers to the full this disadvantage of position. Hence agriculture tends to break up rapidly into distinct centres, into farms of convenient size; and, if many of these are under one ownership and supervision, they soon show the want of complete and

constant direction. They are burdened with the difficulties of a lease and rental system. Thus a large capital employed in farming suffers unusual and increasing difficulties, spreading itself over lands beyond personal observation and control. A capital of half a million may, in the arts, lie within a few square rods, in agriculture it must cover almost as many square miles.

There arises from this peculiar law of growth a force which, when the interests of agriculture excite attention as pressing and supreme, goes far to correct the degradation of labor otherwise incident to it, and makes it the chosen department of independent and self-reliant men. This force acts so powerfully as to restore the balance between the cultivation of the soil and manufacture. Small capitals in competition with larger ones suffer a disadvantage in mechanical and commercial employments; in agriculture they possess an advantage. The condensed labor and personal observation they bring with them, are more sure of profits than the diffused labor and multiplication of remote agents which accompany large farming operations. No capital that can command a half acre of ground is too small for some of the most remunerative branches of culture. This tendency to restricted ownership is further aided by the nature of agriculture, demanding, as in the cultivation of trees and rearing of stock, immediate, constant, interested, intelligent observation, and rewarding it by results not otherwise to be reached. Most mechanical labor admits of definite, complete accomplishment, the products clearly indicating the kind of care and skill bestowed on them. Its tasks can be divided into days' works, of ten hours each, and suffer no loss in the intervals. The exertion it imposes is more thoroughly and immediately remunerative, securing almost at once a cash equivalent in increased products. Quite otherwise is it with agriculture. This is full of extra demands, will often not suffer a regular respite from labor, does not betray negligence by an immediate falling off in the quality of produce, but by a remote effect on quantity, imposes much exertion which is

not obviously and at once compensatory, and finds its reward, in part at least, in the love of neatness, in the luxury of order, beauty, and work well done. Hence the untiring hand and gratified eye of the master have great advantage over the labor of the hireling, to whom all exertion, aside from compensation, is irksome. The pleasure of ownership, the reward of skill, the growth of order and elegance, are so mingled with the toil for a livelihood, as to take from it its severity and servility, and make farming to the small yet skilful holder, a gratification, almost as much as a labor.

The branches, also, of cultivation which fall to the large and small capitalists respectively, favor the latter. Grain, cotton, tobacco, sugar, may be produced on a large scale, and will always be cultivated with exclusive reference to profits. The rough, uniform labor these crops require fits them for field hands, but takes from them much of the satisfaction of gratified taste, of the eye fed with natural beauty. Horticulture, on the other hand — the raising of berries, flowers, fruits, — falls readily to small owners, and the gardener is as pleased with the results as with the profits of toil. The luxury of pleasant and fruitful grounds becomes his in the very line of his buisness, and what to others is a coveted and costly indulgence is to him a remunerative investment. Thus does agriculture, by contrast with other occupations, invite feeble capitalists, and give comforts and luxuries of living not otherwise attainable by them.

Again, the law of progress in tillage tends to the same result. It is not possible, as we have seen, to increase the ratio of profits to labor and capital by mere exertion. This toil secures rather a lighter and lighter reward. Every true advance by which nature is made more liberal, and a larger share of the burden is shifted to her strong hand, is achieved by greater skill, a wiser method of breaking and handling the soil, a better rotation of crops, more powerful fertilizers, more perfect tools, and a laying of labor upon machinery and brute force. More wit, more wisdom, is the constant demand in the farmer. He works with agents very power-

ful, but somewhat restive and intractable. Broken and driven with a firm and judicious rein, there is no limit to their accomplishment. Managed with a stupid and passionate hand, they soon escape control, and leave the vexed and complaining workman the drudge of poor and poorly-paid toil. In no department of production are careful observation, skilful management, and extended theoretical knowledge more requisite than in agriculture. The farmer has to do with living things, with the food of plants and animals, and must know how, therefore, to meet the conditions of growth through a wide circle of life. A little skill often becomes of more worth than much labor. The grand condition of success is to understand on what terms nature will work for us, when bring into play her chemistry, loan her vital powers, and make the elements of earth and air, the winds and seasons, toil in their courses for our behoof. This peculiar and pressing demand for skill, as farming escapes its half-savage state and passes into productiveness, fits it to be the calling of thoughtful men. In the hands of such workers alone can the earth develop its full power, and become the mother and nurse of a prosperous and prolific population.

So also the introduction of machinery into agriculture tends to the subdivision of land, and increasing independence of owners. The labor thus set free must either seek employment in the trades, or by emigration, or be re-absorbed by a better division of the soil and a more thorough cultivation of it. A portion at least of those thus liberated will, in this method, return to their familiar branch of industry.

There are, then, in the progress of civilization many forces at work, apportioning the earth in small parcels to numerous holders, and making way for that faithful garden-culture which develops its full capacity. The mechanical arts cannot progress, with crowded cities and swarming villages, without giving rise to a demand for the products of the garden, the orchard, and the field, which will tend rapidly to concentrate farm-labor, and place it in the hands of many independent producers.

As in the progress of population the most available lands are first occupied, leaving those less accessible for later cultivation, it would at first seem that agriculture is forced, by the increasing demand, either to seek unoccupied continents or ascend a plain of increasing difficulties as it passes from one soil to another less eligible. Spreading over the rich interval, it is crowded up the slopes of hills, and at length reaches their barren summits. This would be in a much higher degree true than it is, did not the gains of agriculture keep pace with its obstacles. The higher price of produce is equivalent to more power, and bestows to the circumference of culture advantages which in the beginning belonged alone to its central ground. Indeed, the margin, as it passes out from the centre, is always the line of equilibrium between means, motives, and the difficulties confronting them. With a new fertilizer, and a new branch of production, as of the grape, sands previously sterile may yield an easy income. With the growth of population and consequent increased value of stock, grazing on the harder lands may give returns scarcely surpassed by the grain culture of the richest districts. Thus steady and variable forces are at work to enlarge the lines of cultivation.

But it is evident that while there may thus be an equality, or even growth of advantage in the lands last redeemed, those first cultivated, or at least those intrinsically most fertile and best located, will have a growing value and bear a heavy rental. There will thus be great concentrations of wealth in the soil, maintaining the power of the agriculturist and his balance with other classes. The stream overflowing its banks, and rising on the slopes, occasions everywhere an increased depth in its waters; thus, also, we have an enlarged volume of values as the movement of occupation advances.

The possession of natural agents therefore, becomes in the progress of the race more and more important, their distribution more perfect, and the independence and intellectual power of those who hold them more complete. The natural

law grows up into the moral law. The ownership of one's powers or personal liberty is closely connected with the ownership of natural agents or property. The principles which underlie the two are essentially the same. Both rest on an acknowledgment of the equal rights which God bestows on his common children. But as we have seen, the interests of production, the interests of the masses, require and lead to a struggle for that free, transferable possession of natural agents which enables each individual to unite his industry to the powers essential for its best success, and by competitive purchase leaves land to fall into the hands of those who most desire it, and therefore will usually most thoroughly develop its resources. Real estate thus becomes active, seeking in the market the best and most efficient holder. Men in securing the possession of the gifts of nature, as in the cultivation of their own powers, and attaining rank among their fellows, are thrown into bold, free, stringent competition, developing all their resources and imparting to the whole body of society momentum by the struggle of each for excellence and eminence.

But those institutions and laws, which, resting upon right, ultimately give full play to the faculties of every man, are not the first, but the last, achievement of civilization. Though interest demands them, it is the interests of the masses, and these can only find a safe balance among themselves, and recognition by the powerful few with the utmost difficulty. Society is in its better forms its own product, the completion and perfection of its own strength by its own growth. Anarchy is the unrestrained violence of all. The first step toward order is the successful, permanent violence of a few. The forces in conflict are not equal, and one prevails. But this force in prevailing must set itself limits. It must have supporters wherewith to watch opposers; it must employ discretion as well as strength; it must concede something that it may retain the more; it must be content to sow and protect others in sowing, that it may be with them a joint reaper. So fast as any influence becomes powerful it must

seek to ally itself therewith, or at least to conciliate the new force. Failing materially of wisdom and moderation in these respects, it opens the way for counter-violence; and a new power, binding itself with more skill and consideration to the agencies present, will advance freedom by revolution. Thus violence must at once commence the march toward right, meeting conflicting forces, balancing itself therewith, pushing its way by victory, compromise, concession, and binding itself to order by compacts of mutual interest with this and that party. The ruler is not unlike the merchant. He is exorbitant in his claims when he can be, but crowded more and more into the open market; subject to the competition of others, he is at length beaten from his vantage-ground, and parts with his commodities at their just value. Power, that it may remain power, must more and more include the interests of the masses, since its own existence, bringing to a conclusion the aimless divisions of anarchy, tends to concentrate all adverse interests into an opposition, which must be kept in a minority of strength if not of numbers. There must, therefore, be a growing harmony of voices in favor of ruling institutions and authorities, or these, outstripped by the united elements of opposition, will be compelled to give way to a power more deeply rooted in popular affection.

It is evident, that in this transition from violence to right, in a rough, general way, those will rule who are most competent. Intelligence is that form of force most efficient in securing authority. But the most intelligent leader and party will best understand their own interests and most successfully combine parties in their attainment. It is ever better to suffer the moderated rapacity of those who know their interests, than the extravagant claims of those who do not; of an intelligent minority than of an ignorant, brute majority. Those will set the wiser and more liberal limits, will ground their authority on more just concessions, and support it by a kinder policy. Not till the oppressed know their rights, and those of others as well, are they prepared

to exercise authority. Prior to such a discovery, their government is the most searching and merciless form of pillage. On a low basis of morality, one ruler is always more just and bearable than many.

In this severe school of suffering the masses are held, till, with a distinct, settled idea of rights, they present a front so firm and bold to their rulers as to demand respect, and give a guarantee of a temperate use of the power they shall win. The whole march, then, from anarchy, through violence to right, is one of discipline, and will be as rapid as the mental and moral states of the parties to it will allow. An insurrection of the masses, the result of the weakness of the dominant power, or a movement in excess of the ideas which sustain it, will throw the community back toward anarchy, as the eruption of a volcano overwhelms the growth already realized, and compels a new formation.

For this reason it is, that the safest revolutions are those of single and short steps, with no general disturbance of the elements of disorder, a single party or interest pushing its way into the circle of those whose rights are recognized; thus combining itself with accepted authority.

Tyranny becomes most hopeless, waiting the solution of force, when those subject to it are cut off by strong distinctions of race or color from the oppressors. A system of manumission, transferring the most intelligent and dangerous, from slaves to freemen, gives a vent to elements, which in African slavery, compressing all the most dull and the most daring into one rank, are sure to prepare the way for insurrection. A free movement upward and downward in society is the safety of growth. Establish barriers, at which those beneath can accumulate in angry masses, till, like a hungry flood, they are able to overleap them, and we have the conditions of wide-spread ruin. The stubbornness of the obstacle measures the force it calls forth, and blind tyranny evokes the mighty and demoniac spirits of revolution.

The line, then, of growth which pure interest prompts, which the love of ownership and property-rights stimulate, lies

parallel with that which simple right and morality require. It commences, however, far lower than moral motives reach, and, from a state of violence and plunder, lifts society upward, till a sense of duty, uniting itself with desire, fortifies the mind, plants it on principle, and prepares it for a complete and permanent victory.

Government can thus exist, and order be instituted, far down in the descent of selfishness toward rapine and lawless plunder. Even here a force catches and holds man, but can only accomplish its mission and reach its noblest results as it travels up into the region of the spiritual affections, fortifies itself there, and gives steadiness and consistency to its motives, enabling society to endure unbroken all the sudden shocks of interest, and wayward winds of popular sentiment. The roots of order hide themselves deep in the mould: they first establish themselves in the darkness, then send a single bud into the air above, and later only bring material from this nether region, that they may build it up into towering top and wide-spread branches, whose life is the light they revel in. Interest, hidden as a seed by God in the dark, cold soil of society, initiates a growth it does not understand, pushes it into higher regions, and there finds and feels a heaven-descended warmth, which henceforth seizes upon it and draws it ever up, thirsting for that which is above. God rules the heart of men by forces first unknown, then known to it.

ARTICLE III.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION.

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No. II.

MODERN ASSUMPTIONS AGAINST THE SUPERNATURAL.

BETWEEN the denial of the *supernatural in the sphere of nature* and of *revelation in the sphere of mind* there is a close connection. When a writer maintains an ominous silence in respect to the active presence of a personal God in nature, and proceeds to explain the present order of the universe in all its parts by an inward principle of development inherent in nature herself, and which produces all its results in and of itself, without any superadded energy from without, anywhere or at any crisis in the progress of this development, we infer with much confidence that the scriptural doctrine of divine revelation — the supernatural manifestation of himself to men by God — finds no place in his system of the universe. If he stands upon the platform of impersonal pantheism, then, as was shown in the preceding Article, he must deny, from logical necessity, every form of the supernatural, revelation included. But there is a class of philosophers who, while they admit the being of a personal God, or at least do not deny his existence, are yet strongly inclined to reduce his supernatural action in nature, over and above the operation of her inherent laws, to a minimum. Admitting, from the necessity of the case, a Creator of primordial matter, they seem to think that matter possessed, somehow, from the beginning the capacity of developing itself into the present orderly system of the universe — of producing out of dead matter life, vegetable and animal; then of diversifying life into the magnificent orders which we see around us, with the addition, as a crowning develop-

ment, of intelligent mind; so that the Almighty Maker has nothing left him to do except to stand by in inactivity, and contemplate the onward course of his creation. Even upon this theory the marks of intelligence with which the world is filled must be referred to God. Whatever exists now in a visibly developed form must have been put into creation at the beginning in a germinal and undeveloped way. Design is a present reality, and it cannot be eliminated from the universe by crowding it back to the beginning of primordial matter. There is no back door in the abyss of past eternity through which it can be dumped into nonentity. It is not necessary that we should be able to decide *when* the present order of things began, or *how*, that is, in what particular way it has been brought to its present state. Independently of these questions, we certainly know that it is the work of a personal God. Were a mass of iron to develop itself before the eyes of men into a steam-engine without the help of mortal hands, we might not be able to comprehend the process; but of one thing we should be sure, that it had in it the wisdom and power of an intelligent mind. Nor would the element of time be of any account. Whether the process occupied a day, a year, a century, a thousand years, or any conceivable period of time, its existence would equally need for its explanation an author possessing intelligence. And if steam-engines were produced from previously existing engines by some process of natural law, this process itself would be a proof of consummate wisdom, and as such would need to be referred to a designing mind. The law of generation that prevails in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, instead of accounting for the existence of these kingdoms, is the very thing that needs itself to be accounted for. We might then leave the advocate of this theory of natural development to the undisturbed enjoyment of it, assured that the evidence which creation furnishes of the existence of a personal God remains unimpaired. But when he attempts to impose upon us his doctrine of a *possible* development as being a true account of the *actual* system of the universe, to

the exclusion of all supernatural interposition on the part of God in the progress of the world's history since the creation of primordial matter, we have a right to inquire on what grounds he can demand our assent. For convenience of discussion we will consider the question of the supernatural: first, in the sphere of nature; secondly, in the sphere of mind, where it takes the shape of *revelation.*

I. *The Supernatural in the Sphere of Nature.*

It is certainly no intuition of reason that God must create once for all, and not at successive intervals; nor that he must confine his immediate supernatural agency to the epoch of creation. Far more consonant is it with the general analogy of his works that here, as elsewhere, he should observe the law: "First the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear"; that he should from time to time put into his universe new principles and forces, in harmony, indeed, with all that previously existed, but superadded by a direct exertion of creative power. We arrange our arguments here under the following heads:

1. *The origin of nature was supernatural in the fullest sense of the word.* We have a right to assume that the man who admits the being of a personal God possessed of infinite perfections — and it is with him alone that we are now dealing, impersonal pantheism having been considered in the previous number of this series — admits also that he is the Creator of primordial matter. The dualistic hypothesis of two self-existent and eternal, and therefore independent, first causes, violates the axiomatic principle of sound reasoning that no more causes ought to be assumed than are necessary. It limits, moreover, the power of God, so that he ceases to be infinite; since, if matter is self-existent and eternal, God has no control over its being or its original inherent attributes, but must take it as he finds it and make the best of it. Nor could this dualistic hypothesis avail, after all, to set aside the supernatural origin of nature; for by nature we understand, not a chaotic mass of crude matter

with whatever properties it may chance to possess, but the present orderly system of the universe, in which matter, life animal and vegetable, and intelligent mind, are all combined into one grand and harmonious whole. It was shown in the previous Article that the marks of a designing mind are not confined to the arrangement and adaptation of matter in its masses; but that the *ultimate atoms* of matter — ultimate so far as analysis can go at present — give irrefragable proof of a designing Author, who not only moulds matter in masses, but who gave to these primitive atoms their diversified properties and relations to each other.[1] In these properties and relations, which underlie the whole system of nature, there is palpable proof of design. The atoms themselves are the subjects of it, not its authors. It must have come to them from without through the supernatural agency of God; so that nature had, after all, a supernatural origin. But if God thus gave to matter its inmost essence, why not go further, as logical consistency requires, and say that he created matter? We presume that all who believe in a self-existent personal God possessed of infinite attributes would do so. At all events they must admit that God is before nature, and gave to nature her constitution, so that she is of supernatural origin. Here, then, we have a starting-point in our inquiries. Nature began in a supernatural way. Supernaturalism enters, therefore, as a fundamental element, into the plan of the universe.

2. *Finite life and mind have a supernatural origin.* This proposition can be denied only by those who deny to life and mind all real entity, thus reducing them to mere organization of matter, ponderable and imponderable; in other words, making them to consist of *form* alone without substance. This theory reminds one of the old adage: *lucus a non lucendo*. It makes life and mind the very opposite of what is indicated by all their manifestations. Let us consider, first, the question of life. Of finite life separated from its connection with matter we have no knowledge. But we see

[1] See Bibliotheca Sacra for 1867, Note v. pp. 625, 626.

it operating in matter as a formative power, and thus accomplishing results altogether peculiar — results to which we cannot reasonably believe that any mere combination of atoms is competent. Each ponderable, elementary substance in nature has its specific sensible properties and affinities; and, when capable of being reduced to a solid state, its specific form of crystalization; all which chemists rightly refer to the constitution of its ultimate atoms. In the same way each compound substance has its peculiar sensible properties, affinities, and form (sometimes forms) of crystalization. But here the capacities of dead matter end. Elementary and compound substances are alike incapable of anything like *development*, even in its lowest forms. If some compound substances of the same composition and atomic weight have more than one set of properties, these are few and definite, and probably due simply to dissimilar molecular arrangement. A crystal has no growth, unless we choose to call the outward accretion of the same homogeneous substance a growth. It has no growth by internal circulation, selection, and assimilation. It cannot develop itself into a systematic whole, having parts of dissimilar constitution and office. It was never alive, and therefore cannot die.

But a living body manifests the presence of an invisible formative power, pervading every part of it, availing itself, indeed, of the properties of the substances, ponderable and imponderable, within its reach, without which it is neither able to operate nor to maintain its place; but still acting above them, keeping up a continuous internal circulation, and producing combinations to which these substances, when left to themselves, have no competency. Thus there is produced, by a true process of growth, an organization which has perfect unity, and in all the higher forms of life diversity of parts also, each having its own special constitution and function. And when life departs, though it be by violence in the very height of its activity, we see all the substances which, under its formative influence, have entered into the organization, immediately resuming the exercise of

their natural affinities, which have never been lost, but only held in check by a stronger power. Here we have satisfactory evidence of a true force, over and above all the forces which belong to the different substances that make up the body.

But the argument does not end here. As we rise to the higher forms of life we meet the phenomenon of *mind*, and, finally, of intelligent mind, with its consciousness of *unity* and *identity*. Every one knows intuitively that he, the intelligent, thinking being, is a unit; and that he is the same unit to-day that he was a year ago, notwithstanding all the changes that have passed upon his material organization. He — that one identical being — has had myriads of thoughts and feelings, but they are all his, and on this ground he is conscious of being responsible for them all, so far as they have a moral character. Here, assuredly, we have perfect evidence of a substantive power which is in the body, but does not consist of its changing organization. Either the Creator has placed us under the necessity of living in perpetual delusion, of seeing as intuitive truth what is only a lie, or the theory which makes mind the product of bodily organization is a delusion. We take the latter alternative. But mind and life are so correlated that whoever admits the supernatural origin of one, must admit that of the other also.

But *when*, it may be asked, did life begin? May it not have been put into matter at the beginning, as a germinal and undeveloped principle; since we see that life, when once existing, may be propagated, according to natural laws, through an indefinite series of ages? We answer: Such an hypothesis is not to be admitted without evidence; and no evidence exists in its favor. The only propagation of life by natural laws with which we are acquainted is *from living beings through organic germs*, whence come other living beings of the same kind. Of the origination of life where no living organic germ existed before, not a single decisive example can be adduced. All experiments looking to this result fail the moment due care is taken to exclude from the matter

operated upon, the accidental presence of undeveloped germs. Of the existence in inorganic matter through vast geologic periods of an undeveloped life-principle we have not a particle of evidence, and have, therefore, no right to assume it. We know that this earth was once a molten mass, incapable of receiving any of the existing forms of life. These cannot have begun until its surface was cooled, and otherwise prepared for their reception. Then, according to all the evidence before us, they were introduced in a supernatural way.

But geology shows repeated eras of extermination, whether suddenly introduced in the form of catastrophes, or gradually supervening upon the existing orders of life, we will not stop to inquire. These exterminations were some of them universal, or extended at least over vast portions of the earth's surface. After them we always find new species, of which the only satisfactory account that can be given is, that they were, in some way, created by the supernatural power of God. A distinguished living geologist sums up the whole evidence from geology in the following words:

"At the close of each period of the Paleozoic ages there was a general extermination of the living species, which was nearly and sometimes quite complete. Again, as each epoch terminated, there was an extermination of life, but in most cases much less general. With the transitions between strata of different kinds in the course of an epoch there were usually some exterminations; and even in the passage from layer to layer, the extinction of one or more species took place. In a corresponding manner there were often one or more new species with each new kind of layer, and generally several with each change in the strata; while many appeared with the opening of an epoch, and a whole fauna nearly, with the commencement of a period. There is, then, this grand principle:

"Creations and extinctions of species were going on through the whole course of the history, instead of being confined to particular points of time; but at the close of long periods

and epochs there were nearly universal extinctions, followed by abundant creations."[1]

3. There is a preponderating weight of evidence in favor of the supposition that *species have a supernatural origin*. We do not propose to enter at large upon the investigation of this much-disputed question. We can only indicate a few salient lines of argument, which, to avoid misapprehension, we introduce with two general remarks: First, the magnificent systems of plants and animals show *in the internal relation of their several parts*, not less clearly than in their relations as general systems to each other and to the inorganic world, the marks of infinite intelligence. Whatever theory therefore we adopt, the relations of species to each other, and the function of each in the great whole must be referred to the Creator's wisdom and power. The only question will be as to the *manner* in which he has chosen to exert these attributes. The devout believer can, then, hold a theory of continuous development, if the evidence in the case requires it. Secondly, the proposition that species have a supernatural origin should be carefully separated from that of the *mode* in which this supernatural agency was exerted. In a late address before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, by its President, William Robert Grove, Esq., we find the following language:

"A curious speculator might say to a palaeontologist of even recent date, in the words of Lucretius,

> 'Nam neque de coelo cecidisse animalia possunt
> Nec terrestria de salsis exisse lacunis
> . . . . . .
> 'E nihilo si crescere possent,
> (Tum) fierent juvenes subito ex infantibus parvis
> E terrâque exorta repente arbusta salirent;
> Quorum nil fieri manifestum est, omnia quando
> Paulatim crescunt, ut par est, semine certo,
> Crescentesque genus servant.'

which may be freely paraphrased thus: 'You have abandoned the belief in one primaeval creation at one point of

[1] Dana's Manual of Geology, pp. 397, 398. Edition of 1863.

time. You cannot assert that an elephant existed when the first saurians roamed over land and water. Without, then, in any way limiting Almighty power, if an elephant were created without progenitors, the first elephant must, in some way or other, have physically arrived on this earth. Whence did he come? Did he fall from the sky (i.e. from the interplanetary space)? Did he rise moulded out of a mass of amorphous earth or rock? Did he appear out of the cleft of a tree? If he had no antecedent progenitors, some such beginning must be assigned to him.' I know of no scientific writer who has, since the discoveries of geology have become familiar, ventured to present in intelligible terms any definite notion of how such an event could have occurred: Those who do not adopt some view of continuity are content to say God willed it; but would it not be more reverent and more philosophical, to inquire by observation and experiment, and to reason from induction and analogy, as to the probabilities of such frequent miraculous interventions."

We are somewhat surprised that a writer, when earnestly contending for the theory of the transmutation of species into each other in a continuous line by natural causes, should have quoted the last three of the above lines from Lucretius which are omitted in his free paraphrase:

> "Omnia quando
> Paulatim crescunt, ut par est, semine certo,
> Crescentesque genus servant."

which may be literally translated: "Since all things grow gradually, as is reasonable, from a definite seed, and growing preserve their kind"; words which are flat against the theory of transmutation. Mr. Grove must ultimately come to *some* living being "without progenitors." Perhaps he would make it an animalcule, or an order of animalcules; and here he meets, upon his own theory, the impossibility of being able "to present in intelligible terms any definite notion of how such an event could have occured." But to let all criticisms on this quotation pass, we remark that we are not shut up to the two alternatives of the development

of species by transmutation according to natural laws, or the creation of species in the gross form assumed by our author — falling from the sky, rising moulded out of a mass of amorphous earth or rock, or appearing from the cleft of a tree. "If he had no antecedent progenitors," says the writer, "some such beginning must be assigned to him." By no means. Mr. Grove cannot be ignorant of the fact that a theory of *divine* development has been maintained. We do not presume to assert that species have been actually produced, wholly or in part, in this way, being "content to say," in regard to the whole system of species, "God willed it." But the thing is entirely conceivable. If, for example, the swamp white oak (*quercus bicolor*) is older than the upland white oak (*quercus alba*), one is at liberty to suppose that God, by the immediate exercise of his power — a power *qualitatively* creative — impressed on some germ or germs of the former species a new law of development, or rather a modification of the former law, whence came, in a silent and invisible way, the new species. And so of animals.[1] We doubt whether all the facts of geology are explicable on such a theory; but those who hold to the development of all the past floras and faunas of our planet in an unbroken line cannot reasonably object to it, unless it be on atheistic grounds. God is always present in his own creation. Why deny, as irreverent, his supernatural agency as often as he sees good to exert it? To us the irreverence seems to lie on the side of those who find difficulty with the manner in which a pair of elephants could be brought into being by God's creative act, if he willed their existence. With these explanatory remarks, let us consider very briefly how the question stands in regard to the origin of species.

Looking, first of all, to the existing animal and vegetable kingdoms, we do not find the weight of evidence preponderating on the side of a theory of universal transmutation — the production of all the existing orders, genera, and species,

[1] See on this subject the interesting Article on The Origin of Species by Prof. Parsons, in the American Journal of Arts and Sciences, Vol. xxx. pp. 1–13.

by a natural law of development, from older forms in an unbroken lineal series, which is supposed to have begun with the very simplest forms of life. The great difficulty of determining with exactness the limits, and therefore the true idea, of species is admitted. Among both plants and animals some species have a capacity of very wide variation; and we are sometimes at a loss, as in the case of the dog and the wolf, to decide whether the difference be that of species or variety. But these capacities of variation which belong to the original constitution of certain species, thus specially adapting them to the uses of man, manifest no tendency to indefinite expansion. They are variations within the limits of given species, or at most of closely allied species, where the question between species and varieties is not clearly determined. Within the historic period there has been not only no general confusion of species, to say nothing of genera, but not an inch of visible progress in that direction.

But it may be argued that the historic period is as nothing in comparison with the immense series of geologic ages that preceded it; that for visible progress in the line of natural transmutation vast cycles of time are requisite. The analogy of the starry firmament may be urged, all whose constellations are doubtless undergoing change of relative position, but at so slow a rate that it is inappreciable to unaided human vision. Let us look, then, at the testimony of these geologic ages, where the advocate of a theory of universal transmutation by natural laws has all the time that he can ask for. Here we find a grand succession of orders, genera, and species in both the vegetable and animal world, adapted to the varying condition of our planet. But throughout the mighty series, stretching back into the abyss of past time, we everywhere find the same great law of *definitely marked species* which now prevails. If we go back ever so far into hoary antiquity, far beyond the beginning of any of our existing species, we find not the slightest approach towards a blending of species by intermediate links. In this respect "all things continue as they were from the beginning of the

creation." "Missing links," in the shape of true species, intermediate between more distantly related species, often come to light. But no links are found by which species run into an indistinguishable mass of varying forms. The plan of creation from the beginning has manifestly been that of definite species, each propagating itself in its own line, without confusion with other lines,

> "Omnia quando
> Paulatim crescunt, ut par est, semine certo,
> Crescentesque genus servant."

The advocates of the derivative hypothesis lay great stress on the fact that only a small part of the forms which have existed in past geologic ages are preserved to us. But they fail to show why among those that are preserved a due proportion of the assumed links of transmutation do not appear. If one millionth part, for example, of the successive floras and faunas have been embalmed in the rocks of geologic ages, then, upon the simple doctrine of the calculation of chances, we ought also to find a millionth part of these transitional forms. The absolute number of all the forms should be reduced a million times, but their relative proportion ought, for anything that appears to the contrary, to remain without essential change. But geology does not reveal these assumed transitional forms. If in some of the lower forms of life, the variations are so great as to make classifications by species a difficult task, we yet want, as Mr. Grove himself admits, the evidence of progression by natural development "from a simpler or more embryonic to a more complex type"; and he quotes Professor Huxley as showing that "though there is abundant evidence of variation, there is none of progression."[1] The sum of geologic evidence goes to show that, if new species have arisen from previously existing species, it has been *per saltum* — by a sudden leap from the older to the newer form. Such leaps cannot be regarded in the light of monstrosities, mere freaks of nature; for a wonderful harmony and mutual adaptation reigns in

[1] Ubi supra, p. 31.

the grand orders of species thus produced, showing that they have taken place after an intelligent plan. The alternative lies between the theory of a *divine* development, as already explained, or that of their immediate creation. Perhaps we shall do well to combine the two. That there was at least one new beginning of organic life by the creative act of God will be conceded by all who believe in the existence of a personal God; and there seems to be no valid reason why the Creator may not have thus interposed to restore life or to enlarge its domains many times since its first introduction.

II. *Revelation in the Sphere of Mind.*

Whoever attentively studies the history of modern scepticism in regard to divine revelation, will be profoundly impressed with the conviction that it is deeply rooted in error respecting God, man, and the relation of man to God. Unworthy views concerning man's nature and destiny, unworthy views respecting God's nature and character, and, as the consequence of these, a false conception of religion in respect to both theory and practice — or, in modern phraseology, a *false anthropology*, a *false theology*, and a *false system of religious doctrines and duties* — these errors everywhere underlie the denial of supernatural revelation as a part of God's plan of moral government in this world. The biblical history of God's supernatural revelations to man is so connected with the biblical doctrine respecting the nature of God and man and their relation to each other, that the two can never be separated. Whoever receives the doctrine as true will find no difficulty in admitting the history as true also. The denial of the doctrine, on the other hand, underlies the denial of the history. We will give, then, a brief survey of the scriptural doctrine on the three fundamental points above named — man, God, man's relations to God.

The *anthropology* of scripture has nothing to do with metaphysical subtilties. It rests on the broad and solid foundation of unperverted reason and conscience, consciousness and intuition, the whole illumined by the supernatural light

of revelation. It regards man, first of all, as a *moral being* in the very essence of his nature, for whom the highest good is righteousness, and the highest evil, sin. If, as some affirm, all holiness is resolvable into benevolence — a point which we will not here stop to consider — it still teaches, in accordance with the dictates of conscience, that I *ought* to be benevolent. This idea of moral obligation is as distinct from that of benevolence as it is from that of happiness; and it lies at the foundation of everything. The law of right is absolute. What particular actions are conformable to this law may be, in some cases, a matter of question; but the law itself cannot be called in question. It speaks to men with supreme authority, and nothing in the shape of expediency can be weighed against it.

That man has true *inward freedom* is implied in the fact that he is a moral being. The idea *I ought* is inseparable from the idea *I can*; and this latter idea is not to be metamorphosed by any metaphysical jugglery into the idea *I must*, in the sense in which water must run down hill, or the heavier weight in a pair of balances must preponderate over the lighter, when it has *outward* freedom to obey the law of gravitation. The scriptures everywhere assume man's freedom as a moral being, and consequently man's responsibility as the subject of God's moral government, and here they leave the matter. They never sacrifice man's moral freedom and responsibility to the doctrines of God's universal sovereignty and man's dependence for salvation on divine grace; nor do they deny or conceal these two fundamental doctrines of revelation in the interest of human freedom. To show the inward harmony of these great truths is a problem that belongs to human philosophy. But whether the task can or cannot be satisfactorily accomplished, the truths themselves remain immovable, each on its own foundation. The Bible has nothing to do with shams. The freedom on which it rests its commands and its appeals to man's conscience is no empty show without substance. Upon the right use or the abuse of it hang the dread awards of the last day.

The strong tendency in man's moral constitution to *fixedness of character*, whether it be on the side of good or evil, is fully recognized in the Bible in such declarations as the following: "The path of the just is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day";[1] "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil."[2] This, in connection with the doctrine of his *immortality*, invests his destiny with a grandeur and solemnity corresponding to the dignity of his nature. He is a candidate for an immortality of wickedness and misery — wickedness and misery beyond the hope of recovery, as in the case of Satan — or of holiness and blessedness beyond the fear of change, as in the case of Gabriel. We are well aware how stoutly many, in the face of scripture, deny the being of Satan as a true personage. But if we look at wicked men as they are, not as we might wish them to be, we discern in the increasing strength of their sinful habits, according to the great law of man's nature, the awful foreshadowings of a day when the dread sentence shall go forth: "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still"; and this is all that is necessary to make a character like that of Satan. The fact that God has implanted in man's nature this powerful tendency to fixedness of character is in perfect harmony with the scriptural doctrine that man's probation is for a limited period only, beyond which he will be unchangeably good or evil. If it be objected that this is inconsistent with God's goodness, let the objector show how it is consistent with the same goodness to allow sin at all in the moral universe, and to visit it with such fearful penalties as we everywhere witness in this world.

In perfect harmony with the grandeur and dignity of man's nature and destiny as a responsible subject of God's moral government is the scriptural view of *the supreme importance of truth*. We find in the Bible no vestige of the popular notion that *sincerity* is the main element in religion. The scriptures do indeed insist upon sincerity as an indispensable

[1] Prov. iv. 18. [2] Jer. xiii. 23.

quality of the good man's character and they denounce hypocrisy with unsparing severity. But they nowhere teach that sincerity in error is as acceptable to God as the belief of the truth. On the contrary, they insist upon earnestness in the pursuit of truth as the very foundation of a righteous character. "Buy the truth, and sell it not";[1] this is the burden of Moses and the prophets. "This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent";[2] such is the doctrine of Christ and his apostles. Herein the Bible only carries out the analogy of the natural world. We do not find, in the sphere of nature, that falsehood ceases to be destructive because it is received as truth. A poisonous substance poisons still, though it be taken as wholesome food or beverage. So error, which is the poison of the soul, destroys men none the less certainly because it is received as truth. This is only saying that God remains consistent with himself in the two spheres of nature and of mind. It would be well if some superficial moralists, who seem to be never more in their element than when they have an opportunity to brand as bigots all who believe in good earnest that a knowledge of the truth is necessary to salvation — it would be well if these superficial and flippant moralists could be induced to ponder seriously this great and all-pervading principle of God's government.

Intimately connected with this supreme value which the scriptures attach to truth is the further assumption that, within the sphere of duty to God and man, *men are able to know the truth with certainty*. That human knowledge has its boundaries beyond which it cannot pass they teach in the boldest terms: "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth and broader than the sea."[1] The attempt to explore these unfathomable depths they rebuke with withering sarcasm: "Vain man would be wise; though man be born like

[1] Prov. xxiii. 23; [2] Jno. xvii. 3. [3] Job xi. 7–9.

a wild ass's colt."[2] But within the sphere of practical life the same scriptures upbraid men with their ignorance, because they have the faculties and opportunities requisite to a knowledge of the truth, and might know it with certainty, if they would address themselves to the earnest pursuit of it. God has placed men in a world of truth, and given them the capacity of apprehending it within certain limits. It would be the worst of libels on his character to suppose that, having created men with an innate love of truth, he is only mocking them with a delusive show that has no reality. The Bible never allows the suspicion that either the testimony of the senses, or the intuitions of reason, or the inward witness of conscience can be illusory. It regards men as living in a world of solid realities, and bound by the high sanctions of eternal weal or woe to believe and act in accordance with these realities.

The *theology* of scripture commends itself at once to unperverted human *reason* by its glorious simplicity, symmetry, and consistency. To the *conscience* it commends itself also, because it is in harmony with all its dictates. And finally, it commends itself to the human *heart*, so far as its primitive instincts are not oppressed by sinful passions, because it meets all the wants of man as a being made for love, faith, and spiritual communion. How perfectly it avoids, on the one hand, the sunken rocks of pantheism and fatalism, and, on the other, the mazes of polytheism, all who read it understand. It exhibits one infinite personal God, our Father in heaven, who cares for us, and can hear and answer our prayers; who governs the world of free moral beings which he has created in perfect harmony with their free moral nature; who directs and controls all events, even to the fall of a sparrow, without interference with the proper activity of second causes, interposing in a supernatural way above nature only on special occasions and for special ends; not in a random and indiscriminate way, like the supernaturalism of

[1] Job v. 12.

polytheism and popular superstition, but according to a fixed plan, without deranging the general course of nature.

But it is on the *harmonious proportion* in which the Bible exhibits the divine attributes that we need especially to insist. It teaches that "God is love";[1] that "the Lord is good to all; and his tender mercies are over all his works."[2] It teaches also, with equal clearness and fulness, that "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all;"[3] where the connection shows that the predicate "light" represents absolute holiness and truth, as darkness does falsehood and impurity. Holiness, not less than love, is the essence of God's nature. If any one chooses to maintain that benevolence is the sum of all holiness, he must also maintain, as the true logical inference, that God's infinite benevolence determines him to hate sin, as antagonistic to benevolence, with infinite strength of feeling and will. The scriptures abundantly teach that such hatred is an essential attribute of his infinite perfection: "Thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness; neither shall evil dwell with thee. The foolish shall not stand in thy sight: thou hatest all workers of iniquity."[4] And this hatred is no inoperative feeling. It falls, like the lightning of heaven upon the wicked. Hence the Psalmist adds: "Thou shall destroy them that speak lying: the Lord will abhor the bloody and deceitful man."[5] Since God has made men free responsible subjects of moral law, he will govern them by moral law, with its high and awful sanctions. To all who persist in violating his law, his love will be a consuming fire. If God is love, rebellion against him is rebellion against love, and his infinite perfections are pledged to visit it with condign punishment.

We believe, however, in the more direct way of bringing home to the conscience the guilt of sin. It is *rebellion against God himself*, a direct blow aimed at his supremacy as the Creator and Ruler of the world. It is to be received as a self-evident axiom that he who made man has a right to his

[1] 1 Jno. iv. 16. [2] Ps. cxlv. 9. [3] 1 Jno. i. 5.
[4] Ps. v.; iv. 5. [5] Ps. v. 6.

supreme love, trust, and obedience, and that to withold these is the sum of all wickedness. It is proper to insist on the proofs of God's benevolence with which the world is filled. But we are not to make the obligation of submitting ourselves with unlimited confidence and love to God's authority conditional on our ability to solve all the dark problems of the universe which involve the question of his goodness. Herein we must walk by faith, not by sight.

On the subject of *man's relation to God* the scriptural doctrine is very simple and definite. It represents that man was made in the image of God that he might be capable of knowing him, having spiritual communion with him, and rendering to him a rational and free service. Thus it exalts man's relation to God, and consequently the duties which grow out of this relation, to the first place. It makes the first and great commandment: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," the broad and deep foundation on which rests the second: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." This order commends itself to unperverted human reason; for it requires that we love God and man in accordance with the intrinsic dignity and excellence of each, and our relation to them. It can be set aside only by the false assumption that in fulfilling the duties which we owe to our fellow men we fulfil all that we owe to God. We call this a false assumption, for it denies at the outset man's immediate relation to God as a rational being, capable of knowing his Maker and having communion with him; for if we are capable of such knowledge, the obligation to acknowledge God's presence, seek his guidance and protection, adore him for his greatness and excellency, thank him for his goodness, and conform our lives to his will, so far as it is revealed to us, flows immediately from it. So the apostle argues when he affirms that the gentile nations are inexcusable, "because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful."[1] The scriptures are luminous with the doctrine that man's highest end is to know and serve God,

[1] Rom. i. 21.

and this knowledge and service of God comprehends in its wide sweep all his social relations and duties. The view that they give, consequently, of sin is that of *apostasy from God* — making one's self, instead of God, the centre and highest end, which brings in its train a disturbance of all the social relations; and finally they assume, as a fact that shines forth in the whole history of the race, that man is in this state of apostasy, and that nothing but redemption from it can give him true happiness in this life or prepare him for happiness in the life to come.

With this massive and self-consistent body of scriptural doctrine concerning man, God, and man's relation to God, the scriptural record of God's supernatural interposition for man's redemption is in such perfect harmony, that whoever receives the doctrine is prepared beforehand, as already remarked, to receive the historic record also. If man is in the very essence of his nature a moral being, endowed with the high prerogative of moral freedom, and as such the responsible subject of God's moral government, with its high and solemn sanctions; if he is an heir of immortality, which is to be to him an immortality of blessedness or woe, according to the use which he makes of his moral freedom; if truth is the nutriment of the human soul, and error its destruction; if God's love is pervaded throughout by the element of righteousness, which determines him to maintain with infinite strength of affection and will the sanctity of his moral law; if man's supreme end is the knowledge and willing service of God, and apostasy from God the sum of all wickedness; and if the sad record of human history shows that man is in such a state of apostasy, involving the derangement of all his social relations here and his ruin hereafter — then it is in perfect harmony with unperverted human reason that God should interpose supernaturally for his redemption, and should certify this interposition in a supernatural way in the sphere of nature, since nature (at least in the domain of this world) is subservient to the interests of man; nature being made for man, and not man for nature.

We ask, then, which one of the bulwarks in this compact chain of scriptural doctrine respecting man, God, and man's relation to God, has been successfully assailed by modern philosophy? There is, as we all know, a class of philosophers who seek to explain the origin of our idea of moral obligation — of right and wrong — by experience, that is, sensational experience, and the association of ideas thus gained. But they utterly fail to show how the association of any number of ideas can generate an idea which is altogether new in kind, and has all the marks of originality and simplicity.[1] But explain the origin of the idea as we will, it exists in every man as an ineradicable part of his nature. It is not simply the abstract idea of right and wrong as a moral distinction, but the self-evident and necessary idea: *I ought to do the right and shun the wrong*; and it points the sinner with steady finger to the tribunal of a personal God, whose eternal righteousness is pledged to hold him to the law of right written by his own hand on the tablet of his conscience.

The truth of man's *inward moral freedom* has been assailed in many ways, covert and open, but never with success. The *metaphysical* schemes for bringing the human will under the law of necessity have been sufficiently considered in the preceding Article, to which the reader is referred.[2] The *physiological* scheme, as held by some phrenologists, would make, if not the mind itself, yet its entire capacity of action according to its various functions — "animal propensities," "moral sentiments," "intellectual faculties" — dependent on certain corresponding organs of the brain. If this scheme be rigidly carried out to its logical consequences, it makes human action simply the *resultant* of all the different propensities, sentiments, and faculties in their reciprocal action upon each other; just as the moon's place at any given instant is the resultant of all the different attractions of the sun, earth, and planets that are constantly operating upon

[1] See on this point McCosh, Defence of Fundamental Truth, p. 193 et. seq.
[2] See Bibliotheca Sacra of Oct. 1867, pp. 609, 611, and Note vi. pp. 626, 627.

it. Thus the will is brought wholly within the sphere of physical laws, and we have a system of fatalism. But it should be said, to the honor of many phrenologists, that they do not accept this result of their system. They admit a true inherent capacity of the mind to make its election between the different and often antagonistic impulses of these physical organs, and its obligation to make this election according to the dictates of the higher moral and intellectual faculties; otherwise they could not talk of *duty* and *wrong* action.

"The propensities, and also the moral and intellectual faculties, may act singly or in groups, in opposition to the whole moral sentiments and intellectual powers enlightened by knowledge and acting in combination; all such actions are wrong. Hence right conduct is *that which is approved of by the whole moral and intellectual faculties, fully enlightened, and acting in harmonious combination.* This I call the supremacy of the moral sentiments and intellect."

"To fit them to discharge this important duty, they must act in harmonious combination, and be illuminated by knowledge of science and of moral and religious duty."[1]

Here and elsewhere, the author, though he does not directly assert man's moral freedom, yet assumes it as the foundation of his reasoning; without which assumption, indeed, his language would be sheer nonsense. But this admission of the reality of human freedom is, if not an abandonment of the scheme in its foundation principle, an immense modification of it. For inherent liberty to do right or wrong necessarily implies that, *all the organs of the brain being in one and the same state*, the man can, at one and the same instant do *wrong* by following the dictates of the lower propensities in opposition to the higher, or *right* by obeying the dictates of the higher "acting in harmonious proportion." There is, then, an action of the free responsible man himself, above all the impulses that come to him through the tissues of the brain, which impulses can only *incite* but never *compel*. Here we dismiss the physiological argument against human

[1] Combe on the Constitution of Man, chap. ii.

freedom, without the necessity of inquiring whether the science of phrenology rests on a true or a false foundation. The following remarks on the subject of human freedom are exactly in point.

"In spite of physiologists, philosophers, and divines, we take refuge in the indestructible testimony of consciousness. Whatever be false, *this* must be true, and lies at the foundation of all truth; there is no truth in the universe *for man* if this be false; we can trust to nothing evermore, if this deceive us. The absolute veracity of consciousness is a first principle of all knowledge, all true science, all sound philosophy. Standing on this immovable basis, unable, perhaps, to go beyond it, or to clear any of the difficulties which on so many sides are started, and in such appalling array, we are perfectly secure. The clear, loud voice of consciousness to every human being is, that as he is constituted by God, he is entirely free to choose for himself, and is endowed with the appropriate faculty for this purpose." [1]

That the scriptural view of man's *grand and solemn destiny*, as an heir of immortality under a government of moral law, is in harmony with right reason and conscience, is a truth too obvious to need extended illustration. Here the old arguments from natural theology have, so to speak, a good and strong staple. They have never been set aside by fair reasoning. They cannot be thus set aside, for they are grounded in man's inmost nature. Their weakness lies simply in their want of positive authority; and here the voice of revelation comes in, not to contradict, but to supplement them. The modern doctrine of the final annihilation of the wicked is not supported by a scrap of evidence from man's constitution as a rational and moral being, and it is at war with the whole analogy of natural religion. It has its origin simply in the assumption that the endless punishment of the wicked cannot be consistent with the divine goodness. As

[1] The Mystery of Evil and God. By John Young, LL.D (Edin.). Part iii. chap. i. sec. 2.

it professes to support itself by scriptural arguments, the consideration of it does not belong here.

It is not on the side of metaphysical argument, but of *supreme worldliness* that the scriptural doctrine of man's high destiny as an immortal subject of God's moral government is in danger of being lost sight of and practically disowned. To men continually engrossed in the pursuit of worldly objects, God's being and government soon come to appear as shadows devoid of substance. To them the things of time and sense are practically the only realities. In scriptural phraseology their treasure is on earth, and their heart there also. Such a worldly state of mind naturally brings in its train a materialistic and worldly philosophy; for between the two there is an entire congeniality. It is precisely here that the so-called "Positive Philosophy" of Comte and his followers has its hold on the human mind. It is a philosophy born of worldliness, and bearing on its forehead the image and superscription of its origin. It begins by buffeting in the face all man's aspirations after a knowledge of reality, whether in the sphere of nature or of spirit. It announces that the *theological* is the lowest stage of human progress, the *metaphysical* the next, and the *positive* the last and highest, in which the human mind, abjuring all inquiry concerning causes, whether efficient or final, occupies itself wholly with the phenomena of experience, its sole aim being their generalization according to their laws of succession. Comte, as is well known, began with atheism (for in the repudiation of all investigation concerning causes, that concerning the great first cause was included), and ended with the establishment of a system for the worship of humanity. This was certainly a fit conclusion. It was suitable that a philosophy born of worldliness and worldly in all its features should have for its object of worship something belonging to this world.

The scriptural doctrine respecting *the supreme importance of truth* is in harmony with the entire system of the universe. It only carries into the sphere of human freedom and respon-

sibility — in other words, into the sphere of morality — the analogy which prevails everywhere else. In the sphere of nature we find that realities remain realities, and exert their power as such for good or evil, whether we believe them or disbelieve them. To believe that the door is locked and bolted when it stands open will not keep out the burglar. The traveller who has lost his way does not reach his home by thinking that he is in the road to it. Confidence in a dishonest man does not make our property safe in his hands. Why, then, should any one think it a mark of profoundness to discard religious *doctrine* as the foundation of religious *duty?* Can there be any duty that does not have its foundation in some truth? and that truth, embodied in human language, is doctrine. Can there be, on the other hand, a doctrine in the sphere of moral freedom that does not bring a corresponding duty in its train? "He that cometh to God," argues the writer to the Hebrews, "must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek him."[1] Here we have the duty, coming to God, conditioned by the belief that he is, and is a rewarder of them that seek him. This scriptural view of the supreme value of truth in religion commends itself to the robust common sense of mankind. It is not very complimentary to the profoundness of the present age that books which openly or covertly depreciate the value of religious doctrine, and thus reduce religion itself to a mere blind sentiment, have so many admirers and eulogists. It seems to argue the growing prevalence of religious systems, if they may be called such, whose essence is the negation of positive beliefs. When we can have a man without bones and muscles, we can have a true system of religion without a doctrinal basis of truth; and since the moral government of God presents some stern and rugged features, the same features must appear in due proportion in any system of doctrine that rests on a foundation of reality.

The scriptures insist much, not only on the supreme value of truth, but on man's competency, within the sphere of

[1] Heb. xi. 6.

practical life, *to know the truth*, and this as the foundation of a righteous character, which consists in willing obedience to the truth. The writings of David Hume gave an immense impulse to philosophic scepticism. His doctrine was that of materialistic empiricism, according to which we can know nothing of the reality of things, all our knowledge being limited to a succession of experiences, in which cause and effect are confounded with invariable antecedent and consequent. This, by a logical necessity, landed him in theoretic nescience. Some of the most prominent metaphysicians of the present day are pursuing substantially the same way, and with substantially the same results. They first assume "that of the outward world we know, and can know, absolutely nothing, except the sensations we experience from it"; and then infer, logically enough, that because "an east wind is not like the feeling of cold, nor is heat like the steam of boiling-water," we can know nothing of the real nature of things;[1] as if, forsooth, we could know nothing of an east wind and steam, as veritable substances, but only the sensations that we receive from them. The original error here is the denial of all intuition of things through the understanding and reason, and thus the limitation of knowledge to the succession of experiences — sensational experiences — of which we are the subjects. But there is a form of transcendentalism, also, which leads to the same results only in a deeper and more scientific way. It holds that all thought is according to certain necessary *a priori* forms, which belong to the original furniture of the mind; but then it raises a doubt whether these *a priori* forms correspond to the reality of things. My mind is *so constituted* — thus it reasons — that I must think of everything as existing in time and space. But how do I know that time and space are anything more than the subjective forms by which all human thought is conditioned? I am *so constituted* as to conceive of everything which begins to be as having a cause. But how do I know that there is in the nature of things outside of my mind any such reality

[1] Mill's Logic, chap. iii. § 7.

as cause? If this mode of reasoning be carried, as it may be with logical consistency, into the sphere of morals, it may be said with equal pertinence: I am *so constituted* as to believe in the necessary and eternal distinction of right and wrong. But how do I know that outside of the *a priori* structure of my mind this distinction has any existence? For anything that I can tell, there may be to the Infinite Mind no such immutable and eternal principle of right and wrong, but he may make it, unmake it, and vary it for his rational creatures at pleasure, according to the *a priori* forms of thought which he imposes upon their minds. Thus we arrive at a scepticism which unsettles all the foundations of moral obligation. What a phenomenon in metaphysics to see the two opposite schemes of materialistic empiricism and transcendentalism shaking hands across the bottomless gulf of universal scepticism!

Of the existence of *a priori* forms of thought we do not doubt, if by these be meant what are commonly called *the laws of thought*. But why should any man assume, not only without reason but against the dictates of unperverted reason, that these laws of thought do not correspond to the reality of things — their reality according to the measure in which we are able to take cognizance of them? Instead of saying: I am *so constituted* as to believe that the distinction of right and wrong is necessary and eternal, a simpler and more philosophic statement would be: God has given me the capacity of discerning the necessary and eternal distinction of right and wrong; and so of all our intuitions.[1] An ineradicable conviction of my moral nature is the supreme excellence and obligation of veracity. Why should I allow myself to think, without a scrap of evidence, that God who has given me this apprehension of the excellence and obligation of veracity, is practising on me perpetual deceit in respect to all my primary convictions? In a philosophical point of view, this scheme of universal scepticism is nothing but shallowness under the show of great profoundness: in a

[1] See on this point the very pertinent remarks of Dr. McCosh, in his Defence of Fundamental Truth, chap. x.

moral point of view, it is worthy of the severest reprobation. Sir William Hamilton himself, the great expounder of the so-called doctrine of "the relativity of human knowledge," declares that to suppose the falsehood of our primary beliefs is "to suppose that we are created capable of intelligence in order to be made the victims of delusion — that God is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a lie. But such a supposition, if gratuitous, is manifestly illegitimate."

We have finished our survey of scriptural *Anthropology*, and found it everywhere impregnable to the assaults of modern philosophy. We need not dwell at large on the topics of scriptural *theology* and *man's relation to God;* since these are so inseparably interwoven with the question of man's nature and destiny as to constitute a grand self-consistent whole, which must be received or rejected as a whole.

First, then, as it respects scriptural *theology*, it is to be received as an axiom of natural theology that God has not made man's nature in contradiction with his own. If man is, in his inmost essence, a moral being to whom righteousness is the binding rule of action and the supreme good, and sin the sum of all evil, it is because his Maker is himself such a being; because he is absolute and eternal light, and in him is no shadow of moral darkness; because, in the language of scripture, he is "a God of truth, and without iniquity; just and right is he."[1] If God has endowed man with the high prerogative of inward moral freedom and responsibility, it is because he means to govern him as a free responsible being; that is, by moral law, with its high and solemn sanctions, not by physical force, as the planets are made to revolve in their orbits. If God has implanted in man's bosom a conscience that speaks to him with absolute authority, visiting his transgressions with the sting of remorse, and pointing him forward with steady finger to the tribunal of him who made conscience, it is because the hour is hastening on when man must meet his Maker, and render up to him an account of the deeds done in the body. If man's

[1] Deut. xxxii. 4.

nature is capable of unlimited development, and thus contains in itself a prophecy of its immortality, it is because such is its destiny under God's eternal government. If God has implanted in man's constitution a solemn tendency to fixedness of character, it is because it is not his plan that we should fluctuate forever between holiness and sin; but rather should be at no distant day confirmed beyond change in holiness and happiness by the right use of our moral freedom, or in sin and misery by the abuse of it. If the entire constitution of this world enforces upon us the necessity of knowing and obeying the truth, as the indispensable condition of our well-being; and if, furthermore, God has implanted in us an intuitive perception of the excellence of truth and our obligation diligently to search after it and conform our lives to it, it is because he is himself a God of truth, and will hold us to the love and practice of it as the indispensable condition of enjoying his favor here or hereafter. Thus we see that scriptural anthropology and scriptural theology constitute together an indissoluble web, from which we cannot take the warp without taking the woof; and if we leave the warp, we must leave the woof also.

And yet there is a rose-water theology very fashionable at the present day, which is equally out of joint with human nature and with scripture; which practically leaves out of view the element of divine justice, and talks of God's benevolence as if it were nothing but undiscriminating good nature, that could not treat sin with awful severity. This, too, in the face of all the solemn indications that God gives in conscience and in the terrible natural penalties which he attaches to vice, that he is just, as well as good; and that, if he forgives sin, it will not be in such a way as to sacrifice his righteousness and truth to his mercy. How pertinent to this soft sentimentalism is the scriptural rebuke: "Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an one as thyself; but I will reprove thee, and set them in order before thine eyes. Now consider this, ye that forget God, lest I tear you in pieces, and there be none to deliver. Whoso offereth praise glorifieth

me; and to him that ordereth his conversation aright will I show the salvation of God."[1]

Next, as it respects *man's relation to God*, this is given, as already remarked, in the anthropology and theology of scripture, and need not be further discussed.

It follows at once from the nature of God and the nature which God has given to man, that "man's chief end is to glorify God and enjoy him forever." All ethical systems which leave out of account man's primary relation to God and the primary duties growing out of this relation begin with fundamental error. Of them we may pertinently say: The light that is in them is darkness, and how great is that darkness. All religious and ethical systems which practically make human reason the supreme arbiter of revelation — which not only use reason in examining the evidence that God has made a supernatural revelation to men (as all honest inquirers must do), but claim, in the face of all possible historic evidence, the *a priori* right of judging what may and what may not be contained in such a revelation, and of receiving or rejecting its contents accordingly — begin also with fundamental error. Since God's infinite reason is the author of man's finite reason, the revelations of the former will never be in contradiction with the primary intuitions of the latter, which are God's own light in the human soul. But these primary intuitions, though they lie at the foundation of moral duty, do not themselves constitute the whole field. They have innumerable practical applications which are far from being self-evident, and where God's infinite wisdom is needed to supplement man's fallible judgment. Much less do these intuitions give us the needful light on the mighty question of man's restoration from a state of apostasy from God — which, if confirmed, must bring in its train endless misery and ruin — to one of holy communion with him. That man is in such a state of apostasy, the whole history of the race shows. Who can show why God should not interpose in a supernatural way, as the scriptures affirm

[1] Ps. xl. 21–23.

he has done, to save from an immortality of sin and woe this crowning work of his creation, this lofty being, *man*, to whom he has given such an exalted nature and destiny? It is only by denying what God is, what man is, what is the nature of the government which God exercises over man, and what is man's destiny under this government, that the objector to supernatural revelation can make any show of argument. Until he succeeds in establishing these denials, which he has never yet done, we have a right to treat his assumptions against the necessity and reasonableness of such a revelation as baseless prejudices.

ARTICLE IV.

THE IRISH MISSIONS IN THE EARLY AGES.

BY REV. RUFUS ANDERSON, D.D., LATE FOREIGN SECRETARY OF THE A. B. C. F. M.

In a religious point of view, Ireland of the present day is painfully contrasted with Ireland as it was a thousand years ago. Yet one would scarcely think so on reading what Hume says of it, previous to its conquest by Henry II., in the year 1172. "The Irish," he says, "from the beginning of time had been buried in the most profound barbarism and ignorance; and as they were never conquered, or even invaded, by the Romans, from whom all the Western world derived its civility, they continued still in the most rude state of society, and were distinguished by those vices alone to which human nature, not tamed by education or restrained by laws, is forever subject."[1]

He adds, indeed, that "the Irish had, by precedent missions from the Britons, been imperfectly converted to Christianity; and, what the Pope regarded as the surest mark of their imperfect conversion, they followed the doctrines of their

[1] Hume's History of England, Vol. i. p. 328.

first teachers, and had never acknowledged any subjection to the See of Rome."

How remote the first of these extracts is from historic truth in respect to Ireland before its subjection to the Pope of Rome, will appear as we proceed.

The excellent Dr. D'Aubigne, moreover, in his History of the Reformation in England, misled by his authorities, has done much injustice to the ancient Irish Christians; and Irish authors very properly take exception to his statement concerning the propagation of the gospel on the continent of Europe.

"The missionary bishops of Britain," he says, "traversed the Low Countries, Gaul, Switzerland, Germany, and even Italy. ..... Columbanus (whom we must not confound with Columba), feeling in his heart the burning of the fire which the Lord had kindled upon earth, quitted Bangor in 590 with twelve other missionaries, and carried the gospel to the Burgundians, Franks, and Swiss. ..... Thus was Britain faithful in planting the standard of Christ in the heart of Europe." Again: "The British church, which at the beginning of the seventh century carried faith and civilization into Burgundy, the Vosges mountains, and Switzerland, might well have spread them both over Britain." Once more: "At that time there existed at Bangor, in North Wales, a large Christian society, amounting to nearly three thousand individuals, collected together to work with their own hands, to study, and to pray, and from whose bosom numerous missionaries (Columbanus was among the number) had from time to time gone forth." [1]

It will be seen that the honor of one of the most protracted, influential, and noble missions subsequent to the apostolic age, which belonged chiefly to Ireland, is here given to Britain.

The Rev. Thomas McLauchlan, a recent historian of the church of Scotland, has fallen into a similar error. He assumes (what is to a certain extent true) that the ancient Scots, emigrating from Ireland, inhabited a part of Albania

[1] History of the Reformation, Vol. v. pp. 29, 34.

(the present Scotland) as well as Ireland. He also assumes that the monastery of Iona was a Scottish institution, and, calling the missions Scottish missions, and rarely if ever Irish, he leaves an impression very like to that of D'Aubigne. His unqualified use of the word "Scottish" is somewhat remarkable.[1] Mr. McLauchlan's error originated in no desire to gain authority for his own system of church polity; for he cordially acknowledges that it would be vain to look among the establishments in the early "Scottish church," for anything like what is called a Presbyterian organization.[2]

We shall not find it difficult to show that the historians above mentioned all wrote under a misapprehension.

D'Aubigne quotes the following from the celebrated Alçuin of the court of Charlemagne, in support of his first assertion. "Antiquo tempore doctissimi solebant magistri de Hibernia Britanniam, Galliam, Italiam venire, et multos per ecclesias Christi fecisse profectus." But the declaration here is, that the most learned teachers in ancient times were accustomed to come from Ireland (not Britain) to visit the churches in Britain, Gaul, and Italy. Nor was Columbanus from Bangor in Wales, as is asserted, but from the most renowned of the Irish monasteries at Bangor in Ireland; founded by the Abbot Comgall early in the sixth century, and embracing at one time a community numbering three thousand.[3] In a life of Columbanus, still extant in the Latin language, written in the seventh century by Jonas, his contemporary and countryman, his birth is declared to have been in Hibernia. It is added that Ireland was then "inhabited by the Scots, who, though without the laws of other nations, yet in the worthiness of the Christian faith exceeded the piety of all other people."[4] The venerable Bede, writing in the eighth

[1] The Irish biographer of Archbishop Usher charges the Scottish writers with claiming, without hesitation, for their country everything that is said of "Scotia," utterly disregarding the teaching of all the ancient historians. — Usher's Works, Vol. i. p. 144.

[2] Early Scottish Church, pp. 171, 172.

[3] Neander's Memorials, p. 434.

[4] Webb's Annotations on D'Aubigne, p. 41.

century, calls Hibernia by the name of Scotia, and the inhabitants he calls Scots. And Archbishop Usher affirms that no author, before the eleventh century, has described Albania under the name of Scotland, and that the name of Ireland until then was Scotia, and its inhabitants were called Scots.[1] The famous monastery of Iona was founded by a native of Ireland, and was claimed as an Irish institution by the Synod of Ulster, as late as the thirteenth century.[2] Neander, speaking of the fifth and sixth centuries, represents the wild parts of Ireland as covered with monasteries, that were distinguished for Christian discipline, industry, knowledge of the scriptures, and such general knowledge as could be obtained from Britain and France.[3] Henry, Bishop of Auxerre, writing to Charles the Bald, about the middle of the ninth century, informs him that Ireland, notwithstanding the dangers of the sea, was sending crowds of philosophers to their shores. Under the successors of Charlemange Hibernians were extensively engaged in the work of education throughout the empire, and were the chief biblical translators and commentators of Europe. Mosheim, writing concerning the ninth century, says: "The Irish were lovers of learning," and "distinguished themselves in those times of ignorance by the culture of the sciences beyond all other European nations." He adds, that "so early as the eighth century they illustrated the doctrines of religion by the principles of philosophy," and "were the first teachers of the scholastic theology in Europe."[4] Neander, speaking of the theological teaching in the ninth century, declares the Irish monasteries to have been "the seat of science and art, whence, and for a long time afterwards, teachers in the sciences and useful arts scattered themselves in all directions." He says, moreover, that there issued from the Irish church "a more original and free development of theology than was elsewhere to be found, and was thence propagated to other lands."[5]

[1] Works, Vol. i. p. 144.
[2] Webb's Annotations, p. 35.
[3] Neander's Memorials, p. 434.
[4] Webb's Annotations, pp. 40, 141, 142, 148.
[5] Quoted by Webb, p. 143.

These testimonies are applicable to Ireland for the space of about four centuries, from the fifth to the ninth, and present us with a very interesting view of the Irish people. Ireland then served, under divine Providence, as a convenient refuge for the Christian church, in a very disordered and dangerous period of the nominally Christian world; being the remotest of the European islands, and secure from the destructive inroads of Goths and Huns, and, for a long time, from those also of the sea-roving Northmen. For many ages it was a sanctuary for scriptural instruction and scholarship, in the intellectual night that followed the downfall of the Roman empire. It was also the source of gospel missions, which sowed the seeds of the great Reformation in Germany, England, and Scotland, that came as a blessing to the world eight or nine centuries afterwards.

The gospel was planted in Ireland by a single missionary, self-moved — or rather divinely moved — and self-supported. His historic name is Patrick, and the Roman Catholics (claiming him, without reason, as their own) call him St. Patrick. He was born about the year 410, but the place of his birth is uncertain. His parents were Christians and instructed him in the gospel. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo in Northern Africa, was his contemporary, but probably never heard the mention of his name. Patrick's first visit to the field of his future mission was in his youth as a captive of pirates, who carried him and many others away as prisoners. Patrick was sold to a chieftain, who placed him in charge of his cattle. His own statement is, that his heart was turned to the Lord during the hardships of his captivity. "I prayed many times a day," he says. "The fear of God and love to him were increasingly kindled in me. Faith grew in me, so that in one day I offered a hundred prayers, and at night almost as many; and when I passed the night in the woods or on the mountains I rose up to pray in the snow, ice, and rain before daybreak. Yet I felt no pain, there was no sluggishness in me, such as I now find in myself, for then the Spirit glowed within me."

Some years later he was again taken by the pirates, but soon regained his liberty and returned home. His parents urged him to remain with them; but he felt an irresistible call to carry the gospel to those among whom he had passed his youth as a bondsman. "Many opposed my going," he says in his "Confession," "and said, behind my back, 'Why does this man rush into danger among the heathen who do not know the Lord?' It was not badly intended on their part, but they could not comprehend the matter on account of my uncouth disposition." Again he says: "Where did I receive so great and blessed a gift, to know and love God, to leave native land and parents, although many gifts were offered me with tears if I would remain there? And against my wishes I was forced to offend my relations and many of my well-wishers. But according to God's guidance I did not yield to them all; not by my own power, but it was God who conquered in me and withstood them all, so that I went to the people of Ireland to publish the gospel to them, and suffered many insults from unbelievers, and many persecutions, even unto bonds, resigning my liberty for the good of others. And if I am found worthy, I am ready to give up my life with joy for his name's sake."[1]

In such a spirit did this apostle to Ireland commence his mission, which he did about the year 440, not far from the time when Britain was finally evacuated by the Romans.

A papal legend makes Patrick to have visited Rome, and to have received his appointment as missionary from Pope Celestine. This, though apparently credited by Mosheim, is rejected by Neander as incredible. The oldest of what may be called the Lives of Patrick, is believed to have been written at least four hundred years after his time. The one by Joceline, in his *Acta Sanctorum*, dates as late as the twelfth century, and all are believed to be of very doubtful authority. What is commonly known as his "Confession" (already quoted) is almost universally received as authentic. It was written in his old age. The "Epistola ad Coroticum," and

[1] Neander's Memorials, pp. 426–428.

the hymn known as his "Lorica," are regarded as his. Of high authority, as claiming to be contemporary with him, or nearly so, is the "Hymn of Sechnal" or "Secundinus," and a biographical poem in his praise, called the "Hymn of Fiace," composed not more than eighty years after his death.[1]

Patrick, being acquainted with the language and customs of the Irish people, gathered them about him in large assemblies at the beat of a kettle-drum, and told the story of Christ so as to move their hearts. Having taught them to read, he encouraged the importation of useful books from England and France. He established cloisters after the fashion of the times, which were missionary schools for educating the people in the knowledge of the gospel, and for training a native ministry and missionaries, and he claims to have baptized many thousands of the people.

It is perhaps needful to a just appreciation of the case that we quote the discriminating remarks of Dr. Todd, one of his ablest Protestant biographers. After stating that Patrick always addressed himself, in the first instance, to the kings or chieftains, Dr. Todd says: "The people may not have adopted the outward profession of Christianity, which was all that perhaps in the first instance they adopted, from any clear or intellectual appreciation of its superiority to their former religion; but to obtain from the people even an outward profession of Christianity, was an important step to ultimate success. It secured toleration, at least, for Christian institutions. It enabled Patrick to plant in every tribe his churches, schools, and monasteries. He was permitted, without opposition, to establish, among the half Pagan inhabitants of the country, societies of holy men, whose devotion, usefulness, and piety soon produced an effect upon the most barbarous and savage hearts.

"This was the secret of the rapid success attributed to St. Patrick's preaching in Ireland. The chieftains were at first the real converts. The baptism of the chieftain was imme-

[1] London Quarterly Review, April 1866, p. 252.

diately followed by the adhesion of the clan. The clansmen pressed eagerly around the missionary, who had baptized the chief, anxious to receive that mysterious initiation into the new faith, to which their chieftain and father had submitted. The requirements preparatory to baptism do not seem to have been very rigorous, and it is therefore by no means improbable that in Tirawley and other remote districts, where the spirit of clanship was strong, Patrick, as he tells us himself he did, may have baptized some thousands of men."

We cannot forbear also to quote a summary view, by his biographer, of the life and labors of the Irish apostle.

"On the whole, the biographers of St. Patrick, notwithstanding the admixture of much fable, have undoubtedly portrayed in his character the features of a great and judicious missionary. He seems to have made himself "all things," in accordance with the apostolic injunction, to the rude and barbarous tribes of Ireland. He dealt tenderly with their usages and prejudices. Although he sometimes felt it necessary to overturn their idols, and on some occasions risked his life, he was guilty of no offensive or unnecessary iconoclasm. A native himself of another country, he adopted the language of the Irish tribes, and conformed to their political institutions. By his judicious management the Christianity which he founded became self-supporting. It was endowed by the chieftains without any foreign aid. It was supplied with prelates [ecclesiastics (?)] by the people themselves; and its fruits were soon seen in that wonderful stream of zealous missionaries, the glory of the Irish church, who went forth in the sixth and seventh centuries to evangelize the barbarians of Central Europe." [1]

When this zealous missionary died, about the year 493, his disciples, who seem all to have been natives of Ireland, continued his work in the same spirit. The monasteries became at length so numerous and famous that Ireland was called *Insula sanctorum*, the "Island of Saints." [2]

[1] Life of St. Patrick, pp. 499, 514.

[2] Neander's Church History, Vol. iii. p. 103; and Memorials, p. 434.

It gives a wrong idea of these institutions to call them monasteries, or their inmates monks. "They were schools of learning and abodes of piety, uniting the instruction of the college, the labors of the workshop, the charities of the hospital, and the worship of the church. They originated partly in a mistaken view of the Christian life, and partly out of the necessity of the case, which drove Christians to live together for mutual protection. The missionary spirit and consequent religious activity prevailing in the Irish monasteries, preserved them for a long time from the asceticism and mysticism incidental to the monastic life, and made them a source of blessing to the world."[1] The celibacy of the clergy was not enjoined in those times.[2] Married men were connected with the cloisters, living, however, in single houses. The scriptures were read, and ancient books were collected and studied. The monastery at Bangor, in Ireland, which was pre-eminently a missionary college, was destroyed by the Northmen in 821, when the abbot and as many as nine hundred monks are said to have been massacred.[3]

The missions which went forth from these institutions, as also those from England and Wales, are frequently called Culdee missions; but as that term is of uncertain import, and appears to add nothing to the significance of the history, but rather the contrary, it is not here used.

Neither have we deemed it necessary to discuss the ecclesiastical position and relations of Patrick and his three hundred and fifty Irish associates. Episcopal writers call them all bishops, but are naturally much perplexed by their number. In our apprehension, they have their counterpart in the foreign missionaries of these modern times; the one class (including the "Apostle of Ireland") being bishops neither more nor less than the other. In this manner we in great measure avoid the difficulty of accounting for the

[1] Walsh's Christian Missions, p. 74.
[2] Usher's Works, Vol. i. p. 137; Vol. iv. p. 294.
[3] Brenan's Ecclesiastical History of Ireland (Dublin, 1864), p. 138.

acknowledged fact, of the very slight reference made to Patrick by the Irish missionaries of subsequent ages; and we find no reason in that fact for assuming, as some have done, that those missionaries were connected with the British and not with the Irish churches.

The names of Columba and Columbanus are familiar to the readers of ecclesiastical history. Both were Irish missionaries, and from the institution at Bangor.

Columba's mission was to the Picts of Scotland, and commenced at the age of forty-two, in the year 563. This was thirteen hundred years ago, and considerably less than a hundred years after the time of Patrick. He had been an active and successful minister, and was accompanied by twelve associates. He was the founder of the celebrated monastery on Iona, an island situated on the north of Scotland, now reckoned one of the Hebrides. This school of the prophets, which has had an enduring fame, became one of the chief lights of that age. Continuing under Columba's management thirty-five years, it attained high reputation for biblical studies and other sciences; and missionaries went from it to the northern and southern Picts of Scotland, and into England along the eastern coast to the Thames, and to the European continent.[1]

Columbanus entered on his mission to the partially Christianized and the Pagan portions of Europe in the year 589, while Columba was still living. That he was an evangelical missionary may be confidently inferred from the tenor of his life, and from the records that have come down to us of his Christian experience.

He thus writes: "O Lord, give me, I beseech thee, in the name of Jesus Christ thy Son, my God, that love which can never cease, that will kindle my lamp, but not extinguish it, that it may burn in me and enlighten others. Do thou, O Christ, our dearest Saviour, thyself kindle our lamps, that they may evermore shine in thy temple; that they may re-

[1] Neander's Church History, Vol. iii. p. 10; McLauchlan's History of Church of Scotland, pp. 225, 226.

ceive unquenchable light from thee, that will enlighten our darkness, and lessen by us the darkness of the world. My Jesus, I pray thee, give thy light to my lamp, that in its light the most holy place may be revealed to me, in which thou dwellest as the Eternal Priest, that I may always behold thee, desire thee, look upon thee in love, and long after thee. It belongs to thee to show thyself to us thy suppliants, O Saviour full of love, that we may know thee, love thee alone, think of thee alone day and night, that thy love may fill our souls, and that this love, so great, may never more be quenched by the many waters of this earth."

Columbanus went first to France, and took with him twelve young men, as Columba had done, as co-laborers, who had been trained under his especial guidance. Here, as a consequence of continual wars, political disturbances, and the remissness of worldly-minded ecclesiastics, the greatest confusion and irregularity prevailed, and there was great degeneracy in the monastic orders. Columbanus preferred casting his lot among the Pagans of Burgundy, and chose for his settlement the ruins of an ancient castle in the midst of an immense wilderness at the foot of the Vosges.[1] There they often suffered hunger, until the wilderness had been in some measure subdued, and the earth had been brought under cultivation. The mission then became self-supporting, but we are not informed by what means the previous expenses were defrayed. Preaching was a part of their duty, though there is less said of this than of their efforts to impart the benefits of a Christian education to the children of the higher classes. The surrounding poor were taught gratuitously. All the pupils joined in tilling the fields; and such was their success in education, that the Frankish nobles were forward to place their sons under their care. It was the most famous school in Burgundy, and there was not room in the abbey for all who pressed to gain admittance; so that it became necessary to erect other convents, and to

[1] Neander's Memorials, p. 235.

bring a large number of teachers over from Ireland to meet the demand.

Here the eminent missionary pursued his labors for a score of years. As he represents himself to have buried as many as seventeen of his associates during twelve years, the number of his co-laborers must have been large. The discipline which Columbanus imposed on the monastic life was severe, but perhaps scarcely more so than was required by the rude spirit of the age, and he took pains to avoid making the essence of piety to consist in externals. The drift of his teaching was, that everything depended on the state of the heart. Both by precept and example he sought to combine the contemplative with the useful. At the same time he adhered, with a free and independent spirit, to the peculiar religious usages of his native land. He had consequently many enemies among the degenerate clergy of the Frankish church, who sought to drive him from the country. This they at length accomplished, with the aid of the reigning prince. Columbanus was ordered to return with his countrymen to Ireland. This he did not do, but repaired first to Germany, and next to Switzerland. He spent a year near the eastern extremity of the Lake Constance, laboring among the Suevi, a heathen people in that neighborhood. This territory coming at length under the dominion of his enemies, he crossed the Alps in the year 612, into Lombardy, and founded a monastery at Bobbio, near Pavia, and there this apostle to Franks, Swabians, Bavarians, and other nations of Germany, passed the remainder of his days, and breathed out his life on the twenty-first of November, 615, aged seventy-two years.[1]

Gallus, a favorite pupil and follower of Columbanus, remained behind in consequence of illness, and became the apostle of Switzerland. He, also, was an Irishman, and was characterized, as was his master, by love for the sacred volume. In what was then a wilderness he founded a monastery, "which led to the clearing up of the forest,

[1] Webb's Annotations, p. 71.

and the conversion of the land into cultivable soil, and it afterwards became celebrated under his name, St. Gall." Here he labored for the salvation of the Swiss and Swabian population till his death in the year 640.[1] This monastery was pre-eminent for the number and beauty of the manuscripts prepared by its monks; many of which, and, among others, some fragments of a translation of the scriptures into the Allemani language about the year 700, are said to be preserved in the libraries of Germany.

There is no special advantage in going further at this time into the details of these missions. Neander is of the opinion that the number of missionaries who passed over from Ireland to the continent of Europe must have been great; though, of very few is there any exact information. Wherever they went, cloisters were founded, and the wilderness soon gave place to cultivated fields. According to Ebrard, there were more than forty cloisters in the vicinity of the Loire and Rhone, that were governed according to the rules of Columbanus, and to which emigrants came from Ireland as late as the close of the seventh century. He also affirms that Germany was almost wholly heathen when that missionary entered it; that before the year 720 the gospel had been proclaimed by himself and his countrymen, from the mountains of Switzerland down to the islands in the delta of the Rhine, and eastward from that river to the river Inn, the Bohemian mountains, and the borders of Old Saxony, and still further on the sea-coast; and that all the really German tribes, with the single exception of Saxony, were at least nominally subjected to the Christian faith as taught by the Irish missionaries.[2] It was in 723 that the English Winfred, better known as Boniface, began his well-intentioned and successful labors to reduce the Germanic Irish church to the Roman rule.

Ebrard's earnest testimony to the evangelical nature of the Irish missions should not be wholly omitted. He declares

[1] Neander's History, Vol. iii. p. 36.
[2] Ebrard's Manual, Vol. i. p. 416, 460.

that they read the scriptures in the original text, translated them wherever they went, expounded them to the congregations, recommended the regular and diligent perusal of them, and held them to be the living word of Christ. The scriptures were their only rule of faith. They preached the inherited depravity of man; the atoning death of Christ; justification without the merit of works; regeneration as the life in him who died for us; and the sacraments as the tokens of Christ's love. They held to no transubstantiation; no purgatory; no prayers to saints; and their worship was in the native language. But though they used neither pictures nor images they seem to have been attached to the use of the simple cross; and Gallus, the distinguished companion of Columbanus, is said, when marking out a place on which to erect a monastery, to have done it by means of a cross, from which he had suspended a capsule of relics.[1] Complete exemption from superstition was perhaps among the impossibilities of that age.

The statement of evangelical truths in the ancient Irish church may be enlarged. The life of Columbanus by Jonas, his friend and successor, somehow escaped destruction under the papal interdict, and is our fullest record of individual Irish missionaries. We have also a statement of the doctrinal views of two distinguished missionaries from Ireland in the eighth century, named Clement and Virgilius; and of another still more distinguished, named Claude, in the ninth century, two hundred years after Columbanus. From these and other sources it is inferred that the early Irish church inculcated no adoration of relics and images; no pilgrimages; no auricular confessions, penances, or absolutions; no mass; no works of supererogation; no adoration of the Virgin Mary; no baptismal regeneration. And Mosheim declares the Irish divines to have been the only ones in the ninth century who refused to submit implicitly to the dictates of authority.

[1] Ebrard's Manual, Vol. i. p. 396; Neander's History, Vol. iii. p. 36.

Yet there were defects in the Irish missions growing out of the times, and not easily avoided.

1. They did not fully recover the apostolic idea, which had been lost, of the local, self-governed church. Their churches, so to speak, were monasteries or colleges, held together by the authority of priest or abbot. Hence the perpetual pupilage of their missionary communities, and the protracted need in those communities of foreign culture and aid. In our own sense of the term, there appear to have been no local, self-governed churches. Nor was religious freedom of thought and action a current idea in those ages, even in the Irish cloisters.[1] Then the Irish missions were too protracted. Irish missionaries continued to follow each other into Germany for successive ages. And so it must be in missions where the church of the apostle Paul is not a primary element in the working of the mission.

2. The grand instrumentality employed by the Irish missionaries appears to have been education. Light and influence were thus diffused, and the education was an essential thing. But though the scriptures appear to have been freely used by the missionaries, so far as was possible in an age of costly manuscripts, and though there was preaching, and often no doubt much of it, yet schools would seem to have been the predominant agency. They were so in the monastery; and while they may have been essential to the life of such institutions as grew out of the Irish missions, they had not in themselves the renovating, life-giving power essential to the creation and preservation of the organized, self-propagating church. And the predominance of school instruction over preaching, if such were the fact, was a serious error.

3. Another defect in these missions was their want of intimate connection with the community at home. The missionaries appear not to have been sent forth by home churches acting in any capacity, nor even by the cloisters, nor to have derived their support from their native land.[2]

[1] Neander's Memorials of Christian Life, p. 438.

[2] McLauchlan believes there were contributions made in Ireland for the con-

We do not know how they met the expense of travelling into what must have been to them remote regions. But when once there they became associated in schools or cloisters and were self-supported. And having abundant occupation, and no strong motive for keeping their work before the attention of Christians at home, and there being few facilities for correspondence, the missionaries must have been soon forgotten. Hence Ireland in great measure lost an invaluable reaction from its missions; and hence, probably, one cause, along with the destructive invasions of the Northmen in the ninth and tenth centuries, of the apparent decline of vital Christianity in that island before the Norman and papal invasion.

The missionary institution at Iona, which began its career in the sixth century, held out against Rome until the eighth; and Ireland, though sadly ravaged by the Danes in the ninth century, maintained its religious independence three or four hundred years longer, until conquered by Henry the Norman. In that conquest, which was avowedly made in the interest of Rome, and for a long time afterwards, an exterminating war is said to have been waged against such of the old manuscripts of the Irish church as had escaped the ravages of the Northmen; and also against the schools, which for several hundred years had supplied Europe with her brightest examples of Christian life, and her most efficient literary teachers.[1]

But the seed which had been sowed over central Europe, though long buried, sprang up in the Reformation of the sixteenth century. And it is an interesting fact that Luther, the great leader of the Reformation, came from the convent of Erfuth, one of those founded many ages before, by the Irish missionaries, and said to have been the very last of their German convents which survived.[2] He having been a monk of the order of St. Augustine, it may be said that the

tinental missions sent from Iona. But these contributions were probably made only in Ulster.

[1] Webb's Annotations, p. 177.

[2] Walsh's Christian Missions, p. 82.

two streams of theological influence, having their rise a thousand years before — the one from Augustine in Northern Africa, the other from Patrick in Ireland — were here united, to flow on together for ages, we know not how many.

It is a question deserving of more consideration than we have now the means of giving, how the truly Protestant, Christian, and missionary spirit of the Irish people came to such a melancholy end. The invasions of the Danes must have exerted a disastrous influence both upon the learning and the religion of the islands. The middle of the ninth century was specially distinguished for these, but they extended into the tenth. The Irish church retained its independence longer than the church of England, and its missionary light in consequence burned longer and brighter. But this spirit gradually declined, until her sons, while they continued to travel in numbers through foreign countries, went rather as teachers of the Frankish clergy than as preachers.[1] The bull of Pope Adrian IV., in the twelfth century, authorizing the invasion of Ireland, for the purpose of "extending the boundaries of the church," shows that up to that time, Rome had no control on the island. The frightful desolations and carnage occasioned by these Norman invaders, and the stout opposition of the Irish clergy and people to the papal decrees, are admitted by papal historians.[2] But the unremitted efforts of the Romish church to subvert the ecclesiastical constitution of Ireland, were at length successful; and the Reformation of the sixteenth century, the seeds whereof had long before been planted by Irish missionaries, seems not to have exerted much influence in Ireland. President Edwards says, in his History of Redemption, that the papists, in the days of Charles I., rising at once all over the island, murdered more than two hundred thousand Protestants within a few days. We know not what authority he had for so large a number; but the Irish Jesuit, O'Mahony, confessed, in 1645, that his party had cut off one

[1] Walsh's Christian Missions, p. 82.

[2] Brenan's Ecclesiastical History of Ireland, pp. 232, 237, 238.

hundred and fifty thousand heretics in the space of four years.[1] The retribution by Cromwell, eight years after the massacre, was terrible. Forty thousand Irish soldiers were transported to Spain, France, and Poland, where they were drafted into the armies of those kingdoms, and the "Irish nation" was compelled to vacate ten of the most fertile counties, and crowd itself into the counties of Connaught and Clare. The whole island, excepting those counties, and also a part of Ulster, already occupied by Scotch settlers, was assigned to the English army and to English colonists. The Scotchmen of Ulster brought with them families, and had no difficulty in obtaining godly ministers from Scotland, who remained through the prelatic persecutions of aftertimes, and the good results there are still seen. The Cromwell settlers felt obliged to intermarry with the natives, and were thus absorbed, in a few generations, into the mass of the unenterprising, unimproving Roman Catholic population. It should be added that most of the one hundred and thirty Independent and Baptist ministers, who had been sent to look after the spiritual interests of this class of settlers, returned to England when their salaries were withdrawn at the Restoration, leaving their people without provision for their spiritual wants. The Episcopal establishment which took the place of these, though richly endowed, seems never to have exerted much religious influence.[2]

In a review of these missions in the early ages of the Christian church, we have been not a little interested in the reflections and inferences with which we close this Article.

It is a great wonder that the Irish missions continued in operation so long. For, unlike the papal missions, they had no strong central government to urge them forward and to lean upon. Indeed, the Irish missions had nothing of the kind. Just think of missions, with such defective agencies, and moved only by the voluntary principle, being prosecuted

[1] Edinburgh Review, October 1845, p. 264.

[2] See Edinburgh Review for October 1865, p. 270; and North British Review for December 1866.

continuously for centuries. There must have been a good degree of Christian principle back of all this. And whether we regard the missionary spirit as the normal condition of piety in the true church of God or not, we must admit that the missionary work, when once fairly entered upon by a large body of true Christians, is not likely to be of transient duration, and especially that it will not be so in our day. This seems to be a legitimate inference from the wonderfully protracted missions now under consideration, and it may well encourage us. Surely if the Irish missions of those early ages had so much of life and duration, we may expect the missions of our times, with their purer theology, their freer spirit, their great extent, and their numerous other advantages both in the church and the world, will have an enduring existence. If the Protestant nations which send them forth do not relapse into Popery — and the missionary enterprises of our times are a great defence against such a result — the Protestant missions may be expected to grow and extend, until their great work is accomplished.

ARTICLE V.

Ἡ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ OR ΤΩΝ ΟΥΡΑΝΩΝ.

BY REV. OLIVER S. TAYLOR, ESSEX, CONN.

OUR Lord Jesus has directed us to ask, in the beginning of our prayers: "Thy kingdom come on earth as it is in heaven." Except when we hear our Lord's prayer repeated, is not the form prevailing an inversion of Christ's order, so as to close our prayers with the petition: "Bring us at length to thy kingdom in heaven." Here observe an inversion, not merely in that we mention the kingdom of God at the close rather than in the beginning of our prayers; but instead of asking for the "kingdom of God" as in heaven to come on the earth, as if this was our great concern, we ask chiefly to be taken to the kingdom of God in heaven. Jesus taught us to pray for the kingdom of God to come from heaven to earth. We little think of this, but are all concerned in being taken in due time from earth to the kingdom of God in heaven.

Whether this inversion of the order in our Lord's prayer reveals any departure from the substance of the petition given us to imitate, or any change of thought and effort respecting the kingdom of God, is a question to be in part answered by our study of the common scripture phrase: *ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ*, or *τῶν οὐρανῶν*, "the kingdom of God," or "the kingdom of heaven."

The latter expression, "kingdom of heaven," is peculiar to Matthew, who uses it as exactly synonymous with the "kingdom of God," found in parallel verses of the other evangelists. Whatever therefore may be said in explanation of one of these phrases will be also the explanation of the other.

It is first to be observed that the original word *βασιλεία*, translated in our Bible "kingdom," may with equal authority, so far as classic use is known, be rendered "dominion" or "reign."

It is true, these words are often used as synonymous; but in most accurate speech they designate two distinct ideas. Each word, "kingdom" and "reign," implies authority; but the former designates rather the place or region where the authority is exercised, and the latter the influence from that authority on the mind of its subjects. One's kingdom is the territory or numbers over which his jurisdiction extends. One's reign is the influence which goes out from his person to be a force on men's character and action. He who reigns over men works results on their minds. He effects something in their thoughts, feelings, and wills. He exercises positive control. Here then is a phenomenon in man's spiritual part, something working a result in mind; and the thing working this result — this power of the superior in exercise — is distinctly called his reign. He reigns over those whom he controls. Thus the word "reign" has its chief import in the power of mind over mind.

God's reign is the power of his will over his subjects. It is wholly a spiritual thing. But there is also a place for his authority; a region, with its inhabitants, over which it extends; and this place or region is designated by the definite word "kingdom." We know these words may be, are sometimes, interchanged. The word "kingdom" may be used to represent that spiritual thing we have called reign. But there is danger if we entirely lose sight of this distinction in terms, that we fall into confusion of the two ideas noticed. We see this in the common version of the Bible; for here we seldom find the phrase "reign of God," but almost universally "kingdom of God"; and the result in popular thought is to conceive of a place called heaven much oftener than of that spiritual fact of God's actual control on the heart and will, which is the heaven revealed by Jesus. Because one word, "kingdom," has been used to represent the two ideas noticed, one of those ideas has become much obscured. More accurate would be the reading: "May thy reign come," "The reign of God is at hand," "The reign of God is within you." In the French translations this distinction of terms is more

accurately observed than in ours. In the Lord's Prayer, for example they say, *ton regne vienne*, not *ton royaume* — "thy reign come," not "thy kingdom."

In some of the parables there are still other meanings of the word *βασιλεία*, it being used by metonymy to signify the mode of administration; again, its results in the heart and in society, and in one instance royal authority.

With this explanation of the word, we revert now to the starting-point of our thought, the petition in our Lord's prayer: "Thy reign come as in heaven so on earth." This is not so punctuated in the English translation. A period is here found after "thy kingdom come," as if disconnecting it from the modifying words, "as in heaven so on earth." We read, "Thy will be done as in heaven so on earth"; but the punctuation does not require that "thy kingdom come" be modified the same as "thy will be done." Why our translators so placed the period as to make this distinction, we cannot understand. We know they found no authority in manuscripts, which were unpunctuated, nor in the real meaning. The exact and literal rendering of the petition is: "Thy reign come as in heaven so on earth." The prayer is for the reign of God to be established on the earth as it is in heaven. We have recognized here, therefore, two places of God's reign: a reign of God in heaven; a reign of God on earth. It is a question of interest to determine which of these is commonly referred to in the New Testament expression, *βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ* or *τῶν οὐρανῶν*.

First in this study, we shall need to go back to the Old Testament, where we find the origin of the idea beneath these words, to the times of prophecy, when the first dim visions of this kingdom were obtained by holy men.

The prophet Daniel seems to have foreseen it most clearly when he wrote:[1] "The God of heaven shall set up a kingdom which shall never be destroyed; and the kingdom shall not be left to other people; but it shall break in pieces and consume all kingdoms, and it shall stand forever." And again,[2]

[1] Dan. ii. 44. [2] Dan. vii. 14.

when he "saw given to the Ancient of Days dominion, glory, and a kingdom, that all people and nations and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed."

And the prophet Micah[1] writes: "In that day I will gather the halting, and the far-scattered I will assemble, and those whom I have afflicted. I will make the halting a remnant, and the far-scattered a strong nation. And Jehovah shall reign over them in Mount Zion henceforth, even forever." And Jeremiah:[2] "Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise unto David a righteous branch, and a king shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice on the earth."

We find reference also to this same heavenly state on earth, in those prophetic verses which speak of the "New Covenant" or "Everlasting Covenant" which God would make with his people; when he would put his law in their inward parts, and write it on their hearts, and be their God, and they should be his people.[1] Also what are called the Messianic Psalms, and the Messianic glimpses in the historical books of the Old Testament, and the more abundant Messianic verses in all the prophets, have a definite allusion to a future kingdom to be established on the earth. Indeed, we find this kingdom first foreshadowed by the theocracy of Moses, when Jehovah ruled over Israel by inspiring this his servant to communicate and execute his will. The imperfect obedience of this stiff-necked people Israel was made suggestive of the time when, under another prophet Jehovah would raise up "greater than Moses," he would have a people who would obey his commandments; when not only would he be their God, but they would be his people in very fact, by their minds and hearts being subject to his will.

Thus do we find an idea that has prevailed in all the ages of the people of God — an article of faith and expectation in

[1] Micah iv. 7. [2] Jer. ii. 3, 5.

[1] Jer. xxxi. 3, 1; xxxii. 33; xxxii. 40; Ezek. xi. 19.

all the generations of the church in the Old Testament — that the day was coming when God would reign on the earth, when his will would be obeyed, and the people be exalted and happy in him. It was a part of the nation's expectation of the Messiah, that he would establish a kingdom on the earth.

When John the Baptist came he entered into this same inspiring hope; and seeing its realization to be nearer, even close at hand, he presents as the chief motive for the people to repent, the declaration: "The kingdom of heaven is at hand." When he thus spake of a kingdom it was no new word to the Jews. It was something they had learned in their early days; it was a word found in the catechism of their youth; that a glorious day of Jehovah's reign was to dawn upon the earth. "This day," cries John the Baptist, "the day of your hopes and delights, is at hand."

And when, soon, Christ is come, and would utter the message he brings from above, he takes up this favorite idea and hope of the remnant of Israel, and joining in the holy expectation of the ages, proclaims as he goes: "The kingdom of heaven is at hand." Thus may we trace to its origin the idea under the phrase we study, and observe its growth up to the time our Lord employed it in his preaching. And need we assert — has it ever been doubted by any student — that this long expected kingdom was to be on the earth? It was no holy state to be reached by death, but some heavenly rule over the inhabitants of the earth.

And now we come to study more minutely Christ's use and meaning of "the kingdom of heaven, or of God"; a most important study in understanding his words and work.

The first message we have recorded from his lips is thus written: "From that time Jesus began to preach, and to say, 'Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.'" Thus he proclaims in the beginning, that the great subject of his teaching is the kingdom of God. He comes forth in the church of his day as a prophet and teacher, with a message from God to man, with some burden of the word of the Lord

upon him which he must utter. There is one subject which is uppermost in his mind, in his office, of which he must speak first and often, and even make the burden of all his words; and that one subject is this ancient article of the faith of God's people, which we have found in their creed from the beginning, which they had chanted through centuries: "We believe in the kingdom of God which is to come on the earth, when his law shall be put in the inward parts, and shall be written on the heart." Jesus takes up this holy desire, this heavenly hope, and announces as the subject of his teaching, the burden of his prophecy, this kingdom of God. So prominent is this in his teachings. His first words were concerning it. And when he opened his mouth for the Sermon on the Mount, this kingdom of heaven is his subject, his text, all his words are in exposition of this. When he sends forth his disciples to speak in his name this is his commission: "Go, proclaim the kingdom of God." And they went, repeating his first words: "The kingdom of God is at hand." And what proportion of his parables are but efforts in this one thought, "To what shall I liken the kingdom of heaven? It is like to the mustard seed"; "It is like to the leaven hid in the meal"; "It is like to a treasure hid in a field"; "It is like unto a merchantman seeking goodly pearls."; "It is like unto a net that was cast into the sea." The teachings of Christ are sometimes called fragmentary. We wonder he did not bequeath to us more connected discourses. Why did he not leave us some systematic statement of the doctrines he would teach? We have, instead, a few words he spake at the marriage feast, a few in the home of Mary and Martha, a few in Simon's house, a few with the publicans, a few with the Syro-Phenician woman, a few at the grave of Lazarus. He seems to speak more from mere incitement of suggestive circumstances than from the impulse of one who has a single, all-engaging subject to unfold. But if we study faithfully his words we find they are not so devoid of unity. We find one subject uniting them all. His illustrations would fit in one sermon. His reasonings seldom

diverge from one theme. His testimonies unite for one conviction, and the one subject giving unity to his thoughts was — The Kingdom of Heaven. This was the all-engaging thought of his mind; and whatever suggestive helps he had, only drew forth some new words on this one theme.

Nor is it some heavenly state beyond the grave that so absorbs Christ's mind. He is in sympathy with the prophets of old, and with his forerunner John the Baptist, in giving his desire and effort too for a heavenly state on earth. We have his meaning, his constant meaning, of the phrase "kingdom of God" in that petition, "Thy kingdom come on earth as it is in heaven." Here is all Christ's zeal in behalf of some spiritual state on earth. "As in heaven so on earth." These were his words, this his work. He himself came from heaven to earth to bring to us heaven's peace and joy and righteousness. He brought to earth heaven's words, heaven's promises, heaven's pardon, heaven's peaceful mind, heaven's affections, heaven's spirit, even the Holy Ghost; in a word, he brought to earth heaven's God — the tender, forgiving, and omnipotent Father, that earth might have the same ruler as heaven.

This was Christ's mission, to transport, with himself, heaven to earth. The kingdom of which he spake was a present rule of God on the heart. The heaven he offered men was a present state of peace and blessedness. Until he came to his last words with his disciples, he had very little to say of the world beyond the grave. It was not his chief mission to describe the Jerusalem above, and tell how many consolations awaited souls in that region beyond death. He seldom sought to comfort his disciples by assuring them this life was one of trouble unalloyed, and the life to come a place of as pure peace. He did not so teach as to impress his hearers that there is no real good, no real purity, no true holiness, except in the future world. His words have even a contrary direction; to draw the mind back from the future to the present, down from some high locality called heaven to the earth. "The kingdom of heaven is at hand." "The

kingdom of heaven is within you." "The kingdom of heaven is peace and joy and righteousness in the Holy Ghost." His chief promise was, not that he would take them to the Comforter, but "the Comforter will come to you." "If a man love me he will keep my words, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our abode with him." Here is the thought. Not chiefly our going from this earth to God; but God, who is in heaven, coming to us on the earth, even the Father, Son, and Spirit, to dwell in us and abide with us here. Not, ye shall know all things when ye reach heaven, but "the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things."

If we count the number of times the expression "kingdom of God" or "kingdom of heaven" is used in the New Testament, we find it in Matthew about thirty-seven times; in Mark thirteen times; in Luke thirty times. And with three or four exceptions, the reference in all these instances is indisputably to the kingdom of God on the earth. The few exceptions referred to are variously interpreted; and by some commentators so as to make them not exceptions, but in harmony with the common meaning, giving but one interpretation to the phrase we study, and that, the kingdom of God on the earth.

Passing to the Gospel by John, we are surprised to find he has made use of this phrase, so common in the other evangelists, but on a single occasion, in his account of Christ's interview with Nicodemus. It can hardly be possible, however, that he should make no more reference to the substance of thought in the phrase. It was too prominent and too constant in Christ's words not to be frequently repeated by any recorder of his teachings.

We find, therefore, this evangelist has been more attracted by other words of Jesus which convey a like meaning with those we study. Instead of *βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ* or *τῶν οὐρανῶν* he uses *ἡ αἰώνιος ζωή*, eternal life. Not a life to begin when we pass to our eternal state, but now known by every believ-

ing soul: "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life"; "I am come that ye might have life"; "He that believeth on me hath everlasting life." The reign of God on the heart secures a heavenly life; and this evangelist, marked in all his writings by his attention to spiritual states, the affections and emotions of the soul, was absorbed in the result of God's reign, and has used the word for this result, "life," present "eternal life," as synonymous with the power of God securing it. And we may observe, this synonym is evidence in the argument we present, that the reign of God which was meant by Christ, was one exercised on the soul in the flesh.

Leaving the Gospels, we find the phrase used less frequently in the Epistles, only thirteen times in all; in eight of which it has the common meaning, and in five making reference either to some millennium state to come on the earth, or to the spiritual world beyond the grave.

Thus in all the Bible, in both the New and the Old Testaments, the phrase "kingdom of God" or "kingdom of heaven" invites our attention almost exclusively to some holy state on earth. Other scriptures leads our minds to the heaven above, but the phrase we study is consecrated to express some holiness on earth. We cannot refrain from an inference here. If we extract from the phrase we have studied all allusion to the future world, do we not leave much less eschatology in the New Testament than is commonly found there? We mean no diminution of the great truths revealed of that world to come, but a less frequent use of them in appeals unto men to turn to God. This present reign of God on earth seemed to Christ's mind to contain the chief motive for repentance. Thus he cried, not, "Repent, for you must die and go to judgment"; but "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." "Repent" for the present rewards of repentance. "Turn," for that to which your turning will now bring you "for the kingdom of God." Dr. Watt's remark, that "the New Testament derives its motives of terror and comfort chiefly from the

resurrection and the day of judgment," is certainly not true of the words of Christ.

We come now to notice the nature of this kingdom or reign of God on the earth. It is exactly made known to us in the petition of our Lord's Prayer following "Thy kingdom come," by "Thy will be done on earth as in heaven." This latter desire is but a continuation or explanation of the former. In every reign or kingdom there is a governing will. In the reign of God his will is that control. Whenever a soul has come to live day by day and moment by moment, doing the will of God, that soul is in the "reign of God" according to the petition, "Thy kingdom come." All self-will is removed from the heart; all passions are subdued. The conscience and spiritual vision are quickened to observe with a spiritual discernment what the will of God is, and then the affections, impulses, and will are eager to perform it. "Jesus said unto them, 'My meat is to do the will of him that sent me.'" In this picture of Christ's mind we see the perfection of the reign of God. We see here the glorious reality of that prophecy, "I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it on their hearts." God's law, which is the expression of his will, is represented as brought into such effective control over the heart as if it were written upon it, or put into it as its all-actuating impulse.

Again, we read of the new covenant in distinction from the old; and the distinguishing thing in the new is the abundant outpouring of the Holy Spirit for the enlightening and ennobling of the darkened, fallen condition of man. This we may call the subjective aspect of the reign of God, which is the full union of the soul with the divine will.

Viewed objectively, this kingdom or reign includes all the peculiar administration of holy influences and powers which secure this sanctified state, namely, the fuller relation of God's will in the words of Christ and the apostles; the great power of God in Christ's life and sufferings and death, and the all-abounding gift of the Holy Ghost in these last days; with the ever-attendant arrangement and harmonious work-

ing of divine providence. These are the instrumentalities of government in this reign of God. We may view this administrative order as existing where the desired results are not secured; as the reign of the queen extends over all England though there be many disobedient subjects. Her dominion or government is over all, and so felt by all, securing in some true obedience, and on others the restraints and compulsions appointed to the disobedient. Wherever her law is proclaimed and enforced, there is her reign, though many of her subjects yield not to obey. Wherever his ministers are proclaiming the name of Christ, the gift of the Spirit, and the will of God, — the co-working providences ever being added — there is his reign over all whose minds are reached by these means, though they do not yield to the same.

Thus while we may view this reign of God as complete in its governing arrangement, it may be far from complete in the results secured. A complete government may not prevent all disobedience.

Viewed objectively, we may say the reign of God has come in fulness on the earth, that reign which is as in heaven — meaning his word, his Son, his Spirit, with the holy ordering of his providence, all are now here to work on souls. But viewed subjectively we see their operation on the souls of men like the leaven in the loaf, or like the mustard seed; in a way so small as to be almost imperceptible, but going on from this small beginning to the perfect work of harmonizing all minds with the counsels of God.

Here now are explained some scripture representations, which at first view seem difficult to harmonize. When Jesus was asked when the kingdom of God should appear, he replied: "The kingdom of God is within you, or among you." The full meaning is, "You look for this kingdom in the future. Behold it is now in your midst." Again, he proclaims, "The kingdom of God is at hand," as if not yet here but near. Again: "Some of you standing here shall not see death till you see the kingdom of God appear." This last verse gives us the impression of some distance in the

future. Thus we have three representations. In one it is present, in another only near, in the last distant many days. We explain these varied words by remembering the different stages of its working. It may have reached the first stage when the second was but near, and the third some distance in the future. "First the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear." The corn is present in the blade, near in the ear, and yet to come in the full, hardened kernel.

The varied parables also represent the kingdom of God in a twofold aspect, which may be contrasted as individual and social. We have thus far viewed it only in its power over individual hearts. This is the ultimate design of its work, to perfect souls; but this cannot be accomplished except by employing social agencies. Therefore the reign of God in its administrative arrangements, includes a society, a holy community, called the church. Thus we find some of the parables illustrating the working of the church in the world. "The field is the world, and the seed are the children of the kingdom." Here is the kingdom in its social aspect. In the parable of the sower the word is the seed, and the individual heart is the soil in which it falls. Here is the individual aspect. Some of the parables may be interpreted as illustrating both the work of grace on the heart, and the work of the church in the world.

Also this kingdom is represented sometimes as invisible, and then again as to be seen. "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation." Certain Pharisees had inquired when the kingdom of God should come, as if eager to behold its approach. They are informed it will come with no ostentatious appearance, like the kingdoms of this world. But again we read: "There be some standing here who shall not taste death, till they see the kingdom of God come with power." Here is the declaration of something visible and impressive to the senses. And such was the manifestation of this kingdom when its woes were visited on Jerusalem for the downfall of the Jewish power which opposed Jesus' sway. On the day of Pentecost the power of the Holy Ghost was

seen, as it came upon the multitude in Jerusalem; not merely in the fiery tongues which descended and sat upon them, but in the cries of those pricked in heart from the power of Peter's words. Here was some visible coming of power in the kingdom of God.

So in revivals since that day, this kingdom has been manifest by signs and workings to be received by our observation. Even in the days of Christ and his disciples this kingdom could be seen by a spiritual vision. That little company was the beginning of a society that would subject the world. While, then, the kingdom of God comes not with the observation of a worldly mind, it is open and manifest to a spiritual discernment. It assumes not power like earthly potentates, but it takes an even mighty power in ways of gentleness and suffering. It is hidden only to the blind. For all the increase of the church of God is acknowledged to be the progress of Christ's visible kingdom on the earth.

We see thus the way of harmony in many verses respecting this kingdom of God, which at first appearance seem at variance. It may be in the midst of us, and yet only near unto us, and also some distance in the future. It may be a power on individual hearts, and also on communities and the world. It may be hidden from the eager watch of the world, and still be open and manifest to a spiritual mind.

We are able now to detect the error in the Jewish conception of the kingdom of God. It was not in that they expected it to be a kingdom established on the earth, for such is the kingdom of God, a reign on the earth in time. Nor was their error in that they thought this kingdom would immediately come with the Messiah. It did come with his coming, and from that time has been in the midst of men. Nor was it in that they expected this kingdom would be established with power. For the kingdom of God has shown its power, even the mighty workings of omnipotence. Their error was that they allowed no time for it to gain its full sway, but thought it would break forth at once by dint of God's almighty hand unto a full dominion. And further,

they had false views of the kind of power that ruleth in that kingdom, supposing it would be like Caesar's reign, one of compulsion and worldly authority. They discerned not the power of spoken truth, of self-suffering to save an enemy, nor of the Spirit of God. They had no appreciation of the moral power from reason, testimony, forbearance, love, humiliation unto death.

We see also a common mistake now prevailing respecting the kingdom of God. It is located above the earth, not on it; beyond the grave, and not with men in the flesh. But we have seen that this kingdom is on the earth and in the midst of living men. "So on the earth as in heaven," is language that remains in our holy form of words, but how little we find it in our faith and efforts. We are so under sin, so completely disabled, and behold the world so deeply fallen, that we cannot rise to faith in a full restoration. We gain no hope for full purity and holiness except by separation from this earth. The highest hope, how often, is that we may gain sufficient grace to mark us in this fallen earth, for a better state to come. The παλιγγενεσία[1] (regeneration) of the earth, and of our hearts while on the earth, is more a matter of speculation than positive hope. Our thoughts for the good fly continually to heaven, and rest there, forgetful of the hope and promise, "As in heaven so on earth." Do we remember the representation of that New Jerusalem in the Apocalypse, that crown of our hopes, that it is not fixed in heaven, and so that all the nations seem going into it from the earth? But it was seen coming down from God out of heaven to earth. The language is, "The tabernacle of God is with men." Thus we find carried out unto the end of the New Testament and unto the full consummation of God's working, that the kingdom of God is on earth, even its glorious perfection in the New Jerusalem is not in heaven but on the earth.

And further, how many think of this kingdom as only invisible, and ever are in fear of sensualities, material views,

[1] Matt. xix. 28.

when any seek to see this kingdom. But is it not true that we do see the kingdom of God in every visible church of Christ? All ist ministrations in its ministry, its word, its sacraments, its confessions, and prayers, are the very instrumentality of God's kingdom. The spiritual kingdom is in this which is visible. Its completion is dependent upon the perfection of the church in its holy ministrations. The church is Christ's body, the visible tabernacle of the most high God while he reigns on the earth.

Will not this interpretation of the kingdom of God also modify some common views in soteriology? We will take up the single scripture, "Except a man be born again he cannot enter the kingdom of God." If we mistake not, just two thoughts are usually suggested by this verse. First, the new birth; secondly, final salvation, or "eschatological salvation," we may say, to get out the pure idea. So where one has "met with a change," as the language is, the mind rushes at once into the world to come, as the place for its results and reward. There will its vitality be seen. For that spirit-condition is this change given. There will be manifest how different it makes me from others. This new birth is an entrance to some place or state not found here on earth but in heaven.

And then alternates the season of doubt. How be sure this is the change required? How determine its sufficiency for that day? O that I could now test so important a change as is connected immediately with my eternal state! Would that some present issue was given, in which would be revealed whether I know the veritable new birth! Thus some live in deception from want, in their view, of any present testing agency for the change they have felt to prove it false; and others live in doubt from want of some present testing agency to prove them truly born again.

Now see how matters are simplified by the real meaning of scripture. We read, "The kingdom of God is righteousness and joy and peace in the Holy Ghost." Here we have a synonym for kingdom of heaven. Let us use it. "Except

a man be born again he cannot enter" "this righteousness and joy and peace in the Holy Ghost." Here we have an immediate issue of the new birth in present qualities or conditions of the soul. For entrance to this new spiritual state was the change ordained. Man is not by nature righteous, joyful, peaceful. His will is under self rather than God. His heart is dissatisfied by many covetous desires which it cannot gratify. His conscience speaks fearful verdicts from want of divine approval.

Now, how natural the figure when Jesus proclaimed that one who is in this selfishness, dissatisfaction, and fear must be made over, "born again," before he can enter into peace and joy and righteousness.

And now when the question arises, Am I born again? it is but the simple inquiry whether I have left my selfishness to live in righteousness, regarding the will of God? Have I found an escape from my dissatisfied, covetous state, into contentment and joy in God's providence? Have I lost my fear of God's presence and judgment, and found veritable peace in his favor?

We are now no more mystified and lead astray in some metaphysical process of new birth, a point or subject which was doubtless the very furthest off from Jesus's mind when he said, "be born again," but we have simply two present conditions or states of the soul, the one said to be in nature, the other in the kingdom of God, and our question is: Have we passed from one to the other? Have I come into righteousness and joy and peace? Am I verily under the reign of God? In a plain, simple word, Am I doing God's will? How I came into this state — what hidden operation, natural or supernatural, on the physical or moral faculties of the soul; what division of mental philosophy will best help me test my change — all this quantity of metaphysics is cast aside as chaff; and the inquiry is: Have I come into doing God's will? Is God verily reigning over me so that I am under him by obedience and trust and joy? This reign of God over us being simply the power of his will to control, we

have but to inquire: Am I doing his will? If I am, I am in his kingdom. If I am not doing his will, I still need to be changed and new-born, and changed again continually, till I do come into doing his will. And as to the eschatological salvation, that cares for itself when we stand aright in God's kingdom on the earth.

It may be said these criticisms imply a false charge on the conceptions of the present day, since the power of God in his Son and Spirit is now recognized. We hear of Messiah's kingdom and of the "state of grace" in the soul, which is like to the definition we have given of the kingdom of God. Consenting that this language we now hear contains a portion of the meaning we would exalt; still it is true we do not hear the words "kingdom of God" applied in common use to this state on earth. If the spiritual powers included in it are recognized in part, they are not expressed by this consecrated language of Christ and the New Testament.

But would any say: Why make so much of this phrase, if its import is still left in different words? We believe its import is not all left, but much of it has gone with the giving up of the words. The terms substituted for this phrase are not so forcible, and for the simple reason, the thoughts to be expressed are not so high and holy.

Repeat again the words which guide us in this study. "Thy reign come as in heaven so on earth." May the very reign of heaven in all its completeness, where thy will is done so universally and continually, may this reign come on earth. May that power of God which is seen in heaven, securing holiness and blessedness, peace and joy, may this power come upon earth and secure this blessedness and these graces here.

This is the language, "As in heaven so on earth." Heaven is to be transported to earth, to secure its own purity here in the souls of men and in communities, and finally in the whole world, when the new heavens and new earth will appear. This is the high and holy conception contained in the words "kingdom of God." It is a condition on earth

worth seeking for its own reward. It is a power of God mighty to control the man. It is the Spirit of God dwelling in the body, writing the law of God in the heart, putting it in the inward parts, where abide our secret, involuntary impulses, so that we are enlightened and impelled by the Spirit in every thought and word and deed. It is divine care over us as over the angels above. It is divine power given us as the pure spirits above enjoy omnipotence.

We ask if such high and holy thoughts as these are commonly believed to be promised to this earth? Is it not rather generally thought that we must die before we come to the place of so much divine power? That we can only begin grace now and make preparation for the kingdom of God "at last." We are not seeking to enter into rest here, but simply hoping for a rest to come; nor to conquer sin here, but waiting to awake in his likeness, when we shall have put off this mortal flesh. The present so-called "state of grace" is viewed as so exclusively preparatory that we estimate not the infinite worth in itself. Our eyes dwell with delight on the heavenly visions of purity and bliss; but our faith adds not the thought that these are the patterns for earth.

This is our criticism; not that a state of grace is ignored, but we have not common any conception for earth so high and holy as is found in the prayer of our Lord: "Thy reign come as in heaven so on earth." In dropping the phrase, we have dropped also much of the heavenly meaning in it. In substituting another phrase, "state of grace," we have substituted an earthly and small conception of God's power on the soul.

This is what we seek from our study: to exalt our view of the present and visible kingdom of God on the earth. We should see in the church the holy reign of God; and in the power of the Spirit, so freely offered us in the new covenant, a sufficient help to elevate our souls into a present divine state; and so come into some heavenly place in Christ Jesus, that in seeking words of sufficient strength to express our glory, we shall restore that sacred language: "Thy reign come as in heaven so on earth." May this be our prayer.

ARTICLE VI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

Eusebius's Ecclesiastical History.[1] — We have great satisfaction in recommending to our readers this work of the Father of Church History, Eusebius of Caesarea, surnamed Pamphili from Pamphilus, with whom his friendship was so intimate that he shared his imprisonment for a time priori to his friend's martyrdom. The present volume contains the whole of the ten books; has four indexes, one, of the passages of scripture quoted, a second, of the authorities referred to by Eusebius, a third, historical and geographical, and the fourth, of words and phrases; it contains ample prolegomena on the codices and editions, a critical Epistola by Gersdorff and somewhat numerous critical notes. Having said this, we have said enough to justify our recommendation of this as the best edition, especially for students. A second volume which is shortly to appear, will comprise the *Vita Constantini*, etc.; a third, the improved and enlarged historico-exegetical commentaries and excursuses of the earlier editions of the same editor.

It were well if our theologians devoted more time, as students, to the careful study of extant monuments of the early days of the church like this history of Eusebius, instead of deriving their knowledge so exclusively from second-hand sources. The reading of one old author gives a far more vivid impression of the spirit and appearance of the time at which he lived than the reading of loads of modern descriptions. For apologetic purposes in particular, such a study is of incalculable value. A man who has read the original early writers can speak with an authority, decision, and incisiveness that are impossible to him who has only studied church histories, even though they be works as excellent as those of a Neander and a Schaff.

Evangelical Calendar for 1868.[2] — Professor Piper's Evangelical Calendar is not one of the ordinary kind, or we should not notice it here. It is a little book of scientific value, as the following table of contents will show. Besides the usual almanac materials, it contains: I. Essays on the

[1] Eusebii Pamphili Historiae Ecclesiasticae Libri x. Recensuit cum prolegominis, apparatu et annotatione critica, indicibus denuo edidit F. A. Heinichen. Lipsiae: H. Mendelssohn; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. 1868.

[2] Evangelischer Kalender. Jahrbuch für 1868. Mit Beiträgen von Arndt, Frank, Frommann, Ranke, und Anderen. Herausgegeben von Fred. Piper. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. 1868.

celebrated Hymn by Clement of Alexandria; on the Sacrifices of Bulls and Goats in the Religious Worship of Phrygia, and on the Church of Euphemia in Chalcedon; II. A series of brief Christian Biographies, including Arnulf of Metz, Elizabeth, Robert Grosseteste, St. Louis, Raymund Lull, Georg Wagner, Johann Gerhard, Joh. Marteilhe, Oberlin, and others less known. These biographies are for the most part very carefully and pleasantly written. Preachers who on week evenings should adopt the plan of occasionally giving their congregations brief biographical sketches, instead of always drawing on their own inmost vital resources, would find the Calendar a great help. We would also call attention to the circumstance that the ten volumes from 1852 to 1861 are to be had at the very cheap price of five silbergroschen per volume.

Life of Jakob Friedrich Fries.[1] — The philosopher Fries, whose biography we now introduce to the notice of our readers, was born in Barby in 1773, and died in Jena in 1843. His father was a missionary and preacher among the Moravian brethren. The memoir is divided into four books with an appendix; the first treating of the years he spent with the brethren; the second, of his life at the University as a private tutor, and in various other situations; the third, of his professorship at Heidelberg; and the fourth, of his professorship and death at Jena. In the appendix are various letters from eminent contemporaries, such as F. K. von Savigny, F. H. Jacobi, K. L. Reinhold, and de Wette.

The philosophy of Fries was the result of a blending of the influence of Kant and of Jacobi. His principal works were the "Neue Kritik der Vernunft," "Wissen, Glauben und Ahndung," "System der Logik" and "System der Philosophie als evidenter Wissenchshaft." De Wette had great faith in the philosophy of Fries, and set its principle features forth in a popular form in his "Theodor, oder die Weihe des Zweiflers," the book as a counterpart to which Tholuck wrote his "Guido und Julius oder die wahre Weihe des Zweiflers."

Fries departed very early from the faith of the Moravian brethren, but seems to have retained to the end of his life a yearning for the certainty which they enjoy. The memoir is by his son-in-law, and is very interestingly written. Not the least attractive part of the book is the appendix of letters.

Hofstede de Groot on the Gospel of John.[2] — The above little work is a new and valuable contribution to the question: When was the

[1] Jakob Friedrich Fries. Aus seinem handschriftlichen Nachlasse dargestellt von E. L. T. Henke. Leipzig: Brockhaus; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. 1867.

[2] Basilides am Ausgange des apostolischen Zeitalters als erster Zeuge für Alter und Autorität neutestamentlicher Schriften, insbesondere des Johannes Evan-

Gospel of John written? Its author is Professor of Theology at the Dutch University of Gröningen. His object is to show that Basilides the Gnostic was a contemporary of one or more of the apostles; that he made use of various New Testament writings, in particular of the Gospels of Luke and John; that his testimony confirms the church's view of the age and authority of these writings; and that his testimony completely harmonizes and is therefore sustained by other writings of his age. Taking as his starting-point a remarkable and hitherto unnoticed passage in the work of Hippolytus published some years ago which runs, "Basilides and Isodorus, the genuine son and disciple of Basilides, says that Matthias communicated to them orally secret doctrines which he had heard from the Saviour, being taught privately." Dr. de Groot shows that as Matthias probably died about A.D. 80 or 90, Basilides must have flourished from about A.D. 65 to 135, a conclusion which is confirmed by various other reports which speak of him as flourishing under Trajan and Hadrian (97–138), especially by the circumstance that, during the reign of the latter emperor, Agrippa Castor wrote a refutation of the principal work of Basilides. In the few fragments from Basilides adduced by Hippolytus, there are several passages from the Gospels of Luke and John and from Paul's Epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, and Ephesians; passages quoted as holy scripture in exactly the same way in which the Old Testament is quoted. The belief seems therefore warranted that at all events very early in the second century the Gospels of John and Luke were currently regarded as authoritative by the church. We cannot enter into further details, but we can commend the treatise to our readers as a brief, but very straightforward, clear, fair, and satisfactory argument for the early recognition of the Gospel of John as the work of the Beloved Disciple and as authoritative scripture.

Theological Lexicon.[1]—This is the first part of a kind of popular Herzog's Real-Encyclopaedia, intended to do for the modern rationalism of Schenkel what Zeller's "Biblisches Wörterbuch" has done in a very excellent way for orthodoxy. Its range, however, is wider than that of the last-mentioned work. Neither the name of the editor nor the names of the contributors are published; but it is well-known that Schenkel is the editor and probably the writer of a good portion. So far as we have examined, the articles are written with great clearness and precision; but wherever rationalism can exert an influence, it manifests itself in a most jesuitical and pernicious form. Instead of being boldly and openly asserted as the

geliums in Verbindung mit andern Zeugen bis zur Mitte des zweiten Jahrhunderts. Von Professor Dr. Hofstede de Groot, Deutsche Ausgabe. Leipzig: Hinrichs; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. 1868.

[1] Theologisches Universal-Lexicon zum Handgebrauche für Geistliche und gebeldete Nichttheologen. Elberfeld: Friederichs; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. 1868.

truth, rationalistic views are placed side by side with orthodox views, in such a manner as to produce the impression that a decision on rational grounds is impossible; in a word, those who take the Lexicon as an authority will be forced into indifference on all the distinctive features of Christianity. The work is a pretty accurate expression of the popular unbelief of Germany — the unbelief which pervades the scientific, the mercantile, and the higher grades of the laboring classes: as such, and as giving a condensed and very intelligible account of what the new reconcilers of culture and Christianity hold, it is not without value. The price of the whole, to contain about one thousand nine hundred and twenty closely-printed pages, large octavo, will be five thalers.

Apologetical Contributions.[1] — This is the second part of the work noticed in a former number of the Bibliotheca Sacra. It embraces the following points: Rationalism, Sensualism; The Knowledge of Faith; its certainty, its limitations, its future completion; God and His Creation; the Kowledge of God; the Idea of God in the Old and New Testaments; the Trinity; Natural Science and Revelation; the Eternity of the World; Miracles; Original State of Man; the Fall; the Sinfulness of the Human Race; Inherited Sin; Actual Sin; Death the Wages of Sin. On all these points the book will be found to contain a number of just and often striking observations. Dr. Düsterdieck's general tendency is distinctively orthodox, though he expresses here and there opinions which would scarcely accord with the views of truth current among us.

Testimonies to the Gospel of John.[2] — This new and able apology for the authenticity of the Gospel of John is written with special reference to the attack recently made on it by Dr. S. Volkmar. Like Godet, in his Commentary on John, he believes that John largely supplements the other Gospels, thus explaining occasional difficulties and throwing light on occasional obscurities. With regard to the differences between John and the Synoptics, he comes to the conclusion that they are not contradictions, but the result of the adoption of an independent type, and thus speak for an authentic author. The circumstance that all the persons introduced speak in the same style, shows rather that the historian lacks art, than that his reports are untrue. Dr. Riggenbach reviews in succession the earliest witnesses from Irenaeus and the Canon Muratori, down to Justin Martyr. The line of argument pursued by Dr. de Groot in the treatise noticed above, is independent of, and supplements this of Dr. Riggenbach.

[1] Apologetische Beiträge von Dr. F. Düsterdieck in Hannover. 2 Beitrag. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. 1867.

[2] Die Zeugnisse für das Evangelium Johannis neu untersucht. Von Professor Dr. Riggenbach. Basel: Bahnmaier; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. 1867. Price, 1 thaler.

The Gospel of Mark.[1] — Lic. Klostermann has undertaken to answer the following three questions: 1. Whether from the recognizable plan which the author of Mark had in his mind and its relation to the Gospel as it now lies before us, the book ought to be described as the complete Mark, or as an incomplete original Mark? He answers: We have the complete Mark. 2. Whether the description given of Mark's Gospel by Papias so corresponds to the present Gospel that we can affirm it to be the same production? To which he answers: Yes. 3. What is the relation between Mark and Matthew? So far as this question can be answered on the basis of an investigation of Mark alone, the conclusion is arrived at that Mark presupposes the existence of an older writing whose character would seem to resemble the existing Gospel of Matthew. So much prominence has of late been given to Mark by Schenkel and others, that an inquiry like the present is of great interest and value.

Neo-Platonic Studies.[2] — In four parts Dr. Richter reviews the Life and Mental Development of Plotinus; his Doctrine of the ὄν and the Metaphysical Basis of his Philosophy; his Theology and Physics; his Psychology. A further part is to be devoted to the Ethics of Plotinus. Plotinus is a comparatively uncultivated field; and as he was one of the most influential writers and thinkers of the age at which Christianity arose, any contribution to our understanding of his peculiarities must be very welcome. The more carefully the religious and philosophical tendencies and characteristics of his age are examined, the more distinctly shall we see, on the one hand, that the human mind was feeling out after, and, as it were, shadowing forth in fancy and speculation, the facts of Christianity; and on the other hand, that Christianity could no more have been born of the age than a centaur or a mermaid could be born of the circumstance that human fancy has figured such things to itself.

New Bible Studies.[3] — Dr. Hölemann, Professor of Theology at the University of Leipsic, is a thoroughly orthodox Lutheran; and this new series of biblical studies is as strict as it can be. The subjects of the studies are as follows: 1. The Unity of the Two Accounts of the Creation in Genesis: 2. This Side Paradise, including two essays, one on the inorganic productions of the stream Pison; a second, on Cain and his physiognomy; 3. The Hünen or Giants before the Flood; 4. The Dying Sighs of Jacob;

[1] Das Markus Evangelium nach seinem Quellenwerth für die evangelische Geschichte. Von Lic. A. Klostermann. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Co.; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. 1867. Price, 48 silbergroschen.

[2] Neuplatonische Studien. Von Dr. A. Richter. Halle: Schmidt; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. Price, about 3 thalers.

[3] Neue Bibelstudien. Von Dr. H. S. Hölemann. Leipzig: E. Bredt; London: Asher and Co.; Trübner and Co. 1867. Price, 2⅓ thalers.

5. The Great Confession in 1 Tim. iii. 16; 6. Paul's Relation to the Question as to the Time of the Second Coming of Christ; 7. Laying on of Hands according to the Scripture; 8. Ghosts according to Scripture; 9. The Teachings of the Word of God relatively to the Rich of this World. As to the first, he says, the author of Genesis gave the simple historical data in the first account, secondary details in the second. In the second essay he treats the description of the productions of the stream Pison as a divinely ordered prophecy of the New Jerusalem. The giants he believes to have been the descendants of fallen angels and the daughters of men. He denies altogether that Paul, as many theologians assert or allow, entertained mistaken ideas about the second coming of Christ. The importance of the scriptural custom of laying on of hands is maintained in the seventh essay. Essay eight discusses the passages in which ghostly appearances are referred to in the Bible. And the ninth essay presents a pretty complete collection of scripture teachings regarding earthly possessions and so forth. Dr. Hölemann writes with great vigor and definiteness.

Dr. Keil: Commentary on the Twelve Minor Prophets. Part of the series publishing by Drs. Delitzsch and Keil, and of course thoroughly orthodox. Price, 3⅓ thalers.

Dr. J. J. Stähelin: The Life of David. A fair contribution to a most interesting subject, which has been less thoroughly investigated than it deserves. It does not profess to be of an edifying character. Dr. Stähelin appears to be rather free, or unfree, in his dealings with scripture. Price, 16 sgr.

Dr. F. C. Baur: Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ. A second and somewhat altered edition of one of the principal works of the late head of the Tübingen School. It is edited by his son-in-law, Professor Zeller of Heidelberg. Price, 4 thalers.

Dr. J. H. A. Ebrard: A Hand-book of Church History, in four volumes, of which the last two contain one thousand one hundred and five pages, carrying the subject down to 1866. Dr. Ebrard writes from the point of view of the German Reformed church; he is, however, unjust in some of his judgments of movements within the Reformed Church, as for example when he styles Methodism a "caricature of the Moravian brethren."

Lic. G. Plitt: Introduction to the Augustana, or History of the Evangelical Church to the Diet of Augsburg. Part I. The author belongs to the rigidly Confessionalistic School of Lutherans. He commences with Luther's early development. Price, 2 thalers.

Dr. M. Duschak: History and Description of the Jewish Cultus. Dr. Duschak is probably a Jew. The work is said to contain very much valuable information, and to be well worthy of the attention of Christian writers. Price, 2⅔ thalers.

Dr. Magling: The Land of the Kurgs and Mission Work there. A well-written book by a former missionary and an able man.

Dr. Ph. F. Keerl: Man the Image of God; his Relation to Christ and the World. This is the second part of a work noticed in a former number of the Bibliotheca Sacra. Rather fantastic. Price, 2 thalers.

Dr. J. H. Kurtz: The Theology of the Psalms. The subjects passed in review are: Messianic Teachings; the Idea of Retribution; Self-righteousness; and the Offensive Imprecation. Dr. Kurtz is orthodox, and a strict Lutheran. Price, 24 sgr.

Dr. F. A. Philippi: System of Theology. The second volume of a work noticed previously. It treats of the original fellowship of man with God. Dr. Philippi is Lutheran Professor at Rostock. Price, 54 sgr.

Zeller: Biblical Dictionary. A remarkably cheap work. Popular and yet sound and good. Price, for two thick volumes, 4 thalers.

Prof. Dr. Sack: History of Preaching in the Evangelical Church of Germany, from Mosheim to Schleiermacher and Menken. A valuable work by an experienced hand. Price, 52 sgr.

Klentgen: Defence of the Theology of our Fathers. A work by an eminent Roman Catholic theologian, which is said to be one of the best productions of the church in Germany.

Bishop C. J. Greith: Introduction to the History of the Monastery of St. Gall in Switzerland. The present volume is in reality an account of the Irish church in the days of Patrick, Columbanus, Columba, and Gallus — of course from the Romish point of view.

Professor Elger of Leitmeritz in Bohemia. Hand-book of Roman Catholic Moral Theology. Regarded by Roman Catholics as clearly written and well arranged.

Dr. Anton Rietter: The Moral System of Thomas Aquinas. A practical rather than a scientific work.

Visping: Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. This is part of a series of commentaries published by Roman Catholic theologians under the title of "Exegetical Hand-book to the New Testament." Interesting chiefly as the work of a Roman Catholic.

De Werner: History of the Apologetic and Polemical Literature of Christian Theology. An immense and somewhat rambling work, in five volumes, by a Roman Catholic. The subject is an interesting one.

Dr. Simar: Hand-book of Catholic Moral Theology. A work similar to the one mentioned above, but probably more scientific in its character.

Rosenthal: History of Converts to the Romish Church in England. We noticed the first volume of this work in a previous number.

Dr. Hettinger: Apology of Christianity. The third edition of a work which may in parts be of service to Protestant theologians. Where this author's Romanism is affected he is unjust towards Protestants.

Brischar: Roman Catholic Pulpit Orators in Germany. The present volume treats of the great Jesuit preachers.

Alban Stolz. Witterungen der Seele. A most remarkable autobiographical work, by one of the ablest popular Catholic writers in Germany. Alban Stolz is a convert to the Romish church. It deserves an attentive reading. Price, 40 sgr.

B. ENGLISH WORKS.

Among the books published in England, some of which have been republished in this country, are the following:

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Exodus, with a New Translation. By James G. Murphy, D.D., T.C.D., Professor of Hebrew, Belfast. 8vo. pp. 385. Andover: Warren F. Draper; Boston: W. H. Halliday and Co. Philadelphia: Smith, English, and Co. 1868.

In 1863 Dr. Murphy gave to the public his Commentary on the Book of Genesis, which has been well received in Great Britain, and has been republished by Mr. Draper in the United States. The present volume is well worthy of a careful and studious perusal. It has essentially the same excellences with the Commentary on Genesis. Like that, it proceeds on the principle that as one Infinite Mind is the author of the book of nature and the book of revelation, the two books will agree. Dr. Murphy combines a scientific education with a philological tact. When he fails to convince us that his interpretation is right, he suggests to us some better way of attaining the truth. We trust that his Commentaries will have a wide circulation among our clergy.

Biblical Commentary on the Prophecies of Isaiah. By Franz Delitsch, D.D., Professor of Theology. Translated from the German, by the Rev. James Martin, B.A., Nottingham. Vol. ii. 8vo. pp. 537. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; London: Hamilton and Co.; Dublin: John Robertson and Co. 1867.

Professor Delitzsch is well known to our readers as one of the most learned men of the age. All his writings illustrate the vast range of his investigations. The second volume of the Commentary on Isaiah is, like his other writings, elaborate and exhaustive. We are pleased to learn that the Messieurs Clark, to whom we are indebted for many of our most valuable works, intend to publish, during the present year, the Commentary of Keil and Delitzsch on the Minor Prophets, and the first volume of Delitzsch's Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. They hope also to publish during the year a Commentary of Professor Hengstenberg on Ezekiel. Among the recent publications of this enterprising house, besides those which we have noticed already, are Dr. Krummacher's David King of Israel, a Portrait drawn from Bible History and the Book of Psalms;

Professor Hetherington's Apologetics of the Christian Faith; Professor Doedes's Manual of New Testament Hermeneutics: and Dr. Preuss's Romish Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception traced from its Source.

THE DIVINE REVELATION: An Essay in Defence of the Faith. By the late Carl August Auberlen, Ph.D., D.D., Professor at Basle. To which is prefixed a brief Memoir of the Author. 8vo. pp. 441. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; London: Hamilton, Adams and Co.; Dublin: John Robertson and Co. 1867.

In the present volume Dr. Auberlen has exhibited the same extent of research and candor of mind which are noticeable in his other treatises. His criticisms on contemporary theologians are fair and not unkind. While his interpretations of scripture are sometimes visionary, he is still eminently evangelical.

TITHES AND OFFERINGS: A Treatise on the Principles, Practice, and Benefits of devoting Portions of our Substance to the Service of God. By E. W. Boase. 8vo. pp. 351. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1865.

We have but recently received this volume, although it was published about three years ago. We think that it could have been published nowhere but in Scotland. In no other country is there sufficient interest in the subject, and at the same time sufficient love of patient investigation to encourage the preparation of a treatise so copious and exhaustive on a theme so hackneyed and often so superficially discussed. It abounds with statistics, which suggest many practical reflections on the duty of honoring the Lord with our substance.

THE ENGLISH BIBLE: How to read and study it; with aids thereto. By William Carpenter, editor of the fifth edition of Calmet's Dictionary, and author of its Abridgement, and of various other Works on Biblical Criticism and Interpretation. 18mo. pp. 118. London: Heywood and Co. 1867.

This is a practical volume, exhibiting good sense and good intentions.

THE INSPIRATION OF SCRIPTURE: Its Limits and Effects. By George Warington, author of The Historic Character of the Pentateuch vindicated, The Mosaic Origin of the Pentateuch considered, etc. 16mo. pp. 284. London: F. Skeffington. 1867.

The aim and spirit of this able treatise may be most clearly stated by quoting the 256th and 257th pages.

"'When God chooses a being of finite knowledge to be the medium of his revelations, it is at once understood that the faculties of this being are left in their natural state, except so far as regards the especial message with which he is entrusted.'—Arnold, Sermons, Vol. ii. p. 385.

"These words of Dr. Arnold contain, in brief but accurate form, the result at which we have arrived by a careful examination of the three great sources of evidence available for determining the question before us — the limits and effects of scripture inspiration.

"The first of these sources — external testimony — showed us that the Bible was at the first, and has been ever since, received and reverenced by the church as the divinely authoritative standard of faith and practice; the authority thus ascribed to it being regarded as equal to that belonging to direct revelation. This was the main conclusion founded upon the church's reception of and witness to the canon of scripture. To which, as a corollary, was added, that concerning all further matters — as the extension of this inspiration to the particular words of scripture, its statements on secular subjects, or its writer's expressions of personal sentiment — no authoritative judgment whatever had been pronounced, but the question left entirely open; the opinions advocated by early and eminent writers exhibiting, indeed, on these points very considerable diversity.

"The second source of evidence — direct, internal testimony — showed us that the various claims, statements, and assertions, open or implied, wherein the writers of scripture, or Christ and his apostles as reported by them, spoke of the inspiration of scripture, corresponded precisely with this witness of the church: positively, in that testimony was borne repeatedly, and in a great variety of ways, to divine authority in all matters of faith and practice; negatively, in that inspiration on those points left open by the church was not claimed, but rather, in certain cases, distinctly disclaimed.

"The third source of evidence — indirect internal testimony — showed us that the facts and phenomena of scripture, when tried by the positive standard of the Bible itself, or, where this failed, by the negative one of divine revelations, agreed together most harmoniously to prove (1) that inspiration did not extend to the letter of scripture, but was confined to its spirit; (2) that it did not extend to the statements of scripture, regarded as narrations of matters of fact, but was confined to its spiritual teaching, the question of personal sentiments being left undecided; and (3) that there was no reason to regard any portion of this teaching as uninspired, even when colored by personal and historical influences, but rather every reason to regard the whole as inspired."

The faults of Mr. Warington's treatise are, that it insists on too strict a construction of the style of the New Testament, fails to take a comprehensive view of the possible interpretations of it, over-estimates the degree of the knowledge which we possess in regard to the circumstances in which certain words were uttered, and the influence of these circumstances in explaining the words. Thus, in comparing Matthew xxiii. 37–39 with Luke xiii. 34, 35, Mr. Warington seems to be perfectly confident that Matthew has mistaken the time when the words of the Saviour were uttered. "We have no hesitation in affirming that the words were *not* uttered in

the connection and at the time given by Matthew, but only in those given by Luke. It is the concluding clause of the passage, 'I say unto you, Ye shall in no wise see me until ye say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.' These words, be it observed, are addressed to Jerusalem. Christ asserts that Jerusalem shall not again behold him until prepared to welcome him with these particular words. Now, taking the occasion as given by Matthew, in what way did this prediction come true? It was uttered, according to him, two days before the passover (xxvi. 2). On one of these days, at all events, it is certain that Jesus came into Jerusalem, namely the day before his betrayal (Mark xiv. 1–2, 12–17). He was unquestionably seen by the people of Jerusalem, if not then, at least on the day following — that of his crucifixion. We may safely assert that neither when entering, nor when thus seen, was he welcomed in the way described. How, then, were Christ's words true? But now, turning to the occasion as given by Luke, what do we find? These words were uttered, according to him, immediately before Christ's final departure from Galilee to Jerusalem (xiii. 22, 31–33). The first time, then, when Jerusalem again beheld him, was when he rode into it amid the rejoicing crowd, seated on a colt, on which occasion *these very words* which he had predicted formed one of the most striking features of his welcome (Matt. xxi. 9; Mark xi. 9; Luke xix. 38). It seems plain from this that Luke's account of the time when this prediction was made is the true one; and that Matthew has here, like Luke before, unwittingly transferred a notable saying from the real occasion of its utterance to another and incorrect one" (pp. 176, 177).

It is evident that Mr. Warington does not recognize the possibility of assigning more than one meaning, although German as well as English critics have been long accustomed to assign different meanings, to Matt. xxiii. 37–39. He supposes that these words must refer to Christ's triumphant entrance into Jerusalem, and cannot refer to his "coming" on any other occasion, temporal or spiritual; his coming to destroy Jerusalem, or to judge the world, or to make new manifestations of himself, to give special revelations of his truth. It is certainly illogical to found a theory on passages which may properly receive a different interpretation from that which is essential to the support of the theory. The present treatise, although in the main candid as well as powerful, does yet, like many others of the same general character, unduly magnify the difficulties of the theory of inspiration, and exalt the first or superficial appearances into absolute certainties.

Six Short Sermons on Sin. Lent Lectures at St. Alban the Martyr, Holborn. By the Rev. Orby Shipley, M.A. 16mo. pp. 108. London, Oxford, and Cambridge: Rivingtons. 1866. — Mr. Shipley is the editor of an octavo, containing 567 closely printed pages, entitled, The Church

AND THE WORLD: Essays on Questions of the Day in 1867, by various writers. The Essays are written in the interest of the ritualists, and have made no slight commotion in the Anglican church. He also published a volume with the same title in 1866, which we have not seen.

Within a few years a large number of works have been reprinted in this country having reference, nearer or more remote, to Natural Theology. Among them are, LIFE: ITS NATURE, VARIETIES, AND PHENOMENA. 12mo. pp. 407. Boston: T. H. Carter and Son. 1866. — THE PHENOMENA OF PLANT LIFE. Boston: Nichols and Noyes. 12mo. pp. 93. 1867. — THE SEXUALITY OF NATURE; an Essay proposing to show that Sex and the Marriage Union are universal principles, fundamental alike in Physics, Physiology, and Psychology. 12mo. pp. 124. Boston: T. H. Carter and Sons. 1867. — THE LITTLE THINGS OF NATURE; considered especially in relation to the Divine Benevolence. Second edition, revised. Boston: T. H. Carter and Son. 12mo. pp. 88. 1866. — Our readers will recognize these four volumes as from the pen of Leo H. Grindon, Lecturer on Botany at the Royal School of Medicine, Manchester, England, and author of Figurative Language, The Manchester Flora. "The physical and the spiritual world," he says, "are in such close connection, that to attempt to treat philosophically of either of them apart from the other, is to divorce what God has joined together." "Science without religion is empty and dead. True wisdom finding the whole world expressive of God, calls upon us to walk at all times and in all places in the worship and reverent contemplation of him." — More distinctively religious than the works just named, but less distinctively scientific is the volume entitled BIBLE TEACHINGS IN NATURE. By the Rev. Hugh MacMillan, author of First Forms of Vegetation. 12mo. pp. 344. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1867. — Another work, not less religious, but more imaginative or fanciful, is THE STARS AND THE ANGELS. Second edition. 16mo. pp. 358. Philadelphia: James S. Claxton. 1867.

C. AMERICAN WORKS.

Among the books recently published by American writers are the following;

THEOLOGICAL INDEX: References to the Principal Works in every department of Religious Literature. Embracing nearly seventy thousand citations, alphabetically arranged under two thousand heads. By Howard Malcom, D.D., LL.D. 8vo. pp. 488. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; London: Trübner and Co. 1868.

Dr. Malcom informs us in his Preface that Lowndes's Bibliographer's Manual names only about fifty thousand authors, although the Manual

embraces all departments of knowledge. This fact illustrates the wide reach of the present Index. We have examined the Index with some care, and are convinced of its great utility. Some critics may wish that certain volumes were named which are omitted, and others may wish that certain volumes were omitted which are named. Some may desire more, others fewer specifications in regard to the extent and character of the treatises referred to. But these very critics would have been perhaps more severely censured by the public if their own plans had been adopted. Dr. Malcom has designed his volume for the benefit of authors, students, and purchasers of books. He says truly: "Next to knowing a thing, is to know where to obtain the information; and as no one can know much, the latter attainment, if extensive, is on the whole the better." "Scire ubi aliquid possis invenire, magna pars eruditionis est."

The influence of that fascinating book Ecce Homo continues to be seen in the spirit of some works and in the titles of others. We have no space at present for comments on the new and interesting volume entitled Ecce Ecclesia; but from an esteemed correspondent we have received the following notice of

Ecce Coelum; or, Parish Astronomy. In Six Lectures, by a Connecticut Pastor. Boston: Nichols and Noyes.

This is a remarkable book, one of the most remarkable which has proceeded from the American press for a long time. It purports to be an exhibition of the great facts of Astronomy, so set forth as to be understood and appreciated by the average minds of an intelligent New England Parish. Without mathematical diagrams, formulas, or figures, it lifts the reader fairly into the heavens, and unveils their glories. From satellite systems we rise to sun systems, to group systems, to cluster systems, to nebula systems, to ulterior systems, to the ultimate systems, and behold their order, periods, distances, shapes, and inclinations, sizes, velocities, masses and densities, and perturbations. The presentation is very full, though concentrated, very clear and animating, with a command of language, and a glow of eloquence which might be objectionable in a purely scientific work, but which as addressed to a common parish audience, must have been exciting, and is quite extraordinary. The last Lecture, on the question, Is there an Author of Nature? is hardly less than a Te Deum, an anthem with a beautiful refrain, addressed to the world as a conviction of God's being and greatness, and in adoration of him. The only adverse criticism which on reading the Prefatory Lecture we were inclined to make, was that the almost impassioned eloquence with which it opened would have been more impressive had it come further on, and after the imagination had been excited by the facts. But after finishing the sixth and last Lecture we could not wonder that a mind so full of the great astronomical truths which the author has set forth, and so full of the emo-

tion which they necessarily kindle, should, in seeing his own parish charge assembled to listen, break forth in strains which none but a mind fully roused by his theme and his audience would have been able to utter. No person can read through this little volume without mental exaltation, and a conviction of the peculiar ability of the author.

LECTURES ON THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. Delivered in the Mercer Street Church, New York, Jan. 21 to Feb. 21, 1867, on the Ely Foundation of the Union Theological Seminary. By Albert Barnes, author of Notes on the New Testament, Notes on the Psalms, etc., etc. 12mo. pp. 451. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1868.

These Lectures will give their venerated author a new claim to the gratitude of the churches. With rare freshness of thought and style he examines the following themes: The Limitations of the Human Mind on the Subject of Religion; Historical Evidence as affected by Time; Historical Evidence as affected by Science; The Evidence of Christianity from its Propagation; Miracles: the Evidence in the Nineteenth Century that they were Performed in the First; The Argument for the Truth of Christianity, in the Nineteenth Century, from Prophecy; Inspiration of the Scriptures, with Reference to the Objections made in the Nineteenth Century; The Evidence of the Divine Origin of Christianity from the Personal Character and the Incarnation of Christ; The Christian Religion as adapted to the Wants of Man, as illustrated in these Eighteen Hundred Years; The Relation of Christianity to the World's Progress in Science, Civilization, and the Arts in the Nineteenth Century. We cannot illustrate the design or the spirit of these Lectures in any better way than by quoting the following paragraph: The Christian "religion is to maintain its position only by *keeping* abreast or ahead of the world. The men who are to defend it in this age and in coming generations are to be men who are 'up to their age.' The arguments by which the philosophy of the Epicureans and Stoics could be met at Athens do not constitute all the arguments which are needed now. The weapons which led to victory in the contests of the 'Fathers' with Celsus and Porphyry will not necessarily lead to victory now. The methods of the school-men are not all that is needed now. The weapons which seemed so formidable in past ages might not be formidable now. Old weapons of war — greaves and shields and spears and catapults — were useful; but there comes a time when they are laid aside, and find repose in ancient halls and towers. There is a 'living age,' and it is much for a young man entering on life, and especially in a position where he will be called to defend Christianity as the main business of his life, to know that there *is* such an age, and *what* it is. Theologians must deal with living men and with living opinions, and if they are not prepared for this, they are not prepared for the work of their age. The ministry must be

prepared to meet men — living men — on the question of the inspiration of the scriptures, and with arguments that will commend themselves to those trained in the principles of profound criticism; on the question about the antiquity of the race on earth, and with arguments not derived from synods and councils; on the whole question of miracles, and of a supernatural influence in the affairs of men. A more deep and subtile Pantheism in the form of Rationalism or Positivism lies at the foundation of the sciences of this day, as they are held, than the great mass of the friends of Christianity are aware of; and against all this, it may be unconsciously, the friend of Christianity struggles and contends when he attempts to impress its truths on the minds of men. No true friend of Christianity could wish that the ministers of religion should be less pious, or less imbued with Biblical learning; but let them go prepared to meet the world as it is, and not go clad in the armor of a past generation, only to find that the enemy which that kind of armor is fitted to subdue has long been wandering in the land of shades among the knight-errants of the past" (pp. 400, 401).

Origin of the Four Gospels. By Constantine Tischendorf, Professor of Theology in the University of Leipsig. Translated, under the author's sanction, by William L. Gage. From the fourth German edition, revised and greatly enlarged. 16mo. pp. 287. Boston: American Tract Society. 1868.

The facts in regard to this translation are given by Mr. Gage on the seventh and eighth pages of his preface, thus: "During an interview with Professor Tischendorf at Leipzig in May 1868, he told me that he was then re-writing his work 'When were our Gospels written?' making it a book for scholars instead of for popular readers, and enlarging it to three times its original size. He believed that both works were needed, in England and America no less than in Germany, and suggested to me to undertake the translation of the larger work. I promised to do so at my earliest leisure; and the result is now before the public. The name of the work I have ventured to change. In the German it bears the same title with the smaller sketch, 'When were our Gospels written?' but fearing lest some should suppose that the two books are almost identical, merely different issues of the same work, it has seemed no violence to give the treatise the name, 'Origin of the Four Gospels.' The learned author has not succeeded in throwing his materials together in a way to attract hasty readers; his style is in this work rather heavy, hard, and disjointed; but great, invaluable facts are there; and there is no lack of a clear, well-poised, thoroughly guarded critical judgment, sound faith, and earnest purpose. If our Christian public at large have reason to be grateful for the publication of the little work of Tischendorf, our clergymen, theological students, and professors have no less cause to thank the great Leipsig scholar for furnishing them with this armory of bright, keen weapons to be employed

in the overthrow of unbelief." Mr. Gage has rendered a valuable service to the religious community by his labors on this important work.

THE NEW TESTAMENT: with Notes, Pictorial Illustrations, and References. Vol. i. The Four Gospels: with a Chronological Harmony. By Israel P. Warren. 12mo. pp. 386. Boston: American Tract Society. 1868.

This commentary is printed beautifully, and is well adapted to popular use. "It aims to give the conclusions reached by the best biblical scholars, such as Alford, Lange, Olshausen, Bengel, Tholuck, Trench, Stuart, Robinson, Alexander, Hackett, Professor Owen, and others, as to the true interpretation of the sacred word."

EZEKIEL AND DANIEL: with Notes, Critical, Explanatory, and Practical, designed for both Pastors and People. By Henry Cowles, D.D. 12mo. pp. 472. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1867.

In 1866 Dr. Cowles published his Commentary on the Minor Prophets. He intends to publish a continued commentary on all the prophets. His style is concise, definite, and almost uniformly perspicuous. His views of prophecy are in the main rational and sound. He is a diligent and accurate scholar, and his commentaries breathe a devout and truly reverent spirit. They are not superficial, but will command the attention of the learned. They exhibit not the process but the results of learning, and will thus attract the interested attention of the people.

THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS, with Explanatory Notes: to which is added a Condensed View of the Priesthood of Christ, and a Translation of the Epistle, prepared for this work. By Henry J. Ripley, late Professor in Newton Theological Institution, and author of Notes on the Gospels, Acts of the Apostles, Epistle to the Romans, etc. 12mo. pp. 213. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Sheldon and Co.; Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard and Co. 1868.

Professor Ripley is a careful and conscientious writer. His Commentaries have done good service to the cause of evangelical religion. He is not a partizan theologian, but aims to be candid and fair. His explanation of Heb. vi. 4–6 affords an illustration of his freedom from the trammels of sect or party. Many Calvinists would refuse their assent to this explanation, and where they could agree with him in opinion would prefer a much more decided style. "If it be asked whether an apostate, becoming afterwards convinced of his error and sin, would be beyond the pale of hope, if he should in a penitent spirit seek forgiveness through Jesus, the answer is easy. Such a case is altogether unlikely, in view of the depraved temper of mind which apostasy involves, and of the insensibility to religious obli-

gations, to the mercy and love of God, and to the pure and ennobling hopes which the gospel imparts. According to all human probabilities it will not occur. But should it occur, and the sin consequently be not persisted in, but abandoned, such a case, notwithstanding the enormity of wickedness chargeable to the person who, by the supposition, has become penitent, would come within the range of our Lord's merciful declaration in John vi. 37, 'Him that cometh unto me I will in *no wise* cast out.'" (p. 77.)

THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD. By Rev. George S. Mott, author of "The Prodigal Son." 18mo. pp. 230. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1867.

The practical impression of this treatise is solemn and deep.

MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. By Timothy Farrar. 8vo. pp. 532. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1867.

Judge Farrar has brought to the study of our great Charter the fruits of a long-continued legal and judicial practice. With a sound mind and honest heart he has devoted himself to an explanation of the principles involved in and lying under the Constitution. He has shown that it has been adopted by the *people as such*; that it is the fundamental law for the whole country; that it is adequate to all the exigences of the government; that it is competent to all the purposes for which a good government is ever wanted. The Constitution being the law, the paramount law, of the American people, imposes certain duties, and these duties carry with them the full power to discharge them. The epitome and essence of the whole Constitution are in the celebrated, enacting clause, "We the people," etc. Had the Constitution ended here, "nothing could have been wanting but the details, specifications, limitations, and qualifications which the government itself would have supplied, if the people had seen fit to omit doing it for them. "There can be no doubt," says Mr. Madison, "that all the particular powers, requisite as means for executing the general powers, would have resulted to the government by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law or in reason, than that, whenever the end is required, the means are authorized; whenever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included. By authoritatively presenting [in the enacting clause] the purposes and objects to be accomplished, it [the Constitution] regulates the magnitude and extent of the powers to be applied to them. The end and the means must be commensurate." "To say that it was the express purpose of the people that a thing should be done, and yet that the government have no power to do it, is therefore a contradiction in terms. The means, says Alexander Hamilton, ought to be proportioned to the

end; the persons from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected ought to possess the means by which it is attained" (pp. 78, 79). By enunciating such principles Judge Farrar lays the foundation for important theories of government, some of which have been controverted during the late rebellion, and also during many other of our political agitations. The views of Judge Farrar in regard to the organization of our government, the general and special legislative powers, the executive, the judiciary, the States as such, and the people as such, appear to be in the main eminently judicious and well sustained.

MISSIONARY LIFE IN PERSIA: being Glimpses of a Quarter of a Century of Labors among Nestorian Christians. By Justin Perkins, D.D. With Illustrations. 16mo. pp. 256. Boston: American Tract Society. 1868.

Dr. Perkins has for many years thrown a fascination over the Nestorian life, and the present volume will add a new interest to the mission in which he has been so faithful a laborer.

THANKSGIVING: Memories of the Day; Helps to the Habit. By William Adams, D.D. 12mo. pp. 372. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1867. — THE THREE GARDENS: Eden, Gethsemane, and Paradise; or, Man's Ruin, Redemption, and Restoration. By William Adams, D.D., Pastor of the Madison Square Presbyterian Church. 12mo. pp. 284. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1868. The author of these volumes preserves his studious habits, and exhibits in all his writings the evidence of extensive reading. If with all his multifarious avocations he can preserve his familiarity with books, he reads a valuable lesson to other pastors who have not the responsibilities of large and difficult parishes. His published volumes show that he has a high ideal of a sermon, and that he faithfully endeavors to reach in practice his own theoretical standard. Here lies one secret of success in the pulpit.

In addition to other already noticed works published by Charles Scribner and Company, New York, are PRAYERS FROM THE PLYMOUTH PULPIT. By Henry Ward Beecher. 12mo. pp. 332; and NORWOOD: or, Village Life in New England. By Henry Ward Beecher. 12mo. pp. 549. It is certainly very remarkable that two such works have appeared within the same half year from the same fertile genius. The prayers contain many exquisite expressions of sentiment, devout, tender, loving. The pages of Norwood abound with beautiful descriptions. Whether it was advisable for Mr. Beecher to allow the publication of either of the volumes, is a question on which very different opinions have been expressed. Mr. Beecher's writings, however, will be read, whether they be approved or disapproved by the critics.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

FREE COMMUNION.

BY REV. SERENO D. CLARK, SECRETARY OF THE CONGREGATIONAL BOARD OF PUBLICATION.

PART II.—THE SPECIFIC PRINCIPLES AND CANONS OF SCRIPTURE PRESCRIBING AND REGULATING CHURCH FELLOWSHIP.

SECTION IV. — *Arguments and Considerations corroborative of the above Conclusions deduced from Apostolic Toleration.*

I. Strict communionists, by the particular texts which they cite to justify their exclusion of evangelical Pedobaptists, associate them with unchristian characters, directly contrary to repeated acknowledgments of their decided piety and Christian enterprise. The texts are: (1) Rom. xvi. 17: "Now I beseech you, brethren, mark them which cause divisions and offences, contrary to the doctrine which ye have learned, and avoid them." These were factious persons, divisive spirits, who had embraced heretical sentiments, which both corrupted their own characters and exerted a pestilential influence on others. They are described in the succeeding verse, such as "serve not our Lord Jesus Christ," as are sensual, serving their appetites, and as with professions of godliness are artful, deluding the unsuspecting, and thus evincing characters unworthy of Christian confidence. (2) 1 Cor. v. 11: "But now I have written unto you not to keep com-

pany, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolator, or railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner; with such an one, no not to eat." The terms here employed need no explanation, signifying as they do, characters which every decent man abhors. (3) 2 Thess. iii. 6: "Now we command you, brethren, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly, and not after the tradition which he received of us." The brother whom Paul here speaks of as walking disorderly, was one who led "a dissolute life"; according to Robinson, one who took such practical views of Christ's coming immediately to judge the world as led to the neglect of ordinary business; to live dishonestly on the earnings of the more industrious; and to indulge in extravagant fancies to the corruption of his own morals and the morals of others; who even persisted in doing this after being repeatedly admonished to the contrary. In 1 Thess. v. 14, such are denominated "unruly," i.e. ungovernable men, proud, self-willed, betraying an utter want of Christian temper. (4) Titus iii. 10: "A man that is an heretic after the first and second admonition, reject." The word rendered heretic (*αἱρετικόν*), signifies, according to Dr. Robinson, "one who creates dissensions, introduces errors, etc., — a factious person." The eleventh verse reveals his character more unequivocally: "Knowing that he that is such is subverted, and sinneth, being condemned of himself." Conybeare and Howson render the last clause: "and by his sins is self-condemned." In like manner it may be shown that all those from whom the apostolic churches were instructed to withdraw had forfeited the Christian confidence of their brethren, were sowing seeds of dissension, and destroying the faith of others.

To apply these passages, therefore, to evangelical Pedobaptists, is logically classing them with those disreputable characters described in them. Our opponents seem half-conscious of the injustice done us by such application, and therefore endeavor to soften the implied censure by the most

generous acknowledgments of our high Christian character and zeal. "We fully admit and heartily admire the pure lives and eminent piety of many of those whom we are not accustomed to invite to partake with us in this sacred rite. We rejoice with all our hearts in the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ manifested in them, and in the work which he is doing in the world by their honored agency. ..... We know that they enjoy manifest and manifold tokens of being loved and accepted of Christ"; even "enjoy much larger measures of his spirit than most of us enjoy."

Here is a plain inconsistency. If we are such characters as those described in the passages above applied to us, we cannot be admired for our eminent piety. On the other hand, if we are distinguished for devoted piety, Christian zeal, and purity of life, then these texts are not justly applicable to us.

But from this inconsistency our Baptist friends cannot extricate themselves, so long as with a Christian spirit they endeavor to justify their exclusion of living evangelical churches from the memorial supper, in which by their own confession the latter have an equal interest, and to which among themselves they have an undisputed right.

II. The conscientious tenacity with which Baptists and Pedobaptists hold to their respective tenets, instead of making against, demands free communion. A tender regard to the consciences of brethren in Christ is distinctly taught in 1 Cor. x. 28, 29. The instruction is: Hurt not the conscientious feelings of a brother. Respect them. Your conscientious convictions, enlightened, as you believe, by the scriptures, are exceedingly sacred to you. Remember that his conscientious convictions, enlightened by the scriptures, are just as sacred to him. Deal kindly, then, with him for his conscience' sake, as you would have him deal kindly with you for the same reason. This respect, due to the Christian consciences of our brethren, is taught with equal explicitness in Rom. xiv. 5, 10, 13. We are not to judge or condemn them. God is their judge.

The conscience of a heathen or of an infidel, from whose minds the truths of the Bible are excluded — the conscience of one who discards its essential truths, or of one who shows great indifference to the commands of God — may be treated with disrespect; but the conscientious scruples of those who are prayerful readers of God's word, and who endeavor earnestly to work the righteousness of faith, are to be treated very differently. A man has nothing more sacred or inviolable than a conscience thus enlightened; nothing from which he would not sooner part than its soft whispers of peace. Such a conscience is most easily wounded. A slighting word or act of another gives it pain. It is that, therefore, which Christians should most highly respect in each other, and treat most tenderly.

Rev. J. T. Smith, in his reply to Dr. Peters on baptism, meets the objection that persons are sometimes so circumstanced that their immersion would be a physical impossibility, thus: "When the law of Christ requires a definite physical act (as it does in both the ordinances of the church) and there is a physical impossibility of performing it, the law is virtually obeyed, and it is so accepted of God, when the desire is felt and expressed of performing it" (p. 149). But is there not a moral necessity which is just as decided an impediment in the way of performing a voluntary act? It is said that God cannot lie. Joseph felt the same impossibility when he said: "How can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God?" Luther evinced the same necessity when he said before his opposers, laying his hand on his heart: "Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise. God help me; Amen!" Is there not in these instances a necessity which is as strong an impediment to a conscientious act as a physical necessity? Is it not a necessity of far more dignity and nobleness? Does it not mark a character most like God? Is it not the consummation of moral sublimity?

There are multitudes, men of talent, of scholarship, and earnest piety, among the Pedobaptists, who with Christian simplicity are fully resolved, with our Pilgrim Fathers, "to

follow the Bible, let it cost what it may," but who are so thoroughly convinced that the views of our opponents respecting baptism are unscriptural, that they could not submit to them without violating the strongest convictions of conscience. When told they must adopt them and act accordingly, or be excluded from sacramental communion, they feel bound to the latter alternative by the same constrainings of conscience as held Joseph in the house of Pharaoh, and Luther before the Diet at Worms. Such are certainly to be commiserated, if not justified. We cannot see why they are not held by a necessity as imperative, and as worthy of Christian regard and sympathy as a physical necessity.

That this is the condition of our Baptist brethren not less than our own, they repeatedly affirm, and we believe. Here, then, are two classes of professing Christians alike devoted, and alike conscientiously adhering to the word of God as the ultimate rule of faith and duty. Now shall one exclude the other from its sacramental board on account of supposed errors conscientiously held? Not so the apostle taught. He bids us respect each other's conscientious convictions touching modes of rites and forms of church order; and so long as we see in each other the image of the Master, to spread boards of sacramental love reciprocally free.

III. Inclusion in a covenant guarantees its privileges (Gal. iii. 29). Here Paul asserts that the believer in Jesus is included in the Abrahamic covenant, entitled to all the blessings of that covenant, and of course to all its privileges as dispensed under the gospel. He who was in the Abrahamic covenant under the old dispensation was entitled, as a true Israelite, to all the privileges of the Jewish church. So he who is in the same covenant under the dispensation of the gospel is entitled, when he has proved his interest in it, to all the privileges of the gospel church. Circumcision brought one into the Abrahamic covenant, but faith brings him into it under the gospel. If we are brought into the gospel covenant by faith, then after manifesting it by pub-

licly taking the vows of God, we are entitled to the public privileges of that covenant.

IV. The right of Pedobaptists to the communion among themselves, insures to other professing Christians the privilege of partaking with them. Our Baptist friends freely concede this right to orthodox Pedobaptists. But if it is right for Pedobaptists to observe the Lord's supper in their own churches, the act must be pleasing to Christ. Consequently, on their own principles, the Baptists may and ought to commune with them. But if it be still maintained to be wrong for Baptists to commune with orthodox Pedobaptist churches lawfully celebrating the sacramental supper, it is so: 1. Because it is the special mission of the former to maintain the ordinances of the gospel in their exact form and order. But we have shown that to refuse sacramental fellowship for such cause cannot be proved scriptural. 2. If wrong, it is so because some moral taint would be contracted by such associations. But it will not be pretended that any moral taint can be contracted by sacramental associations with those with whom Christ communes, and who are distinguished for their Christian virtues. 3. If wrong, it is so because the communion of the Baptists with the Pedobaptists would sanction the errors and misapprehensions of the latter. But communing with others at the table of Christ does not sanction their faults. Were it the necessary result of intercommunion, the Baptists would sanction the sins of their own brethren whenever they gather around the sacramental board. But this they will not admit. No more do they sanction the errors of Pedobaptists by sacramental communion with them. Sacramental communion with another is simply a recognition of a common oneness in Christ. Hence the communion of the Pedobaptists in the Lord's supper is really the sin, not the uniting of the Baptists with them; a sin of which some of the latter are so far from complaining, that they even affirm it to be the duty of the former to commit it in obedience to their perverted consciences.

V. The inevitable results of Baptist principles of church

communion, were they universally adopted and carried out, show their unscripturalness. These results flow from a scriptural fact in connection with a law of mental activity. The fact is that the exact organization of the gospel church, its exact mode of discipline and form of worship are, in their details, far from being distinctly defined in the New Testament. This is affirmed by Andrew Fuller and Dr. Arnold. The law is that the human mind, endowed with large discursive powers, easily swayed by feelings or warped by prejudices, often guided to its decisions by peculiarities of temperament and logical tendencies, early associations or educational proclivities, will, when employed in investigating religious forms, be almost sure to reach different conclusions. To insist, therefore, that the gospel church shall be constructed and administered precisely according to the apostolic model, or that every Christian society, however small, has the right to exclude from its communion all who in the least deviate from what they believe to be that model, will cause instead of peace, animosity; instead of union, divisions and subdivisions without number. The noblest immunities of the human mind, as at present circumstanced, render such a result inevitable.

This has been painfully true in the past; nor so long as partially sanctified hearts diffuse their disturbing influences through our moral sensibilities and around our loftiest powers of thought, can the future promise in this respect much improvement. For only prove one gospel rite or form of worship modal, and reason sees not why another may not be modal, and then another, and another; indeed, it sees no adequate cause for not giving to all the same inflexible nature. Nor if Christ saw a necessity for constituting one modal, can the reason see why there is not the virtual necessity for making others, nay all, modal; in other words, were it necessary to give one a fixed, inflexible character contrary to the freedom of the gospel, why not give all a similar character, contrary to the freedom of the gospel? Thus the myriad minds of God's people, wandering

on from age to age, one fixing here and another there, will not be likely to harmonize anywhere. But as the great majority of Christians in the past have not decided that exactness in mode is essential to the proper administration of a gospel rite or form of worship, the extreme result above supposed has not been reached, and by the continuance of the same cause we trust it will not be reached in the future. But let the principle of strict communionists be universally adopted, and no limit to division in the catholic church can be fixed. Indeed, there could be no catholic church but the invisible church. Thus the principle, that no indulgence should be allowed to mistakes regarding a rite or positive law because it is a part of the constituted form of the scriptural or modal church carried out to its legitimate results, would ensure war rather than peace, and shiver into shreds the visible body of Christ, thus proving the principle unscriptural.

VI. Three principles of divine action respecting the Christian church admitted both by ourselves and our opponents, can be made to meet in sacramental fellowship only on the ground of Christian consciousness. 1. The Divine determination to guarantee to man the enjoyment of the full immunities of his nature in unrestricted inquiry concerning matters of religious belief and practice, guided only by the requisitions of revelation and the dictates of a holy heart. 2. The Divine determination to have a holy church entirely spiritual in its nature, separate from the world as Christ was separate from the world. 3. The Divine determination that this holy church, made alive by the life of Christ dwelling in its members, should, even while scattered over the world, and coming and passing away as the generations revolve, be united in one, so as to form a personal unity with him who is their Lord and life, according to his prayer in John xvii. 21, 22. These are glorious purposes of God respecting his church, not one of which would we alter. These must be harmonized in church organizations and sacramental communion. Where can they find their point of agreement?

Nowhere, we confidently aver, but on manifested faith, uniting all to Christ and to each other. We are therefore prepared to affirm,

VII. This is the only principle on which a true visible catholic church can be founded in a sphere of intelligences but partially sanctified, to each of whom is guaranteed the right of private judgment. Circumstanced thus, two things are indispensable to the highest efficiency of the church of Christ — spirituality and concord. Concord without spirituality is a lifeless mass. On the other hand, spirituality without agreement and co-operation cannot rise into full efficiency. When the vitality of the individual Christian is manifestly in sympathy with the vitalities of all other professing Christians, the church is in its normal state. In such a state alone can it become the true visible catholic church. For that church must have an internal unity as well as an external; indeed, the internal is the essential element out of which the external must grow.

We had a fair experiment of attempted harmony, grounded on external rites and usages of worship, in the Jewish church. Its divine authority linked the Jews to their religion and its ritual services with chains of steel. But with all their attachment to its forms, and their unity thereby secured, the Jewish church was exceedingly defective in spirituality. Formality found in her enclosure a congenial soil. It luxuriated everywhere. Hundreds were palsied by it in every generation. The Jewish church could never have nurtured the religious life of humanity to its full strength. It was indeed designed only for the scaffolding by which God was building up the temple of his spiritual church, destined in the ensuing dispensation to rise in its full splendors. It was not constituted to grow by the independency of sanctified thought. It was never fitted to become the one church of the world.

The Romish church has effectually tried the experiment of establishing herself as a catholic church on external observances under the gospel dispensation; and, though by

suppressing free thought she has extended her sway far and wide, yet, as the atmosphere of independent thinking begins to circulate through the iron-barred apartments of her spacious fabric, she already begins to totter. Her constitution, antagonistic to freedom of inquiry, insures her downfall. "Failure" is written on every stone of her proud edifice. When the light of individual judgment shall illuminate all her dark dungeons she will inevitably fall as a decayed temple. The elasticity and expansiveness of human thought is too great to be confined by any iron railing of rites and forms. All churches established for the express purpose of defending a rite, and therefore churches assuming too much the character of ritualism, will, equally and for the same reason, fail of securing true catholicity, the perfect coalescence of spirituality and concord.

We may safely predict, on grounds purely psychological, that the Baptist church, if it retains the dogma of restricted communion, will never become the visible church universal, absorbing all others into itself. The only rock on which such a church, destined to fill the world, increasing in power and solidity as the centuries roll on, can be built, is the harmony of recognized Christian consciousness.

VIII. The dignity and glory of the principle of sacramental fellowship which we are advocating recommend its adoption. It founds the churches, not on a lifeless rite, but on a spiritual vitality. Reason illuminated, elevated, and refined by revelation, and love kindled by the Holy Ghost, are the noblest and most beautiful realities in the intelligent creation. This is a foundation which has life in itself, and vitalizes the whole superstructure resting upon it.

It is a principle replete with noblest generosities. It demands so much decision, blended with so much charity of judgment, such inflexible adhesion to the leading principles of the redemptive scheme, combined with so much elasticity respecting non-essentials, that it is extremely difficult for the human mind unaided to comprehend it. It is a truth so grand, so antagonistic to man's selfishness, pride of opinion,

and proneness to misplaced decision in regard to principle, and yet so admirably adapted to meet the claims of free thought and the requisites of a holy church, that its discovery can hardly be deemed the result of human sagacity. Manifestly, the example of our compassionate High Priest, and the divinely inspired pen of Paul were needed to bring it convincingly before the comprehension of mankind. A principle so noble and ennobling must occupy a central place in the church of Christ.

IX. Exactness of mode, psychologically considered, is much more important in the eucharist than in baptism. Baptism signifies our ingrafting into Christ and dedication to him. The Lord's supper not only signifies these, but that Christ is the source and nourisher of his imparted life within us. The subjective state required of the recipient is therefore in some respects different. He is commemorating the death of his Lord. He is kneeling, as it were, with him when "exceeding sorrowful"; bowing and gazing upon him suspended in torture on the cross; hearing his groans of anguish and cry of desertion; and is kindling with emotions the tenderest and most sympathetic.

Such being the position of the Lord's supper and the subjective state appropriate to its reception, the comparative evils to the Christian life of misapprehensions respecting the two rites will readily suggest themselves. 1. The sympathies and affections of the recipient of the sacramental feast constituting the highest spiritual state, are most attenuated and delicate, often most evanescent; and hence, in the partially sanctified heart, most easily disturbed, by thoughts and associations at all incongruous to themselves; and in a service usually occupying from half an hour to an hour, almost certain to be. Even mistakes concerning its accidents are exceedingly liable to produce injurious effects; and when these disturbing forces assume the character of unfailing associations of its celebration, most disastrous spiritual results will be sure to follow. This the history of the church confirms. Hence the apostle so earnestly exhorts to self-ex-

amination as preparatory to, and in connection with, its observance, that the mind and heart may be cleared of all uncongenial thoughts and emotions during the hallowed hour. He has left no such instruction touching preparation for baptism. The reason is obvious. 2. Baptism is to be administered but once. The Lord's supper is to be often repeated. A mistake or misapprehension often repeated, must of necessity intensify or multiply the evil effects. 3. The manner of a son's adoption into a family cannot be so important as the method of his conduct afterwards. It cannot be true that the conscientious mistakes of a domestic servant in performing her daily tasks — mistakes liable to disturb the whole household — are of no consequence; while if she make a conscientious mistake touching the precise mode of entering the family, she must be treated as an alien.

In view of these considerations, exactness in mode, to human view, must be less important in baptism than in the eucharist. If therefore Christ has made baptism modal, and the eucharist not so, the reason lies in the inscrutable depths of divine sovereignty. In respect to it we can only say: "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."

Our leading design in this part of our discussion has been to transfer sacramental communion from the modality of baptism (including the reception of the rite in infancy),[1] as its basis, to a baptism accepted by Christ; to show that the freedom of the gospel dispensation extends to its rites constituting a ritual liberty, which insures the acceptance of a rite or ceremony when its essentialities are retained, and it is performed in a manner conscientiously believed to be scriptural; that ritual precision, while an element homogeneous with a ritualistic church, is utterly incompatible with a church disenthralled from ceremonial bondage; that if the gospel church has one rite or form of worship, modal, while the others partake of the free spirit of the church of which they are the abiding exponents, the reason can

[1] See Bibliotheca Sacra, No. 83 p. 452.

discover no assignable cause for the distinction. Consequently, it has been our endeavor to show that when a society of Christians in covenant with God and with each other have submitted to baptism in the form conscientiously believed to be scriptural, Christ accepts them as baptized Christians, and the body as a true church entitled to the privileges of a church. According to principles Part I. pp. 490, 491 the higher law of charity, therefore, is to be our guide, and free sacramental communion becomes the law.

We have now traced our argument through three processes of demonstration: (1) Shown that free communion is demanded by the nature and genius of the gospel; (2) by the laws of associated Christianity; (3) by the radical element of the Christian church itself. A perfect harmony subsists between them; all tend to one point; all culminate in one glorious summit — the unity of the redeemed in their Head, symbolized by the holy supper, the memorial feast of the household of God. We might have concluded *a priori* that the rites and institutions of the gospel, and the manner of observing them would be in entire agreement with its spirit and genius; and on a thorough and careful investigation we find *a posteriori* the conjecture true.

Hence we have dwelt so much in this discussion on charity or unity in Christ. Charity must be the determinative character of a system which is the product of mercy; and the essence and life of the gospel is, and must be, the life of the gospel church and of its institutions. If free communion is in full harmony with the spirit of the gospel, and close communion is not, the former must be true, and the latter untenable. Indeed the whole controversy is a battle about love; call it ritual righteousness, expediency, wisdom, suitableness, congruity, fitness, it is resolvable into this all-comprehending affection — how it may be most intelligently, wisely, and successfully exercised in relation to the positive institutes of the gospel, and in keeping with it.

[1] See Bibliotheca Sacra, No. 83 p. 452.

PART III.—THE PRECEDENCE OF BAPTISM TO THE LORD'S SUPPER NOT DEMONSTRABLE. THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT. CONCLUSION.

SECTION I.—*Precedence of Baptism to the Lord's Supper not demonstrable.*

Founded upon the indispensableness of mode in baptism, strict communionists maintain the further position that there is a constituted order in the two rites of the gospel — baptism necessarily preceding the holy supper.[1] This order the divine Lawgiver has established as unalterably as the institutes themselves. It cannot be reversed for the sake of comfort or convenience even for an hour. They even affirm that all obligation to partake of Christ's supper is based upon the previous reception of baptism. So indispensable, indeed, is this order, that it would be a sin to partake of the eucharist unbaptized; this order being as fixed and unalterable as that established between circumcision and the passover in the Mosaic ritual.

The battle between free and strict communionists among the Baptists rages most fiercely around this point. To the Pedobaptists, however, it is a matter of comparatively little concern. In their estimation, the argument for free communion already presented is sufficient. The denial of the necessary precedence of baptism to the eucharist is only corroborative of previous conclusions; only shows that the free ritualism of the apostles applies not less to the order than the mode of gospel rites. Not that the order is deemed of no importance. Pedobaptists, indeed, generally admit the propriety of the precedence of baptism to the eucharist; some maintain that it should invariably precede it; others, that while this order is the rule, it is not the inevitable rule. Their main positions are two: 1. Their baptism is acceptable to Christ on the Pauline principle already discussed. 2. They deny the truthfulness of a fixed inviolable order in the sacramental rites of

[1] Curtis, pp. 74, 141, 247; Arnold, pp. 16–19; Denison, p. 84; Brantley, pp. 1–8; Howell, pp. 152–179.

the gospel, so that baptism, in all circumstances and in all ages, must precede the eucharist; obligation to partake of the latter depending entirely on the reception of the former. This denial, they maintain, it is not necessary for them to demonstrate. It will be enough to show that the invariable antecedence of baptism to the sacramental supper is incapable of proof. For if this point can be made clear it will also be clear, first, that the Baptists may enjoy the privilege of communion with Pedobaptists around the table of their Lord; and secondly, if it may be their privilege, it is their duty.

We will now present some considerations disproving the necessity of baptismal precedency in sacramental ordinances.

I. We lay it down as an axiomatical proposition, and as fundamental in our argument relative to the view before us, that whatever is essential to a ritual service requires a positive precept or its equivalent. The two rites of the gospel are appointed by express precepts. So it is with all its outward observances, unless they are developments of some principle incorporated in the institutes of the old dispensation, and brought over to the new. But our Baptist brethren deny all authoritative connection between the Mosaic and the gospel church. Its rites and all that pertains to their essentiality must therefore be definitely prescribed by precepts. If, then, the precedence of baptism to the Lord's supper be an essentiality, we may expect to find the order definitely stated in the form of positive law. Precedent, in the circumstances, to be admitted as law, must be so clearly, so indisputably the legal will of Christ in the matter as to preclude all reasonable possibility of mistaking its authoritative significance; otherwise it may be justly esteemed an accident, not an essentiality.

II. This necessary precedence of baptism to the Lord's supper must lie either in the inherent natures or necessary relations of the positive laws enjoining the rites, or in the legal enactment of the Lawgiver. A positive law is a distinct requisition prescribing a specific action. The baptismal law, "Go teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost," imposes a

specific obligation. The eucharistic law, "Do this in remembrance of me," imposes another specific obligation. Each stands by itself, and prescribes an act standing by itself. One sustains no dependent relation to the other. One may be observed acceptably with no thought of the other. There is nothing in their natures, nor in the nature of things, nothing in the language in which they are couched, nor in the circumstances in which they were given, establishing incontestibly the precedence of one to the other. Certainly there is nothing in their natures or their relations which forbids the Lord's supper to be put before baptism, if Christ had so ordained. Nor can the indispensable antecedence of the latter to the former be established by any process of moral reasoning. It is not enough to affirm that since baptism is simply dedicatory while the eucharist is commemorative and to be repeated, the single act should naturally be performed before the commemorative and reiterated. There might be a suitableness in its priority in ordinary cases, but that alone would not be sufficient to establish a law of invariable antecedence. Nor is it enough to say that as baptism marks the beginning of the Christian life, indicating the first public act of consecration to God, and as the eucharist denotes nurture, increase in the spirit of consecration, the former must precede the latter by natural necessity, as planting the tree naturally precedes its cultivation We admit there may be a propriety in first dedicating the soul to God in baptism; but the propriety of the precedence of one rite to another is a very different thing from a fixed inviolable law demanding it. Certainly the propriety does not imply that the neglect of the first cancels all obligations to perform the last. The neglect of one sign of dedication to God is no reason, in itself considered, for neglecting another; most assuredly it cannot imply a prohibition to perform the other. Private prayer or individual communion of soul with God, very properly goes before public prayer or worship. This, we might say, is the natural order. But no one will maintain that neglecting private prayer exempts one from the duty of uniting in public

prayer. Even the neglect of one moral law does not release from obligation to others. We are required to love God with all the heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. But the failure to love God does not release us from the duty of loving our neighbor. Much less can disobedience to one of many positive precepts which stand independently, each on its own basis, be a justifiable ground of disobeying others. The fact, therefore, that there may be a propriety in receiving baptism before the eucharist, does not establish a fixed law of precedence, so that obligation to the latter is annulled by neglect of the former. Plainly, nothing but the express declaration of the Lawgiver can determine the precedence of baptism to the Lord's supper to be so vital that our obligation to partake of the last depends entirely upon our previous submission to the first. In the Mosaic dispensation, circumcision was distinctly prescribed as the necessary prerequisite to the reception of the passover. If a connection subsists between baptism and the Lord's supper equally fixed and unalterable, we have a right to expect a precept prescribing the order equally definite. But that such a precept can be found is not pretended. Precedent is the only remaining method by which the inviolable connection in question can be established. But it seems exceedingly incongruous to the character of Christ as holy Lawgiver in his church, to leave an essentiality in its most important ordinance to be learned by the successive generations of his disciples from the uncertainties of precedent.

III. The necessary precedence of baptism to the eucharist cannot be proved by apostolic precedent. Although it seems to us unreasonable, very much like an absudity, to suppose that an essentiality of the determinative ordinance of the gospel church, instead of being distinctly stated, should be left to be spelled out from the practice of the apostles by those who should come after them; yet this is one of the main grounds on which our opponents build their argument for an inherent and invariable connection between the two rites. The principle is this: as the disciples were appointed

by Christ to erect the superstructure of the visible church, their example constitutes a law of order in its sacramental ordinances, universal and unalterable, though it be not stated in the form of a statute. From this point, thus established, they infer that the neglect of baptism annuls all obligation to partake of the holy supper. That baptism preceded the Lord's supper in the practice of the apostles, so far as known, we readily admit; and yet, that it establishes a law binding the church, in all situations and in all periods of her eventful history, is not to our minds conclusive. A precedent, to become a law universally obligatory, must as indisputably express the legal will of Christ as a direct precept. This is self-evident. But judged by this criterion, the apostolic example relative to the priority of baptism to the eucharist is exceedingly defective.

1. The foundation of the argument is laid in conjecture. It is assumed that Christ gave to the apostles a precept or rule making the eucharist dependent on baptism in such a sense that the observance of the former is prohibited, unless preceded by submission to the latter. This is the first conjecture. The second is, that it was thought best to conceal the precept and require the church, in succeeding ages, to spell out its existence from the practice of the apostle. But why was it not recorded, that the latest generation might have the advantage of a preceptive statement as well as they? It would have occupied but little space to record the precept, "Baptism must invariably precede the Lord's supper." Why was it not? The only conceivable reply is: There was doubtless some wise reason for the omission. But this is nothing more than a pious guess. Thus the very foundation of the argument is enveloped in the mists of conjecture, which gives to the whole an air of unsubstantialness.

2. The bare precedent of an external observance in Christ's kingdom does not prove a principle. The only object in referring to apostolic precedent is to establish a law. But a law is always based on a principle; in other words, it is carrying out into a practical rule of life a thought or desire

of the Lawgiver. It is therefore much more important to ascertain the principle enjoining a church rite, than to ascertain the practice of those who founded the church. Indeed, the paramount object in ascertaining the practice is thereby to ascertain the principle which the uniform practice is supposed to imply. A principle — the reason or motive for a rite — never changes; the rite itself, or its relations, may be modified by circumstances. Hence, the alleged uniform example of the apostle, relative to the point in question, may not prove a universal law.

Look at a parallel instance. The institutes of circumcision and the passover were both neglected the greater part of the time the Israelites sojourned in the wilderness. Moses, as lawgiver of Israel, stands in the same relation to the institution of the order and discipline of the Jewish church, as the apostles stand to the institution of the gospel church. Moses celebrated the passover on leaving Egypt and the ensuing year; but never again. Circumcision was also at first practised; but was neglected ever after during his life. Indeed, the administration of both institutes was omitted for some time after his death. Now suppose there had been no positive statement of the appointment of these observances by law, or of their relative order; and suppose the records of the Jewish church had closed at the death of Moses, as the records of the apostolic church closed at the death of the apostles; what inference could have been justly drawn by the Jews in after times from the practice of Moses respecting the obligation to observe circumcision and the passover? Plainly, that they might be omitted at discretion. Precedent, in this case, taught what was directly at variance with law. The principle on which God acted was, that he would have a people distinct from the other nations, and who should be known as a people separated to his worship and service. He therefore instituted a sign of this separation. But the principle could be carried out while they were isolated in the wilderness without the sign. Circumstances in this case, and that too in a purely ritual church, not only modified the

rites, or their relations to each other, but led to a precedent which actually sanctioned their omission altogether. The uniform practice of the apostles, therefore, cannot of itself prove that the antecedence of baptism to the Lord's supper is to be an invariable law in all the subsequent conditions and ages of the church.

3. The precedent of the apostles in this case is specially unsatisfactory on the ground assumed by the Baptists in discarding entirely the Old Testament as a source of instruction concerning the rites and institutes of the gospel church; affirming it to be a new organization having no dependence on the Mosaic. The rites and institutes of a church succeeding another and occupying its place, grounded in the same covenant, incorporating the same great principles and leading designs — as the gospel church is supposed by the Pedobaptists to take the place of the Sinaitic church — may be much more satisfactorily learned from precedent, than when the church is believed to be an entirely new organization, with a new and more spiritual covenant, and with new rites and forms of worship. In the former case — the new organization on old principles — there may be a change in the mode of the rite, institute, or observance, while the principle or reason of it in its new organic form is substantially the same. In such a church the example of its founders very easily assumes the authority of law.

Take for illustration the institution of the Christian Sabbath. There is a reason lying deep in man's physical and moral nature for the devotion of one seventh part of time exclusively to religious thought and service; his physical nature requiring rest, and his moral welfare demanding occasionally an entire suspension of secular thought and feeling. This principle or reason for the law of the Sabbath recognized in the old dispensation and still remaining, the question is appropriately asked: Is there any indication that devoting one day in seven is forbidden in the New Testament, or is this want in man's nature met in any other way? If not, the example of the apostles in observing the first day of the week as a day

of religious service is very satisfactorily transformed into a law setting apart the first instead of the seventh as the holy Sabbath.

Infant baptism is another case in point. The covenant of the gospel church being but a new dispensation of the Abrahamic covenant which included children with the parents, the question arises: Is that narrowed down so as to exlude the children of those who by professed faith are received into it? As the Jews in the time of Christ were very strongly attached to this feature of the covenant, we naturally conconclude that if it were narrowed or modified so as to exclude the children of believing parents, we should have some intimation of it; indeed, a positive prohibition of their dedication by the use of the initiatory rite. But when, in the absence of all such intimation or prohibition, we hear Paul saying (Gal. iii. 29): "And if ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise"; we naturally conclude that the Abrahamic covenant has flowed down to us in a channel as deep and as broad as under the old dispensation. And when we see the apostles acting just as if the covenant had come down to us with all its rich promises, blessing the children with the parents; Paul at one time baptizing "the jailor and all his straightway," while we have no evidence that any but himself believed; and at another, baptizing Lydia and her household without the least intimation that any believed but herself; and hear him saying "I baptized also the household of Stephanas"; the example of the apostles points at once to a law requiring, or to the privilege permitting, the children of believing parents to be received into the covenant under its new as under its old dispensation by the application of the seal.

In view of these instances we see just the weakness of the argument from the precedent of the apostle as viewed by the Baptists. In a newly organized church in which we have no old principle or covenant long developed in rites and usages to fall back upon, the force of example in authorizing outward ceremonies and their order must always be feeble;

because these may change with circumstances, while the principle or covenant remains unaltered and unalterable. The practice of the apostles respecting the Sabbath can never prove, with absolute certainty, that the first day of the week is to be observed to the end of time as a day holy to the Lord, without relying on the principles and commands of the Old Testament. Hence it is that our Baptist brethren are so undecided in respect to the holiness of the Sabbath as prescribed in the fourth commandment. For the same reason the bare example of the apostles can never teach with unerring certainty the precedence of baptism to the holy supper. It can no more prove this order to be an undeviating law than the practice of Moses in neglecting the rites of circumcision and the passover proves that these Jewish institutes might be omitted in all succeeding ages of the Jewish church, or celebrated according to the will of their leaders. The precedent of the apostles may prove that the principle could be best carried out then by putting baptism before the eucharist; but it does not prove that circumstances or individual cases may not rise in the subsequent history of the church, when the principle, or more important principles, will be better carried out by reversing the order.

4. Whatever is not vital, but adventitious or incidental, to an institute or to its administration, cannot be considered binding in all ages and in all circumstances. When a precedent is so situated that it may have legitimately arisen out of existing circumstances, it wants the element of law. It has no necessary dependence on a superior will. The unleavened bread used in the eucharist, its reception in a reclining posture, its celebration in an upper room, and at evening, are of this sort. These are all incidentals, and may be modified by circumstances, while the spirit of the ordinance remains intact. So the antecedence of baptism to the eucharist may be incidental, never designed to be an invariable law to all succeeding ages.

5. This argument from apostolic precedent, taken in its length and breadth, and carried into the various branches

of Christian conduct, is a sword with two edges. When employed relative to sacramental fellowship, it cuts directly across the line of thought pursued by our opponents. Precedent of thought or principle, is much more important than precedent of external observances. Hence, the argument drawn from the apostolic precedent relative to fellowship is much stronger than the argument of our opponents for the priority of baptism to the eucharist; the latter being a precedent of action merely, the former of thought or principle. What was that principle? It was that the gospel is a system of forgiveness — that Christ's disciples must forgive as he forgives (Eph. iv. 32). Consequently, it was their belief that they must fellowship sacramentally all whom Christ thus fellowships. Hence, their precedent of fellowship is a precedent of the deepest Christian thought and experience — the expression of Christ's heart, his yearning desires towards all his disciples. It is therefore a principle as wide as the whole circle of accredited believers, and lasting as time. It is treating Christ's disciples just as he treats them. From this principle the primitive disciples never deviated in ecclesiastical action. Thus we have in the example of the apostles relative to eucharistic fellowship the precedent of principle and action combined. It has all the force of our opponents' argument with the irresistable force of a precedent of thought, of Christian feeling in addition. Besides, this primitive precedent of communion has for its basis a definitely stated precept (Rom. xv. 7): "Wherefore receive ye one another, as Christ received us, to the glory of God."

Consequently, the apostolic precedent relative to free fellowship contains every element requisite to constitute it a law invariable and immutable, meeting all individual cases in every period of the church's history. It is a uniform precedent of action, and a precedent of principle, of thought or design, as unalterable as the feelings of the Saviour's heart. It contains just what, and just all, that is necessary to give it the authority and force of a universal law. The inference, therefore, of our opponents, that the precedent of the apostles

is an unbending law, excluding all the unbaptized from church fellowship, coming as it does in direct collision with another precedent confirmed by a precept, cannot be justly drawn. For it is impossible that apostolic precedent should establish two laws demanding lines of conduct exactly opposite, so that obedience to one is necessarily disobedience to the other.

IV. The apostolic commission, it is maintained, expressly teaches the precedence of baptism to the sacramental supper. It is recorded Matt. xxviii. 19, 20. This is called "the law of the Christian church." Here we have, it is said, the things we are to do and the order in which we are to do them. Men are first to be taught the way of salvation, then baptized, and afterwards instructed to observe all things commanded them; and among these "all things" to be observed is the Lord's supper. This order, it is said, is to be strictly followed. Hence, it is inferred that the omission of baptism implies a forfeiture of the privileges of the eucharist. But this, to say the least, is a far-drawn conclusion, and fastened to its premise by threads extremely attenuated. Besides, according to our reasoning under the preceding head, it is by no means legitimate. This mention of baptism may imply the natural order, even the order preferred by Christ, and still it may not prove that the omission of baptism exempts from all obligation to the Lord's supper and all the other things to be observed; even rendering it a sin to observe them. It may imply a propriety in the order, the best way, a general rule. But when we undertake to make it a universal rule — an iron track which can never properly be deviated from in any circumstances, and draw from it the still further inference, that the omission of baptism excuses from the duty of the eucharist, even rendering its observance, however conscientious one may be, or however tender or strong his attachment to his Saviour, offensive in his sight, we draw from our fancies or prejudices, not from the living word.

Besides, if this inference is correct, it proves too much. The "all things" to be observed doubtless include all Chris-

tian duties and privileges. If the neglect of baptism deprives of the privileges of the eucharist, and exempts from the duty of observing it, then neglect of baptism releases from obligation to all Christian duties, and deprives of all Christian privileges. It releases from obligation to prayer and public worship, brotherly love, contributing to the necessities of saints, warning sinners, admonishing the erring among those who profess the Saviour's name; indeed, from laboring in any capacity for Christ. If the omission of baptism releases not from all these duties, and it is still urged that it releases from the duty of the sacramental table, then the omission of baptism releases from a part only of the duties included in the "all things"; which is an extremely distorted interpretation of the passage. It is making a discrimination utterly without warrant. The position of our opponents drives them to this absurdity, unless they assume the ground that the "all things" imply simply church duties and privileges, in distinction from Christian duties and privileges. But this distinction would be equally unreasonable. It would make "all things" to mean only one thing. Thus, their inference from the apostolic commission involves them in most glaring inconsistencies.

Is it still said, we think their inference has some evidence to support it? It will not materially strengthen our argument to deny this. Evidence of a given point, and a demonstration of it, are two very different things — often standing as wide apart as truth and error. It is just this difference — the fact that this inference is not demonstrable — on which we insist, and on which we rely for the maintenance of our cause, because it furnishes ample ground for the exercise of charity towards those who, in the baptist sense, conscientiously mistake the order of the Christian institutes.

V. Could the priority of baptism to the eucharist be proved to be a law of Christ's house, we should still deny the right of the Baptists to withhold sacramental fellowship from the orthodox Pedobaptists on two grounds, discussed in Part II. Section 2: (*a*) because Christ manifestly accepts of baptism

as well in the form of sprinkling as in the form of immersion; (*b*) because ritual freedom extends to the order of gospel rites not less than to their modes; and thus releases the church from the obligation of insisting upon the precedence of one to the other as a term of sacramental recognition. On these unchanging principles of the New Testament we plant ourselves, with no apprehension of being disapproved by the Master.

Strict communionists found an argument for the precedence of baptism to the eucharist on the identity of John's baptism with Christian baptism. This identity is denied. But we have not time to enter largely into the discussion of the question; nor do we deem its solution essential to our argument. We will only mention a few considerations which go to show the impossibility of identifying the two. We would premise that sameness of form does not prove rites identical; identity of import alone proves this.

1. The discriminating manner in which John's baptism is invariably spoken of, indicates a difference between it and the Christian rite. It is never named without some descriptive adjunct guarding or limiting its import. It is the baptism of water, or John's baptism, or the baptism of repentance. Neither the evangelists nor the apostles ever call it by the simple name "baptism," by which they designate the Christian ordinance.

2. John's baptism did not belong to the Christian dispensation, and could not therefore be identical with Christian baptism. John's work was preparatory. He came simply as the harbinger of Christ; not to set up his kingdom, but to prepare the place for its erection. The predictions of the prophets demonstrate this (Isa. xl. 3, 4). Here is an allusion to pioneers sent before a victorious monarch going to take possession of a city or territory. Their service was to prepare a way for his coming. The monarch did not approach till their work was completed. They did not organize his government; this dignity was reserved for the monarch to do in person. So Christ did not take possession of his kingdom,

or set it up by the agency of John. John had no such commission. He was simply a forerunner — a reformer. He came in the power of Elijah to call the nation to repentance, "to make ready a people prepared for the Lord" Christ could not set up his kingdom till that reformatory work was done. Wherever, therefore, we place the mission of John, whether in the old dispensation, or in a dispensation peculiar to itself — a sort of preparatory dispensation — a state of twilight between the dawn and the rising of the sun, it most undeniably did not belong to the new dispensation, unless we can identify two things utterly distinct — a preparation for an event with the event itself. John's baptism in form may indeed have been introduced into Christ's kingdom after it was founded, and he had assumed the prerogatives of king. But this is a very different thing from supposing it to be identically the same. The nature and significance of a rite must always partake of the nature and significance of the dispensation whose purpose it serves.

3. The fact that the Messianic kingdom of the new dispensation was not set up till after John's baptism was instituted, shows that it was not Christian baptism. This is not a matter of inference as adduced under the last head, but positively stated. John proclaimed that the kingdom of heaven was at hand; it was approaching, but had not come. He speaks of Christ, the head of this kingdom, as the ἐρχόμενος. We know that Jesus did not even begin to preach for some months after John began to baptize. Now it is plain that a sovereign or absolute monarch must be sole lawgiver in his own dominions. It would be an absurdity to speak of the laws or institutions of Cyrus before he ascended the throne; certainly before the kingdom of Persia was founded. This must be especially true respecting Christ, who is sovereign in the highest sense, so exalted that he can admit no counsellor. All the rites and ordinances of his kingdom must surely have originated with himself. It is universally allowed that Christ originated every other rite or part of the discipline and order of his church except baptism. Even the

Pedobaptists, who maintain that the principles of the rites of the gospel church were brought over from the Mosaic dispensation, admit that they were brought over by his sole authority. Surely the Baptists, occupying the position that all the institutes of the Christian church are enactments entirely new, must admit this. It is extremely inconsistent to maintain that the most important rite of the new dispensation; as they affirm, the very foundation stone of Christ's visible church, was instituted even before the distinctive form of his New Testament kingdom had begun to be. John's averments also — "He that cometh after me is preferred before me, for he was before me"; "He must increase, but I must decrease"; He that cometh from heaven is above all" — clash with the idea that John was empowered to set up the kingdom of Christ, to enact and promulgate its laws. The time and manner of promulgating the law of baptism have, too, a striking significance as bearing on this point. It was directly after he had announced that all power in heaven and in earth was given him to administer his mediatorial kingdom. The logical connection is this: As I have accomplished the work of atonement and instruction, I am now fully empowered to promulge the laws and institutions of my kingdom. "Go ye, therefore," etc. (Matt. xxviii. 19). Why, in this last commission, did he designate baptism, and not the memorial supper, if both had been appointed before? Does not the omission of the latter indicate that baptism was now first appointed, and its formula stated?

4. John's baptism was not administered in the name of Christ, and therefore was not Christian baptism. Nothing is more determinative of the nature of baptism than the name in which it is administered. To be baptized into the name of any one is to be baptized into his authority — into a profession of his principles, implying unreserved submission to them as the rules of life. To be baptized into the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, is a solemn dedication of the whole being to the Triune Jehovah; it is an acknowledgment of all the blessings which each of the

Persons of the Holy Trinity has engaged to confer on believers in the scheme of atonement; a belief that the Father is one's covenant God and Protector, that the Son is his Atoning Sacrifice and Intercessor, and the Holy Spirit, his Sanctifier. We are not informed that the baptism of John was administered in the name of any one. It was simply a baptism unto repentance. It was not administered in the name of Jesus; for when John began to baptize, Jesus was not known to him. We have no knowledge that he changed his practice in this respect afterwards. He certainly did not baptize in the name of the Holy Trinity. His baptism, therefore, was not identical with the Christian rite.

5. The faith required in the two baptisms was totally different. The one being a faith that the Messiah was speedily to come; the other a faith or trust in his blood shed for the remission of sins as a ground of acceptance with God — a faith so dissimilar, that while the former may be exercised by the natural man, the latter can be exercised only by the regenerate. Our Baptist brethren especially insist that this higher faith is implied in Christian baptism, regarding it even as a symbol of Christ's death and resurrection; and consequently as expressive of faith in him as our dying and risen Lord. Did John's baptism have this profound significance? The opinions of Christ's disciples, even up to the period of his death, refute the supposition.

6. Those who were received into the church by the apostles after the kingdom of Christ was actually set up, were baptized according to the injunction given just before his ascension, notwithstanding they had received John's baptism. This was unquestionably true of some of the three thousand converted on the day of Pentecost. But, not to insist on this, it is certain that the disciples at Ephesus, who had previously received only John's baptism, submitted to Christian baptism.

7. It is plain that regeneration, or vital union to Christ, was not the determinative qualification for the reception of John's baptism, while this is the determinative qualification

for Christian baptism; which distinction marks the vital difference between the two rites. Whatever may have been the nature of the repentance to which John summoned the Jewish nation, it is evident that he did not insist on the manifestation by the candidate of that repentance which is alone the product of the renewed heart.

We have no disposition to deny that John inculcated genuine repentance. Indeed, we do not see how a holy God, who looks at the heart, and in estimating character always weighs the spirit, could have commissioned one in preparing the way for the Messiah to preach anything but true, godly sorrow for sin. But what kind of repentance was John commissioned to preach, and what kind of repentance did his hearers actually exercise, and what kind was made the ground of baptism, are questions very different from each other, the confounding of which has caused much perplexity. We admit, therefore, that the *μετάνοια* which John preached was that repentance which flows from a regenerated heart; but we see no evidence that this was made a test qualification for the reception of baptism. If he did require it, he must have been deceived times almost without number. For it is said that Jerusalem, and all Judea, and all the region round about Jordan, were baptized by him — doubtless many thousands. All these confessed their sins. Now if they had been regenerated, and their repentance was truly Christian, they would have accepted Christ when he came. But the highest number of Christ's disciples named is about five hundred. The other hundreds baptized by John rejected him; which can be accounted for, only on the supposition that, while they professed repentance, their hearts had not been renovated by the Holy Ghost. The probability is, that but very few of them had been born again; and therefore that evidence of regeneration was not deemed an indispensable qualification for the rite. Their repentance, in the language of Dr. Justin Edwards, was a persuasion of "the necessity of repentance in order to the remission of sins" (Note on Luke iii. 3. See also Luke vii. 29). It was baptism unto repentance (*εἰς*)

expressing purpose (Bloomfield on Matt. iii. 11; Mark i. 4. See Robinson, under εἰς, d). These passages plainly indicate that evidence of regeneration was not demanded of the candidate for Johannic baptism.

Hence, while Christian baptism is appropriately called the "laver of regeneration," John's baptism is appropriately called the "laver of repentance." The editor of Olshausen (Vol. i. p. 257) has well expressed this difference. "In John's baptism it was virtually said: 'As thou art now immersed, so hast thou deserved to be destroyed in death; as thou now arisest, so shouldest thou arise a new man.' In the Christian baptism, on the contrary, the language is: 'As thou art now immersed, so art thou now buried into the vicarious death of Christ; as thou now emergest, so art thou born again a new man.'"

John also suggests a similar distinction between his baptism and that of Christ, in his intimation that the demands of the latter would be far more profound and heart-searching (Matt. iii. 11, 12; John i. 6–13). The purport of these passages is: "You may receive my baptism on a false profession of repentance, or of superficial reformation; but when Christ, whose forerunner I am, shall come, your sincerity shall be searchingly tested. He shall baptize with the Holy Ghost and with fire; he is the Regenerator; he will receive none to his kingdom who are not thus wrought upon by the Holy Ghost. He will make a thorough sifting among those who receive my baptism; all who are not united to him by the graces of the Spirit will be regarded as chaff, and burned with unquenchable fire."

Thus Christian baptism, as the initiatory rite to the Christian church — a church of regenerated members, — demands the evidence of regeneration; a change which the great majority of those who received John's baptism had not experienced, and which indicates a similar difference in the nature of the baptism which Christ instituted.

For these reasons, and for others which might be adduced, John's baptism can never be proved identical with Christian

baptism. We have therefore no determinative evidence that Christian baptism was instituted before the eucharist; the eucharist being instituted before Christ's death; Christian baptism, not till just before his ascension.

The two great arguments for the precedence of baptism to the eucharist, built on the identity of Johannic with Christian baptism, therefore fall to the ground. 1. It is argued that as Christian baptism was first instituted, it must be first administered. This argument is exceedingly feeble. But whatever strength it has rests entirely on the assumption that John's baptism was Christian baptism. If that is not Christian baptism, the eucharist was first appointed, and therefore, according to the argument, is first to be administered. 2. That the disciples being baptized with John's baptism, were baptized before partaking of the sacramental supper. But if John's baptism was not Christian baptism, the disciples with whom the Lord's supper was first celebrated were not baptized. Our opponents themselves admit that there is no decided proof of the baptism of only two of them, even with John's baptism. But if Johannic baptism is not Christian baptism, there is not a particle of evidence that one of them ever submitted to the Christian rite. What shall be done with this precedent? Ought it to have no authority with those who rely so much upon precedent when pointing in the opposite direction?

Section II. — *The Historic Argument.*

The Christian church has given, in every age and country, its almost unaminous testimony in favor of receiving to her fellowship, in the emblems of the Saviour's death, all who give satisfactory evidence of faith in his blood, separation from the world, and dedication to his glory. All her central governing influences have been in this direction. It was a vital point in the primitive church. It was not deemed more important to profess Christ than to maintain the unity of all in him. True, there were some dissentients, such as the Donatists and Novitians, as there were from most other es-

sential truths of the gospel. But the great body of the church rose against these advocates of dissent. It is remarkable that the church, amidst all her contentions both in the East and in the West, should have preserved this central principle so incorrupt till she sank under the clouds of error and formality which chilled her very life amid the frosts of the Middle Ages. And it is not less remarkable, that when she emerged from that darkness in the sixteenth century, this spirit of unity rose with her as an inseparable part of her very existence. It was earnestly defended by Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin, and all the other great lights of the Reformation. It was incorporated in all the important Protestant creeds of Europe. But we have not time to enumerate the details necessary to substantiate the above views. This vein of argument has been skilfully and successfully wrought by Dr. J. M. Mason, in his work on "Terms of Communion"; to which the reader is referred for particulars.

This historical argument expresses the religious consciousness of the Christian world. It tells us unmistakably how the Christian heart feels concerning sacramental communion.

We admit that the general voice of the church relative to topics merely ritual or dogmatical, entirely disconnected from Christian experience, carries little weight with it; but when it relates to vital points of the gospel which the Spirit vivifies and works into the soul as practical realities, it becomes significant and worthy of regard. The incidentals of the Lord's supper belong to the former; its spirit and essentialities to the latter. The uniform voice of the church, of the wisest and most learned, of those who have drank deepest of the pure wells of salvation, advocating sacramental fellowship with all whom the Saviour receives, shows that it is the dictate of the most vital experiences of the gospel, and should be heeded.

Before closing this head, we will briefly allude to one historical argument which bears with peculiar force on the Baptists, owing to their historical position to infant baptism. They maintain that this was unknown to the apostles. It

began to be introduced in the second century, and in the fourth, or a little later, became a universal custom till the rising of the sun of the Reformation, which dispersed the clouds which had gathered over this as well as other important truths. Now, either infant baptism became at once a universal practice, contrary to all observation in regard to the operations of the human mind in receiving newly propounded opinions, especially one based on so complicated a process of reasoning as that of infant baptism; or the custom came in gradually; some receiving the inovation, others rejecting it; so that there must have been, as now, two classes of Christians — Baptists and Pedobaptists. Consequently they either tolerated each other and communed together; or one separated from the other, and set up a new organization. But we have no evidence that the Baptists and Pedobaptists who lived during the alleged transition state of the church were divided into distinct communions. On the hypothesis of the Baptists therefore, that infant baptism is an innovation, free if not mixed communion, during the period that elapsed from its introduction to its universal prevalence, is a moral certainty.[1] The idea that Baptists and Pedobaptists, on grounds of Christian charity, should extend to each other sacramental recognitions, is an opinion, on the historical position of the Baptists as old, at least, as the third century.

Such are some of the leading positions and arguments of the advocates of free communion. They are so clear, decisive, and scriptural, that we cannot doubt either their truthfulness or their eventual reception by the churches. Propitious indeed to Zion will be the day when those who belong to the one body in Christ, and "are members one of another," shall treat each other with the tenderness and cordiality which the ineffable unity demands.

[1] See Dr. Pond's Lectures on Christian Theology, pp. 690, 691.

ARTICLE II.

THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES.

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THE preparation of a satisfactory statement concerning the Evangelical Lutheran Church, such as the Bibliotheca Sacra desires and reasonably expects, in completing the series of denominational Articles, is a task not easy of execution; and the writer does not even presume to hope that he will be entirely successful in the attempt. The most that he can promise himself or others is some fair degree of good intention and honest endeavor.

A number of things combine to enhance the difficulty of the undertaking. The Lutheran church boasts of the liberty in non-essentials granted to her children. She does not design to burden the conscience or fetter the free development of individual liberty. In everything not expressly revealed in the word of God, and included in the faith of the church, she allows and practices a large degree of diversity. Her great Confession distinctly declares that "for the true unity of the Christian church it is not necessary that uniform ceremonies, instituted by men, should be everywhere observed" (Augsburg Confession, Art. vii.). In this country, originally composed of different nationalities, conducting her worship in different tongues, constantly receiving large accessions from different countries, she exhibits more or less of the peculiarities which distinguish different parts of the church as existing in the several countries where she is known. Hence her organization is not so compact, nor her government and usages so uniform, as those of some other

[NOTE. — This is one of the Series of Articles representing the peculiar views of different theological sects or schools.]

denominations. Besides, the present condition of the church in this country is not the most favorable to such a statement or exposition, and indeed would seem almost to forbid any one to speak for the whole.

Still the Evangelical Lutheran church may justly claim the privilege of being heard, and others may justly claim to know something of her history, doctrines, usages, etc. For, besides being by far the largest Protestant body in the world, the Lutheran church has a distinct position in the United States among evangelical denominations, and Providence has given her a great work to do. Such a statement seems the more appropriate and important in this Journal, because in the region where it is published and has its largest circulation, the Evangelical Lutheran church is comparatively but little known. The writer would only further premise, that as he does not assume to speak for the whole church, he only claims or expects such weight to be given to his statements, as the truth will secure for itself.

Name.

The Lutheran church is known in history by different titles. The name "Lutheran" was first applied by Eck, in the famous disputation with Luther, in the year 1519; and, being designed as a term of reproach, as well as liable to misapprehension and prejudice, it was opposed by the Reformer himself. He had no desire to have his name given to any portion of the church, and those who have been compelled to bear it, while holding in highest veneration the name of Luther, utterly disavow any sentiments that might seem to savor of undue homage to man, or regarding him in any other light than that of an instrument in the hands of God, chosen indeed, to reform and bless the church. At the Diet of Spires, in 1529, the name "Protestant" was given to those who protested against the usurpations and abuses of the Romish church, and this title was afterwards extensively applied to such as adhered to the Lutheran faith. The historical and official title, by which the church is known

in some countries at the present day, is that of "The Church of the Augsburg Confession." The term "German Lutheran Church" is used by some to designate the denomination, somewhat as German Reformed or Dutch Reformed is employed, although the church has not at all been confined to Germany, even on the continent of Europe, and in this country such a title has no fitness or propriety. The Lutheran reformers would have preferred the simple title "Evangelical"; but yielding to the force of circumstances, and submitting to the laws which fix and determine even names and titles, the church has accepted, as the generally received appellation, that of "Evangelical Lutheran"; and this serves, in name at least, to distinguish her both from the Roman Catholic church, and from other Protestant denominations.

Early History in the United States.

The planting of the Lutheran church in this country dates back almost to the first settling of the colonies, and was the joint result of religious persecution in the Old World, and a sincere desire to extend the true religion of Christ in this western hemisphere. Gustavus Adolphus, that illustrious hero of the Protestant and the Lutheran faith, had been enthusiastic in his project to establish Protestant colonies in this newly-discovered country, and was only diverted from the carrying out of his plans, by being compelled to devote all his energies, with his noble life, to the defence of the faith at home. After his death, on the bloody but victorious field of Lützen, Oxenstiern, Prime Minister of Sweden, urged forward the important cause that was to secure in this land a home and refuge for all the oppressed. In the year 1637, only seventeen years after the landing of the Puritans at Plymouth Rock, and thirty after the first settlement at Jamestown, Virginia, two ship loads of Swedish Lutherans settled on the Delaware. This settlement was designed to be in the interest of Protestant Christianity, and of the Lutheran type. Much interest was manifested in the evan-

gelization of the Indians, and the first book ever translated and published in their language was Luther's Smaller Catechism. At the time Elliot was performing his truly apostolic labors in behalf of the Indians in New England, Swedish Lutheran missionaries were engaged in the same holy work in Delaware and Pennsylvania. The royal instructions to the governor of this colony enjoined especially that the true worship of God and a pure faith should be maintained.

Even prior to the Swedish settlement on the Delaware, among the settlers of New Amsterdam, now New York, were a few Lutherans, but they do not seem to have done much for their church, or to have enjoyed special favor with their Dutch neighbors who bore rule. The ties of relationship, a common faith, and the persecutions endured by Protestants before coming to America, were not all sufficient to teach them in every instance the lessons of charity and toleration, and the Lutherans at New Amsterdam were doomed to experience, from their fellow Protestants, somewhat of the rigor and unkind treatment both had suffered at home. It was not until 1664, after repeated applications, and when the New Netherlands had been surrendered to the crown of Great Britain, that Lutherans received the privilege of publicly worshipping God in New York, according to their own convictions. This privilege, now happily enjoyed by all in this land, was not then considered an inalienable right, and the denial of it to these Lutherans must be charged rather to the spirit of the age than set down to the discredit of the Dutch church, which is not behind any other in the love of freedom and respect for civil and religious rights. It is only alluded to here as an item of history.

The chief settlement however of Lutherans, and that from which a large part of the Lutheran church in this country has grown, was that of Germans in Pennsylvania, and neighboring States. For this movement preparations had been going on in Germany for half a century; and the hand of Providence was no less visible than in the settlement of other portions of the land by other denominations of Chris-

tians. The fires of persecution had been kindled, and so violently did they rage, that they threatened to devour the church. A single picture from Macaulay will give some faint idea of the hardships and sufferings endured by Protestants in some portions of Europe during this era. "Dumas received orders to turn one of the fairest regions of Europe into a wilderness. ..... The French commander announced to nearly half a million of human beings that he granted them three days of grace, and that within that time they must shift for themselves. Soon the roads and fields, which then lay deep in snow, were blackened by innumerable multitudes of men, women, and children, flying from their homes. Many died of cold and hunger; but enough survived to fill the streets of all the cities of Europe with lean and squalid beggars, who had once been thriving farmers and shopkeepers. Meanwhile the work of destruction began. The flames went up from every market-place, every hamlet, every parish church, every country seat, within the devoted provinces." The imagination may be left to supply the rest. No wonder that multitudes sought homes in this New World, where Providence had prepared a refuge for the persecuted and oppressed. Some few had arrived earlier, but in the year 1710, the stream began to flow that poured its thousands and tens of thousands of German Lutherans upon these shores. The movement was liberally patronized by Queen Anne and the British government, and was designed to afford relief from the horrors of Romish persecution, and at the same time to people the British colonies.

These early emigrants suffered greatly in their religion, from the want of ministers, places of worship, and the stated means of grace. They had to depend on the father-land for ministers, and chiefly also for religious publications. Without regular organizations in many instances, and without churches, they enjoyed few privileges belonging to God's house; and yet in many a heart there continued to glow the fervor of Christian love and zeal.

A new epoch in the history of the church in this country

was marked by the coming of Muhlenberg. Arriving in 1742, he set himself vigorously to work, visiting the churches, gathering the scattered members, conferring with the pastors already on the ground, and in due time effecting somewhat of a regular organization. Muhlenberg is commonly looked back to as the patriarch, if not the founder, of Lutheranism in the United States. To him, more than to any other one man does it owe its firm establishment and its organic life. Six years after his arrival, in the year 1748, the first Evangelical Lutheran Synod was formed. At that time there were only eleven Lutheran ministers known in this country, six of whom, together with lay delegates, united in the formation of this first Synod, the others being too remote to join with their brethren in this action. Those present were Rev. Dr. Henry M. Muhlenberg, Revs. Brunnholtz, Handschuh, Hartwig, Sandin, and Naesman, the latter two of the Swedish Lutheran church. Among other acts was the setting apart of J. N. Kurtz to the work of the ministry; and from this time the church in America was no longer wholly dependent on the church in Europe for ministers of the gospel.

It may be well here, in passing, to notice the character of the Lutheranism of that early day. Judged by the ministry, we must accord to it the merit of superior excellence, uniting a high degree of learning and wisdom with earnest zeal in the work of salvation. The Lutheran ministers, coming from Germany, were among the most learned of the land, and in devotion to their calling were surpassed by none. They were abundant in labors. Coming chiefly from the Pietistic school in Germany, they happily combined in themselves thoroughness of training and ripeness of learning, with fervency of spirit. Removed alike from formalism and fanaticism, they possessed a zeal which was according to knowledge. Happy would it have been for the Lutheran church, had the successive ministers always equalled these pioneers in talents, learning, piety, and true Christian zeal.

It is worthy of special observation, in this age of churchism

against Christian union and fellowship, when some are seeking to build higher and stronger the walls of separation between orthodox Protestant denominations, that while adhering to the faith and usages of the Evangelical Lutheran church, they encouraged and practised the most enlarged catholicity of spirit and action among evangelical churches. They knew nothing in their practice of a narrow and intolerant spirit. Their system of Lutheranism was not that, whether of a former or later age, which looks with suspicion or distrust upon the genuineness of other churches, or refuses to recognize and hold fellowship with those who do not join with them in the very same views, and the very same utterances. It was enough for them that they had "one Lord, one faith, and one baptism"; and they cordially and joyously extended the hand of fellowship to the ministers of other communions. And this they did, not as a mere matter of Christian courtesy, but in good faith, according to them what they claimed for themselves, to be true ministers of Jesus Christ, and to be treated as brethren in the ministry. There was frequent interchange of visits among them with ministers of other churches, and the meetings of their ecclesiastical bodies witnessed the mutual esteem in which each other was held. We find the most friendly relations existing between Lutherans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and others, and such names as Muhlenberg and Tennant and Whitefield associated in the work of the Lord. They considered themselves brethren, servants of the same Master, and engaged in a common cause.[1]

[1] "Both Swedish and German ministers manifested by brotherly visits to the clergy of other confessions that they were liberally disposed, and were desirous of maintaining a Christian friendship for and with all who love the Lord Jesus in sincerity and truth. This course of conduct failed not to produce a reciprocal good will among the servants of our Lord in other churches. Brotherly kindness was on all sides extended to our preachers; they received the most friendly invitations to attend the conventions, conferences, associations, and synods of sister churches, which civilities they, in their turn, cheerfully reciprocated. Pastor Muhlenberg, for instance, attended by special invitation a convention of the English Episcopal church, and was received with distinguished kindness. On another occasion the celebrated Presbyterian minister, Tennant,

The Lutheran church continued to grow, but its increase was not in proportion to its promising beginning, nor was there a corresponding growth in intelligence, piety, and good works. For lack of English preaching many of the young went off to other churches, and no effort was made to remedy the loss. The church seemed only to be intended for Germans, and so intense was the prejudice, that some doubted whether genuine Lutheranism could exist in English churches. During the latter part of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, the influence of German rationalism was strongly felt, and all the alarming symptoms of spiritual decay were but too manifest. Worldliness crept in like a flood, and with the decay of faith and piety came the usual accompaniments of neglect of the church and the interests of the Redeemer's kingdom. The character of the ministry suffered in learning and piety, and corresponded but too well with the general condition of the church.

From a state of lamentable indifference and inactivity the church was again aroused, and the formation of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran church in the United States, was at once the result of a spiritual awakening, and the means of further improvement and enlargement. This event took place in the year 1820, and from this dates an entirely new era in the history and operations of the church.

paid Dr. Muhlenberg a visit, concerning which the latter expressed himself, in a letter to a friend, as follows: 'The visit of Rev. Mr. Tennant I considered as a season of spiritual refreshment.' Another time the brethren Muhlenberg, J. N. Kurtz, Wrangel, and Brezelius, attended the solemnities of the Commencement of Princeton College by special invitation. In 1763 three ministers of the Episcopal church, Messrs. Durkee, Richard Peters, and Ingliss, three Presbyterian clergymen, Dr. Tennant, Dr. Finlay, President of Princeton College, and the Presbyterian minister at Newark in Jersey, and Rev. Mr. Whitefield, delighted our German and Swedish brethren with their presence and attention during the synodical sessions. Mr. Whitefield preached on that occasion, at the express request of the Lutheran ministerium, and also attended the examination of the children of the Philadelphia congregation in the truths of the Christian religion, at the close of which he endeavored, in his own happy manner, to impress the mutual duties of parents and children on the hearts of all present."—History of the American Lutheran Church, by E. L. Hazelius, D.D., pp. 88, 89; see also Church of the Redeemer, by Rev. Dr. S. S. Schmucker, pp. 83–98.

Hitherto the several district synods, which had been formed, had no organic connection, no true bond of union, and there was no mutual co-operation or combined effort in the work of building up and extending the Redeemer's kingdom. Each separate synod operated as best it could and in its own way. The evil was felt, and felt deeply. Not only were brethren of the same faith laboring without the sympathy and counsel so much needed, but there was a want of any agency by which the church could unite her means and energies in establishing institutions and associations for the furtherance of the gospel. At this time the church had no college or general theological seminary, no home or foreign missionary societies, no education, church extension, or publication boards — indeed no general agency of any kind by which the efforts of the church might be directed. The organization of the General Synod furnished a bond of union and a central power or agency, which, under God, has been the most efficient instrument in promoting the general welfare of the church.

One of the first acts of the General Synod was to found a theological seminary, and thus make better provision for the supply of ministers. Hitherto those preparing for the Lutheran ministry had either studied privately with some approved minister, or had gone to the theological seminaries of other denominations. From the establishment of a theological seminary there sprang up colleges and other institutions of learning and religion, until now the church can boast of no small number in different sections of the land. In connection also with the General Synod, more or less intimate, have been formed various societies of a benevolent and religious character, with a view to the greater efficiency and wider influence of the church. Publications recommended or authorized by the General Synod have been extensively used by the churches, and the influence has been of the most salutary kind.

At the time of the formation of the General Synod there were five Lutheran synods in the United States, four of which

united and took part in the organization of that body. One or two of these subsequently withdrew, and afterwards again united, and again withdrew. By division and accretion the number increased, until in 1861, when, on the breaking out of the war, the Southern synods were cut off, there were in the General Synod nearly thirty distinct synods, embracing almost the entire territory of the Union, and harmoniously co-operating in the work God had given them to do. Since that time new difficulties have arisen to mar the harmony of the church; but these are too recent to allow of an impartial judgment, and too uncertain in their results to hazard a conjecture as to the future. A very brief notice may be taken of some recent movements in the church before the close of this Article. The loss of the Southern synods, and other changes, left the number of district synods in the General Synod, at its last meeting, twenty-three.

Inasmuch as the establishment of the General Synod of the Lutheran church in the United States has had vastly more influence in determining the character of our Lutheranism, as well as in advancing the general welfare of the church, than any other one agency, some further notice of that body seems necessary to any correct or proper understanding of our subject.

This event took place, as already stated, in the year 1820, and after considerable correspondence and consultation. Peculiar, and apparently insuperable, difficulties stood in the way of such a movement. Rationalism in the father-land was still predominant, and its influence was widely felt in this country. There was great ignorance of the principles of genuine Lutheranism and opposition to them, on the part of many. Synods as well as individuals had become careless of orthodoxy, and there was an extreme sensitiveness about burdening the conscience or fettering the mind by ecclesiastical authority. The church had almost lost sight of her noble Confession, and ignorance of its contents was followed by disregard of its claims. Even the Synod of Pennsylvania, the mother-synod, and which has always been jealous of her

Lutheran character, had ceased to require of her ministers, at licensure and ordination, any adhesion even to the Augsburg Confession. For many years preceding and succeeding the formation of the General Synod, the Synod of Pennsylvania required no subscription but the word of God, and there was allowed a very wide latitude of interpretation. Laxity of doctrine, suspicion of authority, impatience of restraint, with wide-spread indifference, diversity of sentiment and language, and a scattered church, all combined to dishearten those who longed for union and the spiritual welfare of our Lutheran Zion. The fathers had fallen asleep, and the children had lost much of their spirit, and become estranged from one another.

But a divine voice was calling to the church to arise and shine. A few noble men set themselves to remedy the existing evils. With becoming reverence and sublime faith in "Jesus Christ, the Supreme Head of his church," they say: "Relying upon God our Father, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, under the guidance and direction of the Holy Spirit in the word of God, for the promotion of the practice of brotherly love, to the furtherance of Christian concord, to the firm establishment and continuance of the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace,—We, the deputies, etc., etc., for ourselves and our successors, do adopt the following fundamental articles," etc. — Constitution, preamble.

As the General Synod was to be simply a union of synods, its powers were chiefly advisory, leaving the judicial and executive authority mainly in the hands of the district synods. It did not design to adopt formally a creed, but has in various ways given currency and prominence to the Augsburg Confession, and has been the chief means of reinstating in its proper position of honor and authority that universal symbol of the Lutheran faith.

The type of Lutheranism designed to be established was truly evangelical, yet liberal and catholic; such as might haply unite the various portions of the church, and also bring her into cordial and active co-operation with other evangeli-

cal churches, in the common work of evangelizing the world. No other union could then have been effected, and none less liberal would have satisfied the enlarged and catholic views of the founders of the General Synod. Nothing could have been further from their spirit and aim than the attempt to build up a narrow and exclusive sect. The Constitution adopted provides (Art. iii. sec. vii.): "The General Synod shall ..... be sedulously and incessantly regardful of the circumstances of the times, and of every casual rise and progress of unity of sentiment among Christians in general, in order that the blessed opportunities to promote concord and unity, and the interests of the Redeemer's kingdom may not pass by neglected and unavailing."

Accordingly the General Synod has entered into correspondence, by interchange of delegates, with various other denominations, and has encouraged active co-operation with other churches, in the American Bible Society, Tract Society, Sunday School Union, and other national, benevolent, and Christian institutions.

Her efforts in behalf of theological education, in founding a general theological seminary, and encouraging the establishment of colleges and seminaries, have done much to increase the number and improve the character of the ministry of the church. Some four hundred ministers have already been trained in her theological seminary, while the number has been greatly increased by other institutions growing out of this. Indeed, but for the establishment of the General Synod, it is difficult to see how the church could have been supplied with ministers, or her continued existence in the land maintained; for previous to this nothing worthy had been attempted or accomplished. The General Synod having inaugurated such movements, leaves the carrying out of plans chiefly to the district synods, as they have the power to act more decisively and efficiently.

The preparation and publication of suitable "books and writings, such as catechisms, forms of liturgy, collections of hymns, etc.," for the use of the churches has also been a

work of the General Synod. This part of her work has been attended with peculiar difficulties, owing to the diversity of tastes, difference of language, constant change going on in the transition from German to English, and the disposition on the part of many to consult rather their own convenience or interest than the harmony and welfare of the whole. Still the General Synod has effected much in this direction, and there is a growing disposition to profit by her labors and counsels.

That the General Synod has not directly accomplished more, is not so much owing to any want of power, as to the very object and design of the organization, and the character of material that composed that body. It may be truly said it has surpassed the expectations of its earliest and best friends.

As it is not the design of this Article to furnish a history of the Lutheran church in the United States, or even a sketch of her history, any further than may aid in a clearer understanding of her present position, we may pass now to other points, leaving to a subsequent part any further presentation of facts that may be deemed of interest or importance. These historical references have already extended beyond our intention, and the reader may prefer to learn something about the faith, doctrines, usages, and distinctive peculiarities of the Lutheran church. What follows will refer chiefly to the Evangelical Lutheran church as embraced in the General Synod in the United States. This is the service to which the writer was specially invited. Hence the introduction so prominently of the General Synod, and hence the general tenor of what we may yet have to say. If less is said about other portions of the church, and special prominence given to this branch of Lutheranism, it is because this is the object and intention of the Article. To others will be allowed the task of telling their own story.

Rule of Faith.

In common with all orthodox Protestant churches, the Evangelical Lutheran church holds the canonical scriptures

of the Old and New Testaments to be the inspired word of God and only infallible rule of faith. While in this there is nothing peculiar, yet in the interpretation of the scriptures she is perhaps less shackled than most churches by systems of doctrine or opinions of men. The history of the Lutheran church exhibits a remarkable freedom in the discussion of all doctrines, and even on those points on which she differs from other churches, she adheres to her own views of the faith only so far as she insists that these views are in accordance with the divine word and founded upon it. Without discarding philosophy, or depreciating the service of reason, or disregarding the voice of the church in other ages, she prefers to go to the Bible to learn what to believe and what to do, and to receive its teachings, without submitting them to the decisions of Fathers, or Councils, or Creeds. Those who prepared and presented the Augsburg Confession say: "We do not feel willing to transmit to our children and descendants, and entail upon them, any other doctrine than that of the pure divine word" (Art. xxi.); and further declare their purpose not to receive anything "either in doctrine or ceremonies contrary to the holy scriptures."

The Formula of Concord, regarded by some portions of the church as of symbolical authority, is alike decisive, and draws a clear distinction between the divine word and all systems prepared by uninspired men, when it says: "We believe, teach, and confess that the only rule and standard, according to which all doctrines and teachers alike ought to be tried and judged, are the prophetic and apostolic scriptures of the Old and New Testaments alone"; adding that "the symbols and other writings are not authorities like the holy scriptures; but they are only a testimony and explanation of our faith, showing the manner in which at any time the holy scriptures were understood and explained by those who then lived."

The position of the church is thus one of direct antagonism: 1st. To Deists, and all others who deny the need of a divine revelation, and that the Bible is the word of God.

2d. To Rationalists, and all those who reject the supernatural, or deny the divine inspiration of the Bible, or who would subordinate its teachings to their own reason. 3d. To Romanists, and all who deny the sufficiency of the scriptures, or who would exalt tradition or the authority of the church to an equality with the word of God. 4th. To all, of whatever church, who deny the right of private interpretation, or that the scriptures are a safe guide in the hands of the people, who should read and judge for themselves.[1]

The Evangelical Lutheran church must ignore her origin, discard her confession, and repudiate her history, before she can become anything else than what she has always been — the uncompromising friend of the divine authority, sufficiency, and inestimable value to all, of the divine word.

Confession of Faith.

While the church holds the Bible to be the only and infallible rule of faith, she is not without a Confession, that it may be known how she understands the Bible, especially on all the most important points. The only Confession of Faith universally recognized by the Evangelical Lutheran church throughout the world, as well as in the United States, is that presented at the Diet of Augsburg, in 1530. It is the mother-symbol of Protestantism, and has had more to do with shaping the Confessions of Protestant Christendom than any other Confession of ancient or modern times. This is not the place to speak at large of the character or merits of this venerable Confession, but it may be stated that it has won the highest homage from the most distinguished theologians of other churches. Calvin says: "It is my pride willingly and cheer-

[1] The learned historian, Mosheim, observes: "According to the opinion of this church (Lutheran) the entire rule for a correct religious faith and for a holy life is to be drawn exclusively from the books dictated by God himself; and it believes that these books, of course, are so plain and so easy to be understood in respect to the way of salvation, that every man who possesses common sense, and who understands their language, can ascertain their meaning for himself, or without an interpreter." — Ecclesiastical History, Vol. iii. p. 129, Murdock's Translation.

fully to subscribe it." Bishop Bull of the church of England: "The Augsburg Confession is the noblest among Confessions, the English [Thirty-nine Articles] not excepted." Archbishop Laurence, of the same church, calls it "the boast of Germany and pride of the Reformation." D'Aubigne, the popular historian of the Reformation, describes it as "a production which will ever remain one of the master-pieces of the human mind, enlightened by the Spirit of God." The finished American scholar and divine, Dr. James W. Alexander, pronounces it "a beautiful and stirring argument and protest." Others might easily be cited, but these are sufficient to show that, great and good men of other churches being witnesses, the Lutheran church need not be ashamed of her noble Confession.

Besides the Augsburg Confession, there are other books called symbolical, and part or all of which have been received by portions of the church in some countries. These books are, The Apology to the Augsburg Confession, The Smalcald Articles, The Smaller and Larger Catechisms of Luther, and The Formula of Concord, the whole sometimes called The Book of Concord. Of these, the Smaller Catechism has been especially popular, and has been almost universally used in the church as a manual of instruction for the young. Its popularity may be judged from the fact that it has been translated into the Hebrew, Arabic, Syriac, Greek, and Latin, as well as nearly all living languages; and that thirty-seven years after its appearance, one hundred thousand copies had been printed and circulated. It is said to have had the largest circulation of any volume ever printed except the Bible. But the Augsburg Confession is the only universally recognized Confession of the Lutheran church in all lands, and the only one to which the General Synod of the Lutheran church in the United States demands adherence by synods uniting with it. No very serious attempt has been made in this country to bind the Lutheran church to the other symbolical books until quite recently; and now the effort is mainly by Lutherans from Europe, with a few Americans

who are acting in concert with them. The great mass of Lutherans, born and reared in the United States, know little about the symbolical books, and the ministers and churches do not desire so extended or so rigid a system as that contained in the entire collection of so-called symbolical books, but are satisfied with the one catholic universal symbol of Lutheranism — the Augsburg Confession.

Subscription.

The whole question of subscription to Creeds or Confessions must be considered as yet in a somewhat uncertain and indefinite light in the Protestant churches. There is the widest difference of views and practice among churches confessedly orthodox, some advocating a more rigid, and others maintaining a more liberal, subscription. The Lutheran church in Germany has been divided in sentiment on this subject, and the *quia* and *quatenus* have served as the shibboleths of party. The Lutheran church in the United States forms no exception to the general rule, and this subject is one that at present furnishes abundant cause for discord and strife.

At the first organization of the General Synod in 1820, there was a failure to recognize, in any distinct or official manner, even the Augsburg Confession. This was chiefly owing to the nature of that body as a union of synods, and to the influence of some synods whose greatest complaint against the General Synod has since been, that it was not more distinctly symbolical and Lutheran. This defect or omission in the Constitution of the General Synod was deemed the less important, as that body was not intrusted with the power of regulating or adjusting the faith of the church. But the General Synod did give expression to its adherence to the Augsburg Confession very soon after its organization, by inserting an acknowledgment of it, both in the Professor's Oath or obligation, in the theological seminary then founded, and also in the "Formula for the Government and Discipline of the Evangelical Lutheran Church." More

recently the General Synod has adopted an amendment to the constitution, and now requires of all synods uniting with it the following, namely: "Receiving and holding, with the Evangelical Lutheran church of our fathers, the word of God as contained in the canonical scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, as the only infallible rule of faith and practice, and the Augsburg Confession, as a correct exhibition of the fundamental doctrines of the divine word, and of the faith of our church founded upon that word," etc.

This may not satisfy all in the church, or meet the approbation of all in other churches. Some would have more and others less. There are those in the church, who will be satisfied with nothing short of an unconditional subscription to every jot and tittle in the Confession; while others have uneasy consciences that so much is exacted. This question cannot be here discussed at length, but the absurdity of demanding an unqualified adherence to the Confession "in every statement of doctrine," as maintained by some, and that the subscribers must "agree to use the same words in one and the same sense," in their interpretation of it, as a condition of ministerial fellowship, may be seen by a single illustration. The article in the Apostle's Creed, "He descended into hell," has not only been differently interpreted by different churches, but by different individuals in the same church, and this continues to be so, even in the Lutheran church, and yet all agree to receive this creed, this diversity notwithstanding.

No other Protestant church pretends to require or enforce an absolute agreement with everything contained in its Confession. Dr. Hodge of Princeton, an acknowledged authority, and one of the staunchest defenders of the most rigid Confessional orthodoxy among Presbyterians, declares in the Princeton Repertory of the Old School Presbyterian church, that it "could not hold together a week" if the "adoption of all the propositions" in the Westminster Confession were "made a condition of ministerial fellowship"; and that such a mode of subscription "could not be carried out without

working the certain and immediate ruin of the church." The most distinguished theologians of the Lutheran church in Germany have always maintained that subscription to the Confession should not carry with it an unqualified pledge to every non-essential part, or "every statement of doctrine" on points not fundamental. The introduction of these remarks has been in consequence of attempts in different quarters to impugn the orthodoxy of the General Synod because of not requiring a more rigid subscription. But until "a more excellent way" is shown, the General Synod may congratulate itself with having aimed at and attained to the *juste milieu*. It is believed that this doctrinal test secures about all that is secured by any test in any church, and that within the General Synod of the Lutheran church the orthodoxy is as sound and the harmony of views as great as in any other portion of the church, or as is secured by any other mode of subscription among other denominations. In accordance with the views just stated, and in accordance with the very best results secured by other modes of subscription by other orthodox churches, the General Synod, mindful of the truth on the one hand, and of Christian liberty on the other, has framed her requirement so as neither to sacrifice "the faith once delivered to the saints," nor to "burden the consciences of the brethren in Christ" (Constitution, Art. iii. Sec. 2).

DOCTRINES.

It is proposed now to present the leading doctrines, chiefly as exhibited in the Augsburg Confession, and understood and held by the church. In doing this it will be necessary to limit the presentation to the most prominent and important points, and to avoid all unnecessary details and explanations.

Theological.

Godhead.

The Evangelical Lutheran church does not differ from other orthodox churches on the doctrine of the Godhead.

Her faith is the faith of the early church, and in the unity of that faith the great body of the Christian church is agreed. Accepting and holding as her own the three ecumenical Creeds, the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian, there could be no departure from the general orthodox faith without at the same time involving a departure from the acknowledged standards. Satisfied with these, and believing that God had guided his church in the confession of the truth, the Lutheran church declared her union with the church of the early ages, in the words: "Our churches unanimously hold and teach, agreeably to the Decree of the Council of Nice, that there is only one Divine Essence, which is called, and truly is, God; but that there are three persons in this one Divine Essence, equally powerful, equally eternal — God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Ghost, — who are one Divine Essence, eternal, incorporeal, indivisible, infinite in power, wisdom, and goodness, the Creator and Preserver of all things visible and invisible. And the word "person" is not intended to express a part or quality of another, but that which subsists of itself, precisely as the Fathers have employed this term on this subject." By way of contrast the Article adds: "Every heresy opposed to this Article is therefore condemned," and specifies the leading ones.

An analysis of the Article, so explicit in itself, will show that it teaches: 1st. The unity of the Divine Essence; 2d. The Trinity of persons in the Godhead, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; 3d. The term "person" understood in the sense of the Fathers; 4th. The divinity of each person, co-equal and co-eternal; 5th. The Triune God, the Creator and Preserver of all things visible and invisible; 6th. The condemnation of all opposing views or doctrines.

Divine Decrees — Foreknowledge and Predestination.

The doctrine of the divine decrees is one that did not enter into the controversy between Protestants and Romanists at the time of the preparation of the Augsburg Confession. Happily, at that period, it did not engage special attention,

and was not made an article of faith. Luther and Melanchthon were at first inclined to the Augustinian view; but they abandoned it, and it never became the received doctrine of the church. Although not prominent in the Lutheran system, the Formula of Concord presents the views of the Lutheran church, in distinct antagonism to the Calvinistic system, on this perplexing question. And, while the Lutheran church allows here a large degree of liberty, and has not considered it as fundamental, not being included in the Augsburg Confession, the views of her greatest theologians, as well as the general faith of the church, are in harmony with the doctrine as expressed in the Formula of Concord. The views of the Lutheran church may be considered as embracing the following:

1. A distinction is made between foreknowledge and predestination. The foreknowledge of God extends to all things, predestination to that which is according to his will. This distinction is absolutely necessary, unless we are willing to make God the author of evil as well as of good. He foresaw the fall of man, but he did not predestinate it, in any fair or proper meaning of the term. God foresees all the evil in the world, but to say that he predestinated it, is to charge him with being its author. God never predestinated or ordained that any man should sin, nor can it be according to his holy will or pleasure. Sin is always and everywhere opposed to God.

2. A distinction is likewise made between the decrees or purposes of God which are absolute or unconditional, and those which are conditional. God determined unconditionally to create the universe — to form the earth and place man upon it. In view of the fall, he determined unconditionally to provide salvation for the human race. But he determined to bestow salvation or eternal life, conditionally, on those who would repent and believe. The decrees of God, in reference to intelligent moral agents, are not arbitrary, "or as if the Lord would institute a certain military review, saying, this one shall be saved, but that one shall be lost; this one shall

persevere to the end, but that one shall not persevere" (Formula of Concord, Art. xi.).

3. The election of God to eternal life is according to foreknowledge, and conditioned upon repentance and faith. This is the doctrine of the divine word. Peter says, "elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father"; and Paul says, "whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son." As "God foresaw precisely, and with greatest certainty, before the world was made, and he knows still, who among those that are called will believe or will not believe; also who among the converted will remain steadfast, and who will not remain steadfast; who, if they fall back into sin, will return, and who will become hardened"; so the truly faithful may be said to be "chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world" (Formula of Concord).

4. The decree of reprobation from eternity is decidedly rejected. The Lutheran church utterly reject as erroneous the doctrine, that "solely through the bare counsel, purpose, and will of God some are destined to damnation, so that they cannot be saved." The "decretum quidem horribile" of Calvin finds no place in the Lutheran system or symbols. There is no eternal decree of God consigning any portion of the race to hopeless ruin simply "to the praise of his glorious justice."

5. The purposes of divine grace and mercy embrace the whole world (John iii. 16). The provision made by the death of Christ is for all men (Heb. ii. 9; 1 Jno. ii. 2). The offer of salvation is to all, and this offer is honest and sincere on the part of God (Rev. xxii. 17; Ezek. xxxiii. 11). God is willing to save all (1 Tim. ii. 4; 2 Pet. iii. 9). Those who are lost perish because of their own unbelief and continuance in sin.

6. It is altogether of divine grace and mercy that any are saved; and it is altogether of human depravity and perverseness that any are lost. "The mercy of God and the most holy merit of Christ" are declared to be "the only cause" of our election of God; as our guilt and refusal of mercy are the ground of our rejection and condemnation.

It may be very easy to arraign this view of the divine decrees, and to show what may seem insuperable difficulties. Apparent logical inconsistencies may be alleged. And it is not denied that there are difficulties, or pretended that such a view solves all the mysteries of this sublime subject. The Lutheran church does not feel bound to take care of the logical difficulties, in accepting just as they stand different portions of the divine word. She accepts what she finds in the Bible, whether she can construct all the different parts into one logically consistent system or not.

But it would be quite as easy to array insuperable difficulties against the opposing Calvinistic system. In seeking to be consistent, and giving more weight to logical deductions than to divine teaching, it may well be questioned whether conclusions have not been reached most prejudicial to the divine character and government, and to the freedom and responsibility of man. It is not, however, our intention to argue the case, or to defend the one or arraign the other, but simply to state the Lutheran view and to let it appear in contrast with opposing systems.

The difference between Lutheranism and Calvinism on this point, may be seen by a few extracts from their acknowledged standards.

Westminster Confession, Chap. iii.

"By the decree of God for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to everlasting death. These angels and men thus predestinated and fore-ordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished."

"Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God ..... hath chosen ..... without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing

Formula of Concord, Art. xi.

"The eternal election or predestination of God ..... does not pertain both to the good and the bad, but only to the children of God," and rejects as erroneous the view "that God is not willing that all men shall be saved," or that "some are destined to damnation so that they cannot be saved."

"There is no doubt that God foresaw precisely and with the greatest certainty before the world was made, and he knows still, who among those that are called will believe or will

in the creature, as conditions or causes moving him thereunto."

"Neither are any other redeemed by Christ. ..... The rest of mankind God was pleased ..... to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice."

"Others not elected, although they may be called by the ministry of the word, and may have some common operations of the Spirit, yet they never truly come to Christ, and therefore cannot be saved."

not believe; also who among the converted will remain steadfast, and who will not remain steadfast," etc.

"In his counsel God ordained that the human race shall be truly redeemed. ..... The reason that all who hear the word of God do not believe, and therefore meet with a deeper condemnation, is not to be found in God's unwillingness to bestow salvation. ..... For God does not desire that any man should be damned."

"As the preaching of repentance is universal, so is also the promise of the gospel, that is, it extends to all persons, Luke xxiv. 47. ..... And this call of God which is given through the preaching of the Word we should not regard as pretended and unreal, but we ought to know that through it God reveals his will; namely, that in those whom he thus calls he will operate through the Word, so that they may be enlightened, converted, and saved."

These citations are enough to show the divergence of the two systems, and this is the only object in thus presenting them. It may be proper to add, that while the Lutheran church decidedly rejects the absolute decree, assigning each individual, unconditionally, to eternal life or eternal death, she rejects with equal decision the opposite extremes into which Arminianism has sometimes run. The rigors of Calvinism and the laxity of Arminianism are alike opposed, and the sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man maintained. To God is given all the glory of salvation, to man all the guilt of endless ruin.

Anthropological.

In regard to man, the Augsburg Confession teaches that the whole human family is involved in one common apostasy and ruin, in consequence of the fall of Adam, and the de-

scent of the race from him, and that all must perish, unless saved through "the merits and sufferings of Christ," being "born again by baptism and the Holy Spirit." This great and terrible truth is set forth as a simple matter of fact, resting alike on the word of God, and individual consciousness, so far as it comes within the sphere of consciousness, without any attempt to explain it according to any system of philosophy, or any theory of the origin of souls, or of the transmission of this evil nature. "The chief Confession of the Evangelical church, the Augsburg," says Julius Müller, "has with a wise reserve so laid down its explanation on this point, that a certain diversity of dogmatic theories may be reconciled with the same." Sin is treated more as a practical question, than one of theory; and we are pointed to the frightful disease, and the only sufficient remedy. Still it is not difficult to learn what the Confession and the church teach concerning man, for due, if not special, prominence is given to questions in anthropology. The second Article of the Augsburg Confession is as follows:

"We teach, that since the fall of Adam, all men who are naturally engendered, are conceived and born in sin; that is, that they all are from their mother's womb, full of evil desires and propensities, and can have by nature no true fear of God, no true faith in God; and that this innate disease, or original sin, is truly sin, which brings all those under the eternal wrath of God who are not born again by baptism and the Holy Spirit. Hence, we condemn the Pelagians and others, who deny that original corruption is sin, whereby they assert, to the disparagement of the merits and sufferings of Christ, that piety is the result of our natural powers."

In opposition to Pelagius, and all who deny the corruption of man by nature, the Confession recognizes a fall. Man is not now what he was as originally created, when he was in the image of God, of which the Apology says: "But the greatest excellency of this noble first creature, was a bright light in the heart to know God and his works, true fear of God, truly sincere confidence in him, and in all respects a

correct, reliable understanding, and a heart well disposed towards God and all divine things."

The Article itself distinctly teaches, 1st. That all men are sinners. 2d. That this is in consequence of the fall of Adam. 3d. That this sin is innate, or born with us. 4th. That it is guilt, or exposing to the wrath of God. 5th. That those who are saved from it must be "born again."

The different theories to account for, or explain this, find no place here. The doctrine does not rest on any uncertain speculation of men, but on the sure word of God. What the Article contains, may be much more in accordance with one theory than another, but is not framed to suit any theory but that of the divine word.

The main points about which there have been differences of opinion among churches claiming to be orthodox are two; and upon these the Confession is by no means vague or uncertain:

1. "This innate disease, or original sin, is truly sin." It is not regarded as some defect or calamity in no wise affecting the moral character of man, or as a mere disorder of the constitution, in consequence of which there is a proneness to sin. But it is sin, the parent sin, the root and source of all other sins in man. Many then, as before and since, were unwilling to allow to this natural corruption and depravity, the character of sin, or to admit that a sinful nature could be inherited. Systems of philosophy were allowed to determine their views of doctrine. "This active hereditary contagion," says Melanchthon in the Apology, "by which our whole nature is corrupted, by which we all inherit such hearts, minds, and thoughts from Adam as are immediately opposed to God, and to his first and greatest commandment, the scholastics pass over in silence." He combats the views of those who taught that original sin was "merely a defect, an incumbrance which has come upon us from Adam, but of ourselves we are not involved in sin and inherited wrath," and maintains "that not a *part* merely, but the *whole* man, with his whole nature, is born in sin, with a hereditary constitutional disease."

"Evil lust and the want of original righteousness are sin and punishment. We here speak of the inborn evil character of the heart, not only of actual guilt, or of real crimes and sins." Such utterances, which might be indefinitely multiplied, leave no room for doubt on this point.

2. Not less decisive is the teaching, that this original sin is guilt, *reatus*, exposing to the punishment and wrath of God. The Confession, as cited, calls it "truly sin, which brings all those under the eternal wrath of God, who are not born again." The adversaries of this doctrine maintained that no one was condemned for this sin alone, "that it is not a sin which merits death and condemnation." On the contrary, Melanchthon argued in defence of the Confession, that this original sin "really is sin, deserving death and eternal condemnation;" and that so heinous is it before God, "that we need Christ the Mediator, in order that God may not impute it unto us, and the constant light and operation of the Holy Spirit to mortify and remove it." Following the Bible, it is taught that we are "by nature the children of wrath."

How this state of sin and condemnation is to be explained, whether on the theory of federal headship and representation in Adam, or of realistic union in him, so that his sin was the sin of each individual of the race, or of the natural propagation of a fallen and sinful nature, we are not instructed or required to believe. The language may be more in harmony with one mode of explanation than another, but the Confession rests in the fact. The Formula of Concord indeed condemns the view, "that original sin is only a *reatus*, or guilt contracted by the offence of another, without any corruption of our own nature." Still we are not distinctly committed either to immediate or mediate imputation. Julius Müller represents "the trope of doctrine of the Lutheran dogmatic," as stepping "in between two deviations in opposite directions," and "the connection of our culpability with the fall of our first parents as a double one, mediate and immediate."[1]

[1] How nearly this accords with the latest conclusions of some who belong

Any one familiar with the history of the doctrine, and how it has distracted and rent certain portions of the Protestant church, will not fail to admire the wisdom and judgment displayed in setting it forth in the Confession of the Lutheran church. The doctrine itself of original sin is clearly taught, but the specific mode of explanation is left to the wisdom and discretion of the individual. We may here quote, in illustration and confirmation of what has been said, the words of Dr. Hodge, in the Princeton Repertory for July 1867: "Original sin, however, is one thing; the way in which it is accounted for is another. The doctrine is, that such is the relation between Adam and his posterity, that all mankind, descending from him by ordinary generation, are born in a state of sin and condemnation. Any man who admits this, holds the doctrine." This doctrine the Lutheran church firmly holds, and has happily escaped many difficulties which have beset some of the Reformed Confessions that have attempted to incorporate a specific explanation of the doctrine as a part of the faith.

Against any Supralapsarian views the Confession guards, by declaring (Art. xix), "As to the cause of sin, it is taught among us, that, although Almighty God has created and preserves all nature, yet the perverted will works sin in all evil-doers and despisers of God."

to the school of immediate imputation, the following brief extract will show: "There is doubtless a wide difference between imputed sin and inherent sin. We, however, have both, and that naturally; and it tends only to error to attempt to explicate either of them in disregard of the other, or to separate what God has indissolubly united, namely, our double relation to Adam. It is infinitely certain that God would never make a legal fiction a pretext to punish as sinners dependent and helpless creatures who were actually innocent. The imputation of our sins to Christ affords no pretext for such a statement, because that was done by the express consent of Christ, and was, in every respect, the most stupendous proof of divine grace. Nor is the righteousness of Christ ever imputed for justification except to the elect, nor ever received except by faith, which is a grace of the Spirit, peculiar to the renewed soul. In like manner the sin of Adam is imputed to us, but never irrespective of our nature and its inherent sin." — Breckenridge's Knowledge of God objectively considered, pp. 498, 499.

Ability and Free-will.

The questions of ability and free-will are treated, not in a metaphysical, but in a religious and practical manner; and as original sin is held to be universal, and the depravity of man total, extending to all his moral and spiritual powers, there is an utter want of ability on his part to begin or carry forward the work of his salvation. With an understanding that is blinded by sin, and a heart alienated from God and divine things, man cannot and will not, of himself, seek after God. He has no ability to do so, because he has no disposition or desire to do so. His mind is enmity against God, and the sinner has no power to change his own heart. He is under the dominion of Satan, and the slave of his own depraved nature. He has no more power than the blind man has to see, or the paralytic to walk, or the leper to cleanse himself. He is blind and paralytic and unclean; and must receive from some higher power the ability to see and walk and be clean. Of himself he can do nothing that is spiritually good.

The Confession makes a distinction, and allows to man a certain kind of freedom. It does not, indeed, intend to deny that freedom which belongs to him as a rational and accountable being. To be accountable he must be free — free from any compulsion to act contrary to his own inclination or choice, and free to choose according to his own disposition. But at the same time, owing to his depraved affections and desires, man always chooses the evil and never the good, until he is renewed by the Holy Ghost. Such is his choice in spiritual things. In things temporal or worldly he may choose better. Here natural reason may guide him to a wiser choice, and natural ability may enable him to act.

Article xviii. says: "Concerning free-will it is taught that, to some extent, man has freedom of will to lead a life outwardly honest, and to choose between things which reason comprehends." And further, quoting from Augustine with approbation: "We acknowledge that in all men there is

a free-will; for they all, indeed, have natural connate understanding and reason; not that they are able to act in things pertaining to God, such as to love and fear God from the heart, but only in external works of this life have they freedom to choose good or evil."

In like manner the Apology: "It is proper, therefore, to make this clear distinction: namely, that our reason and free-will enable us, to some extent, to live outwardly honest, but that the new birth, and the formation of a new heart and mind in us is solely the work of the Holy Ghost."

The inability in man is moral or spiritual, and not natural. It is natural in the sense of being a part of his corrupt nature and common to all, but it has reference, not to his natural, but his spiritual, powers, and not to natural but spiritual things. Without special divine assistance man can use his senses, exercise his understanding and judgment, or perform any act which comes within the province of the natural man. But he cannot discern spiritual things, or conform his own heart and life to the will of God. This requires the aid of the Holy Spirit; and until man is born again he is utterly impotent to all spiritual good. Naturally he is free, but spiritually he is in bondage — "carnal, sold under sin."

According to the doctrine of the Evangelical Lutheran church, the work of renewing the soul in the image of God is wholly divine. It not only rejects the Pelagian view, that man possesses the ability of himself to please God, but also the view, that man co-operates to aid in the work of his regeneration, so that it is jointly the work of God and man. It ascribes the whole work to God. "Our reason and free-will possess in some measure the ability to produce an outwardly honest life, but the new birth, the inward change of the heart, mind, and disposition are works of the Holy Spirit alone" (Formula of Concord, on Free-will).

It must not, however, be supposed that the Lutheran church teaches the doctrine of necessity; or that man has nothing at all to do in the work of his salvation. Both of these errors are contrary to the faith of the church, and care-

fully guarded against. The Formula of Concord, in harmony with the Augsburg Confession, condemns those "who taught that all that happens, so happens from necessity, and cannot otherwise occur; and that man does all through compulsion." On the other hand it says: "When the Holy Spirit has commenced his work of regeneration and renewal in us, through the word and the holy sacraments, that then, assuredly, we can and should co-operate through the power of the Holy Ghost, although still in great weakness. But this co-operation results, not from our natural and carnal powers, but from the new powers and gifts, which the Holy Spirit originated in us in conversions." The confession itself says (Art. xx.): "And because the Holy Spirit is given through faith, the heart becomes qualified to perform good works. For before this, while it is without the Holy Spirit, it is too weak."

Thus the church seeks to guard different points of this important subject, holding to the universality of sin through Adam, and individual guilt; the inability, yet freedom and responsibility, of man; his helpless dependence on divine aid, yet active co-operation with the Holy Spirit in working out his salvation.

Soteriological.

The doctrine of salvation through Jesus Christ has chiefly to do with the person and work of our Divine Redeemer, including the application of the purchased redemption.

Person of Christ.

From the earliest times to the present, the doctrine of Christ's person has been considered of the utmost importance — fundamental among fundamental doctrines. It has secured due prominence in the Lutheran system, and has been guarded with a most jealous care. Article iii. of the Augsburg Confession, "On the Son of God," has the following:

"It is taught likewise, that God the Son became man, and was born of the blessed virgin Mary; and that the two

natures, human and divine, inseparably united in one person, are one Christ, who is true God and man, who was really born, who truly suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried, that he might be a sacrifice, not only for original sin, but also for all other sins, and might appease the wrath of God." This agrees with the doctrine as contained in the ancient ecumenical creeds, and with this also agrees all other exhibitions as contained in other symbols of the church. These need not here be cited.

In this brief statement are contained all the points involved in the true doctrine of Christ's person. These points are four, and which guard it against all opposing heresies:

1. The absolute divinity of Christ, as the eternal Son of God and second person in the Trinity. He is called "God the Son," and declared to be true God. The first Article of the Confession, already cited, declares the "three persons" to be "equally powerful, equally eternal"; and, according, as it does, with the Nicene or Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan creed, teaches the "eternal generation" of the Son. The title "Son of God" is not in consequence of his being born of the virgin Mary, or does not pertain to his human nature as such, but is used to denote a relation eternally existing with the Father. No discussion or proof of this doctrine would be in place here; but the evangelical Lutheran church holds fast to the early faith of the Nicene and Athanasian symbols.

2. The perfect humanity of Christ, as consisting of a natural human body and a rational soul. "God the Son became man — was born of the blessed virgin Mary — two natures, human and divine — true God and man — was really born, truly suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried." The proper humanity of Christ is insisted on, no less than his divinity. He is as truly man as he is God — Son of God and Son of Man.

3. The union of these two natures, the human and the divine, in the one person, Jesus Christ. "And that the two natures, human and divine, inseparably united in one person, are one Christ, who is true God and man." This union

is called inseparable, and the result is one person. The Saviour is the God-man, Immanuel, — not as God and man separate and distinct, the one apart from the other, but mysteriously and indissolubly united — Son of God and Son of Mary — "God manifest in the flesh."

4. The distinction of these two natures, so that in the one person there is no commingling or admixture of the human and the divine. The "one person, who is true God and man," has "the two natures," and, although "inseparably united," they are not commingled or confused. The divine remains divine, and the human remains human; each possessing its own essential, unchanged, and unchangeable attributes.

This doctrine arrays itself in the most direct antagonism to all opposing heresies touching the person of Christ. Every phase of Unitarianism, ancient and modern, with all Docetic, Gnostic, and Apollinarian views, is utterly discarded, and, along with them, all Eutychian and Nestorian errors and tendencies.

The Evangelical Lutheran church is very zealous in maintaining the doctrine that Christ, in the prosecution of his mediatorial work, acts in his entire person, as the God-man, and not now as God, and now as man. There are certain attributes and works that belong specifically to the one or the other nature; but, in the possession of these attributes and performance of these works, the one nature is to be considered as inseparably united with the other, and the whole to belong to the one person, who is Mediator and Redeemer. Thus it belongs to the human nature of Christ to suffer and die. The divine nature is incapable of suffering and death. But the person who suffered and died on the cross and rose again, was the Son of God as well as the Son of Man. It belongs to the divine nature of Christ to work miracles, in and of itself, to raise the dead and rule the elements; and yet he did these things as Jesus of Nazareth. So that Christ must not be looked upon as simply human or divine, but as both, inseparably united in the one person.

All that he does in his mediatorial work, he does as the God-man, Immanuel.

Some, in their zeal for this doctrine, and what was supposed to be involved in it, have gone beyond this, and maintained what, in theological technology, is known as the *communicatio idiomatum*, that is, the communication of attributes or properties, so that the properties of the one nature are communicated to the other; or, in reality, rather, that certain of the attributes of the divine nature of Christ are communicated to his human nature. This doctrine does not maintain that the essential attributes of the one nature ever become the essential attributes of the other. The very contrary is affirmed. But that, in consequence of the personal union and communion of the two natures, "without any confusion of the natures and of their essential properties," there is a real communication of the divine properties to the human nature of Christ.[1] This doctrine is not found in the Augsburg Confession, or in any symbol universally received by the Lutheran church, and so cannot be held as an essential part of the Lutheran system of faith. It is found in the Formula of Concord, and was manifestly elaborated to sustain a particular view of the Saviour's presence in the eucharist. If, as some explain it, the doctrine means no more than "a common participation of the whole person in the properties of both natures," then there

[1] "Et quidem his vocabulis (realis communicatio realiter communicari) nunquam ullam physicam communicationem vel essentialem transfusionem (qua naturae in suis essentiis aut essentialibus proprietatibus confunderentur) docere voluimus, ut quidam vocabula et phrases illas astute et malitiose falsa interpretatione, contra conscientiam suam, pervertere non dubitarunt, tantum, ut piam doctrinam suspicionibus iniquissimis gravarent. Sed vocabula et phrases illas verbali communicationi opposuimus, cum quidam fingerent commuicationem idiomatum nihil aliud nisi phrasin et modum quendam loquendi, hoc est, mera tantum verba, nomina et titulos inanes esse. Et hanc verbalem communicationem adeo urserunt, ut de nulla alia communicatione audire quidquam vellent. Quapropter ad recte declarandam majestatem Christi vocabula (de reali communicatione) usurpavimus, ut significaremus, communicationem illam vere et re ipsa (sine omni tamen naturarum et proprietatum essentialium confusione) factam esse." — Müller's Sym. Bücher der Ev. Luth. Kirche, Formula of Concord, 688.

is nothing peculiar in it; for all orthodox churches maintain this. But if it means a real communication of the attributes of the divine nature of Christ to his human nature, then it is, to say the least, without any clear warrant in the word of God, and has failed to receive the assent of many of the most distinguished theologians, as well as of the entire church. To show how fully other churches hold to the inseparable union of the two natures in Christ's person, and that both are united in his entire work, we need but quote a single authority, and that one of the most recent writers on dogmatic theology. Rev. Dr. R. J. Breckenridge says: "All the office-work of this Mediator looking to the salvation of man, or having any bearing thereon, is not to be considered as the special work of one nature or the other nature indissolubly united in his person, but is to be considered as the work of the person thus formed of these two natures, that is, the work of him who is God-man — the work of Immanuel — the work of the Mediator. We are not to divide our Saviour; for his fitness to be our Saviour lies precisely in this, that the two natures are hypostatically united in him. ..... His very fitness to be the Mediator between God and man depends upon this. ..... And we must bear in mind the intimate and mutual communication with each other which these two distinct natures united in the person of Christ must necessarily have, by virtue of their union in that indissoluble manner. This ineffable communication takes place immediately in the person of the Son, in which they are united." Any difference from this, in Lutheran theology, is rather one of definitions or terms and theoretic speculation than of substantial disagreement.

Work of Christ.

The work of Christ in its true, full, and comprehensive sense, embraces all that he accomplishes for us in his prophetic, priestly, and kingly offices, but a discussion of all these would unnecessarily add to the length of this Article. On some of these points, there is little diversity of views, and

they may be passed over here without prejudice or detriment to the truth. It will suffice to make a statement in regard to what is generally conceded to be the most prominent part of Christ's work, and about which there has been most difference of opinion. While, therefore, the prophetic and kingly offices are not depreciated, it is his priestly office that now claims attention, in which he provides redemption through his sacrificial, atoning death. This subject was viewed by the authors of the Confession, chiefly in its relation to the pardon and acceptance of the sinner with God. The sinner is guilty and at enmity with God. The question is: How can he be pardoned and restored to the divine favor? What will satisfy the offended Sovereign, and what will satisfy the guilty conscience? It was to find a remedy for sin, a remedy full and complete, that they looked to Christ. Accordingly, the Confession sets forth the infinite merit of Christ as the only ground of a sinner's justification. Against all meritorious works of righteousness, and all atonement or expiation that we ourselves can make, it holds up the work of Christ wrought in our behalf, and his sufferings and death as the only and perfect atonement for all sin.

As to the nature of Christ's sufferings and death, it is taught that they are vicarious and expiatory. He suffered in our stead, and to make expiation for sin. The law of God had been violated, and the justice of God required that sin should be punished: and this was done when Christ voluntarily submitted himself to the bitterest sufferings and most cruel death. He died for sinners, and to make satisfaction for sin. He was "the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world." The Augsburg Confession teaches not only that the Son of God became man, but as the God-man, "truly suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried, that he might be a sacrifice, not only for original sin, but also for all other sins, and might appease the wrath of God" (Art. iii.). It further declares "that there is no sacrifice for original sin, or for other sins, but the death of Christ" (Art. xxiv.). The Apology, in its defence of the Confession against Romish corrup-

tions of the doctrine of the atonement, speaks of "the death of Christ," as "an expiation for guilt," "a propitiatory sacrifice," and says, "that there has been but one sacrifice, namely, the death of Christ, which was intended to be an atonement for others, and to appease the wrath of God." These and similar declarations leave no room for reasonable doubt as to the doctrine of the church concerning the nature of the atonement. It was designed to meet the claims of God's law, and God's justice, and at the same time to meet a corresponding want on the part of the sinner, so that reconciliation might be effected, and God be just, while he justifies the believer in Christ Jesus.

Later, in the Formula of Concord, stress was laid upon the active obedience, as well as the sufferings and death of Christ; and Lutheran theologians have generally acquiesced in the propriety and importance of this distinction, so that the satisfaction of Christ is viewed as embracing both his active and passive obedience, or all he did and suffered for our sakes.

As to the extent of the atonement, the Evangelical Lutheran church has never held or taught any other view than that it was universal, or for the whole world. Any other view would conflict with the general system held, as well as with express statements of this particular doctrine. The atonement of Christ is not only deemed sufficient for the whole world, and adapted to the condition and wants of every sinner, but as actually provided for and to be offered to all. No theory of the divine purposes, or conclusions drawn from results actually attained, are allowed to mould the interpretation of the plain, simple, and reiterated declarations of the divine word. As the Bible teaches that "Christ tasted death for every man," and that his blood is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, so the church, with Melanchthon in the Apology, holds that "Christ was given for us to atone for the sins of the world." The compassionate love of God in sending his Son, knew no limits short of the whole world of fallen human beings, and none will be

excluded from the benefits of his redemption, except those who exclude themselves.

In opposition to the Romish view, the atonement of Christ is held to be complete, not only sufficient for original sin, but for all actual sins. This error of the Romish church is most earnestly combatted and exposed, as prejudicial alike to the honor of Christ, and to the peace of souls. It is called "an abominable error," "an unparalleled innovation," and its utter groundlessness shown. Nothing is allowed to come between Christ and his righteousness, and the soul that is in need of pardon and grace. To the lost, guilty soul Christ is everything, and every other trust is but a refuge of lies.

On such a foundation as this it is taught "that we obtain the remission of sins, and are justified before God by grace for Christ's sake, through faith, if we believe that Christ suffered for us, and that for his sake our sins are remitted unto us, and righteousness and eternal life are bestowed on us" (Augsburg Confession, Art. vi.).

Christ having completed his atoning work on earth, now "sits at the right hand of God," and "is the only Saviour, High Priest, Propitiator, and Intercessor before God" (Augsburg Confession, Art. iii. xxi.).

Application of Redemption.

This is the peculiar and appropriate work of the Holy Ghost, as Christ said: "He shall take of mine and shall show it unto you." The necessity of the Holy Spirit's aid to apply the purchased redemption is everywhere taught or recognized. Luther teaches very fully in his Larger Catechism, that we never could know Christ, or believe on him, or come to him as our Lord, were it not for the Holy Ghost conferring on us the power, through the preaching of the gospel; and that the treasure obtained by the suffering, death, and resurrection of Christ, would remain hidden and unknown, did not the Holy Ghost reveal it and appropriate it to us. It is by faith in Christ that we become partakers of his salvation; and the Augsburg Confession teaches (Art. v.): "For the

purpose of obtaining this faith God has instituted the ministry, and given the gospel and the sacraments, through which, as means, he imparts the Holy Spirit, who in his own time and place works faith in those that hear the gospel," etc.

The word of God and the sacraments are the appointed means through which the Holy Spirit operates in awakening, renewing, and sanctifying the soul. Other aids may be employed, and in some sense may be called means, but these are God's own established means in his church, and without which ordinarily the Holy Spirit does not exert his efficacious and saving power. The Formula of Concord says (Art. ii.): "Before the conversion of man there are but two efficient causes found producing conversion, namely, the Holy Spirit, and the word of God as the instrument of the Holy Spirit, through which he effects conversion and which man is to hear; he cannot, however, have faith in it and accept it through his own powers, but exclusively through the grace and operation of God the Holy Spirit." The view is condemned as erroneous "that God draws men to himself, enlightens, justifies, and saves them, without the hearing of the word of God, and without the use of the holy sacraments." The church does not regard these means as indifferent, but as divinely appointed and efficacious, so that they become a savor of life unto life, or of death unto death. The authority just quoted declares, "although both the planting and the watering by the preacher, and the running and willing by the hearer would be in vain, and conversion would not follow if the power and operation of the Holy Spirit were not superadded, who through the word preached and heard enlightens and converts the heart, so that men believe that word, and give their assent to it; nevertheless, neither the preacher nor the hearer should doubt of this grace and operation of the Holy Spirit, but should feel assured, when the word of God is preached in purity and sincerity according to the command and will of God, and people listen to it with diligence and earnestness, and meditate upon the same, that God is cer-

tainly present with his grace, and gives that which man cannot otherwise receive or give by his own strength."

But while honor is thus placed on the word of God and the sacraments ordained by Christ, the Holy Spirit is the efficient agent in the work of man's regeneration and sanctification, to which the larger Catechism thus testifies: "For as the Father is called Creator, the Son Redeemer, so also should the Holy Spirit, on account of his office, be called a Sanctifier, or one who sanctifies."

We may here briefly notice some of the most important changes in this process of salvation, in which the sinner passes from a state of spiritual death, under condemnation, to one of spiritual life, justification before God, and blessed heirship to heaven. We cannot attempt to trace minutely the successive steps, but only touch upon a few leading points.

Regeneration.

As this term is employed with considerable latitude of meaning, it will be desirable to define the sense in which it will be here used. Regeneration, strictly speaking, is distinguished from conversion: the former designating the work of the Holy Spirit wrought in us, the latter our turning to God, or from sin to holiness, under the gracious influence of that Divine Agent. The one is the result of the other. In regeneration we may be said to be passive, in conversion we are active. The two ought not to be confounded when clearness of distinction is needed. But as it will answer our present purpose, and secure greater brevity, we shall use the term as expressive of the whole change, that wrought in us and that effected by us, in which we pass from death unto life, and from the power of Satan unto God; only limiting it to the beginning of the new life, and not extending it to its continued growth and perfection. The very word itself indicates a beginning, a birth, as distinguised from subsequent progress and development. Thus understood, it will serve to give definiteness and clearness to our statement; to mark a few of the leading elements in this great change.

1. As to its nature it is spiritual and radical. It has reference to man as a spiritual being, and is clearly distinguished from any and every mere outward change, or moral reform, by involving a change of the heart. As sin affects the whole man, so does this; but it operates from the very heart and centre of his being; moulding the outward man after the inward renewal. "In true conversion a change, or new inclinations and tendencies, must take place in the understanding, will, and heart. God draws the person whom he converts, and so draws him, that out of a darkened understanding is created an enlightened understanding, and out of a rebellious will, an obedient will. And this the scriptures call creating a new heart, Ps. xli. 10" (Formula of Concord).

2. The result is, what is called "a new creature," or a "new man in Christ Jesus." It is not, indeed, meant that any new faculties have been imparted to the soul, or that there has been any change in its essence. As in the fall, man lost none of his original native powers or faculties, but only experienced an utter corruption of his nature, bringing him under the dominion of sin and death; so in regeneration no new faculties are bestowed, but only the quickening and renovation of what was spiritually dead. The essence of man remains the same, but his nature is changed from sin to holiness, and he passes from death unto life.

3. The efficient agent is the Holy Spirit, and the work is thus one of divine power. This has already been shown, and the means employed by the Holy Spirit briefly mentioned. The manner in which the Holy Spirit operates upon the heart, thus changing its entire spiritual character, while deeply mysterious and inscrutable to us, may be described as "a mode applicable to a rational creature." He does not compel any to be regenerated; and, although man is utterly impotent, being dead in trespasses and sins, yet he operates in him, according to the laws of his nature as a rational and accountable being.

4. The necessity of this change is absolute and universal. All are by nature sinful. This sin renders them unfit for

communion with God, or for an abode of holy blessedness. Without regeneration, a new birth, that which is flesh will remain flesh, and must be forever excluded from the presence and enjoyment of God and all the bliss of heaven. We may not always say when or precisely how it was effected, but we may say, for Christ has said: "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God."

Justification.

Upon no point of doctrine has the Lutheran church been more decided and earnest than upon this. The great Reformation of the sixteenth century turned upon it. The doctrine of justification by faith, was the centre around which everything moved, and the church clings to it as her treasure and her crown. Other articles of faith she may "earnestly contend for," but this one she holds, as Luther said, "the article of a standing or a falling church." The Lutheran church does not pretend that this doctrine is peculiar to herself, or that others may not hold it in equal purity, but she does claim to hold it with a peculiar affection, and to give it a special prominence in her system of doctrine. The very life of the church began in this, and in it must continue or perish. If it should be asked to what doctrine does the Evangelical Lutheran church give prominence above every other, the answer would be, to the doctrine of justification by faith in the atonement and righteousness of Jesus Christ.[1] Melanchthon says in the Apology (Art. iv.): "This concerns the principal and most important article of the whole Christian doctrine, and much indeed depends upon this article, which contributes especially to a clear, correct apprehension of all the holy scriptures, and which alone shows the way to the unspeakable treasure, and true knowledge of Christ: yea, which is the only key to the whole Bible, and without which

[1] "Luther, by the deep experience of his own heart and life, was led to the *material* principle of Protestantism, namely, justification by faith, which is the central point for the right understanding of the development of the whole Protestant system of theology" — Hagenbach's Hist. of Doctrines, Vol. ii. pp. 141.

the poor conscience can have no true, invariable, fixed hope, nor conceive the riches of the grace of Christ."

1. Justification is used to signify, not infused or imparted righteousness, but the declaring and counting as righteous. "We are justified before God, by grace, for Christ's sake, through faith. ..... God regards this faith, and imputes it as righteousness in his sight" (Augsburg Confession, Art. iv.). The Apology, in explanation and defence, repeatedly states that justification is used in a forensic sense, and marks the distinction between counting and treating as righteous, and making righteous; or between justification, as a simple act of pardon and acceptance, and sanctification, or righteousness wrought in the believer. "Et justificari significat hic non ex impio justum effici, sed usu forensi justum pronuntiari. — Justificare hoc loco (Rom. v. 1) forensi consuetudine significat reum absolvere et pronuntiare justum." —"We believe, teach, and confess, that according to the phraseology of the holy scriptures, the word to justify, in this article, signifies *to absolve*, that is, to pronounce a sentence of release from sin, as illustrated in the following passages, Prov. xvii. 15; Rom. viii. 33" (Formula of Concord). This distinction between imputed righteousness, and infused righteousness, or counting and making righteous, so generally recognized among those who are considered evangelical and orthodox, has found its opponents not only in the church of Rome, but also among some individuals and parties in Protestant churches. But the Lutheran church has sought clearly to distinguish justification from every other act, however intimately associated or inseparably united with it, that thus it might stand forth in the clearest light. "If we wish to retain in its purity the article concerning justification, great diligence and care are to be observed, lest that which precedes faith, and that which follows it, be at the same time intermingled and introduced into the article concerning justification, as necessary and pertaining to it. ..... For to justification these alone belong and are necessary: the grace of God, the merit of Christ, and faith which accepts these in the promise of the gospel, and

thus the righteousness of Christ is imputed unto us; whence we obtain and have remission of sins, reconciliation with God, the adoption, and the inheritance of eternal life" (Formula of Concord). Much more of the same kind might be adduced, from the symbolical books and from standard theologians, but it is unnecessary. The church still adheres to this view, and deems any departure from it adapted to obscure the merit of Christ, and to deprive the soul of all true hope and consolation.

2. The ground of our justification is thus stated (Augsburg Confession, Art. iv.): "It is further taught that we cannot obtain righteousness and the forgiveness of sin before God by our own merits, works, and atonement; but that we obtain the remission of sins, and are justified before God, by grace, for Christ's sake, through faith, if we believe that Christ suffered for us, and that for his sake our sins are remitted unto us, and righteousness and eternal life are bestowed on us. For God regards this faith and imputes it as righteousness in his sight, as Paul says, Rom. iii. and iv." In harmony with this is every utterance of the church. The Formula of Concord but reiterates the truth when it says: "Accordingly, we believe, teach, and confess that our righteousness before God is this — that God forgives us our sins out of pure grace, without any regard to our antecedent, present, or subsequent works, merit, or worthiness; granting and imputing to us the righteousness of the obedience of Christ, on account of which righteousness we are received into favor with God, and reputed as just."

3. The sole condition on which we receive Christ, and the medium and instrument by which we apprehend him, is faith alone. This faith is a divine gift, imparted to us by the Holy Spirit working in us, and is not a bare assent to the truth of the gospel, but a confiding trust in Christ, as our righteousness and our all. In the exercise of this faith the whole heart goes out after Christ, and he is received as its Redeemer and Saviour.

4. The faith that justifies never stands alone. "True

contrition precedes justification," and "love is also a fruit which certainly and necessarily follows after faith. ..... The renewal and sanctification of man, although they do not pertain to the article or subject of justification before God, yet they follow after it. After a man is justified through faith, true and living faith worketh by love" (Formula of Concord).

Sanctification.

The work of sanctification, begun in the believer in regeneration, is carried on through life. He is to grow in grace and in the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ. Where there is a genuine faith, it will not fail to work the fruits of holy living. The faith that does not purify the heart is not a faith that will avail to our justification. These two, justification and sanctification, though distinct, must not be so separated, as though we could have the one without the other. The Lutheran church teaches, that, while justification is complete, so that there "is no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus," sanctification is progressive, and never reaches a point in this life beyond which there is no room or demand for improvement. The Christian is to press onward and to follow after holiness. The chief means of growth in the divine life, or of sanctification, are the word and sacraments. Jesus prayed: "Sanctify them through thy truth; thy word is truth."

Good Works.

The controversies in the church of the sixteenth century with Romanists, and sometimes among Protestants themselves, about good works, have ceased to occasion discussion. The objection that evangelical doctrines were unfavorable to good works has been disproved by arguments and facts. The Lutheran church has always maintained that, while works could avail nothing to our justification before God, they must follow faith, as its fruit, and as the command of God. The Christian cannot merit heaven by any good

deeds; but "the unprofitable servant" may prepare himself for an inheritance of shame and contempt. No higher motives can be presented than are contained in the gospel to the most earnest efforts in the doing of good. Our works evidence our faith, and glorify him who has called us to holiness and obedience in the gospel.

The Sacraments.

Here, perhaps, if anywhere — or more than anywhere else, — the doctrine of the Lutheran church is supposed to differ from that of some other evangelical churches. And yet the difference on the general subject is by no means what ignorance and prejudice have sometimes made it; nor does the church hold any such views of the individual sacraments as have been very commonly charged to her. As there has been much misapprehension on this point, we may be allowed to give a somewhat fuller statement than on others where there is no dispute. And, as there may be some difference of views among Lutherans themselves, the appeal will be chiefly to the Confession and to the Apology, written by the same hand. The leading Article of the Augsburg Confession treating of this subject, the thirteenth, is as follows:

"Concerning the use of the sacraments, it is taught that the sacraments have been instituted, not only as tokens by which Christians may be known externally, but as signs and evidences of the divine will towards us, for the purpose of exciting and strengthening our faith. Hence they also require faith; and they are properly used, then, only when received in faith, and when faith is strengthened by them."

Taking this as our guide, with the explanations of the Apology, we learn:

1. As to their nature, "sacraments are external signs and seals of the promises" — "efficacious signs and sure testimonies of God's grace and purpose towards us." "A visible word, for the external sign is like a picture, and signifies the same thing that is preached by the word" (Apology, Art. vii.).

2. As to their design, they are intended as means of grace "for the purpose of exciting and strengthening our faith"; "to admonish and strengthen our hearts to believe the more firmly and joyfully"; "As the word enters our ears, so the external signs are placed before our eyes, inwardly to excite and move our hearts to faith"; "and thereby console our alarmed, timid hearts, and rest assured that the word and promises of God cannot fail, but are as sure, nay, more so, than a new divine voice, or a new miracle from heaven, promising grace to us" (Apology, Art. vii.).

3. As to their use, they require faith. "We cannot too carefully consider, or speak too freely of the abuses and errors introduced by the pernicious, shameful, and impious doctrine of the *opus operatum*, namely, that the mere use of the sacraments, the work performed, makes us just before God, and secures his grace, even without a good disposition of heart. We therefore say that the proper use of the sacraments requires faith to believe the divine promises and receive the promised grace which is offered through the sacraments and the word. For the divine promises can be accepted by faith alone" (Apology, Art. vii.).

4. As to their efficacy, they "are not mere signs," but "efficacious signs and sure testimonies" — "seals of the promises"; and "we should firmly believe that the grace and remission of sins promised in the New Testament are imparted to us. This proper use of the sacraments really consoles and refreshes the heart" (Apology, Art. vii.).

From these statements, drawn directly from the confessional writings of the church, it will be seen that the views embraced and taught are different from those of the Romish church, which ascribe an efficacy to the sacraments themselves, so that the mere use of them insures divine grace, and also from the opposite extreme of denying all efficacy save as mere exhibitions of truth. They are the divinely appointed signs, instruments, and seals of the grace promised to us in the New Testament of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Something yet must be added in regard to each of the sacraments separately.

Baptism.

"Respecting baptism it is taught that it is necessary; that grace is offered through it, and that children ought to be baptized, who through such baptism are presented to God, and become acceptable to him" (Augsburg Confession, Art. ix.).

The Lutheran church holds to the necessity of baptism, and that it is a means of grace. The necessity is not absolute, so that no soul can be saved without it; but necessary as of divine appointment, and the ordinary means through which God is pleased to dispense his blessings, so that those who despise or neglect the ordinance, exclude themselves from the promises of his grace. Children are to be baptized "in order that they may become participants of the gospel, the promise of salvation and grace, as Christ commands, (Matt. xxviii. 19). ..... For in and with baptism, universal grace and the treasure of the gospel are offered to them" (Apology).

Baptismal regeneration, in the usual sense of that term, as meaning that baptism, *ex opere operato*, works regeneration, has no place in the Lutheran system, but is directly opposed to its whole genius as well as its express declarations. Some expressions may be strained to bear such a meaning, but it is contradicted by the full and unequivocal meaning of other passages. Everything is made to turn upon faith. Luther strongly says, in his larger Catechism, and reiterates the doctrine: "Without faith baptism is of no benefit, although in itself it is a divine, inestimable treasure. ..... For it is irrevocably decreed, that whatever is not faith profits nothing in obtaining salvation, nor can it receive any blessing." But baptism, rightly administered and received, is taught to be a means of grace; and through it Christ seals to his disciples the blessings of his redemption.

The uniform mode of baptism in the Lutheran church has been by affusion or pouring. In the symbols written by Luther himself, he has shown a preference for immersion as

the mode, but this has never been adopted by the church; and while the quantity of water, as well as the mode of application, is not deemed essential, the uniform practice and decided preference of the church have been shown in favor of affusion or pouring, instead of immersion. The extreme view of Baptists on immersion is opposed to the whole free spirit of Lutheranism, attaching an importance to the mode of an external ordinance which does not really belong to the externals of Christianity. Lutheranism cannot make an essential to church membership, or to genuine fellowship among the disciples of Christ, anything so unimportant and questionable as the quantity and mode of applying water in baptism; and while the validity of immersion would not be denied, the uniform and chosen practice of the church is in favor of a different mode, as truly scriptural and proper.

Lord's Supper.

On this subject it is well known that the Lutherans and Reformed could not agree at Marburg. This constituted the chief point of difference then, as it is the point around which most of the doctrinal differences and controversies centre now. Three hundred years have not served to settle the difficulty.

Then, they agreed so far as jointly to say: "The sacrament of the altar is the sacrament of the true body and blood of Christ, and the spiritual partaking of this body and blood is necessary for every Christian. ..... And, although we are not agreed at present on the question, whether the real body and blood of Christ are corporeally present in the bread and wine, yet both parties shall cherish more and more a truly Christian charity so far as conscience permits" (Articles of Marburg Conference, 1529, Art. xv.).

Luther then insisted on the literal interpretation of the words "this is my body," while the Reformed dissented from such an interpretation. When the Augsburg Confession was prepared and presented, it contained (Art. x.): "Concerning the Supper of the Lord it is taught that the true body and

blood of Christ are truly present, under the form of bread and wine, in the Lord's supper, and are there administered and received."

It is not easy to determine precisely what meaning was attached to these words by Melanchthon when written, or what they actually teach. It would perhaps be easier to say what they do not, and were not intended to, teach. This much at least is certain, that the Lutheran church has repudiated and rejected nearly every view or interpretation that has been placed upon them by those holding opposite opinions. The church not only rejects transubstantiation, but consubstantiation, so persistently charged upon her, and subpanation and impanation and every other view that involves a gross corporeal presence, or that the body and blood of Christ are locally included in the bread and wine. Even the oral manducation of the Formula of Concord, with all its refined distinctions, has no place here, and is no part of the Augsburg Confession, or of the faith of the Lutheran church. Every idea of a physical or sensible presence is utterly excluded in the interpretation of the church, and the whole is regarded as supernatural and above our understandings. At the same time it is equally certain that these words were designed to express, and do express, a meaning different from the view entertained by the Reformed; and to teach the doctrine of a true presence of the body and blood of Christ in this sacrament. They mean to teach that Christ is truly present, and present according to both natures, and that in this sacrament his body and blood are communicated and received. How this is effected is not stated, except that the presence is "under the form of bread and wine." As to any union between the outward and visible signs, and the true body and blood of Christ, the church affirms none, but commonly calls it a sacramental union, as the presence is called a true or real presence, and sometimes a sacramental presence.

It need not be concealed that this doctrine has been the occasion of serious difficulties in the very bosom of the

Lutheran church itself, and that its reception has been very far from being cordial and universal. Only ten years after the publication of the Augsburg Confession, Melanchthon altered the tenth Article so as to read, "quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere exhibeantur vescentibus in coena domini," that is, "that the body and blood of Christ are truly represented in the Lord's supper"; and although this change never received formally the sanction of the church, but at a later day was condemned as unauthorized, yet it is certain that the Melanchthonian view continued to have many adherents, and that at all times there has been considerable difference of opinion among those considered consistent and genuine Lutherans, as to the interpretation of this Article, or how it should be received.[1] The interpretation put upon

[1] Gieseler, in his History of the Church, says: "As to the new edition of the Augsburg Confession in 1540, the so-called Variata, afterward so much calumniated, no one at that time thought of taking offence at it. It was considered as a revision, which made the Confession more plain; very much praised by Brentz, and immediately used at the Colloquy of Worms, January 1541. ..... As long as Melanchthon lived the Variata was universally used without objections, even by the most decided opponents of Melanchthon, as Westphal, and in the Weimar Confutation Book" (Vol. iv. pp. 432, 433).

It is even affirmed that Luther revised and approved this edition: Nic. Selnecker (Catalogus Brevis Praecipuorum Conciliorum) "Recognita est Aug. Conf. posterior, relegente et approbante Luthero, ut vivi adhuc testes affirmant." Casper Peucer, son-in-law of Melanchthon: "mandante, recognoscente et approbante Luthero" (Preface to Melanchthon's Works, 1562, Vol. i.).

The Confession of the Saxony churches, written by Melanchthon 1551, to be presented to the Council of Trent, has: "In hac communione vere et substantialiter adesse Christum, et vere exhiberi sumentibus corpus et sanguinem Christi" (Works 1562, Vol. i. p. 134).

How little he sympathized with those who obstinately insisted on a peculiar view as essential to church fellowship, a few brief citations will show: To Bucer, April 1531: "Melius illi toti causae consultum fuerit, si sinamus paulatim consilescere has tragicas contentiones" (Corp. Ref. ii. pp. 498). To Vitus Theodorus, April 1538: "Ego ne longissime recederem a veteribus, posui in usu sacramentalem praesentiam, et dixi, datis his rebus Christum vere adesse et efficacem esse. Id profecto satis est. ..... Sacramenta pacta sunt, ut rebus sumptis adsit aliud. Quid requiris amplius?" (Corp. Ref. iii. 514). Responsio ad Criminationes Staphyli et Avii, 1558: "Intuens Ecclesiarum nostrarum vulnera, cum propter alias causas multas ingenti dolore afficior, tum vero eo magis crucior, quod occupati intestinis bellis non studemus vel *συγκρητισμῷ*, ut olim dicebatur, nos adversus communes hostes conjungere" (Works, 1564, Vol. iv. p. 813).

it by the other later symbolical books, is not only contrary to the oft-repeated views of Melanchthon, but has not been generally accepted; and the mode of the Saviour's presence, and the manner of this reception, must be left largely to the faith and conscience of individuals. The same liberty at least must be granted, as was allowed by Luther and Melanchthon during their lives, and implicit agreement in every particular cannot be expected, or, if expected by any, will not be secured.

To show how cautiously the most distinguished Lutheran divines have expressed themselves on this controverted question, a few brief citations will be given:

Chemnitz: "The presence of Christ's body in the supper is not natural. It is easier, therefore, to show what the sacramental eating is not than what it is."

Hunnius: "The Lord's supper is a spiritual work, instituted and ordained by Christ himself, whereby, in the consecrated bread, he gives unto the believer his body to eat, and in the consecrated wine his blood to drink, in order thereby to apply unto every individual more specially all the promises of the gospel, to seal them to him, strengthen his faith, and give him food and everlasting life."

Hollaz: "The mode in which the body of Christ is present in the bread used in the Lord's supper is not determined; and, though there is a sacramental union of the bread with the body of Christ, this is not dependent on a definite mode of the presence, but on the special divine promise."

Mosheim: "What the nature of this presence is, we know not. ..... We deny that Christ is present and received in a physical or material manner. But should any one ask how he is present, our answer is, we know not. We commonly call his presence in this holy ordinance a sacramental presence."

The General Synod of the Lutheran church, besides having no special jurisdiction in matters of faith, beyond requiring of synods uniting with it a reception of the Augsburg Confession, as already stated, purposely allows and sanctions some degree of liberty in interpreting the Confession. Well

knowing that a similar diversity of views on this very subject prevailed in the early church, without division, and not regarding this peculiar aspect of the sacrament as a fundamental doctrine, there is no disposition to press the matter upon the conscience of any. Within certain limits, well enough understood, freedom of opinion and liberty of conscience are cheerfully granted. While some adhere more strictly to what they understand to be the doctrine of the Confession on this point, the views commonly entertained do not probably differ materially from those of other orthodox churches; except that there may be a disposition to lay more stress upon the ordinance, and to insist more emphatically on the presence of Christ, and that he is present as the God-man who suffered and died for us. The sacrament, too, is maintained as something more than a mere exhibition of truth — a symbolical representation; it is a means of grace, in which the believer has true fellowship with his crucified and exalted Redeemer, and in which there are sealed to him all the blessings of a purchased salvation.

In regard to the design of this sacrament, we suppose every Lutheran cordially adopts the language of Melanchthon in the Apology: "The sacrament was instituted by Christ to console the alarmed conscience, to strengthen our faith when we believe that the flesh of Christ was given for the life of the world, and that by this nourishment we are united with Christ and obtain grace and life"; and also the language of the Formula of Concord: "This most august sacrament was to be a perpetual memorial of his bitter passion and death, and of all his benefits, a sealing of the New Testament, a consolation for afflicted hearts, and a continual bond and union of Christians with Christ their head and among themselves."

There are those in the Lutheran church in this country, who rigidly insist on the view as drawn out and stated in the Formula of Concord — the real, substantial presence of the true body and blood of Christ, and that the body and blood are received by the mouth. And they are unwilling

to acknowledge, or associate with, as Lutherans, any who do not profess the same faith. This, however, has never been, nor is it now, the spirit of the General Synod of the Lutheran church. Within it the largest liberty consistent with purity of doctrine, has alway been the rule. In common with very many and very distinguished divines of other churches, the opinion generally prevails within the General Synod, that there is no such fundamental difference between Lutherans and other orthodox churches, in regard to the Lord's supper, as should be any bar to their Christian fellowship, or to their harmonious co-operation in the work of advancing our common Christianity.[1]

Ecclesiological.

The constitution and government of the Lutheran church have differed somewhat in different countries. The church does not profess to find a definite and fully developed system of government in the New Testament, and hence has allowed such modifications as the times and circumstances seemed to favor or demand. In some European countries, as Sweden and Denmark, a modified form of episcopacy prevails; while in Germany the government is chiefly by consistories, without bishops. In the United States the church recognizes "three judicatories; the council of each individual church, the district synods, consisting of all the clergy and an equal number of laymen from a particular district of country, and one General Synod formed by representatives from the district synods" (Formula of Government, Chap. i.; prepared by S. S. Schmucker, D.D.).

It must not be supposed, however, that the Lutheran church

[1] In the Article on the "Lutheran Church" in Appleton's American Encyclopaedia, Vol. x. (1860), understood to be from the pen of C. P. Krauth, D.D., of Philadelphia, the writer after quoting learned authorities to show that "as to Lutherans and Calvinists, however widely they may appear to differ in words and names," yet there is "an essential unity," and only "a secondary diversity in the two parties"; and further truly adds: "Many learned writers of different denominations have found nothing in the doctrines or usages of Lutherans to prevent a union between them and other Protestants."

has no system of ecclesiastical polity, or that she regards all systems as equally scriptural and equally good. Nothing could be further from the truth. For upon all points her judgment has been fully expressed; and it is only as a matter of necessity, or of divine right, that many points are not considered as absolutely fixed by the New Testament. According to her view the true church may, and does, exist under different forms of external organization and government.

The Lutheran church holds to the establishment of the Christian church as a divine institution, and which will continue until the end of the world. This church "is the congregation of all believers, among whom the gospel is preached in its purity, and the holy sacraments are administered according to the gospel" (Augsburg Confession, Art. vii.). This church is essentially one, but its unity is spiritual, and in order to this "it is not necessary that uniform ceremonies and regulations instituted by men should everywhere be observed." In the visible church are many unworthy members, which, however does not destroy its character as the true church of Christ.

The church and state, or ecclesiastical and civil power, are to be clearly distinguished, and each is to be considered as supreme within its own sphere. Both are of divine appointment, but for wholly different ends. Both are to be upheld in the legitimate exercise of their power. "These two governments, the civil and ecclesiastical, ought not to be mingled and confounded. ..... Both, on account of God's commandment, ought to be honored and sustained with all sincerity, as the two greatest blessings on earth. ..... The churches undoubtedly retain the authority to call, to elect, and ordain ministers. And this authority is a privilege which God has given especially to the church; and it cannot be taken away from the church by any human power." Civil government "relates to matters entirely different from the gospel, and protects with its power, not the souls of men, but their bodies and possessions against external violence by

the sword and bodily penalties" (Augsburg Confession, Art. xxviii. xvi. Smalcald Articles, Appendix).

The ministry is also divinely instituted, not as a distinct order, but as an office to which men must be duly called and set apart that they may publicly preach and administer the sacraments. The Lutheran church fully recognizes and holds the universal priesthood of believers, and that all have one High Priest, Jesus Christ, "who has passed into heaven, now to appear in the presence of God for us." No other priesthood or hierarchical order is acknowledged to stand between God and the people. The Christian ministry is simply an office in the church, and ministers are distinguished from the laity only because they have been called to this office of ministering in holy things. Every hierarchical tendency is opposed to the spirit of the gospel, and to the universal rights of Christian believers (Augsburg Confession, Art. v. xiv.).

No distinction of grade among ministers is recognized as of divine appointment, but the parity in office of these servants of Christ is steadfastly maintained. "According to divine authority, there is no difference between bishops and pastors or ministers; all who preside over the church have this command alike [to preach the gospel, administer the sacraments, etc.], whether they be called pastors or presbyters or bishops. . . . . For the office and the authority are entirely the same" (Smalcald Articles, Appendix). Where any distinction has been allowed in the Lutheran church, it has been entirely a matter of toleration or expediency, and not any concession to a claim of divine right.

Ecclesiastical power really vests in the church itself, or in the members constituting the church. Each individual congregation, embracing pastor and people, has full authority under Christ to act for itself. Here is the beginning and seat of ecclesiastical authority and power. But as the church is one, and is to act in a united capacity, congregations may unite in forming ecclesiastical bodies or synods, and, by delegation and representation, these synods act for

individual congregations; and their acts are the acts of the church. This principle is believed to be fully exhibited in the New Testament, and is universally recognized in our ecclesiastical affairs. These synods may again unite in forming a General Synod. In accordance with such views and principles has the Evangelical Lutheran church in the United States been organized. The position occupied is intermediate between Presbyterianism and Congregationalism. More power and freedom are claimed for individual churches than is acknowledged by Presbyterianism, and more authority and power granted to synods than is acknowledged by Congregationalism. If a political term might be employed, we would call the government federal-republican, in which the members of the churches, through congregations and synods, form a union for the good of the whole.

In all ecclesiastical bodies of the Lutheran church the equal rights of the laity are fully admitted. In district synods and General Synod they have an equality with the ministry in numbers, and equal privileges in speech and voting; and these rights are carefully guaranteed and duly respected. No hierarchical spirit is allowed here any more than in the service of the sanctuary. The church is a Christian brotherhood, as well as a universal priesthood.

Eschatological.

There is nothing peculiar in the doctrine of the Lutheran church on the points embraced under this general head. In common with other orthodox Christians, she believes in a future world, the resurrection of the body, the immortality of man, a final judgment, and the eternity of rewards and punishments. The office of raising the dead and judging all men Christ will execute when he comes again in power and glory.

The doctrine of Millenarianism, as currently taught and understood, is contrary to the Confession of the church and to the teaching of her most distinguished theologians. When-

ever and wherever such a doctrine has appeared in the church, and has been advocated by individuals, it has only been tolerated as not a fundamental heresy; but such a faith is utterly inconsistent with the whole system of Lutheran doctrine. The Augsburg Confession (Art. xvii.) says: "It is also taught that on the last day our Lord Jesus Christ will come to raise and to judge all the dead"; and adds, "In like manner certain Jewish doctrines are condemned, which are circulated even now, that, prior to the resurrection of the dead, the holy and pious alone will occupy a temporal kingdom, and that all the wicked will be exterminated." That Christ's kingdom on earth is a spiritual kingdom is taught in Art. iii.: "And sits at the right hand of God, that he may perpetually reign over all creatures, and govern them, through the Holy Spirit sanctify, purify, strengthen, and console all those that believe in him. ..... Also, that finally this same Christ will return visibly to judge the living and the dead, etc., according to the Apostles' Creed."

The church looks for the triumph of Christ over all his enemies — not only the subjection of the nations to his sway, but the purification of this world from sin, and the establishment of a new heavens and a new earth wherein shall dwell righteousness.

An attempt will now be made to gather up the most important and most interesting facts that may serve to give a general view of the progress and present position of the church.

Statistics.

Entirely reliable and accurate statistics of the church are scarcely to be obtained; and all that can be attempted is an approximation to the truth. Different synods have had different methods of reporting, and the changes have been so constant and so great that, after considerable examination and comparison of data, allowance must be made for want of strict accuracy. The following, however, will serve to form a general judgment:

In 1748, when the first synod was formed, there were eleven Lutheran ministers in the Colonies. In 1820, at the formation of the General Synod, there were five synods, and about one hundred and forty ministers, and some thirty thousand members. In 1823, the synod of Pennsylvania, more then than one half of the entire church, withdrew, leaving the number of ministers in connection with the General Synod only about sixty. For the next forty years the growth of the General Synod may be thus exhibited:

	Synods.	Ministers.	Churches.	Members.
1823,	3	61	200	10,000
1833,	4	80	250	15,000
1843,	12	300	600	60,000
1853,	20	560	1,250	112,000
1863,	27	900	1,700	170,000

During the same period the entire Lutheran church in the United States, according to the same estimates, would exhibit about the following;

	Synods.	Ministers.	Churches.	Members.
1823,	5	175	900	40,000
1833,	9	240	1,000	60,000
1843,	19	430	1,400	150,000
1853,	31	900	1,800	200,000
1863,	40	1,400	2,500	260,000

The present numbers are, 44 synods, 1,725 ministers, 3,100 congregations, 350,000 members.

The theological seminary of the General Synod at Gettysburg was founded in 1825. The Hartwick Seminary had been founded a few years before. In 1832, Pennsylvania College, at Gettysburg, the first college in the United States under Lutheran auspices, was founded. Since that, literary and theological institutions have multiplied, until now there are some fifteen theological seminaries and seventeen colleges, with academies and female seminaries. If the quality were equal to the quantity, there would be no lack of educational institutions; but, while some of them are respectably endowed, and have a competent corps of professors, others have to struggle to maintain an existence. Some three hundred thousand dollars have been raised during the past

three years for these institutions, and the sum will probably be largely increased during the present jubilee year (from October 31, 1867, to October 31, 1868).

General Benevolent Institutions.

In connection with the General Synod, and under its auspices, have been formed various benevolent societies designed to enlist and direct the energies of the church. Of these, the Parent Education Society was organized in 1835 (the work it was designed to do, and which for a number of years it did accomplish, has been left of late to the education societies of the district synods); the Foreign Missionary Society, organized in 1837, and which has sustained missions in India and Africa, yet it must be confessed on too limited a scale; the Home Missionary Society, organized in 1845; the Church Extension Society, organized in 1853; besides, the Publication Society, organized in 1851, and the Historical Society, founded in 1845.

The Lutheran church has not given to the cause of foreign missions and general benevolence, in proportion to her numbers and wealth, nor in proportion to what other churches have done. This is doubtless in part owing to the want of a spirit of benevolence, but other causes have combined to restrain benevolent contributions in that direction. The rapid increase of the church at home, the constant and growing demand for ministers and church edifices to supply the newly organized churches, with the effort to establish institutions for the furtherance of this work, have engrossed most of the attention, and received most of the contributions, of the church. Yet there is a very general feeling among the intelligent and reflecting portions of the church, that we have been sadly deficient in missionary zeal, and that the cry of the heathen has been too much neglected. The amount contributed directly to foreign missions is not more than about ten thousand dollars a year, a very small sum for such an object and by such a church. Home missions have received much more attention. The work in this depart-

ment is carried on jointly by synodical societies, and by a General Home Missionary Society. Most of the synods attend to the work on their own territory, and some of them sustain individual missions in the West, handing over only the surplus funds to the General Society, so that its exhibit would furnish a very meagre and incorrect view of what is actually accomplished. At present it may perhaps be said that theological education and home missions have the chief place in the heart of the church.

Quite a number of institutions of an eleemosynary character, for orphans, widows, and the infirm, have been established in different parts of the church, and some of them have received liberal contributions. At present there are more than a dozen of these houses of mercy, and the number is annually increasing. The church deems it a sacred duty to care for the poor and fatherless, and in this at least has not been behind other denominations.

Publications.

Besides a general Publication Society, with its office and depository in Philadelphia, there are about thirty Lutheran periodicals published in the United States, of which more than one half are in the German, Swedish, and Norwegian languages. This diversity of languages, while it has greatly increased the difficulty in supplying the church with a suitable religious literature, has tended to diminish the circulation of any one of these publications. Still, some of these periodicals will not suffer by comparison with those of other churches. The Publication Society has not yet sufficient age or means to accomplish what may be hoped for in years to come. It is yet in its childhood, if not infancy, and must have time to grow.

Culture and Worship.

From the beginning, the Lutheran church has been an educating church, and if in the United States she has not equalled her renown in the Old World, she has been striving

amidst many difficulties to advance. A prominent feature in her educational efforts, is the catechizing of the young. Every Lutheran pastor is expected to pay due, if not special, attention to this part of his work. Annually, or from time to time, the young are assembled and carefully instructed in the doctrines and duties of our holy religion. There is no part of the Lutheran system that is more highly prized than this, and none that has yielded more abundant fruits. Under ordinary circumstances, this is part of the regular preparation for admission to the communion of the church; and, while mere intellectual acquaintance with the truth is not deemed by any means all, or the chief, part of what is required, it is deemed of too much importance to be overlooked or neglected. The church thus aims at reaching both head and heart, and uniting intelligence with piety. Like everything else, catechizing may be perverted and made a merely formal process, by which individuals are supposed to be prepared for church membership; but this is not its true design, nor its intelligent use. Thousands and tens of thousands could testify to its spiritual advantages. In very many of the churches it is combined with individual personal conversation, and special efforts for the awakening and salvation of the young. The Catechism has been called the Bible for the young, and is intended to go hand in hand with the divine word, of which it is a simple explanation.

In the services of the sanctuary, the preaching of the word deservedly holds the most prominent place. Yet the Lutheran church seeks to elevate what is more strictly worship. Believing that the preaching of the gospel is God's ordinance for the salvation of the world, and also that his house is the house of prayer and the place of praise, the extremes are avoided of making the sanctuary simply a place to hear preaching, or, on the other hand, a place where the people attend service. Romish pomp and ceremony and Puritanic baldness, are alike foreign to the Lutheran idea of the services of God's house. Discarding all display that merely addresses the senses, the Lutheran church would retain whatever may

aid devotion, and give solemnity and dignity to the different parts of divine worship. The organ is a very common accompaniment in the singing of God's praise. The use of a brief liturgical service, though optional with pastor and people, is provided for, and found conducive to uniformity and solemnity. Extemporaneous prayer is by no means interfered with or depreciated, but such use of liturgical forms encouraged as may suit the tastes and preferences of those who use them. The mingling of solemn confession, humble prayer, and sacred song, with devout preaching and hearing of the word, contributes to the completeness and impressiveness of divine service.

The sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper are administered according to the order prescribed in the Liturgy. Preceding the Lord's supper it is the uniform custom to hold what is usually called a "preparatory service," in which those who intend to participate at the communion, make a general and public confession of sin, implore the divine forgiveness, and receive the divine promises to the truly penitent and believing. Confession and private absolution, enjoined in the Augsburg Confession and other symbolical books, have never been practised in the churches of the General Synod, and, indeed, have never been general in any part of the church. Some few churches, rigidly symbolical, profess to continue the practice; but the mass of those out of, as well as in, the General Synod have only a general and public confession. The absolution, so called, within the churches of the General Synod, at least, is only declarative — the announcement of the divine promise of pardon and acceptance through Jesus Christ.

Confirmation is practised as a solemn, appropriate, and scriptural usage; and those who have been baptized in infancy, after careful religious instruction, and on their own voluntary profession, are thus publicly recognized and admitted to all the privileges of "fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of God." This solemn rite, however, is not regarded as essential to membership; and

those coming from churches where it is not practised are received by certificate without confirmation. While honored and practised in the Lutheran church, it does not hold the place that it does in the Episcopal and Catholic churches.

The ecclesiastical festivals are observed. With no superstitious reverence for days, but with the conviction that an intelligent observance of them may be found eminently conducive to the faith and spirituality of the church, the General Synod has adopted the following: "Resolved, that the churches in connection with the General Synod be recommended to observe our regular ecclesiastical festivals in commemoration of the fundamental facts of our religion, namely, Christmas, Good Friday, Easter, Ascension-Day, and Whit-Sunday, in the hope and persuasion that, by the Divine blessing, they will be found to be, as they have often proved, occasions of reviving to our congregations."

In addition to these, the observance of days of prayer, and the 31st of October, as the anniversary of the Reformation, have been recommended. The present year, commencing October 31, 1867, being the three hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Reformation, will be observed as a jubilee. During this year efforts will be made to awaken a deeper interest in the great doctrines restored through the Reformation, and to quicken the zeal and liberality of the church. No one need be afraid of the Lutheran church running off into Romanism by this observance of festival days and seasons. The church thinks there is no necessity of giving all that is good in such things to Rome and the devil, but prefers to claim and exercise Christian liberty.

Present Condition.

It is not easy in a few sentences, if at all, to describe the present condition of the Lutheran church in the United States. It may be said that the church is still in a formative process. Diversity in doctrine, worship, organization, and spirit still prevails. The liberty of which the church has boasted is freely exercised to disintegration as well as to edi-

fication. In doctrine the diversity ranges from the liberal, consistent, evangelical position of the General Synod to the most extreme and rigid symbolism, holding to every jot and tittle in the Confession, and unchurching all who will not coincide. In worship the range is from puritanic simplicity to ritualistic ceremonials. In organization, besides the General Synod, two or three other ecclesiastical unions have been formed. Through the Rebellion, the Southern synods were separated from the General Synod, and have organized themselves, numbering some five or six synods, into the "Evangelical Lutheran General Synod in North America." Recently a few other synods and parts of synods withdrew from the General Synod, and, with some bodies not in the General Synod — in all numbering eleven, — have organized the "General Council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America." The former of the two is the result purely of political difficulties, and grew out of the late war. The latter is the result of professed dissatisfaction with the General Synod's liberal basis and practice, and a desire to establish a more rigid Lutheranism. Its "Fundamental Principles of Faith and Church Polity," acknowledging all the symbolical books, declare that the Confessions "must be accepted in every statement of doctrine," and that "those who set them forth and subscribe them, must not only agree to use the same words, but must use and understand those words in one and the same sense." Notwithstanding this declaration, several of the larger and more rigidly symbolical synods refused to unite with the "General Council," on account of doctrinal and other difficulties; the "General Council," in the face of its profession, having prominent Millenarians among its members, as well as allowing, in some of the churches, mixed communion with other denominations, interchange of pulpits, tolerating secret societies and other practices deemed inconsistent with the purity of the church.[1]

[1] The Joint Synod of Ohio, before uniting, desired the General Council to give "information on the following points: 1. What relation will this venerable body in future sustain to Chiliasm? 2. Mixed communion? 3. The exchanging of pulpits with sectarians? 4. Secret or unchurchly societies?

It would be premature to express too decided a judgment as to the result of these different movements. A number of synods still stand separate, finding no union to suit their tastes. Meanwhile the General Synod, with a history of nearly half a century, and having secured and enjoyed the respect and confidence of other denominations, will continue on its way, inviting and encouraging those who love its position and doctrines to unite with it in extending the blessings of "brotherly love and Christian concord." The spirit of the Lutheran church as represented by the General Synod, is one of liberality and good will to all evangelical churches. Her pulpits, her altars, her ecclesiastical conventions are open to all who profess a common Lord and a common Christian faith. She invites all the true friends of Christ to her communion-table, and rejoices in "the communion of saints." While laboring in her own sphere to do the Master's work, she rejoices in all the prosperity and success of others laboring in the same blessed cause.

With few distinctive peculiarities, but combining what is good in all churches; not seeking to magnify non-essential differences, but looking at the things in which we all agree; deeming unity in spirit more important than unity in forms and ceremonials; fully recognizing the superscription and image of Christ in other churches, the Evangelical Lutheran church says to fellow Christians of every name, who hold "the truth as it is in Jesus": "We be all brethren, children of one Father, and serve one Master, who is Christ the Lord."

If we have spoken partially or too kindly of the Evangelical Lutheran church, it is as becomes a son to speak of his own mother; if too feebly, it must be set down to lack of ability to speak on such a subject. In the words of the author of 2d Maccabees: "If I have done well, and as is fitting the story, it is that which I desired; but if slenderly and meanly, it is that which I could attain unto."

The Synod of Iowa presented a paper "involving most of these same questions." The general Council was not prepared to give any definite or decisive answer to these questions; and these Synods, with the Missouri Synod, declined to unite with that body. — Minutes of General Council, First Convention, 1867.

ARTICLE III.

MILL VERSUS HAMILTON.[1]

BY REV. JOSEPH HAVEN, D.D., PROFESSOR IN CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

Two conflicting systems of philosophy are contending at the present day for the mastery in Great Britain and America. The issues are by no means unimportant. It is a question of no little moment, which shall command the cultivated mind of the age and direct its thinking, for the next generation. It is the custom of some to speak lightly of metaphysical differences and discussions as of no practical importance. But consequences of greatest moment are often involved in systems of merely speculative philosophy. Such is the case in the present instance. Not the philosopher, the metaphysician, merely, but, directly or indirectly, every man of intellectual culture, and through these the still larger class whose opinions are influenced and whose conduct is guided by them, is personally concerned in this matter. No educated man, of whatever calling or profession, at the present day, — certainly no Christian minister, — can afford to be uninformed or misinformed as to the controversy now going on between these two conflicting modes of thought. Many, however, especially professional men, who desire to pronounce an intelligent opinion on the subject, have not the time which is required for such investigations, or, perhaps, the previous metaphysical training which would qualify them to sit in judgment on questions of this nature. It may be of service to such in their inquiries to point out in the following Article *the essential points of difference of the two systems*, and also *some of the defects of each*.

Before proceeding to our main purpose, however, a few

[1] A Paper read before the Alumni Institute of the Chicago Theological Seminary, at its recent session.

words seem necessary respecting the men themselves whose systems we are to compare and discuss. It is known to most that Hamilton, having received in early life the most complete classical training, — first at Glasgow and afterwards at Oxford, — became a student of law, was subsequently appointed professor of History, afterwards of Logic and Metaphysics, in the University of Edinburgh, which post he filled with honor and increasing reputation for many years. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the man is his wonderful erudition. Few men, ancient or modern, have ever equalled him in this. He was complete master of the opinions of men of all ages and nations. The literature and whole history of any subject which he had occasion to discuss, of any idea or doctrine which he wished either to advance or to reject, lay before his glance in all its completeness; so that whatever position he assumed, he was master of the situation. Aristotle and his chief commentators, the writings of the schoolmen and of the early church Fathers, the mediaeval writers, the modern philosophers of Europe, from Descartes to Kant, all were familiar to him as household words. While, however, he called no man master, Aristotle among the ancients, and Reid and Kant among the moderns, were the three thinkers who exerted the greatest influence in the formation of his opinions and habits of thought. His power of analysis and generalization is unsurpassed. His clear, searching eye penetrated at a glance through all the surroundings and incidentals, to the very pith and heart of a subject. His logic is terrible, as Cousin — foeman worthy of his steel — frankly confesses. Dogmatic at times, resolute and persistent always, severe sometimes with an opponent, but manly and honest even in his severest mood, he is an antagonist whom few would do well to encounter, and none to provoke. His style is peculiar, "never loose," to use the well chosen words of McCosh, "never tedious, never dull; it is always clear, always terse, always masculine, and at times it is sententious, clinching, and apothegmatic. . . . . He uses a sharp chisel,

and strikes his hammer with a decided blow; and his ideas commonly stand out before us like a clear-cut statue, standing firmly on its pedestal between us and a clear sky. Indeed, we might with justice describe his style as not only accurate but even beautiful in a sense, from its compression, its compactness, its vigor, and its point."

To pass from this remarkable man to his present critic and antagonist. John Stuart Mill, the son of James Mill, a philosophic writer of considerable eminence of the empirical and utilitarian school, seems to have received his early bias and direction chiefly from his father's speculative opinions and modes of thought. Without the advantage of academic and classical training, he is still a well-educated, though a self-educated man, widely read and well-informed on most subjects, more particularly in history and natural science; while his studies and published writings have led him chiefly to the discussion of logic and metaphysics, including political economy and social science. Accustomed to think for himself, like most self-educated men, he is deficient in a proper reverence for the past, and that deference for the opinions of others which is the fruit of highest culture. Though not properly a disciple of Comte, he finds much in the spirit and principles of the positive philosophy which commands his respect and admiration. "Though a fairly informed man in the history of philosophy," says one of his principal reviewers, "he has attached himself to a school which thinks it has entirely outstripped the past; and so he has no sympathy with, and no appreciation of, the profound thoughts of the men of former times. These are supposed to belong to the theological or metaphysical ages which have forever passed away in favor of the positive era which has now dawned upon our world. Bred thus in a revolutionary school of opinion, his predilections are in all things in favor of those who are given to change, and against those who think there is immutable truth, or who imagine that they have discovered it. ..... He is ever able to bring out his views in admirable order, and his thoughts lie in his style

like pebbles at the bottom of a transparent stream, so that we see their shape and color without noticing the medium through which we view them. I have only to add that in his love of the clear and his desire to translate the abstract into the concrete, he often misses the deepest properties of the objects examined by him; and he seems to me far better fitted to co-ordinate the facts of social science than to deal with the first principles of fundamental philosophy." [1]

At present Mr. Mill is in the ascendant in England. He commands a degree of influence and authority and fills a place in the public estimation second probably to that of no other living thinker and writer in Great Britain. His opinions are law, not merely to the masses, who are attracted by his earnest and noble advocacy of the rights of the people and of civil liberty, but to the educated, and especially the youthful, mind of the country, which is fascinated by his philosophy, and recognizes in him a leader and teacher. He is the magnus Apollo, not merely in the boroughs, the places of business, and the halls of parliament, but in the universities and the schools and courts of law. This personal influence and popularity give additional importance to his philosophical speculations, inasmuch as they give him a power for good or evil over the public mind such as is wielded probably by no other man in Great Britain at the present moment. With respect to the work on which Mr. Mill's reputation as an author now chiefly rests, his "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," it must be regarded as in some respects a remarkable production. Perhaps it is not too much to call it, with Masson, "a truly splendid work." It certainly displays great mental power, great acuteness and skill in detecting the weak and vulnerable points in an opponent's position, and a persistent determination to silence and set aside the great authority of Sir William Hamilton as acknowledged leader of British thought in matters of philosophic speculation. This work he deliberately undertakes, and to some extent, doubtless, accom-

[1] McCosh, Examination of Mill, pp. 14, 15, 16.

plishes in the volumes before us. It was a work quite necessary to be done by some one in the interests of the positive philosophy, as represented by the English branch of the school of Comte, as also of the empirical and sensational school of Locke, Hobbes, Hume, Priestly; to the further existence of which methods of thought in England the utter demolition of Sir William Hamilton's opinions and authority had become a prime necessity. It was for Mr. Mill, as the acknowledged leader of the revolutionary and empirical philosophy, to attempt the task. With fixed purpose and manly courage he has essayed the work by no means easy to be done. Of his success the future must judge. Even his opponents must give him credit on the whole for fairness and candor in his general treatment of the illustrious rival whose system and whose authority he seeks to demolish. We fully agree, however, with the general estimate of Mr. Mill and his work which is expressed by Dr. McCosh, himself one of the fairest and most impartial of critics: "I am sure Mr. Mill means to be a just critic of his rival. But, from having attached himself to a narrow and exclusive school of philosophy, he is scarcely capable of comprehending — he is certainly utterly incapable of appreciating — some of Hamilton's profounder discussions. It would be easy to show that not a few of the alleged inconsistencies of Hamilton arise from misapprehensions on the part of his critic. ..... I certainly do not look on Mr. Mill as a superficial writer. On the contrary, on subjects on which he has not been led to follow Mr. James Mill or M. Comte, his thoughts are commonly as solid and weighty as they are clearly expressed. But speaking exclusively of his philosophy of first principles, I believe he is getting so ready an acceptance among many for his metaphysical theories mainly because, like Hobbes and Condillac, he possesses a delusive simplicity, which does not account for, but simply overlooks, the distinguishing properties of our mental nature."[1]

With these general remarks upon the individual writers,

[1] Examination of Mill's Philosophy, pp. 23, 30.

we proceed to the work more properly before us, the discussion of the two systems as such. And first, their essential differences.

Essential Differences.

1. The first and most obvious difference between the two systems is at the very starting-point from which they set forth. In the whole history of philosophy we find the different schools and systems dividing and diverging on this question first and chiefly: Whence come our ideas, notions, beliefs — wholly from experience? or are there some among them of an *a priori* nature, necessary, *connate*, the result of constitutional causes — ideas and beliefs arising in the mind prior to and independent of all experience of the world without, springing from the very structure of the mind itself? This is the great water-shed of philosophic thought and speculation in all ages, from which divers theories start upon their course toward widely distant oceans. In English philosophy this difference has from the first been most distinctly marked. On the one hand, the empirical or sensational school, deriving all our ideas from experience, and denying all innate, or connate, or *a priori* truth, has been largely in the ascendant in England, as represented by such names as Hobbes, Locke, Hartley, Bentham, Berkeley, Hume, Priestly, Paley, the Mills, father and son, and others of less note.

On the other hand, the spiritual or transcendental school, as distinguished from the sensational, represented abroad by such names as Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Cousin, and the chiefs of modern German speculation, has not been without its disciples and advocates in Great Britain. Of this class were Cudworth and the Cambridge Platonists. The Scotch school has from the first been of this type, as represented in the sober common sense of Reid, the elegance of Stewart, the philosophic clearness and precision of Mackintosh, the genius and eclecticism of Coleridge, and the wonderful erudition and comprehensive grasp of one mightier than they all — Sir William Hamilton. We class Coleridge in this enumeration,

with the Scotch school, and this again with the leading transcendentalists of France and Germany — Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Cousin, — for the reason that, however widely they may differ in other points, and in the general spirit of their respective systems, on the question now under consideration, they stand together and agreed. That in the category of our ideas and beliefs are some which transcend the limits of experience, and are not derived from that source, is a doctrine as clearly enunciated, and as firmly held, by Reid, Stewart, and Mackintosh as by Coleridge or Cousin; and as positively by Hamilton and his pupils as by either. As to this matter, the latter is as thorough a Transcendentalist as Kant or Schelling.

No philosopher, ancient or modern, has cherished a stronger conviction, or more distinctly and earnestly avowed that conviction, that only on the theory of necessary or *a priori* ideas is any philosophy possible, than has Sir William Hamilton. It pervades and gives character to his whole system, and, as Masson has very justly remarked, "the whole tenor of his labors was towards an assertion, purification, and redefinition of Transcendentalism; and when he died, he left the flag of Transcendentalism waving anew over more than one citadel of the world."

And this is precisely one of the fundamental differences between the philosophy of Hamilton and that of Mill, who stands as strongly committed to the opposite view. All truth is experimental; all knowledge, ideas, belief of anything, the result of experience, he would have us believe. This is the key to his whole system. It is avowed in his earlier philosophical essays; it is implied in his logic, which is built on this foundation; it comes out distinctly in his latest and chief philosophical work, the Examination of Hamilton. Our highest principles and generalization, our so-called first truths, even mathematical axioms, ideas of right and wrong, of beauty, duty, and the like, are all, he would assure us, of empirical origin, the result of a more or less wide and oft-repeated induction. Nothing is true *a priori*. Knowledge, notion, belief, axiom, are all to be traced back ultimately to

sensation. Utilitarianism, or a refined and enlarged expediency, is the only ground of morals. It is only by experience that we come to know that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, or that one course of conduct is right and another wrong.

2. Another essential difference of the two systems relates to the theory of perception. This, too, like the preceding, is one of those great division lines which mark off opposite systems, as a chain of mountains runs through and divides a continent. As the former question decides the psychology, so this the cosmology of any given system. Of what is it precisely that we are cognizant in the act of external perception — of the object itself directly, or only of the sensations produced in us by the object? That is the question. Cognizant (or as Hamilton would say conscious) of the object itself, says one theory. We perceive not merely our own sensations, awakened by the external object, but the object itself, as possessing certain essential necessary qualities, namely, extension in space, divisibility, size, figure, etc., which in common parlance are known as the primary qualities of matter. Thus we come into direct cognizance of an external world. Per contra, we are cognizant, not of the object itself, replies the other theory, not of this directly, not in fact of this at all, but only of our own affections and sensations. We know the existence of anything external to self indirectly and by inference, if indeed at all. According as we give one or the other of these answers to the question proposed, we take our place in philosophy as realists or idealists.

Mankind in general, it has been well said, are natural realists. They believe in the quality of mind and matter, and that the latter is the reality which the senses represent it to be. The external object, the rock, the tree, the mountain, is what it seems, and would be the same as now in form, size, color, sound, and taste, were there no percipient mind to see, hear, touch, or taste it. The waves that beat upon some unknown shore which no foot of man has ever trod, flash in the moonlight with the same sparkling bril-

liancy, and crash upon their rocky barriers with the same tumult and uproar, as the billows that play upon the Atlantic coast. Nature is what it seems, and is not in any sense the creation of our own minds. It requires, however, but little exercise of philosophic thought, to perceive that a very considerable part of what we thus regard as really existing out of ourselves is only the affection of our own organism. The taste, the color, the odor, the sound, are our own sensations, and not properties of the object. The most we can say is, they are the effect of the external object on our own sensitive organism, and were that organism different from what it is, the result would be different; the rose would no longer seem red, but green, or some other color; the wave would no longer flash in the sunbeam nor sound as now upon the rocks; that which is now acid or sweet or bitter to the taste or pungent to the smell, or soft to the touch, would present far different appearances.

Accordingly we are not surprised to find among philosophers few natural realists, and to find these few throwing out of the account very much which the unthinking multitude regard as external reality. The secondary qualities of matter, so called, are, even by the natural realist, generally considered to be simply affections of our own sense, and not properly qualities of matter at all.

But having conceded so much where shall we stop? What evidence that the other, and so-called primary qualities of objects, are not in like manner, some or all of them, mere subjective affections, produced in us by, or at least representing to our minds, some object without, which external object remains to us in itself unknown? So have thought the great majority of philosophers; constructive idealists these, admitting the reality of an external world as somehow represented to us in external perception, but admitting it as an inference from our own subjective impressions, and not as an object of immediate cognition. What we really know in perception is not the external world, but only our own ideas and impressions of that externality, say they.

While in the ranks of natural realism we scarcely number more than some half score philosophers of note, among them Reid, Hamilton, and the disciples of the latter, we find on the roll of constructive idealism such names as Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Berkeley, Malebranche, Sir Isaac Newton, Locke, and Browne. Others again have gone further, and have questioned the existence of any such external reality as represented through our senses, resolving the whole into merely subjective affections of the mind itself; pure idealists these, represented by Berkeley in England, and Fitchte in Germany.

It is somewhat doubtful, perhaps, to which of these two classes Mill belongs, that of pure or that of constructive idealists. We have thoughts, sensations, feelings, and that is all. Out of this, our philosophy must construct itself; out of this our theory of matter and of mind is to be evolved. Our present sensations suggest the possibility of other sensations of a similar nature and to an indefinite extent; the idea of something distinct from our fleeting impressions; something fixed and permanent while they vary; something independent of them and of us, capable of producing similar effects at any time on our minds and on other minds, and this, he says, is our idea of external substance. "Matter, then, may be defined a permanent possibility of sensation. If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he does I believe in matter and so do all Berkeleians. In any other sense than this I do not." In like manner he resolves the notion of mind into "a series of feelings, or, as it has been called, a thread of consciousness, however supplemented by believed possibilities of consciousness, which are not, though they might be, realized." As in the case of matter, so of mind, this idea of something permanent in distinction from the sensation or feeling of the present moment, "resolves itself into the belief of a permanent possibility of those states." Matter, then, according to this, is the permanent possibility of sensation; mind, a series of feelings, a running thread of

consciousness, with a permanent possibility of the same. Such is the cosmology of Mr. Mill, a constructive idealism of the most refined and attenuated sort — if indeed it be not rather the nihilism of Hume himself, from which it is difficult to distinguish it. He seems to us in all this, to be more purely an idealist than Berkeley, who admits the real entity of mind, while Mill resolves it into a mere series of feelings, with a permanent possibility of the same.

It is a little remarkable that this series of feelings should have, or seem to have, a knowledge of its own past and future, of itself as having been and to be. This Mr. Mill admits to be inexplicable, and a paradox — one of those ultimate facts which admit of no explanation.

3. The difference now pointed out leads to and involves a further essential difference of the two systems, in respect to the doctrine of the relativity of our knowledge — a difference ontological, as the others were cosmological and psychological. Cosmology and psychology end with the phenomenal. They are sciences of things as they appear. Ontology, if there be such a thing possible, is the science of the absolute, of things as they are *per se*, and not merely of the appearances — phenomena — which they present. Is such a science possible, however, to man? A question on which philosophy has much debated, and on which, as on the previous questions, different systems find themselves essentially divergent. That there is something beyond and back of the phenomenal, something supernatural or absolute, philosophers have usually admitted. That a knowledge or science of this is possible, — that, with all its endeavors, the human mind can transcend the limits of the purely phenomenal, and attain to a science of things *per se*, or of the absolute, — they have with almost equal unanimity denied. The absolute can be known, not to sense nor to reason, but only to faith. The finite cannot comprehend the infinite. Our knowledge is wholly relative, wholly of the phenomenal.

Perhaps no philosopher has done more to set this matter in its true light than Immanuel Kant. Transcendentalist as

he was in psychology, asserting the *a priori* elements of our knowledge with the most convincing clearness and positiveness, he utterly and emphatically denied the possibility of an ontology. Only with the phenomenal has man's reason to do; the absolute is wholly beyond his reach — only another name for the unknown and inconceivable. Those who came after him, however, were not content to abide by that position. The whole current of German philosophy subsequent to Kant, has been one continued struggle to recover an ontology or science of the absolute as the foundation of all true philosophy. The absolute identity theory of Fichte, carried out and developed by Schelling and Hegel, are a persistent, resolute attempt to demonstrate an ontology. Cousin has thrown his brilliant name and pen into the same scale.

At first sight one would say Mill and Hamilton agree in this matter. Both reject the possibility of any such thing as a science of the absolute. Man knows, and can know, only phenomena, never things *per se*. Our knowledge is wholly relative. We know phenomena only; and we know these only as they stand related to our faculties and capacities of knowledge.

Thus far they are agreed. But when we come to inquire what is meant by relativity of knowledge, as that expression is used by each, we find the two philosophers by no means at one.

'True our knowledge is relative,' says Hamilton, 'in the sense already explained. We know not independently and absolutely, but only by means of the phenomena presented to our faculties; but we do know in this way, and our knowledge is real and certain. In every act of perception, for example, as already stated, we have direct, immediate knowledge of self as percipient, and also of the object perceived — the *ego* and the *non ego*. We are conscious of the two.' This is the doctrine of natural realism. 'On the contrary,' says Mill, 'we know immediately and positively, as already stated, neither the self-perceiving nor the

object perceived, — neither the *ego* nor the *non ego*, — but only the impressions produced and the feelings awakened thereby. We know nothing positively beyond these feelings and impressions. There is no certainty of aught else. If it be asked what guarantee have I that these impressions are correct, — that the reality corresponds to the impression, it turns out that there is really none whatever. Things seem to be thus and thus, but there is no certainty that they are so.' As thus held, the relativity of knowledge amounts to absolute nescience. Nothing is known, nothing certain or positive. As thus held, the doctrine differs *in toto* from the relativity of knowledge as held by Hamilton; and it is a difference essential to the two systems — a difference growing out of the different doctrines of perception held by each.

Defects of Mill.

We have pointed out certain essential differences between the two systems. We regard the system of John Stuart Mill as essentially defective in each of the respects now mentioned. The system is at fault, as it seems to us:

1. In deriving, as it does, all our knowledge and ideas from sensation and experience. This is essentially a shallow and superficial account of the matter. We have ideas and elements of knowledge that cannot thus be accounted for; and while much that goes to make up the inventory of the mental furniture may doubtless be ascribed to an empirical origin, it is equally certain that among those ideas are some which, if not properly innate, are, to say the least, connate, having their foundation in the very structure and constitution of the mind; so that as the mind develops, these ideas are developed in it by the very nature and law of its being. Without entering fully into the argument, which would lead us beyond our proper limits, it is sufficient to our present purpose to say, that it is impossible to explain on any other principle the idea of beauty, the idea of right and moral obligation, and the idea of God.

Even Mr. Mill, while purposely rejecting all intuitive

principles and *a priori* elements, and seeking to construct all our ideas and operations out of the material furnished by sensation and association, is, as he proceeds, obliged to call in other and *a priori* principles.[1] Thus he admits the existence of intuitive and immediate knowledge, as the source whence other truth may be inferred, and the starting-point of all reasoning. He admits consciousness as a sufficient and self-evident witness whose testimony is indisputable and ultimate in all cases. He admits our belief in the veracity of memory to be an ultimate fact. He admits a native law of expectation, and original laws of association. All this intuitive, ultimate, and original ground-work of human knowledge, is quite inconsistent with that empirical origin of all our ideas which constitutes the fundamental tenet of the school to which Mr. Mill belongs. In fact, the system of Mill, with all its sensational proclivities and empirical spirit and purpose, contains as many assumptions and postulates, or calls to its aid as many first principles, as are demanded by the most strenuous advocates of the intuitional school, whether Scotch or German.

2. The system is at fault in denying, as it does, an immediate knowledge of the actual external world in perception. We regard this doctrine as the special contribution of the Scotch school (and especially of Sir William Hamilton) to mental science — the most important step in advance, which psychology has made in the present century. Mr. Mill reverses all this, takes a step, or in fact many steps, backwards, and lands philosophy again where it was placed by Hume and Berkeley. The effect is to unsettle everything already established, and to leave no solid substantial basis for philosophy to rest upon. If we do not really and immediately perceive an actual external world, but only infer its existence from certain sensations or affections of our own, then we have no longer any positive knowledge that there is such a world without, or even of the existence of the mind itself; for the

[1] See McCosh's Defense of Fundamental Truth, chapter iii. on Mr. Mill's Admissions.

inference and impression in either case may be erroneous. All that we really and positively know is the existence of certain sensations and impressions — all else is inference and conjecture, more or less probable. Matter becomes, as we have seen, the mere possibility of sensations; and mind (or what we so call) is only the associability of these sensations with each other, together with a certain inexplicable recognition or recollection of themselves as having thus existed and associated in the past, which phenomenon we call memory. "This, and nothing more," is the sum and substance of all knowledge and certainty to the being, called man. To this pitiable residuum, this miserable phantom of a shade, is philosophy reduced by the showing of Mr. Mill.

3. The uncertainty which is thus thrown over the realm of psychology and cosmology is made to extend also to all truth by Mr. Mill's peculiar doctrine of the relativity of knowledge — a view of the matter which takes away all certainty of truth, and reduces human knowledge, as we have seen, to a simple and absolute nescience. This we regard as another and fundamental error of the system. Not only is our knowledge of an external world and of the mind itself reduced to a mere inference from our sensations, but our knowledge of anything comes in the last analysis to this — that the thing seems to us thus and thus. The only thing certain is that we have such and such impressions. Of the correctness of those impressions there is no guarantee. To us, constituted as we are, a part is less than the whole, a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, and two and two make four. There is no certainty that these things are so elsewhere and always — that they are so in the nature of things in other parts of the universe; they may be otherwise. There may be those to whose intelligence two and two are five; orders of being to whom selfishness, deception, and fraud are virtue, and benevolence, sin. Nothing is true universally and necessarily, but only as the mind by its laws and habits of association perceives it, or believes it to be thus and thus. Such, at least, we understand

to be the position of Mr. Mill, plainly stated; and, we need hardly add, it is a doctrine far-reaching and fatal in its consequences to all philosophy and all knowledge. The simple fact that two things have been invariably associated in our experience is sufficient, according to Mr. Mill, to account for their seeming to us to be inseparable. "Thus," to use the language of Dr. McCosh, "two and two, having been associated in our experience with four, we give them a relation in the nature of things; but if two and two had been followed by the appearance of five, we should have had a like assurance of two and two and five being equal. Truth, in Mr. Mill's philosophy, is not even a logical or rational consistency between ideas; it can be nothing more than an accordance of our ideas with sensations, and laws of the association of sensations; which sensations come we know not whence, and are associated by resemblances existing we know not how, or more frequently by contiguity, implying no relation of reason, no connection in the nature of things, and very possibly altogether fortuitous or absolutely fatalistic."

"We see now the issues in which the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, as held by Mr. Mill, lands us. The geometrical demonstrations of Euclid and Appolonius and Newton may hold good only within our experience and 'a reasonable distance beyond.' The mathematics taught in Cambridge may differ in their fundamental principles from those taught in the corresponding university of the planet Jupiter, where two and two may make five, where two straight lines may enclose a space, and where the three angles of a triangle may be more than two right angles." [1]

The whole body of scientific truth which Mr. Mill has himself done so much to elaborate, becomes in this light, as the same critic justly remarks, "simply possibilities of sensations, coming in groups and in regular succession and with resemblances which can be noticed. And is this the sum of what has been gained by the highest science of the nineteenth century? As we contemplate it, do we not feel

[1] Examination of Mill, p. 378.

as if the solid heart of truth and the radiating light were both gone, and as if we had left only a series of systematic vibrations in an unknown ether? Does this satisfy the convictions and the longings of man? Does not the intelligence declare that it has something deeper than this?" [1]

The application of this doctrine to morals is sufficiently obvious; and we agree with a writer in the London Quarterly [2] in pronouncing it one "than which none indeed can be more morally pernicious. ..... If in some other world two and two may make five, in some other world what we regard as virtue may be vice, and our wrong may come forth there as right." [3]

[1] Examination of Mill, p. 374.

[2] Jan. 1866, cited also by McCosh, p. 379.

[3] The essential features of Mr. Mill's system are quite accurately portrayed in the following humorously sarcastic lines from Blackwood for August 1866;

"His system by some very shallow is reckoned,
Three facts, or three fallacies, fill up his cast:
Sensation comes first, recollection is second,
And then expectation, the third and the last.
We feel something present
That's painful or pleasant;
We repeat or recall it by memory's skill:
What happened before, sir,
We look for once more, sir,
And that 's the whole soul of the great Stuart Mill.

"At a glimpse of things real we never arrive,
Nor at any fixed truth we try to explore;
In some different world two and two may make five,
Though appearances here seem to say they make four.
Our mental formation
Has small operation;
The mind — if we have one — is passive and still;
We are ruled by our senses,
Through all our three tenses,
Past, present, and future, says great Stuart Mill.

. . . . . .

"What's called right and wrong, sir,
Is just an old song, sir;
Ne'er tell me of duty, good actions, or ill;
Being useful or not, sir,
Determines the lot, sir;
So Bentham found out, and so thinks Stuart Mill."

We have noticed what we regard as the essential and fundamental errors of the system of Mr. Mill. The radical differences between his system and that of Hamilton are so many radical errors of the former.

4. It is to be noticed in addition, as a defect of this philosophy, that, even admitting its essential positions, it fails to account for some of the most important mental phenomena.

For example, asserting the strictly empirical origin of all our notions both of mind and matter, it makes the mind, as we have seen, to be a mere series of feelings, tending to associate according to certain laws, with a permanent possibility of the like. But whence this tendency of one feeling or state of consciousness to associate with another — this associability of the feelings? Is not this an *a priori* element — something imparted antecedently to the series of feelings which we call the mind, and something wholly inconsistent with the empirical theory? This associability of the feelings is quietly assumed, postulated as a fact, which it certainly is — but a fact unaccounted for, and not to be accounted for, as it seems to us, on Mr. Mill's theory of the mind. In the language of Masson, — whose critique on Mill, in his work entitled "Recent British Philosophy," is the most thorough and able discussion of that system which has yet appeared, — "It seems to me that a very large amount of *a priori* assumption is implied in the very terms of the statement. It is assumed, in the first place, that there are certain predetermined associabilities among the phenomena of feeling from the first — that they tend to come together or grow together according to certain laws or rules of associability pre-imparted to them. ..... Without these precise associabilities among the crude phenomena of feeling, there would not be the result he seeks, that is, the generation of these notions of mind and matter, of an *ego* and a *non ego*, which each mature mind has. But as these associabilities are laws pre-imparted to the phenomena, and regulating most strictly the process of their cogitation, how can the process be said to be empirical?"[1]

[1] Recent British Philosophy, pp. 312, 314.

Again, the fact of memory is wholly inexplicable on this theory of the mind, as Mr. Mill himself frankly admits. This series of feelings, this running thread of consciousness, recognizes itself not only as existing in the present, but as having existed in the past. But how can a mere series of feelings be aware of feelings which have preceded? The flash of present consciousness — how comes it aware of that which in like manner flashed with consciousness in some past movement? This continuity or union of that which is with that which was — does it not involve something more as the basis and ground-work of the whole than the author's theory of the mind as a mere series of sensations will furnish? In the language of Mr. Mill himself, who frankly admits the difficulty, and leaves it unexplained: "If therefore we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, *ex hypothesi,* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." Mr. Mill, so far from accepting the first part of this alternative, that the mind is really anything different from a series of feelings or possibilities of feeling, prefers to retain his theory or definition of the mind even with the admission of the paradox which it involves. We may well ask with Masson, "what is the advantage then of propounding such a definition?"

There is still another and very important mental phenomenon which the philosophy of Mr. Mill wholly fails to explain. We refer to the feeling of obligation which arises in the mind in view of actions perceived to be right. In accordance with his theory of the empirical origin of our ideas, and in common with the utilitarian school of moralists, Mr. Mill, as we have already seen, derives our idea of right and wrong from the perceived advantage of a prior course of conduct — the benefit or detriment which in our experience we find to result

from such and such procedure. In common with Bentham, the elder Mill, and moralists of that school, he makes the "greatest happiness" principle the ruling motive and spring of human conduct. "The utilitarian doctrine, he justly remarks, is that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end." The existence of the moral judgments and feelings he distinctly admits as a fact in human nature, phenomena concerning whose reality there can be no dispute; and he proceeds to account for these phenomena on the principle of the chemistry of association, which plays so important a part in the philosophy of Mr. Mill. "The only color for representing our moral judgments as the result of a peculiar fact of our nature, is that our feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation are really peculiar feelings. But it is notorious that peculiar feelings, unlike any others we have experience of, are created by association every day." As instances of this he refers to the love of power, feelings of ambition, envy, jealously, the love of wealth, etc. Now not to insist on the fact that some, at least, of these are strictly native principles, and by no means the product of any principle of association or chemistry of thought — as the love of power for instance — it is sufficient to remark that in respect to the mental phenomena now in question, that is our moral feelings, there is this remarkable feature which does not pertain to any other class of feelings, whether native or acquired — a sense of obligation. I not only perceive by observation and experience that a given course of conduct will be for the advantage and perfect happiness of all concerned, in which case motives of prudence and of general benevolence may lead me to adopt this line of action, but over and above all such considerations I feel instinctively that I ought to pursue such a course, that the opposite is blameworthy and must not be pursued. Now whence this "ought," this "must," this sense of obligation. It is precisely here that the utilitarian and empirical theory of Mr. Mill breaks down. It is precisely this essential characteristic feature of our moral feelings which the philosophy of

association is wholly unable to explain, namely, to use the language of Masson, "the conversion of the *prodest* into the *oportet;* the evolution of the participle in *dus* out of never so much of the past participle passive; the demonstration how or why, if it were granted that moral actions are those done with a view to the greatest possible diminution of pain and promotion of pleasure throughout the sentient universe, there should have arisen in connection with this class of actions the notion of moral obligation to do them, unless on the principle of some *a priori* or connate notion of rightness that fitted itself on to that class of actions." [1]

The matter has been well stated by Dr. McCosh: "In none of its applications is the theory seen to fail so utterly as in the attempt thus to produce our moral perceptions. Provided we once have the ideas, the laws of association might show how they could be brought up again; how in the reproduction certain parts might sink into shadow and neglect while others come forth into prominence and light; and how the whole feeling by the confluence of different ideas might be wrought into a glow of intensity; but the difficulty of generating the ideas, such ideas, ideas so full of meaning, is not thereby surmounted. The idea I have of pain is one thing, and the idea I have of deceit, that it is morally evil, condemnable, deserving of pain, is an entirely different thing, our consciousness being witness. On the supposition that there is a chemical power in association to create such ideas as those of duty and merit, sin and demerit, this chemical power would be a native moral power; not the product of sensations, but a power above them, and adapted to transmute them from the baser into the golden substance." [2]

In each of the respects now mentioned, the philosophy of sensation and association, even if its positions are conceded, fails utterly to meet and account for the mental phenomenon.

5. It is a defect, not indeed of the system which he advocates, but of Mr. Mill himself as a philosophical writer, that

[1] Recent British Philosophy, p. 264.

[2] Examination of Mill, p. 390.

he fails at times to grasp the real drift and meaning of a statement or doctrine which he is opposing, and so raises a false issue. Instances of this occur repeatedly in his examination of Hamilton. Thus, for example, he goes on page after page with all manner of supposition, doubt, and conjecture as to what can be the possible meaning of Sir William Hamilton, when he affirms the relativity of our knowledge; and, after involving the matter in all possible confusion, concludes that he cannot have meant anything worth the trouble of asserting — that too, after having himself quoted a passage in which Hamilton expressly, and with the utmost precision, tells us just what he does mean by the expression. "In this proposition," says Hamilton, "the term *relative* is opposed to the term *absolute;* and therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, I virtually assert that we know nothing absolute, — nothing existing absolutely, that is, in and for itself, and without relation to us and our faculties." He goes on to say, that were our senses and faculties of perception indefinitely multiplied, still our whole knowledge would be, as now, only of the relative. Of existence in itself, we should still know nothing. "We should still apprehend existence only in certain special modes, only in certain relations to our faculties of knowledge."

Nothing can be plainer than this — nothing truer. Yet Mr. Mill professes to be entirely lost in the vain endeavor to comprehend in what possible sense Hamilton can use the term "relativity of knowledge." For does not Hamilton also teach in plainest terms, that there are certain qualities of matter; to wit, extension, and the other primary and essential attributes, which we know immediately, and as they are in themselves — not merely by their effects on us. If so, how is such knowledge relative? but Hamilton himself answers, "In saying that a thing is known *in itself*, I do not mean that a thing is known in its absolute existence, that is, out of relation to us. This is impossible; for our knowledge is only of the relative. *To know a thing in itself, or immediately*, is an expression I use *merely in contrast to the*

knowledge of a thing in representation, or mediately." The words which we have taken the liberty to italicize in the above passage, and that previously cited, show, as clearly as it is possible for language to show anything, precisely what Hamilton means by "relativity of knowledge" on the one hand, and by "the knowledge of a thing, as it is in itself" on the other; and it requires no little ingenuity to twist the two into any real, or even apparent inconsistency.

Mr. Mill quotes these very passages, but on the very next page tells us with all assurance and complacency, that "if what we perceive and cognize is not merely a cause of our suggestive impressions, but a thing possessing in its own nature and essence a long list of properties, extension, etc., all perceived as essential attributes of the thing as objectively existing ..... then I am willing to believe that in affirming this knowledge to be entirely relative to self, such a thinker as Sir William Hamilton had a meaning; but I have no small difficulty in discovering what it is!"[1] We can hardly conceive how a mind of ordinary sagacity and acumen could find any such difficulty; but while it is not for us to question the fact, in the face of his own positive assertion, that he really cannot tell what Sir William Hamilton means in the above statements, it becomes a serious question whether a mind so peculiarly constituted is precisely fitted to sit in judgment as a critic on a system like Hamilton's, or, in fact, on any system of metaphysical philosophy.

A like instance of confusion of thought occurs in his critique on Hamilton's doctrine of the Infinite and the Absolute, as against Cousin; in which he persistently substitutes the concrete expressions, "*An* Infinite," "*An* Absolute," in place of the abstract, "*The* Infinite," "*The* Absolute," and proceeds to argue the case as if they were synonymous; whereas the whole matter turns on precisely this difference.

This is the more remarkable inasmuch as he himself first correctly states the real question at issue, and then deliberately proceeds to substitute and discuss in its place an

[1] Examination of Hamilton, i. p. 33.

entirely different question. "The question is," he says, whether we have a direct intuition of "the Infinite," and "the Absolute," Mr. Cousin maintaining that we have, Sir William Hamilton that we have not; that the Infinite and the Absolute are inconceivable to us, and, by consequence, unknowable."[1] That is precisely the question. And yet, in reviewing the arguments of Sir William Hamilton for the position which he maintains, the very first remark of Mr. Mill is "that most of them lose their application by simply substituting for the metaphysical abstraction "the Absolute," the more intelligible concrete expression "something absolute."[2] Indeed they do! "It is these unmeaning abstractions however, these muddles of self-contradiction, which alone our author has proved against Cousin and others, to be unknowable. He has shown without difficulty, that we cannot know the Infinite or the Absolute. He has not shown that we cannot know a concrete reality as infinite or as absolute."[3] This latter, we reply, was not what Cousin held; Cousin's doctrine is not that we may know a concrete being as infinite and absolute, but that we may know "The Infinite" and "The Absolute," — as Mill himself had just before correctly stated. And if Hamilton has shown this, then he has shown precisely what he undertook to show.

This misconception of the matter at issue, and confusion of things that differ, runs through the entire chapter, and reappears at every step of the argument. Thus in regard to the negative character of our notions of the Infinite and Absolute: "This is quite true of the senseless abstraction "the Infinite." That indeed is purely negative; but in place of "the Infinite," put the idea of "something infinite" — in other words, change the very proposition which Hamilton is refuting — "and the argument collapses at once."[4] Verily so! This mistake is one into which McCosh has also fallen, who cites with approval the views of Mill, and, as above, pronounces them to be "safer, and in some respects juster, than those of Hamilton!"[5] No doubt we can conceive of

[1] Examination of Hamilton, i. p. 48. [2] Ibid. i. p. 58.
[3] Ibid. i. p. 161. [4] Ibid. i. pp. 62. [5] Ibid. p. 73.

something infinite, or of a being of infinite perfection (as McCosh and Mill assert); but that is not to conceive of "the Infinite."

6. There is yet another respect in which the erroneous tendency of Mr. Mill's philosophy is manifest, to which at present we can merely allude. We refer to its theological bearings. While professing to leave the whole subject of natural theology untouched, and an open question, it seems to us really to undermine some of its essential principles. The matter has been well stated by Dr. McCosh: "It is clear that many of the old proofs cannot be advanced by those who accept his theory. The argument from catholic consent can have no value on such a system. That derived from the moral faculty in man, so much insisted on by Kant and Chalmers, is no longer available, when it is to be allowed that the moral law has no place in our constitution, and that our moral sentiments are generated by inferior feelings and associated circumstances. But then he tells us the design argument 'would stand exactly where it does.' I doubt much whether this is the case. I see no principles left by Mr. Mill sufficient to enable us to answer the objections which have been urged against it by Hume. Kant is usually reckoned as having been successful in showing that the argument from design involves the principle of cause and effect. We see an order and an adaptation in nature which are evidently effects, and we look for a cause. Has Mr. Mill's doctrine of causation left this proof untouched? Suppose that we allow to him that there is nothing in an effect which of itself implies a cause; that even when we know that there is a cause, no light is thereby thrown on the nature of that cause; that the causal relation is simply that of invariable antecedence within the limits of our experience; and that beyond our experience there may be events without a cause, — I fear that the argument is left without a foundation." [1]

Mr. Mill is himself of the opinion that a belief in an over-

[1] Examination of Mill, pp. 424, 425.

ruling Providence and a personal God is by no means essential to religion or to the practical government of human conduct. In his latest work, a critique on the positive philosophy of Comte, he holds the following language: "Though conscious of being in an extremely small minority, we venture to think that a religion may exist without belief in a God, and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, an instructive and profitable object of contemplation." [1]

Mr. Mill, however, would not be understood as denying the existence of the Divine Being, or his providential and moral government. He would leave all this an open question in philosophy, and censures M. Comte for unwisely and unnecessarily encumbering the positive philosophy with a religious prejudice, by avowing the opinion that mankind, when properly instructed, "would cease to refer the constitution of nature to an intelligent will, or to believe at all in a Creator and supreme Governor of the world. ..... It is one of Comte's mistakes that he never allows of open questions," says Mill. "The positive mode of thought is not necessarily a denial of the supernatural; it merely throws back that question to the origin of things. If the universe had a beginning, its beginning, by the very conditions of the case, was supernatural; the laws of nature cannot account for their origin. The positive philosopher is free to form his opinion on this subject according to the weight he attaches to the analogies which are called works of design, and to the general traditions of the human race. The value of these evidences is indeed a question for positive philosophy; but it is not one on which positive philosophers must necessarily be agreed."

It would be interesting to know on which side of this open question Mr. Mill himself stands — whether in his opinion the universe had a beginning and a Beginner or not. On this he gives us no light, but only informs us that if we see fit to believe in a God, we can do so without necessarily

[1] Comte, etc., p. 133.

renouncing or coming into conflict with philosophy; though for himself he does not consider such a belief at all essential to religion.

In his Treatise on Liberty he speaks in high terms of the doctrines and precepts of Christ, but pronounces them incomplete as a system of ethics for the world. He thinks that "many essential elements of the highest morality are not provided for, nor intended to be provided for, in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity, and which have been entirely thrown aside in the system of ethics erected on the basis of those deliverances by the Christian church. And this being so, I think it a great error to persist in attempting to find in the Christian doctrine that complete rule for our guidance which its Author intended to sanction and enforce, but only partially to provide. I believe that other ethics than any which can be evolved exclusively from Christian sources must exist side by side with Christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind." [1] As an instance of this deficiency, he specifies the duty which we owe to the state as one which in the Christian ethics "is scarcely noticed or acknowledged"! We fear Mr. Mill has not studied the Christian ethics as carefully as he might, or he would hardly have ventured such an assertion.

Such, then, is the philosophy of Mr. Mill in its religious bearings. While not denying the doctrine of the divine existence and the great truths of the Christian system, it neither gives nor professes to give us any aid in establishing these truths. The best it can do is to leave the whole matter of the divine existence and the divine government of the world an open question; while it silently undermines and rejects some of the strongest arguments by which these positions have hitherto been maintained. For itself, it does not consider it at all essential to the interests of religion and the moral culture of the race that these truths should be maintained or believed. There may be a religion efficient for all

[1] Liberty, pp. 91, 92.

practical purposes without a God. If admitted, the Christian system is ethically incomplete and insufficient, requiring to be supplemented.

We have noticed in the preceding pages some of the defects of Mr. Mill's system, as it strikes us. To sum up the matter in a few words: He gives us a philosophy without first principles, a cosmology without a material world, a psychology without a soul, and a theology without a God.

But it is time to notice in turn the errors of the system which Mr. Mill so strenuously opposes.

Defects of Hamilton.

There are, it must be conceded, certain errors and inconsistencies, not so much of the system of Hamilton, for they are not essential to that, as of the individual thinker; which are to be regretted nevertheless as defects, more or less serious in the philosophical speculations of this remarkable man. Some of these have been pointed out by Mr. Mill, some of them previously by other writers.

1. Hamilton's theory of causation — This we cannot but regard as essentially defective. He attributes this idea to the mind's inability to conceive the absolute commencement of anything, the absolute beginning of existence, or its absolute end. The belief that every event has a cause, instead of being a special principle of our nature, an intuition of the mind, arises according to this view, "not from a power, but from an impotence of mind." We regard this theory, and the reasoning by which it is sustained, as wholly unsatisfactory and erroneous. We do not, in fact, as Hamilton supposes, conceive the Deity as in creation evolving existence out of himself, but rather as calling it into being out of nothing. True, we cannot comprehend this, nor even represent it to ourselves in thought as taking place, but it is our idea of what does occur in creation, it is what we understand by that term. We deny that there is any such impotence of the mind as that referred to; and we deny that if there were it would adequately account for that principle of the human

mind which leads it everywhere and always to demand a cause for every event.

To resolve this principle, as Hamilton does, into an inability to conceive an absolute beginning is a most unfortunate solution of the problem, since according to one of the established maxims of this philosophy, that may be true which is to us inconceivable, and so there may be, after all, such a thing as absolute beginning of existence, or, in the Hamiltonian sense, events without a cause. There is no certitude, then, of a first cause, only an inability on our part to conceive of events uncaused; which inability, however, is no proof that such events do not occur.

2. Nor can we regard the Hamiltonian theory of the will as more satisfactory than his account of the principle of causation. The two theories in fact stand very closely connected. For the same reason above mentioned, namely, that we cannot conceive an actual commencement, it is also impossible, says Hamilton, to conceive a free volition, for that would be a volition without a cause, an absolute commencement. We have however the testimony of consciousness in favor of freedom, and so accept the fact while admitting it to be inconceivable. To this view of the matter we wholly object. A free volition is not a volition without a cause, nor is it in any way or for any reason, a thing inconceivable. It is wholly a false idea of freedom to conceive of it as something inconsistent with the idea of cause, inconsistent with the influence of motives, inconsistent with any influence, tendency, inclination whatever, for or against a given object. Nothing can be more absurd or more contrary to fact than such a conception of freedom. Yet it is throughout Sir William Hamilton's idea. Free-will is inconceivable, he maintains, first and chiefly, as already stated, for the reason that it supposes a volition without a cause, that is an absolute beginning, which is inconceivable, and furthermore, for the additional reason that the will is determined by motives, and "a determination by motives cannot to our understanding escape from necessitation."

It is of no use to reply with Reid and other advocates of free-will, that motives are not of the nature of causes, that they influence, but do not cause or determine, the mind's action. "If motives influence to action," replies Hamilton, "they must co-operate in producing a certain effect upon the agent, and the determination to act, and to act in a certain manner, is that effect." They are therefore causes, and cause is necessity. Against this idea of what constitutes freedom we earnestly and stoutly protest as wholly unfounded, and untrue to the facts of the case. The thing really inconceivable is not the doctrine of free-will, but how such an idea of freedom as that now described could ever come to be entertained by a mind so clear and penetrating as Sir William Hamilton's. Such surely is not the freedom to which consciousness testifies, and which our moral accountability demands. The volitions of which our consciousness testifies, that they are free, are not volitions uncaused and undetermined, but such as the mind has itself put forth in the full and free exercise of its own powers, in view of motives and the manifold influences that surround it and constitute the circumstances of its action. Under these influences the mind acts, and acts as it does, but still with full power and consciousness of power to an opposite choice. This is all the freedom we know anything of in consciousness, and such freedom is perfectly conceivable, because matter-of-fact and constantly recurring history.

But Hamilton will have it that these influences which lead the mind to act as it does are veritable causes, and not merely reasons of the mind's action, and as causes, are of the nature of necessity. "On the supposition that the sum of influences (motives, dispositions, and tendencies) to volition A is equal to twelve, and the sum of influences to counter-volition B equal to eight, can we conceive," he asks, "that the determination of volition A should not be necessary?" That, we reply, is precisely what we can and do conceive. Actual, the volition A may be and will be in the case supposed — actual, but not necessary. The certainty

of an event and the necessity of an event, are two different things; a distinction constantly overlooked by Hamilton in common with Mill and most writers of the necessitarian school, as well as many of the advocates of free-will. The certainty of an action may result from the impossibility of its not occurring, in which case the act is one of necessity, or it may result from other causes, in which case there is no necessity. In the case supposed, where the influences which tend to volition A greatly preponderate, it may be quite certain that A and not B will be the actual choice of the mind, but still with no impossibility of choosing B; on the contrary a distinctly recognized and felt possibility of it; therefore no necessity.

We have long felt that an intelligent and valid defence of the doctrine of free-will is utterly impossible on any such ground, and any such notion of what freedom is, as that assumed by Sir William Hamilton. It was by no means difficult for an antagonist so acute as Mr. Mill, following in his wake and adopting his premises, — understanding by freedom, as he does, the entire absence of any such thing as cause or influence, whether of motive, disposition, character, or any other source; and by necessity all connection of volition with any preceding cause, motive, or influence whatever, — with these ideas and concessions as to the nature of freedom and necessity, nothing was easier, we say, than for Mr. Mill to show that there is no ground for the doctrine of liberty to stand upon, and that the arguments of Hamilton in defence of free-will are inconclusive and untenable.[1]

[1] In common with Edwards and most necessitarians, Mr. Mill understands by necessity simple certainty of an event, the sure and invariable connection of a volition with its appropriate moral cause in the shape of motive or influence; necessity in any other sense he distinctly disclaims. "A volition," he says, "is a moral effect which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as physical effects follow the physical causes. Whether it must do so, I acknowledge myself to be entirely ignorant, be the phenomenon moral or physical; and I condemn accordingly the word necessity as applied to either case. All I know is that it always does." And again: "If necessity means more than this abstract possibility of being foreseen; if it means any mysterious compulsion, apart from simple invariability of sequence, I deny it as strenuously as any one" (Examination of Hamilton, Vol. ii. pp. 281, 300).

3. There are some other matters of less importance in which we cannot but think the positions of Hamilton erroneous. His theory of the general conditions which determine the existence of pleasure and pain; namely, that these emotions are the result, the one of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of conscious power, the other of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such power, — is an explanation of the matter which, however applicable to the pains and pleasures of intellectual and physical activity, will by no means apply to the much larger class of painful and pleasurable feelings which are organic and passive. This Mill has acutely shown by reference to the sense of taste, as exercised on objects sweet or acrid or bitter; all which equally answer the conditions of the theory, but by no means produce equally pleasurable results.[1]

The theory of unconscious mental modifications, while it may very probably be true, seems to us hardly established by the arguments which Hamilton gives in its favor. The instances to which he refers as evidences of such modification may quite as readily be explained on the hypothesis of Stewart, that the missing trains of thought were once present in consciousness, but have subsequently been forgotten.

Again, whatever may be thought of Sir William Hamilton's application of the term "consciousness" to denote the knowledge of objects external to self as well as of what passes within the mind, it is certainly inconsistent to maintain, as he does, that "consciousness comprehends every cognitive act, in other words, whatever we are not conscious of, that we do not know," and still to deny that in an act of memory we have a consciousness of the past. If consciousness is limited to immediate knowledge, exclusive of the past and the absent, then it is not true that it comprehends every cognitive act.[2]

A similar inconsistency, as Mr. Mill is not slow to discover, occurs in the definition of logic as "the science of the laws of thought as thought," or, "the science of the necessary

[1] Examination of Hamilton, pp. 257–259. [2] Ibid. i. p. 144.

forms of thought," while at the same time, as subsequently explained, the laws in question prove to be not necessary laws at all, but such as may be violated at pleasure — not necessary to all thought, but only to all valid or correct thought.[1]

Many of these inconsistencies and discrepancies which Mr. Mill has enumerated are doubtless owing to the fact that the different parts of his system are not carefully adjusted to each other. It is, as Masson has expressed it, "a philosophy of imperfect junctions. One doctrine pursued at one time does not always meet or lead into another pursued at another time, or seem as if it could meet or lead into it." Mr. Mill compares this characteristic of the system to what might happen in the operation of tunnelling Mt. Cenis, were the workmen simultaneously approaching from each end to tunnel past each other in the dark, instead of meeting exactly in the middle. One cause of this incompleteness may have been, as Mr. Mill himself suggests, "the enormous amount of time and mental vigor, which he expended in mere philosophical erudition, leaving, it may be said, only the remains of his mind for the real business of thinking." In part also, it is due to the fact that his Lectures, hastily written in the first instance, had not the benefit of his own revision and publication, but were edited by Professors Veitch and Mansel after his death. Meanwhile, during the twenty years which followed, his system was becoming more thoroughly matured and more carefully elaborated, his notes and dissertations appended to his edition of Reid were published, containing his ripest and maturest thoughts, not always coinciding however, in form and phraseology, not always perhaps in idea and doctrine, with his earlier views as expressed in the Lectures. Had he lived to revise his own works for publication, much of this imperfect adjustment would doubtless have been remedied.

In conclusion, while we would by no means deny or overlook the faults of Sir William Hamilton as a philosopher, some of which we have now indicated, we cannot regard them

[1] Examination of Hamilton, ii. pp. 144, 145.

as essential to, nor at all destructive of, his general system. On the contrary, his main positions are right, and abundantly capable of defence, notwithstanding the errors in question; while, on the other hand, the position of his critics and antagonists are fundamentally erroneous. It has been said of him, with entire justice, by one who, while admiring, takes the liberty to differ freely, that "notwithstanding incongruities in some parts of his system, he has furnished more valuable contributions to speculative philosophy than any other British writer in this century. ..... More than any other Englishman, Scotchman, or Irishman for the last two centuries, he has wiped away the reproach from British philosophy, that it is narrow and insular. For years past ordinary authors have seemed learned, and for years to come will seem learned, by drawing from his stores." As regards the influence of his speculative system over British thought, it is sufficient to point to the fact that the chairs of philosophy in three, at least, out of four Scottish universities are filled by his disciples, viz. Professor Fraser of Edinburgh, Veitch of Glasgow, and Baynes of St. Andrews; while McCosh of Queen's College, Belfast, is in the main Hamiltonian, and Mansel of Oxford, decidedly so; while among the great writers as well as scholars of Great Britain not a few names of eminence are on the list of his disciples — among the number, that of Dr. John Cairnes of Berwick-upon-Tweed, and of Masson, not the least — with whose words of glowing tribute to the master, we close this sketch.

"Although Hamilton is no more in the midst of us, Hamiltonianism is not defunct. But why should I say Hamiltonianism? All our British speculative thought, in every corner where intellect is still receptive and fresh, has been affected, at least posthumously, by the influence of that massive man of the bold look and the clear hazel eye, whose library lamp might have been seen nightly, a few years ago, by late stragglers in one of the streets of Edinburgh, burning far into the night, when the rest of the city was asleep. Oh, our miserable judgments! Here was a man probably unique

in Britain; but Britain was not running after him, nor thinking of him, but was occupied, as she always is, and always will be, with her temporary concerns and her riff-raff of temporary notabilities. And now one has to dig one's way to the best of him through the small type columns of perhaps the most amorphous book ever issued from the British press. But some have done this, who had no inducement to do so, except their love of ideas, wherever they were to be found. Mill and Bain, who are fundamentally opposed to Hamilton's Transcendentalism, and Spencer, who is certainly not a Hamiltonian, all acknowledge their respect for Hamilton, and the obligations of British thought to his labour. ..... But try him by any standard. What a writer he was! What strength and nerve in his style; what felicity in new philosophical expressions! Throw that aside, and try him even in respect of the importance of his effects on the national thought. Whether from his learning, or by reason of his independent thinkings, was it not he that hurled into the midst of us the very questions of metaphysics, and the very forms of those questions, that have become the academic thesis everywhere in this British age, for real metaphysical discussion"?[1]

[1] Recent British Philosophy, p. 217, 252

ARTICLE IV.

IRONY IN HISTORY; OR, WAS GIBBON AN INFIDEL?

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PART I.

1. *The Charge against Gibbon, as stated by Dean Milman and Bishop Watson.*

THE author of the "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" has been accused of resorting to irony and sarcasm in those parts of his work where he seems to speak approvingly of Christianity, especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters. The charge, as reduced to distinct terms by those who profess to have made this history their study for the purpose of furnishing a corrective to its statements (or the manner of its statements), is as follows:

"The art of Gibbon," says Milman (in his edition of the "Decline and Fall," designed, professedly, to correct by notes such inaccuracies or misstatements as may have been detected, particularly with regard to Christianity), "or, at least, the unfair impression produced by his two memorable chapters, consists in his confounding together in one indistinguishable mass, the origin and apostolic propagation of the new religion with its later progress. ..... The main question, the divine origin of the religion, was dexterously eluded or speciously conceded by Gibbon. His plan enabled him to commence his account, in most parts, below the apostolic times; and it was only by the strength of the dark coloring with which he brought out the failings and the follies of the succeeding ages that a shadow of doubt and suspicion was thrown back on the primitive period of Christianity."[1]

Among the various answers made to Gibbon on the first appearance of his work, Bishop Watson's "Apology" is the

[1] Milman's Gibbon (Boston, 1853), Preface, pp. 15, 16.

only one Milman considers as possessed of sufficient merit to render it worthy of notice. In his preface, above quoted, he describes it as "able," but as being "rather a general argument than an examination of misstatements." "In assigning," says Bishop Watson, "to this astonishing event [the early success of Christianity] five secondary causes, derived from the passions of the human heart and the general circumstances of mankind, you seem to some to have insinuated that Christianity, like other impostures, might have made its way in the world, though its origin had been as human as the means by which you suppose it was spread. It is no wish or intention of mine to fasten the odium of this insinuation upon you." [1]

Statements of the objections to this history might be given from a great variety of sources, but none from better-informed or more careful writers. The gravamen of the whole appears to be that Gibbon explained the rapid extension of Christianity by secondary causes, and that his express admission of the divine origin of this religion must be taken in an insidious and ironical sense; his true meaning being that it is unnecessary, in view of such causes, to admit that this religion had any such origin.

2. *Irony, its Nature and Use.*

Irony consists in seeming to adopt false conclusions or sophistical reasonings for the purpose of making their absurdity appear. It is a use of language conveying a meaning contrary to its literal import. It is a *reductio ad ridiculum.* When properly used it is an effective weapon, and there is no kind of writing to which it is not adapted. We find it even in the Bible; as when Elijah taunted the prophets of Baal, and said: "Cry aloud; for he is a god. Either he is talking, or he is pursuing, or he is on a journey, or peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked" (1 Kings xviii. 27). It occurs frequently in the appeals of orators and public speakers; as, for example, in the Philippics of Demosthenes

[1] First Letter to Gibbon.

and the orations of Cicero; in the speeches of Chatham and Burke, Henry and Webster; in the sermons of Saurin and South. Sometimes it has been extensively used in arguments on the gravest questions. It characterizes in an eminent degree the Provincial Letters of Pascal. The late Archbishop Whately published a pamphlet under the title of "Historic Doubts relative to the Existence of Napoleon Bonaparte," wholly ironical; the object of which was to show that objections similar to those brought against the scripture history, and much more plausible, might be urged against all the received accounts of this distinguished personage of modern history. Edmund Burke had in like manner before him, in his "Defence of Natural Society, by a late Noble Lord," assuming the person of Bolingbroke, proved, according to the principles of that author, that the arguments he brought against ecclesiastical, would equally lie against civil, institutions.

3. *Illegitimate Use of Irony.*

Care, of course, must be taken to make such use of language, or to employ, in oral discourse, such emphasis in pronunciation, that the real meaning may not be mistaken. No argument is required to show that a writer is guilty of a gross literary blunder who so uses irony that he is fairly understood as sincerely defending the false proposition he assumes, or who so much as leaves it doubtful whether he is employing it or not. If, for example, Elijah might have been fairly understood as expressing his belief that Baal was truly God when he said he was a god; if Pascal in his raillery of the fathers of the Sorbonne had been understood as pronouncing their logomachies solid arguments; if Demosthenes had been understood as affirming that the ambassadors and representatives of Philip were superior to the the king himself; Burke as proclaiming himself a disciple of Bolingbroke, and Whately as denying the existence of such a man as Bonaparte, or attempting to inculcate universal scepticism; or if the language used in any of these

cases had left it doubtful what was intended, then is it clear that the writer, however great his name in literature, has made an illegitimate and unskilful use of this mode of writing. Its ironical character must be evident, or the purpose of its introduction is defeated, and worse than defeated.

Especially is this true in history. History professes to deal with facts. We properly regard the narrator of it as in some sense a witness on the stand. He must speak truly. He has no right to trifle, or to speak under such tropes as to hide his real meaning. If he purposely hides his real meaning, so far as facts are concerned, it of course becomes a false statement; and to the extent this vice of style characterizes a work, it is rendered valueless as a history. Irony may be as legitimately employed in historical as in any other writings; but under the same necessary law it must be evident that it is employed. If whole pages and chapters, and an entire class of facts and characters in a history covering several centuries are presented ironically, and the irony is left doubtful, so that we can neither decide where it begins nor where it ends, it seems to be a just ground of condemnation of the whole work. If Gibbon wrote in this style, Paley might well ask with reference to the difficulty of answering him, "Who can refute a sneer?" and Byron describe him as

> "Snapping a solemn creed with solemn sneer,
> The lord of irony, that master-spell."

4. *The Historian to speak for himself.*

The most satisfactory course to be pursued in eliciting the truth on this subject, is first to take up the work itself, to ascertain from it, so far as this is possible, the author's real sentiments regarding Christianity, as if we knew nothing of his personal history. To permit what he has himself put on record, in the matter whereof he is called in question, to testify for or against him, according to a just interpretation, seems, indeed, to be the only fair mode of proceeding. After this is done, we may then inquire whether there is any evi-

dence from other writings or sources, that he stood in a hostile attitude towards Christianity.

Not only the true position, on the most important of all questions, of a man who must be allowed to have been one of the greatest ornaments of historical literature is concerned; but in respect to this important question itself, the divinity of the Christian religion, the truth of history, as far as the authority and testimony of his work extend, is directly involved.

5. *Mr. Gibbon on the Success of Christianity.*

The fifteenth chapter opens with this striking paragraph: "A candid and rational inquiry into the progress and establishment of Christianity may be considered as a very essential part of the history of the Roman empire. While that great body was invaded by open violence, or undermined by slow decay, a pure and humble religion gently insinuated itself into the minds of men, grew up in silence and obscurity, derived new vigor from opposition, and finally erected the triumphant banner of the cross on the ruins of the capitol. Nor was the influence of Christianity confined to the period or to the limits of the Roman empire. After a revolution of thirteen or fourteen centuries, that religion is still professed by the nations of Europe, the most distinguished portion of human kind in arts and learning as well as in arms. By the industry and zeal of the Europeans it has been widely diffused to the most distant shores of Asia and Africa; and by the means of their colonies has been firmly established from Canada to Chili, in a world unknown to the ancients."

Mr. Milman professes to see a change in the tone and a falling off in the style of Mr. Gibbon, where he comes to trace the progress of Christianity. It surely is not to be detected in these opening sentences. They form a very remarkable introduction to an assault upon Christianity. The historian even seems to go out of his way to speak of the thirteen or fourteen centuries of revolution which this "pure and humble religion" had survived, of its spread to

the most distant shores of Asia and Africa, and its establishment on this continent in a world unknown to the ancients. If this be sarcasm (Milman charges him with "malignant sarcasm") the mode of being sarcastic in Gibbon's day was certainly very peculiar.

6. *The Difficulties Gibbon felt in his Undertaking.*

He proceeds in the introduction to the fifteenth chapter: "But this inquiry, however useful or entertaining, is attended with two peculiar difficulties. The scanty and suspicious materials of ecclesiastical history seldom enable us to dispel the dark cloud that hangs over the first age of the church. The great law of impartiality, too, often obliges us to reveal the imperfections of the uninspired teachers and believers of the gospel; and, to a careless observer, their faults may seem to cast a shade on the faith which they professed."

The mention of these two difficulties, the suspicious materials of ecclesiastical history, and the necessity of referring to the faults of nominal Christians, prove that he was fully aware of the perilous ground over which his proposed task must take him. But it would be only to the "careless observer" that a shade would seem to be cast over the Christian faith. He immediately adds in language which sounds very strange as coming from a rejecter of the gospel:

"But the scandal of the pious Christian and the fallacious triumph of the infidel should cease as soon as they recollect not only by whom, but likewise to whom, the divine revelation was given. The theologian may indulge the pleasing task of describing religion as she descended from heaven arrayed in her native purity. A more melancholy duty is imposed on the historian. He must discover the inevitable mixture of error and corruption which she contracted in a long residence upon earth among a weak and degenerate race of beings."

Mr. Gibbon, in these extracts, either speaks in the most reverential terms of the Christian religion, and avows his faith in it, or he is speaking sneeringly, sarcastically, ironi-

cally. Is there satire or irony in what he says of the removal of the scandal of the Christian, and the fallacious triumph of the infidel, in view of the imperfections of the uninspired teachers and believers of Christianity, by the recollection of its divine origin? Or, in the important distinction he draws between the task of the theologian and that of the historian; the former having to set forth the doctrines of a religion revealed from heaven to inspired, the latter to describe the actions and errors of uninspired, men? On the contrary, never was the humbling doctrine of human degeneracy and infirmity more powerfully or eloquently stated. A divine religion must be judged irrespective of the weakness of its recipients and exponents.

Dean Milman has the candor to acknowledge that the melancholy and humiliating view of the early progress of Christianity cannot be charged wholly on the historian. "It is idle," he says, "it is disingenuous, to deny or to dissemble the early depravations of Christianity, its gradual, but rapid departure from its primitive simplicity and purity, still more from its spirit of universal love." [1] He admits that the passage just quoted, separated from the following disquisition, "might commence a Christian history, written in the Christian spirit of candor." [2] In his "History of Latin Christianity" Milman himself notices how the lofty claims of Christianity, that it came down from heaven, "might appear utterly belied by the claims of conflicting doctrines on the belief, all declared to be essential to salvation, and the animosities and bloody quarrels which desolated Christian cities. Anathema instead of benediction had almost become the general language of the church. Religious wars, at least rare in the pagan state of society, seemed now a new and perpetual source of misery, a cause and a sign of the weakness and decay, and so of the inevitable dissolution of the Roman empire." [1] Did Milman, then, regret the sub-

[1] Preface to Gibbon, p. 19.

[2] Milman's Gibbon, Note, p. 505.

[3] Milman's Latin Christianity (New York), Vol i. p. 353.

stitution of a Christian for the pagan state of society? Or did he intend that the dark coloring in the picture he draws should "throw back" a shadow of doubt and suspicion on the primitive period of Christianity?

7. *Gibbon's Plan in this Portion of his History, and his Reason for Confining himself to Secondary Causes.*

Mr. Gibbon next proceeds to announce a very distinct and formal plan, according to which he proposes to discuss the great subject of the progress and establishment of Christianity. And he introduces it with another most striking and distinct concession of its truth and divine origin:

"Our curiosity is naturally prompted to inquire by what means the Christian faith obtained so remarkable a victory over the established religions of the earth. To this inquiry an obvious but satisfactory answer may be returned — that it was owing to the convincing evidence of the doctrine itself, and to the ruling providence of its great Author."

Without any qualification or the least appearance of prevarication, he admits that this answer is both obvious and completely satisfactory; but to make it in the particular work in which he was engaged his special or only answer would be to invade the domain of the theologian. Milman accuses him of confounding the origin and apostolic propagation of the new religion with its later progress. Is this just, when he marks, as he does here, so clearly, the distinction between them, and has so good reason, as Milman himself intimates, for confining himself to the human causes that operated in its later progress, to wit, that his account had its commencement "below apostolic times"? Gibbon would not forget that his work was that of the historian. Hence he proceeds:

"But as truth and reason seldom find so favorable a reception in the world, and as the wisdom of Providence frequently condescends to use the passions of the human heart and the general circumstances of mankind as instruments to execute its purpose, we may still be permitted,

though with becoming submission, to ask, not indeed what were the first [again carefully guarding against the impression that he ignored the great First Cause], but what were the secondary causes of the rapid growth of the Christian church."

The chief ground of the suspicion which had been awakened against Gibbon, as stated by Bishop Watson, was, that he explained the rapid spread of Christianity by these merely secondary causes, as if he intended to insinuate that Christianity, like other impostures, might have made its way in the world though its origin had been as human as the means. But Gibbon claimed, and it is difficult to see why not justly, that to confine his attention to these "secondary causes" was his peculiar province as a historian. That there were such causes, and that such are still in operation, under the direction of Divine Providence, for the promotion of religion, cannot be denied. They are recognized and often specified by the firmest advocates of our holy religion. There is not a history nor a treatise bearing on this subject in which they are not made more or less prominent. Even Milman himself, as a historian, recognizes them, and uses language open to similar or more serious objection than that used by Gibbon. In his "History of Christianity to the Abolition of Paganism in the Roman Empire," he thus speaks of the effect of a mistaken opinion or belief to which Gibbon also incidentally refers in connection with one of his five causes: "There can be no doubt both that many of the early Christians almost hourly expected the final dissolution of the world, and that this opinion awed many timid believers into the profession of Christianity, and kept them in trembling subjection to its authority. The ambiguous predictions of Christ himself, in which the destruction of the Jewish polity and the ruin of the city and Temple were shadowed forth under images of more remote and universal import; the language of the apostles, so liable to misinterpretation that they were obliged publicly to correct the erroneous conclusions of their hearers, seemed to countenance an

opinion so disparaging to the real glory of Christianity, which was only to attain its object after a slow contest of many centuries, perhaps of ages, with the evil of human nature."[1] In setting forth the "design" of his history, he expressly says that "it is his opinion that at every period much more is to be attributed [in accounting for "each phasis of Christianity"] to the circumstances of the age, to the collective operation of certain principles which grew out of the events of the time, than to the intentional or accidental influence of any individual or class of men. ..... It [Christianity] will darken with the darkness and brighten with the light of each succeeding century. In an ungenial time it will recede so far from its genuine and essential nature as scarcely to retain any sign of its divine original."

These passages are the more important, as Milman appears to have prepared his historical works with the design of counteracting that portion of Gibbon's which relates to Christianity, or as the best mode of answering him. This is inferred from the language he uses in an Article on Guizot's edition of Gibbon in the London Quarterly Review for January 1834. That the Article is from his pen is evident, as the preface or introduction to Milman's edition is to a considerable extent in the same words as those found in this Article. He says: "Nothing less is wanting [i.e. to weaken or neutralize the general impression of Gibbon's work] than a Christian account of the whole period, written in an attractive style and in a vein of true philosophy, fairly tracing and constantly estimating the real effects of the Christian religion on the mind, the manners, and destinies of mankind. It must be a history attempted on a totally different plan from any yet published in this country, or, indeed, with complete success elsewhere. It must be very unlike the dry polemic manner of Mosheim, and the more animated, but uncritical and sectarian work of Milner. It must obtain its triumph, not by writing down those parts of history on which Gibbon has lavished all the power and

[1] Milman's History of Christianity (London, 1840), Vol. i. p. 455.

splendor of his style, but by writing up Christianity to its proper place in the annals of human civilization. For here is the radical defect in the 'Decline and Fall.'"[1] It is therefore justly inferred that Milman, both in his "History of Christianity to the Extinction of Paganism," and his "History of Latin Christianity," although Gibbon's name scarcely appears in either, sought to realize in these works what he regarded as the only successful mode of answering Gibbon. But there will be occasion to compare still further the opinions or the manner in which these two historians state important points.

To return: It is true that Mr. Gibbon confines himself as a historian exclusively to secondary causes. But, if he admits that the rapid spread of Christian doctrine was owing to the convincing evidence that was in that doctrine itself, and to the ruling providence of its divine Author, and at the same time assigns a good reason for confining himself to these causes — to wit, that they alone belonged to his sphere as a historian, — ought he not to have the benefit of his own avowals, until it is clearly proved that they were not intended to be taken in their literal sense? It is to be observed that he nowhere intimates that these secondary causes are sufficient (but the contrary) to account for the progress of Christianity; and at the same time he unmistakably asserts that these causes were used or overruled by Divine Providence to execute the purpose of promoting the reception of this pure and humble religion.

8. *The Secondary Causes Enumerated by Him.*

These are as follows: "1. The inflexible and, if we may use the expression, the intolerant zeal of the Christians; derived, it is true, from the Jewish religion, but purified from the narrow and unsocial spirit which, instead of inviting, had deterred the Gentiles from embracing the law of Moses. 2. The doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficacy

[1] London Quarterly, No 100, Art. i. Vol. l. p. 295.

to that important doctrine. 3. The miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church. 4. The pure and austere morals of the Christians. 5. The union and discipline of the Christian republic, which gradually formed an independent and increasing state in the heart of the Roman empire." The examination of these *seriatim* constitutes the subject-matter of the fifteenth chapter.

The author, it will be observed, does not profess to enumerate all the secondary causes, but contents himself with naming those which he thought, it would appear, had been most influential. Not one of them, as stated by him, has the least disparaging aspect towards the Christian cause; but all are in strict harmony with its lofty and sacred nature. It is mentioned in the Life of Sir James Macintosh, that he was persuaded "to look through the famous fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of Gibbon." "I could not lay them down," he says, "without finishing them. The causes assigned in the fifteenth chapter, for the diffusion of Christianity, must, no doubt, have contributed to it materially; but I doubt whether he saw them all. Perhaps those which he enumerates are among the most obvious. They might all be safely adopted by a Christian writer, with some change in the language and manner."[1]

9. *Secondary Causes of the Triumph of Christianity as stated by Merivale.*

The Rev. Charles Merivale, B.D., author of "A History of the Romans under the Empire"; Rector of Lawford, and Chaplain to the Speaker of the House of Commons, will not be suspected of hostility to Christianity by any one, who has read his History, or the Boyle Lectures for 1864. He is, as his titles indicate, an honored minister of the church of England; and yet, in the "Conversion of the Roman empire" to Christianity he recognizes the operation of secondary or human causes. And several of those he names are identical with the ones assigned by Gibbon.

[1] Milman's Gibbon, p. 244, note.

The subject of his Boyle Lectures was, The Conversion of the Roman Empire. In the Lectures, he confines himself mainly to one branch of the Christian evidences, by which, as he believes, the most refined and intelligent of the heathen were actually converted; namely, to "the sense of spiritual destitution, the consciousness of sin, the acknowledged need of a Sanctifier and a Redeemer." "And with this may be combined," he adds, "the results which flowed from the recognized want of a system of positive belief." But in the Introduction to these Lectures as published, he names other causes as operating in this great transformation, which he had no time to notice within the limits of eight lectures, delivered from a pulpit to a mixed and fluctuating congregation. He says that he refrained from dwelling on that branch of the subject known as the external evidence to the truth of Christianity, not only because it was ill-suited to the pulpit, but because "the age was uncritical, and little competent to weigh such external testimony with the accuracy which is now demanded. There was great proneness to accept the claim of miracles; but at the same time, and in consequence of this very proneness, very little weight was attached to it as an argument of divine power. Great stress was laid on the fulfilment of prophecy, but in this respect also the age was liable to be grossly imposed upon; and it must be allowed that the preaching of Christianity owes some portion, however trifling, of its success to the false pretension of the so-called Sibylline Oracles, which form no part of its genuine credentials." Nothing can be found in Gibbon wearing a more suspicious aspect than this. And yet, no one can call in question the Christianity of the writer, or prove the falsity of what he says.

The third of the four causes which he assigns, is identical with Gibbon's fourth; to wit, the pure lives, or "the practical effect of Christian teaching upon those who embraced it." He thinks this was "a testimony which worked powerfully upon large numbers among the heathen, among persons perhaps of less critical acumen, but eminently susceptible of impressions from the contemplation of goodness."

The fourth and last of the secondary causes named by Merivale is of a similar nature to the fifth and last mentioned by Gibbon. "No argument," he says, "was so effectual, no testimony to the divine authority of the gospel so convincing, as that from the temporal success with which Christianity was eventually crowned." "The conversion," he continues, "of the more intelligent among the heathen, which encouraged the *coup d'état* of the first Christian emperor, had been, I conceive, actually effected before the proved inefficacy of the heathen religions had caused them to be abandoned by the herd of time-servers. The empire as a political machine was now transferred to the rule of Christ," etc. "To the Romans, as long as they retained a spark of ancient sentiment, the emperor, in his capacity as chief pontiff, a title with which Constantine and Valentinian dared not dispense, seemed still the appointed minister of the national religion, still the intercessor for divine favor, the channel of covenanted mercies to the state, whatever form of ministration he might employ, to whatever name he might address himself in behalf of the empire." [1]

Similar statements and views in Gibbon are precisely those which fall under the censure of Bishop Watson's criticism.

10. *The Manner in which Mr. Gibbon unfolds the Operation of his several Causes.*

The first of these is the inflexible and intolerant zeal of the Christians towards false religions, purified from the narrow and unsocial spirit which had distinguished the Jews. He uses the word "intolerant" here, as is evident from what follows, in no odious sense, but as opposed to that "facility with which the most different and even hostile nations embraced, or at least respected, each other's superstitions." There was nothing of this facility in Christianity; being a revelation from heaven, and pronouncing every other religion false, and idolatry to be an insult to Jehovah, it could not recognize in any other religion any claim whatever.

[1] Merivale's Conversion of the Roman Empire, see Preface.

After noticing those features of Judaism which fitted it for a particular country, as well as for a single nation, Mr. Gibbon proceeds:

"Under these circumstances, Christianity offered itself to the world, armed with the strength of the Mosaic law, and delivered from the weight of its fetters. An exclusive zeal [equivalent to his former expression, intolerant zeal] for the truth of religion and the unity of God was as carefully inculcated in the new as in the ancient system; and whatever was now revealed to mankind concerning the nature and designs of the Supreme Being was fitted to increase their reverence for that mysterious doctrine. The divine authority of Moses and the prophets was admitted, and even established as the firmest basis of Christianity. From the beginning of the world an uninterrupted series of predictions had announced and prepared the long-expected coming of the Messiah, who, in compliance with the gross apprehensions of the Jews, had been more frequently represented under the character of a king and conqueror, than under that of a prophet, a martyr, and the Son of God. By his expiatory sacrifice the imperfect sacrifices of the temple were at once consummated and abolished. The ceremonial law, which consisted only of types and figures, was succeeded by a pure and spiritual worship, equally adapted to all climes as well as to every condition of mankind; and to the initiation of blood was substituted a more harmless initiation of water. The promise of divine favor, instead of being partially confined to the posterity of Abraham, was universally proposed to the freeman and the slave, to the Greek and to the barbarian, to the Jew and to the Gentile. Every privilege that could raise the proselyte from earth to heaven, that could exalt his devotions, secure his happiness, or even gratify that secret pride which under the semblance of devotion, insinuates itself into the human heart, was still reserved for the members of the Christian church; but at the same time all mankind was permitted, and even solicited, to accept the glorious distinction, which was not only proffered as a favor,

but imposed as an obligation. It became the most sacred duty of a new convert to diffuse among his friends and relations the inestimable blessing which he had received, and to warn them against a refusal that would be severely punished as a criminal disobedience to the will of a benevolent but all-powerful Deity."

Is any misrepresentation or inuendo discoverable in this? Does Gibbon's pen here betray its bias against our faith? Could any acknowledged Christian writer present a fairer or more eloquent summary of it, or state more clearly and accurately the relation between the two testaments or economies; or speak more reverentially or conceive more correctly of the true central position of the "expiatory sacrifice" on which Christians rest their everlasting hopes?

Could we place the picture of Paganism which he proceeds to sketch side by side with this, we might perhaps be able more fairly to judge whether his sympathies were with it rather than with the religion of the Bible. He describes it as a system of human fraud and error:

"The Christian, who, with pious horror, avoided the abomination of the circus or the theatre, found himself encompassed with infernal snares," and on the most "interesting occasions [such as bridals and funerals] was compelled to desert the persons who were the dearest to him rather than contract the guilt inherent to those impious ceremonies." "The arts of music and painting, of eloquence and poetry, flowed from the same impure origin."

Gibbon represents the primitive Christians, whatever differences might exist between them — whether Orthodox, Ebionites, or Gnostics, — as all equally animated with the same abhorrence of idolatry. Of the Ebionite and Gnostic heresies he speaks only as a man could whose sympathies were with the truth. Thus he says:

"While the orthodox church preserved a just medium between excessive veneration and improper contempt for the law of Moses, the various heretics deviated into equal but opposite extremes of error and extravagance. From the

acknowledged truth of the Jewish religion, the Ebionites had concluded that it could never be abolished. From its supposed imperfections, the Gnostics as hastily inferred that it never was instituted by the wisdom of the Deity. There are some objections against the authority of Moses and the prophets, which too readily present themselves to the sceptical mind, though they can only be derived from our ignorance of remote antiquity, and from our incapacity to form an adequate judgment of the Divine economy. These objections were eagerly embraced and as petulantly urged by the vain science of the Gnostics."

This is inexplicable language for a man to use who was biased either against the doctrines of the Bible as commonly received among Christians or the orthodox view of them.

And here it may be remarked that Mr. Gibbon in his history gives proof of the most thorough acquaintance with the patristical polemic theology. He is not excelled in this respect by any professed theologian or any historian of the church. In his discussion of the doctrine of the Logos, for example, and the influence of Platonism in the early church, the Arian and Athanasian controversy, even to the distinction made in the terms Homoousion and Homoiousion, he exhibits a most thorough knowledge of the subjects in all their bearings, theological as well as historical. Nothing is more wonderful than the attainments he had made, and that evidently by original investigations in this department of learning. His work, although Dean Milman in the entire eight volumes of his "History of Latin Christianity" makes scarcely an allusion to it, and not one of a disparaging nature, is indispensable to the student of ecclesiastical history.

In the second place, Mr. Gibbon considers the doctrine of a future life, supported and sanctioned as it is by Christianity, as among the powerful secondary causes which gave it wide and rapid extension. After referring to the uncertainty of the ancient philosophers with regard to the immortality of the soul, he says, with a discrimination and an appreciation

of the whole subject rarely equalled except by those who have followed closely in his steps:

"Since, therefore, the most sublime efforts of philosophy can extend no further than feebly to point out the desire, the hope, or at most the probability of a future state, there is nothing except a divine revelation that can ascertain the existence and describe the condition of the invisible country which is destined to receive the souls of men after their separation from the body. ..... It was necessary that the doctrine of life and immortality, which had been dictated by nature, approved by reason, and received by superstition, should obtain the sanction of divine truth from the authority and example of Christ. When the promise of eternal happiness was proposed to mankind on condition of adopting the faith and of observing the precepts of the gospel, it is no wonder that so advantageous an offer should have been accepted by great numbers of every religion, of every rank, and of every province in the empire. The ancient Christians were animated by a contempt for their present existence and by a just confidence of immortality of which the doubtful and imperfect faith of modern ages cannot give us any adequate notion."

He then proceeds to maintain that the erroneous opinion respecting the Millennium which prevailed in the primitive church helped the prevalence of Christianity. "The revolution of seventeen centuries," he says, "has instructed us not to press too closely the mysterious language of prophecy and revelation; but as long as for wise purposes this error was permitted to subsist in the church, it was productive of the most salutary effects." In other words, he held that Providence could and did overrule the errors and mistakes of men for the wider diffusion of true religion.

Bishop Watson, on this part of the subject, contents himself with denying that there was anything in "the doctrine of a future life as promulged in the gospel" calculated to induce the heathen to receive the gospel; and, in regard to the Millennium, his whole argument is directed to prove that

the apostles did not expect that Christ would come in their time, which is nowhere asserted by Gibbon. He was writing of what occurred subsequent to the times of the apostles, and distinctly states what is well known to have been the fact, that this expectation arose from pressing too closely, or from a too literal interpretation of the language of prophecy.

In treating the third of the causes named, "the miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church," it is not to be forgotten that he means, by the primitive church, the church in the post-apostolic period. Gibbon did not believe that the gift of miracles was continued in the church after the times of the apostles. In this he followed the Rev. Conyers Middleton, D.D., author of the Life of Cicero, and a distinguished minister of the church of England. He maintains, nevertheless, that the false claim to miraculous powers had its effect in gaining adherents to the Christian cause. Whether he was right or wrong in this opinion, his holding and advocating it does not of itself prove that he intended thereby to cast a slur on the Christian faith.

"The duty of an historian," he says, "does not call upon him to interpose his private judgment in this nice and important controversy [in respect to the genuineness of the post-apostolic miracles, a controversy which, just previously, in connexion with the publication of Dr. Middleton's views, had waxed warm and angry]; but he ought not to dissemble the difficulty of adopting such a theory as may reconcile the interest of religion with that of reason, of making a proper application of that theory, and of defining with precision the limits of that happy period, exempt from error and from deceit, to which we ought to be disposed to extend the gift of supernatural powers. From the first of the Fathers to the last of the Popes, a succession of bishops, of saints, of martyrs, and of miracles is continued without interruption; and the progress of the superstition was so gradual and almost imperceptible, that we know not in what particular link we should break the chain of tradition. . . . . And yet, since every friend to revelation is persuaded of the reality, and every reasonable

man is convinced of the cessation of miraculous powers, it is evident that there must have been some period when they were withdrawn from the Christian church. ..... The recent experience of genuine miracles should have instructed the Christian world in the ways of Providence, and habituated their eye (if we may use a very inadequate expression) to the style of the Divine Artist. Should the most skilful painter of modern Italy presume to decorate his feeble imitations with the name of Raphael or of Correggio, the insolent fraud would be soon discovered, and indignantly rejected." Surely a Christian writer might say, as Mr. Gibbon does, that the Most High could carry on his cause in spite of the impositions of those who laid claim to miraculous powers, and could even overrule these impositions for its advancement. Mr. Gibbon adhering to his stately historical style, in distinction from the theological, says: "The unresisting softness of temper, so conspicuous in the second and third centuries [Mr. Merivale, in a passage already quoted, says, "the age was uncritical, and little competent to weigh external testimony"] rendered the miracles of the primitive church of some accidental value to the cause of truth and religion." "The real or imaginary prodigies, of which the primitive Christians so frequently conceived themselves to be the objects, the instruments, or the spectators, very happily disposed them to adopt with the same ease, but with far greater justice, the authentic wonders of the evangelic history; and thus, miracles that exceeded not the measure of their own experience, inspired them with the most lively assurance of mysteries which were acknowledged to surpass the limits of their understanding."

In all this, and in all that he says on this topic, there is not the least sign discoverable of sympathy with his contemporary Hume, in the principle, that no amount of testimony is sufficient to prove a miracle, as being contrary to human experience. In the contrast which he runs between the true and the false, he does not merely concede, but claims, that there must have been true miracles. Bishop Watson, in what is termed his "Reply," contents himself with attempt-

ing to rebut the prejudices against all miracles. of many in his age, in which class, he says, expressly addressing himself to Mr. Gibbon, "I am far from including you."

The pure morals of the Christians, is the fourth of the human causes on which Mr. Gibbon comments as seconding the influence of revelation. He extols their virtues, but does not leave out of the picture the shades imparted by their censures and proscription of many of the innocent pleasures and amusements of life. Alluding to the "reproach suggested by the ignorance or the malice of infidelity," that many of the converts to Christianty were once atrocious criminals, he says:

"But this reproach, when it is cleared from misrepresentation, contributes as much to the honor, as it did to the increase of the church. The friends of Christianity," he continues, "may acknowledge without a blush, that many of the most eminent saints had been, before their baptism, the most abandoned sinners."

At the same time, he represents the early Fathers, in accordance with what cannot be denied, as carrying the "duties of self-mortification, of purity, and of patience, to a height which it is scarcely possible to attain, and much less to preserve, in our present state of weakness and corruption." Mr. Milman pronounces it an insidious and sarcastic description, and regards the paragraphs in which it is contained, as the most uncandid in his History.

The union and discipline of the Christian republic, or church, is the last of the series of causes on which Mr. Gibbon remarks. He says of the first organized churches in the Roman empire, that "independence and equality formed the basis of their internal constitution. ..... The public functions of religion were solely intrusted to the established ministers of the church, the bishops and the presbyters; two appellations which, in their first origin, appear to have distinguished the same office and the same order of persons." He then points out the circumstances under which the "title of Bishop began to raise itself above the humble appellation of Presbyter."

Bishop Watson admits that the account he gives "of the origin and progress of episcopal jurisdiction, of the pre-eminence of the metropolitan churches," is, "in general, accurate and true"; and is not surprised at the severity with which he speaks of the most benign religion that can be conceived of, being made, through the ambition and avarice of men, the instrument of oppression.

Mr. Gibbon next proceeds to take a general and combined view of the influence of his five causes; and referring to the loss of power over the common mind of the prevailing superstitious systems, uses this language — very remarkable for an unbeliever:

"Some deities of a more recent and fashionable cast might soon have occupied the deserted temples of Jupiter and Apollo, if, in the decisive moment, the wisdom of Providence had not interposed a genuine revelation, fitted to inspire the most rational esteem and conviction, while at the same time it was adorned with all that could attract the curiosity, the wonder, and the veneration of the people." In concluding the chapter, after having spoken of the comparatively small number who enlisted themselves under the banner of the cross (not more than a twentieth of the subjects of the whole empire), before the conversion of Constantine, he says: "But how shall we excuse the supine inattention of the Pagan and philosophic world to those evidences which were represented by the hand of Omnipotence, not to their reason but to their senses? During the age of Christ, of his apostles, and of their first disciples, the doctrine which they preached was confirmed by innumerable prodigies. The lame walked, the blind saw, the sick were healed, the dead were raised, demons were expelled, and the laws of nature were frequently suspended for the benefit of the church. But the sages of Greece and Rome turned aside from the awful spectacle, and pursuing the ordinary occupations of life and study, appeared unconscious of any alterations in the moral and physical government of the world. Under the reign of Tiberias, the whole earth, or at least a celebrated

province of the Roman empire, was involved in a preternatural darkness of three hours. Even this miraculous event which ought to have excited the wonder, the curiosity, and the devotion of mankind, passed without notice in an age of science and history."

Is this a sneer or satire? Of course it must be so regarded if the author of the "Decline and Fall" was a deist. Then there is nothing more atrocious and unpardonable in all literature. It falls little short of impiety and blasphemy to hold up to ridicule and contempt the narrative of the crucifixion of the world's Redeemer. And where does this vice of the historian begin, and where does it end, in a work which has so much to do with the history of the church, its ministers and doctrines? And of what avail, then, are the eulogiums passed upon his laborious research, his general accuracy, his unrivalled felicity of expression, and the wonderful combination of all the great qualifications of a writer of history found in him? They cannot and ought not to save him or his work from the contempt of his fellow-men; for the charge brought against him is established only by proving another; to wit, an unpardonable perversion and an utter disregard of the dignity of a noble species of literature to which he devoted his life, by devoting so many of his pages (his readers finding it difficult to decide when and where) to satire and irony on the most serious of all subjects.

Comparing the effect of what good Bishop Watson says of "the silence of profane historians concerning the preternatural darkness" with the impression the language of Gibbon is fitted to produce on an unsuspicious mind, it seems far less favorable to the wonder and devotion which such a miracle ought to awaken. He devotes himself to proving that the darkness may have been neither excessive nor extensive, and might have been occasioned by the darkening of the sun through the intervention of clouds, and that it extended only for a few miles about Jerusalem.

In like manner Milman explains away much of the supernatural which accompanied the crucifixion. "This super-

natural gloom," is his language, "appears to resemble that terrific darkness which precedes an earthquake.[1] ..... The same convulsion [the earthquake] would displace the stones which covered the ancient tombs, and lay open many of the innumerable rock-hewn sepulchres which perforated the hills on every side of the city, and expose the dead to public view. To the awe-struck and depressed minds of the followers of Jesus, no doubt, were confined those visionary appearances of the spirits of their deceased brethren which are obscurely intimated in the rapid narratives of the evangelists." To which he adds, in a foot-note: "Those who assert a supernatural eclipse of the sun rest on the most dubious and suspicious tradition; while those who look with jealousy on natural causes, however so timed as in fact to be no less extraordinary than events altogether contrary to the course of nature, forget or despise the difficulty of accounting for the apparently slight sensation produced on the minds of the Jews, and the total silence of all other history."[2] All this in a work written, as it would seem, for the express purpose of answering or meeting "the radical defect in the Decline and Fall"!

Even Guizot seems to regard the darkness at the crucifixion as a phenomenon which did not extend beyond Jerusalem, and as no more than an obscurity of the atmosphere occasioned by clouds or some other natural cause; and refers for authority to the Notes of Michaelis and the Commentary of Paulus on the New Testament.[3]

Better let the Pagan world be represented, as it is in the pages of Gibbon, turning aside from the awful spectacle and busying itself in the ordinary occupations of life, unconscious of what is passing — another mournful proof of the blinding influence of the "ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness" (Rom. i. 18 sq.).

[1] History of Christianity from the Birth of Christ to the Abolition of Paganism, etc. (London, 1840), Vol. i. p. 363.

[2] Idem, p. 365.

[3] See his note near the end of the Fifteenth Chapter of the Decline and Fall.

As illustrating the manner in which Gibbon regarded the supernatural, it would be apposite in this connection, were there space, to introduce his account of what he styles a "preternatural event, not disputed by the infidels," and supported by such "authority as should satisfy a believing, and must astonish an incredulous mind," namely, the earthquake and fiery eruption which defeated the apostate Julian's attempt to disprove the prophecies of Christ, by erecting a stately temple for the Jews on the commanding eminence of Moriah. "The imperial sophist," he says, "would have converted the success of his undertaking into a specious argument against the faith of prophecy and the truth of revelation." He speaks of the evidence supporting a divine interposition to defeat this impious undertaking in a way which implies that it could not be called in question by a fair and reasonable mind, and of course convinced his own.

11. *The Causes, the Extent, Duration, etc. of the Persecutions to which the first Christians were exposed.*

As the author commences his account of the persecutions with those under Nero, and omits all mention of those recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, it has been contended that this omission tends to throw discredit on the authenticity of that book of holy scripture; for, if authentic, it was necessary for him to consult and quote it. Two reasons may be given for his neglect to refer to the persecutions recorded in the Acts, without any intention on his part, to express doubt, or cast the least suspicion on its authenticity. 1. His subject confined him to the persecutions inflicted by the Pagans; those recorded in the Acts were Jewish persecutions; and it does not give an account even of the martyrdom of the apostle Paul. 2. He avowedly left the defence of Christianity, as a divine revelation, or where it rested on inspiration for its evidence, to the theologian.

Again: it has been objected to this chapter, that it is "a disgraceful extenuation of the cruelties perpetrated by the Roman magistrates against the Christians"; and that it

exhibits a "most contemptibly factious spirit of prejudice against the sufferers." For proof of these charges, the manner in which he relates the death of Cyprian is referred to; and he is said to dwell, "with visible art, on the small circumstances of decorum and politeness which attended his murder." Turning to that account (it is written in Gibbon's best style), nothing is found disparaging to Cyprian; but the Proconsul is represented as pronouncing with some reluctance the sentence of death; and his presbyters and deacons are described as permitted to accompany him to the place of execution, and to assist him in laying aside his upper garment; and the Christians are represented as permitted to transport his remains by night, in a triumphant funeral procession, with a splendid illumination, to their burial-place. His account of the martyrdom of Cyprian professes to be a mere abstract of the authentic history of that event contained in an original life of Cyprian by the deacon Pontius, the companion of his exile and the spectator of his death, whose candor and impartiality he praises. He presents this account as "conveying the clearest information of the spirit, and of the forms of the Roman persecutions." It appears, therefore, that if there is any appearance of extenuation of the Roman persecutions in this case, it is chargeable to the deacon Pontius, whose account he epitomized.

Again, it has been thought that Gibbon betrays his scepticism by his disposition to underrate the number of martyrs. On this point he agreed with the learned Dodwell, who expressed the opinion which has been confirmed by the latest investigations in ecclesiastical history. Dr. Philip Schaff, citing the high authority of the learned and impartial Niebuhr, says, "that the Dioclesian persecution was a mere shadow as compared with the persecution of the Protestants in the Netherlands, by the Duke of Alva, in the service of Spanish bigotry and despotism." And Dr. Arnold, in speaking of a visit to the church of St. Stephen at Rome remarks: "It is likely enough, too, that Gibbon has truly accused the general statements of exaggeration. But divide the sum

total of reported martyrs by twenty, by fifty if you please; after all you have a number of persons of all ages and sexes, suffering cruel torments and death for conscience' sake and for Christ's sake, and by their sufferings, manifestly with God's blessing, ensuring the triumph of Christ's gospel." Mosheim says that no doubt many of the names of those found in the immense army of the martyrs might with great propriety be struck out of the list, and adds a remark in which he is almost literally followed by Gibbon, that the Roman magistrates did not direct their severity promiscuously against the great body of Christians at large, but selected as objects of capital punishment such of them as filled the office of bishop and presbyter. "Were Dodwell's position," he adds, "to be so far modified as to assert merely that the number of martyrs was considerably less than is commonly supposed, it must command the ready assent of every one whose judgment has not been mislead by popular traditions and idle stories."

If Gibbon "regretted the subversion of the old Pagan systems," which is one of the charges brought against him, we should naturally expect to discover the evidence of it in his account of the emperor Julian. On the contrary, he distinctly says that in the creed which Julian adopted "by a strange contradiction, he disdained the salutary yoke of the gospel, while he made a voluntary offering of his reason on the altars of Jupiter and Apollo. ..... But as the faith which is not founded on revelation must remain destitute of any firm assurance, the disciple of Plato imprudently relapsed into the habits of vulgar superstition." He charges him with puerility and fanaticism, with duplicity, hypocrisy, and persecution.[1] Contrast with this account the sketch which

[1] "Even bigots," says Rev. Dr. Robertson, the historian, "I should think must allow that you have delineated his most singular character with a more masterly hand than ever touched it before." In the same letter (dated May 11, 1781), he expresses the hope that his new volumes will escape the illiberal abuse his first volume drew upon him; and he pays him this high compliment: "It was always my idea that an historian should feel himself a witness giving evidence upon oath. I am glad to perceive by your minute scrupulosity that your notions are the same.

he draws of "the great Athanasius" as he styles him, on whose history and character he seems to dwell, as with a loving fondness for nearly one hundred pages of his work. "The immortal name of Athanasius will never be separated from the catholic doctrine of the Trinity to whose defence he consecrated every moment and every faculty of his being. ..... Seated on the archiepiscopal throne of Egypt, he filled that eminent station above forty-six years, and his long administration was spent in a perpetual combat against the powers of Arianism." He "displayed a superiority of character and abilities which would have qualified him, far better than the degenerate sons of Constantine, for the government of a great monarchy." To no other character that comes into notice in his history does Mr. Gibbon pay a higher tribute than to the strict and rigid Athanasius.

PART II.

12. *Gibbon's Autobiography and Miscellaneous Writings.*

It remains to inquire whether from other writings or his opinions elsewhere put on record, there is any evidence that Mr. Gibbon rejected Christianity. His Miscellaneous Works, published after his death, by his friend Lord Sheffield, are contained in two large quarto volumes of more than fourteen hundred pages. In this large mass of writings, consisting of Memoirs of his Life and Writings, several entire works or fragments on a great variety of literary themes, copious notes on his life-long readings and studies, and a large number of letters to and from both friends and strangers — is there anything to convict him of hatred to Christianity?

His autobiography is one of the most remarkable records of a literary life ever penned. The late Rev. J. W. Alexander says, in his Familiar Letters: "Read Gibbon's autobiography again; it rouses me like a bugle." Scarcely with any other celebrated author of another generation and country, have we the means of becoming so well acquainted. "Few men I believe," says Lord Sheffield, in his Preface, "have so fully unveiled their own characters by a minute narrative of

their sentiments and pursuits, as Mr. Gibbon will be found to have done; not with study and labor, not with an affected frankness, but with a genuine confession of his little foibles and peculiarities, and a good-humored and natural display of his own conduct and opinions."

13. *His Childhood; Mrs. Porten; Oxford; becomes a Roman Catholic.*

Of a feeble constitution, he was doated upon, and his childhood cared for, by an affectionate aunt (Mrs. Porten), who inspired him with an invincible love of reading; "at whose name (he says late in life) I feel a tear of gratitude trickle down my cheek." In his sixteenth year his health improved, and he was sent to the University of Oxford, where he seems to have been left very much to himself, to study or to neglect study, as best pleased him. He complains particularly that an ecclesiastical school should have failed to "inculcate the orthodox principles of religion," and that he "was left by the dim light of his (my) catechism to grope his (my) way to the chapel and the communion table, where he (I) was admitted without question, how far, or by what means he (I) might be qualified to receive the sacrament." Neglected by his instructors, he gave way to the taste which had been fostered in him, and read incessantly. His passion then was for Arabic learning, which never deserted him, and which he was able to turn to good account in his subsequent historical investigations.

His active mind also busied itself with religious questions. The controversy, occasioned by Dr. Middleton's Treatise on the Genuineness of Post-apostolic Miracles was then rife. He read what was written on both sides; and, perhaps, naturally enough, considering the ground which the church of England then so strenuously held, in favor of the genuineness of these miracles, became a Roman Catholic. He read Bossuet's exposition of the doctrine of his church, and History of the Variations of Protestantism, and the writings of Parsons, a Jesuit of the time of queen Elizabeth, and was

strengthened in his conviction. He went to London, and, at the feet of a Romish priest, abjured the Protestant faith, and wrote a long letter to his father, announcing the change with all the ardor of a new convert.

14. *Is sent to Lusanne; Mr. Pavilliard; returns to Protestantism, and receives the Sacrament.*

His connection with Oxford was, of course, brought to an end, and, with his father's displeasure, he was sent to Lusanne, to make his home in the family of a minister of the school and church of Calvin, a Mr. Pavilliard. This clergyman's house was in a gloomy unfrequented street of this unhandsome Swiss town. In his native country the expatriated youth had been accustomed to all the elegances and luxuries of life. He was now without a servant, and could neither speak nor understand a word of French. He devoted himself earnestly to study. Mr. Pavilliard was an excellent scholar, and directed his studies with judgment and zeal. French at length became more familiar to him than his native English, and was used as the instrument in conducting his mental processes. He attacked Latin, and eventually Greek, with an ardor seldom equalled, and became an exact and critical scholar in these languages. From all that he read and studied he filled common-place books with a profusion of notes and references.

Under the instruction and guidance of his clerical tutor, he was soon led to renounce the Roman Catholic faith, and joined the communion of the Swiss church. Mr. Pavilliard wrote to his father and aunt, "God has at length blessed my cares, and heard our prayers. I have had the satisfaction of bringing back Mr. Gibbon to the bosom of our Reformed church. I have made use with him neither of rigor nor of artifice." On Christmas-day, 1754, he received the sacrament in the Protestant church of Lusanne. "It was here," says the historian, in his Memoirs of himself, "that I suspended religious inquiries; acquiescing with implicit belief in the tenets and mysteries which are adopted by the general con-

sent of Catholics and Protestants." These Memoirs profess to have been written, in the fifty-second year of his age, after the completion of his history. We have, therefore, a formal, distinct avowal of what his faith was, and had been from an early age up to the period named. He surely ought to have the benefit of his own statement, and solemn declaration on this subject, if we are to respect him at all, or believe him on any other. Or, is it necessary to regard him as here speaking in a double, ironical sense?

The following is from a letter which young Gibbon wrote to his father on the occasion of his return to the Protestant faith: It illustrates, at the same time that it shows what was the state of his religious opinions, to what an extent he had lost the correct use of his mother-tongue, and had adopted a foreign idiom. A comparison of it with the stately and magnificent sentences, which subsequently flowed from the same pen in the Decline and Fall, affords a signal proof of how little can be made out of the probabilities of internal evidence against clear external testimony: "I am now a good Protestant, and am extremely glad of it. I have in all my letters taken notice of the different movements of my mind, entirely Catholic when I came to Lusanne, wavering a long time between the two systems, and at last fixed for the Protestant. I had still another difficulty: brought up with all the ideas of the church of England, I could scarcely resolve to commune with Presbyterians, as all the people of this country are. I at last got over it, for considering that whatever difference there may be between their churches and ours in the government and discipline, they still regard us as brethren, and profess the same faith as us. Determined, then, in this design, I declared it to the ministers of the town, who, having examined me, permitted me to receive it with them, which I did Christmas-day," etc.

15. *The Books he valued, and his Study of the Scriptures in Greek.*

He always speaks of Mr. Pavilliard in terms of the highest respect and gratitude. He names a book which next to his

tutor, contributed most effectually to his education, De Crousaz's Logic; whose philosophy, he says, was formed in the school of Locke, and his divinity in that of Limborch and LeClerc, ministers of the church of Holland. He also gives the names of three books which he says contributed to form the historian of the Roman empire: the Provincial Letters of Paschal, Gianone's Civil History of Naples, and the Life of Julian by the Abbé de la Bleterie, the perusal of which seems to have led to his first essay on "the truth of the miracle which stopped the re-building of the temple of Jerusalem."

He appears to have been a regular attendant on public worship, both in Switzerland and England, and makes record in his journal of reading every Sunday the scripture lessons of the day in the Greek, a very remarkable practice in one who had no respect for revelation. He commenced it as early as 1759, and continued it even when marching about the country, as he did for more than two years, as a captain of the national militia in the Hampshire regiment, whenever he attended church. In his journal, under date of July 18, 1762, he records: "I did nothing but go to church. The lessons were the twelfth chapter of 2d Samuel and the fifth chapter of St. John's Gospel, both of which I read in Greek."

His regiment was then in camp at "the fashionable resort of Southampton." Again, under date of August 1st, same year: "I read the lessons at church in Greek, namely, the thirteenth chapter of the first book of Kings, and the twenty-first chapter of St. John's Gospel. How very free a version the Septuagint is; for I imagine ours is a very literal one." "October 31st, 1752: I went to church, heard a pretty good sermon from Mr. L., and read the second lesson, the fourth chapter of St. Luke, in Greek."

If it should be imagined that he adopted this practice solely for the purpose of perfecting or preserving his knowledge of Greek, it should not be overlooked that he continued it when he had become absorbed in the study of Homer and Longinus.

16. *His first published Essay and Devotion to Literature.*

In his nineteenth year he returned to his native land, and three years afterwards published his first work, an Essay on the Study of Literature, written in French, which gained him some reputation. "The design of this essay was to prove that all the faculties of the mind may be exercised and displayed by the study of ancient literature, in opposition to D'Alembert and others of the French Encyclopedists, who contended for that new philosophy that soon produced such miserable consequences";[1] from which it is evident that he could not at this period of his life have been a disciple of this "new philosophy." His next effort was an attack on Warburton's famous "Divine Legation of Moses." Warburton was then the dictator and tyrant of the world of letters; and although Gibbon exposed the weakness of the particular theory he assaulted, the critics scarcely deigned to notice his performance. He projected other works which were successively abandoned. He travelled in France and Italy, and while at Rome, October 15th, 1764, the subject of his great work was suggested to him. He was a long time engaged in preparation, and making tentative efforts. He made many experiments before he could satisfy himself with his style. "Three times did I compose the first chapter, and twice the second and third, before I was tolerably satisfied with their effect. In the remainder of the way, I advanced with a more equal and easy pace; but the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters have been reduced, by three successive revisals, from a large volume to their present size." These chapters formed the conclusion of the first volume. The subject of them evidently deeply interested his mind, and they were composed with the greatest study and care, so that when he says in them that to the inquiry by what means the Christian faith obtained so remarkable a victory, the "obvious but satisfactory answer may be returned, that it was owing to the convincing evidence of the doctrine itself, and to the

[1] Chalmers's Biographical Dictionary, Article, Gibbon.

ruling providence of its great Author," we are bound to believe that it was no careless expression, and that throughout these chapters he weighed every word.

17. *Eminent Religious Contemporaries who do not appear to have detected Hostility to Christianity in Gibbon.*

The Rev. Dr. George Campbell, translator of the Gospels, author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric, who answered Hume so triumphantly on miracles, and the Rev. Dr. Robertson the historian, praised the work on its first appearance, as a masterly performance, both in respect to matter and manner. Dr. Campbell's letter to Mr. Strahan, on the appearance of the first volume of the Decline and Fall, is too important to be omitted. It is dated Aberdeen, June 25th, 1776:

"My expectations," he says, "were indeed high when I began it; but I assure you the entertainment I received greatly exceeded them. What made me fall to it with greater avidity was, that it had in part a pretty close connection with a subject I had occasion to treat sometimes in my theological lectures; to wit, the Rise and Progress of the Hierarchy, and you will believe that I was not the less pleased to discover in an historian of so much learning and penetration, so great a coincidence with my own sentiments, in relation to some obscure points in the Christian Antiquities." This theological professor and astute defender of the Christian faith, in the foregoing expression of high satisfaction, obviously refers particularly to the fifteenth chapter. And can it be supposed that he would have volunteered such an expression had he detected anything in the tone and manner of Mr. Gibbon wearing the aspect of hostility to Christianity?

Dr. Robertson was a friend and frequent correspondent of Mr. Gibbon. After reading his "Vindication" he writes to him that he had not observed any expression in it which he should wish to be altered. He belonged, it is said, to the moderate party, so-called, in the church of Scotland; but as regards the doctrines of his church, expressed in its

"Standards," was a man of unquestioned orthodoxy. He was Principal of the University of Edinburgh, and Minister of one of the parish churches. Robertson and Campbell are the greatest names the Scottish church numbers among its clergy, with the exception perhaps of Reid and Chalmers.

18. *Mr. Gibbon's Rejoinders to the Attacks on him in his Memoirs and "Vindication."*

"I had flattered myself," he says in his Memoirs, "that an age of light and liberty would receive, without scandal, an inquiry into the human causes of the progress and establishment of Christianity." But there is one expression in his Memoirs, touching these suspected chapters, which, taken by itself, wears, it must be admitted, a somewhat suspicious aspect. It is found in the following: "Had I believed that the majority of English readers were so fondly attached even to the name and shadow of Christianity; had I foreseen that the pious, the timid, and the prudent would feel, or affect to feel, with such exquisite sensibility, I might perhaps have softened the two invidious chapters." But what, clearly, must be his meaning in this? He must of course refer to their attachment to that which was no more than a "name and shadow," and no real part of Christianity. He could not, with any sincerity, doubt that the majority of English readers were attached to the name itself of Christianity, however far many of them may have been from being real Christians. Nothing, he emphatically declares, was more remote from his intentions and expectations, than to disturb the feelings of the pious. He seems to have been wholly taken by surprise; he frankly owns that he "was startled." Having, in these same Memoirs, declared his "implicit belief" in the doctrines of the Bible, as commonly received among Christians, we must understand him, where he speaks of "the name and shadow of Christianity" in such a manner that he shall not stultify and confound himself. He evidently means no more than that he was wholly taken by surprise, that his discussion of the human or secondary

causes of the progress of Christianity, his rejection of some things which the Christian world, Protestant as well as Roman Catholic, had united in receiving, such as the post-apostolic miracles, and the immense number of the primitive martyrs, should have given such offence.

His fear, he says, was soon "converted into indignation," and he resolved to observe silence, trusting himself and his writings to the candor of the public, until Mr. Davis of Baliol College, Oxford, presumed to attack, "not the faith, but the fidelity of the historian." This led to the publication of his "Vindication," mainly confined to the charge of want of historical fidelity, brought by Davis and Chelsum and Travis. Dr. Johnson is reported to have said that if Davis had made the errors Gibbon charged back upon him, he must have been a blockhead. And an equally unsparing criticism was passed by the learned Porson on the attack of Archdeacon Travis. It may well be asked, If Gibbon was so formidable an antagonist to the Christian cause, why its defence was left to men so feeble that their connection with this controversy is all that preserves their names from utter oblivion? Why did not Hurd or Horne or Porteus or Horseley enter the lists against him? Gibbon speaks with great respect of Bishop Watson and of his mode of thinking as bearing a "liberal and philosophic cast." "He very justly," says Gibbon, "and politely declares that a considerable part, near seventy pages of his small volume, are not directed to me, but to a set of men whom he places in an odious and contemptible light." The part referred to is headed, "Appeal to Infidels." "He fairly owns," continues Gibbon, "that I have expressly allowed the full and irresistible weight of the first great cause of the success of Christianity; and he is too candid to deny that the five secondary causes which I had attempted to explain operated with some degree of active energy toward the accomplishment of that great event. The only question which remains between us relates to the degree of the weight and effect of those secondary causes; and as I am persuaded that our

philosophy is not of the dogmatic kind, we should soon acknowledge that this precise degree cannot be ascertained by reasoning, nor perhaps be expressed by words." Dr. Watson, in a letter to Gibbon, which from its date, January 14th, 1779, appears to have been called forth by the "Vindication," addresses him as "a man whom I wish no longer to look upon as an antagonist, but as a friend."

To Dr. Priestly, who charged him with attempting "to discredit Christianity in fact, while in words he represented himself as a friend to it," he writes: "as long as you attack opinions which I have never maintained, or maintain principles which I have never denied, you may safely exult in my silence, and your own victory." And then he retorts on him in these caustic words: "The public will decide to whom the invidious name of unbeliever justly belongs; to the historian, who, without interposing his own sentiments, has delivered a simple narrative of authentic facts, or to the disputant, who proudly rejects all natural proofs of the immortality of the soul, overthrows (by circumscribing) the inspiration of the evangelists and apostles, and condemns the religion of every Christian nation, as a fable less innocent, but not less absurd than Mahomet's journey to the third heaven."

19. *Gibbon's Opinions of Bayle, Voltaire, and the French Revolution.*

He evidently held Bayle in high esteem as a philosopher, but seems to have regarded Voltaire as no more than a fine and superficial writer; and of his Treatise on Toleration had no higher opinion than Bishop Watson himself. In his journal, under date of March 14th, 1764, he speaks of having read this treatise, and pronounces it a trifling collection of common-place remarks, and represents himself as "diverted with his false and contradictory conclusions concerning ancient history. This history he (Voltaire) says is filled with prodigies. They cannot be true; therefore ancient history consists merely of fable and conjecture" etc. Voltaire meant to include the Bible, on account of its miracles or prodigies, with other ancient history.

Mr. Gibbon seems to have had no sympathy whatever with the infidels of the French Revolution. The execution of the monarch filled him with grief and indignation. The prevalence of revolutionary doctrines on the Continent at length led him to desert his beloved Lusanne. "I beg leave," he said, "to subscribe to Mr. Burke's creed on the Revolution of France." In reference to his decided opinions on this subject and his strong feelings, Lord Sheffield says: "So strongly was his opinion fixed as to the danger of hasty innovations, that he became a warm and zealous advocate for every sort of old establishment, which he marked in various ways, sometimes rather ludicrously; and I recollect, in a circle where French affairs were the topic, and some Portuguese present, he, seemingly with seriousness, argued in favor of the inquisition at Lisbon; and said he would not at the present moment give up even that old establishment." This, doubtless, serves to explain the sense of a sentence in one of his letters to Lord Sheffield, in which he descants with great warmth on what he styles the "French disease"; a sentence which taken by itself, certainly wears a suspicious aspect. After speaking in terms of high admiration of Burke's book, he says: "The primitive church, which I have treated with some freedom, was itself at that time an innovation, and I was attached to the old Pagan establishment." The mode of expression is certainly not to be approved; but if he could mark his dislike of the new doctrines, which were threatening society with disaster, by arguing with seeming seriousness in favor of the inquisition, it is easy to see how, in the warmth of his zeal, he was led into like exaggeration in reference to the old Paganism. His meaning was that he would resist any change in established institutions, rather than accept the doctrines and innovations of these French reformers.

20. *Result of this Inquiry.*

The result then of this inquiry, respecting the unbelief which has been charged upon Mr. Gibbon, is, that we no-

where find, in his voluminous writings, any instance of clear, outspoken unbelief, or rejection of the Christian religion. It appears that he had difficulties on the subject of the authenticity of the Book of Daniel, which he laid in a letter, which has never been published, before Dr. Richard Hurd, who had just then published a work on prophecy. But the fact that these difficulties were confined to a single book of the Old Testament, and that he submitted them to so able a scholar and defender of the faith as Dr. Hurd, is surely no evidence that he rejected divine revelation. On the contrary, we find him expressing implicit belief in the doctrines commonly received among Christians. It further appears that the charge of infidelity on the part of some of his contemporaries, arose from what they were pleased to regard as innuendo; in other words, they charged that he said one thing while he meant another. If they were right then he prostituted history; he set at naught the dignity of a science to which he devoted years of studious investigation, and his conduct richly deserves the severe language of Priestley: "A conduct which I scruple not to call highly unworthy and mean; an insult to the common sense of the Christian world"; and justified him in calling upon Gibbon to "defend not his (your) principles only, but his (your) honor. For what can reflect greater dishonor on a man than to say one thing and mean another?" It greatly lessens, if it does not destroy, the value of his work as one of history, and ought to consign it to no higher place than that of a splendid specimen in the cabinet of literary curiosities.

21. *Can the Opinion concerning Gibbon's Unbelief be accounted for?*

If he was not an infidel it seems indeed truly marvellous that the opposite opinion has been so generally adopted in the religious world. Many writers of the highest repute seem to have regarded it as beyond all question. Were it not for the danger of extending these pages beyond their prescribed limits, it would be instructive to notice the manner

in which they state and attempt to refute the alleged position of the historian, as it could hardly fail to lead to the conviction that they would have been wiser to imitate those eminent defenders of Christian truth, Campbell, Horseley, and Horne, who sounded no note of alarm.

But may not this unfavorable opinion be accounted for in good measure at least from the following considerations?

1. He was led to advance views on several religious questions of great interest at the time he wrote, which had led to heated controversy, contrary to those which had been long and almost universally received; which the Reformed churches had adopted from Romish historians. His vast learning placed him far in advance of the generality of scholars of the Protestant world. Ecclesiastical history had not been studied and explored as it has since been.

One of these subjects was the genuineness of the miracles subsequent to the apostolic age. The general opinion of the religious world may be learned from the *odium theologicum* which was visited upon Dr. Conyers Middleton, on the publication of his work, "A Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers," etc. Dr. Middleton was a man of extensive learning. The doctrine of his book was, that miraculous powers ceased with the apostles, and that following their age we can find an interval of about fifty years where there is no mention made of the existence of, or claims to, any such powers, during which some of the purest and best Fathers wrote. Dr. Middleton's book, the doctrine of which is now received with general approbation throughout the Protestant world, threw the whole English church into a ferment, as it seemed to involve such men as Chrysostom, Augustine, and other venerated writers of the church, previous to the Reformation in delusion. It was charged against him that his object was to impeach the credit of the miracles of our Lord and his apostles. His work was condemned by the authorities of his church, and the University of Oxford conferred degrees on his opponents. Gibbon, an under-graduate of the University, read Middleton's book, and the numerous answers it called

forth; and was led by the controversy and the Roman Catholic authors he consulted, to renounce the Protestant faith. From the severe manner in which Mosheim, who defended the genuineness of the miracles of the second and third centuries, condemned Middleton, we learn that the opinions of the continental divines corresponded to those of the English.

Gibbon, upon his return to Protestantism, became a disciple of Middleton on this question, and in his history advanced the same views. "The church of England, which had prided herself on her liberality and learning, found that she was ranked in point of credulity with Papists and Pagans themselves. It was very exasperating. She rose against it and attacked the historian; and hence Gibbon has received a character for misrepresentation which he does not deserve."[1] His rejection of the miracles subsequent to the times of the apostles was interpreted as a virtual rejection of all miracles, and of course caused him to be regarded as an infidel; and all that he might say touching Christianity to be looked upon with doubt and suspicion. Consistently with this, what Gibbon says of the miracles and doctrine of the gospel, and the ruling providence, in the affairs of men, of its Author, is understood in an ironical sense, or as a compliment couched in latent sarcasm.

Another of the subjects on which the opinions of Gibbon awakened prejudice and suspicion against him, was the number of martyrs, and what he says respecting the intemperate zeal with which many sought the crown of martyrdom. In this he followed the learned Dodwell. Gibbon and Dodwell may have underrated their number, but not more, according to Mosheim, than they were overrated by their opponents. Ecclesiastical writers on this subject too, have now come very generally to agree with them. It would not be surprising, when we take into account the peculiar facts of his early personal history, if Gibbon took some pleasure in penning such sentences as the following:

[1] Dr. L. Withington, Theol. Rev. (1835), Vol. ii. p. 45.

"The church of Rome defended by violence the empire which she had acquired by fraud; a system of peace and benevolence [meaning the true Christian system, or the gospel] was soon disgraced by proscriptions, war, massacres, and the institution of the holy office [the inquisition]. And as the Reformers were animated by the love of civil as well as of religious freedom, the Catholic princes connected their own interest with that of the clergy, and enforced by fire and sword the terrors of spiritual censures. ..... If we are obliged to submit our belief to the authority of Grotius, it must be allowed that the number of Protestants who were executed in a single province and a single reign far exceeded that of the primitive martyrs, and in the space of three centuries and of the Roman empire."

2. The bitter spirit of animosity against Christianity, which prevailed in Europe at the time Gibbon wrote, which found expression in the French Encyclopedists, and the writings of such men as Bolingbroke and Hume, made it easy to arouse suspicion, and prepared the Christian world to believe that there were no arts, however mean and dishonorable, to which the enemies of the gospel would scruple to resort. It is more easy to arouse than to allay suspicion. And in a controversy in which the accusation of infidelity lies against one side, there can be no doubt on which side Christians will readily arrange themselves. It is evident that the majority have never examined the question in regard to Gibbon for themselves, but have been content to take their opinion at second-hand. Something very different from what appears even to have been good Bishop Watson's final judgment in the case has been propagated as an opinion no longer to be questioned; so much so, that no more is necessary than to ask: Was Gibbon an infidel? to awaken surprise equal, perhaps, to that which would be occasioned were it seriously asked: Was Baxter a Christian?

Taking up one of the latest publications in which Gibbon is noticed, we find almost as many errors or misstatements concerning him, as there are sentences. (1) "Gibbon was even

more of a Frenchman than Hume." The meaning must be that he was more infected with French philosophy, and pleased with French manners and society. Gibbon appears to have visited Paris only twice; and, on both occasions, tarried but a short time. M. Necker and his excellent lady, the daughter of a Protestant clergymen, were his chief friends. (2) "Sundering his relation to Oxford in his seventeenth year, he embarked upon a course of living and thinking which, whatever advantage it might afford to his purse, was not likely to aid his faith." His connection with Oxford was dissolved on account of his renunciation of the Protestant faith; and he was sent to Switzerland, under the displeasure of his father, on the most stinted pecuniary allowance. (3) "By a sudden caprice he became a Roman Catholic, and afterwards as unceremoniously denied his adopted creed." The good Mr. Pavilliard, on the contrary, relates with what patience and pains he gradually led him back to the truth. (4) "In due time he found himself in Paris publishing a book in the French language." This book, the Essay on the Study of Literature, written in French, was published in London, when he was yet an entire stranger in the French capital. (5) "He there fell in with the fashionable infidelity, and so far yielded to the flattery of Helvetius, and all the frequenters of Holbach's house, that he jested at Christianity and assailed its divine character." When Mr. Gibbon was on his first visit at Paris, he was a visitor at the house of the Baron d'Olbach, and received polite attention from Helvetius; but there is not the least evidence, in his Memoirs, or letters, that Christianity was jested at, or even made the subject of discussion. (6) "While residing at Lusanne, Switzerland, he cultivated the florid French style of composition, and applied it in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire." He so far lost the correct use of his native tongue during his early residence at Lusanne, that it was only by a long and difficult process he was able to form the style adopted in his history after his return to England. (7) "That work has been severely censured; but,

despite its defects, it is one of the permanent masterpieces of English literature." The first true sentence. (8) "In the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters the author gives his opinion of Christianity." These chapters contain the history of the progress and early persecutions of Christianity, and it is not their object to express the author's opinion of Christianity, excepting as it appears in the statement of the causes of its wonderful victory. (9) "He attributes the progress of the Christian religion to the zeal of the Jews, to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul as stated by philosophers, to the miraculous powers claimed by the primitive church, to the virtues of the first Christians, and to the activity of the Christians in the government of the church." It will be observed by comparison with Mr. Gibbon's language on a previous page, that the writer states but two of these causes, with any degree of correctness. In reference to the second, for example, the doctrine of immortality, Mr. Gibbon argues as philosophy could only feebly point out the desire, the hope, or at the most the probability, of a future state, that "a divine revelation" was necessary.

The volume from which the above citations are made was published in New York in 1865, has passed through several editions, and been re-published in London. If its statements of the history of opinion in other cases is no more accurate, of what value can it be?

Take another example of like kind. Thomas B. Shaw, B.A., Professor of English Literature in the Imperial Alexander Lyceum of St. Petersburg, in his excellent work, "Outlines of English Literature," proves, in his notice of Gibbon, in more than one instance, that he had formed his judgment, rather from the opinions of others, than from an original examination of his writings. Thus he represents Gibbon as returning to England, shortly before the close of his life, induced by the death of Lord Sheffield, to console and counsel the widow. Of course he could never have read Gibbon's Memoirs of himself, nor his posthumous Miscellaneous Writings, published under the editorial supervision

of this same Lord Sheffield. In the several American editions of Professor Shaw's work, which have been examined, this error is repeated. And it will probably be found that in the majority of cases, the unfavorable judgment respecting Gibbon has been taken at second hand, or even at third and fourth; and in this manner has been perpetuated, in literary history.

It may be asked, If Gibbon was not an infidel, why he did not, in so many words, deny the charge, and in full vindication of himself, employ his fine powers in defence of Christianity? So far as denying the charge is concerned, it might be said that he did this in his letters to Dr. Watson, the only one of his assailants for whom he seems to have had any respect; but especially in the notice he took of the bishop's Apology in his Vindication, where he distinctly says that the only question between them related, not to the first cause, nor to the existence of secondary causes, but merely to the degree of influence to be attributed to those secondary causes in the propagation of Christianity.

After he had recovered from the first startling effect of the objections made to his history, he confesses to a feeling of "indignation"; but he resolved, as he informs us, where his principles were concerned, to leave them to speak for themselves. To defend himself against the charge of infidelity, in the form made, would have been to acknowledge himself guilty of a most disreputable literary blunder, in having composed a work which required to be vindicated against such a charge. We have had an example, recently, of the indignant scorn with which a distinguished American writer of history repelled the charge, that he "despised American democracy," as "so pitiful a fabrication, that he blushed (I blush) while he denounced (I denounce) it." He refers to his writings for proof of his being a "fervent believer in American democracy," and says, "I scorn to dwell longer on the contemptible charge."[1] So Mr. Gibbon appears to have preferred that his contemporaries and posterity should

[1] The Motley-Seward Correspondence, Nov. 21, 1866 and Dec. 11, 1867.

judge him in respect to the matter whereof he was called in question by what he had put on record, rather than by any reply he could make to the false accusations or misinterpretations, and special pleadings of his antagonists.

22. *Conclusion — Morals of Gibbon.*

The severest critics and reviewers of Mr. Gibbon have never attempted to cast any reproach on his character as an amiable and upright man, nor to question the stainless purity of his morals. They admit that he was "affectionate and even piously attentive to relatives who could contribute little to his entertainment, and nothing to his emolument; that he was constant in unequal friendship, and grateful to fallen greatness; that he delighted in the conversation of chaste and accomplished women, and his correspondence with friends of his own sex was never tinctured with pruriency of imagination." [1] It is not contended that he was a devout Christian; he may have been what some would denominate "a man of the world." He was devoted to literature and philosophy, and was ambitious of fame. But that he rejected Christianity remains to be proved. He sometimes gave utterance to expressions, which, taken by themselves or viewed apart from other expressions, might be interpreted to wear a hostile aspect towards revealed religion. For example, when he speaks of Mr. Joseph Milner, one of his critics, as pronouncing "an anathema against all rational religion," and denouncing "natural Christians," we might be ready to say Mr. Gibbon was a rationalist, which is but another name for infidel. But as we read on we discover his meaning: "The natural Christians, such as Mr. Locke, who believe and interpret the scriptures, are, in his [Mr. Milner's] judgment, no better than profane infidels." The writings of Mr. Locke had had great influence in his education, and he seems here clearly to wish to be classed with those Christians who according to the religious and philo-

[1] See Quarterly Review, Vol. xii. p. 387.

sophical writings of Mr. Locke, "believe and interpret the scriptures."

Can a man who after fifty years of age writes memoirs of himself, in which he puts on record that from an early period of his life, he had acquiesced in the tenets of the Christian faith, and in whose voluminous writings cannot be found any counter-statement, nor anything clearly irreconcilable with this avowed belief, be regarded as an infidel, on the ground merely of an interpretation, which involves the supposition of an utter disregard by him of the laws of good writing?

Shall we needlessly, or by a process of laborious argument, find an enemy in one who holds so eminent a place in the world of letters?

ARTICLE V.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

THE REVOLUTIONARY CHURCHES OF ENGLAND.[1] — The very title of Lic. Weingarten's work will seem to some a misnomer and will frighten others. We do not quite like it ourselves; principally, however, because it bears a sensational character, and we dislike sensationalism with a cordial hatred, whether it appears in literature or in life. We shall do best at once to set before our readers the compass of the work by giving the titles of the chapters: Introduction, treating of the Significance of the History of the English Church during the Seventeenth Century relatively to the entire Development of the Reformation and of the Literature. 1. The English Reformation in the Sixteenth Century; Puritanism and Independency. 2. Fall of the Episcopal Church and Struggle between Presbyterians and Independents. 3. The Saints. 4. Independent Sects and Religious Liberty. 5. The Kingdom of the Saints and the Short Parliament. 6. Oliver Cromwell. 7. Separation and Sifting of Parties; Richard Baxter and the Unionistic Efforts. 8. George Fox. 9. The first Friends and the first Organization. 10. Period of Storm and Push. 11. The Restoration. 12. The Levellers; Origin and Beginnings of Deism. 13. Restoration and Revolution; the Act of Toleration and the Formation of Dissenting Churches; Quakerism and the Close of its Inner Development; Barclay and Penn. 14. Results and Significance of the Period; the English and the Entire Reformation.

This is unquestionably the first German work that has at all appreciated the significance of the Free Churches of England and America, relatively to Protestantism as a whole. In a general way the scholars of Germany are painfully ignorant of the actual character and history of what are contemptuously, but very falsely and foolishly, called "the Sects." One eminent theologian once remarked that he could not interest himself much for Independency, because it had no history; and received the very appropriate reply: "if it had any fault, it was that of having rather too much history." A very rich theological history Congregationalism has not had; but still, more than is generally supposed in Germany.

We cannot do more than adduce from Lic. Weingarten's work the following words which express his view of what free churchism has done in

[1] Die Revolutionskirchen Englands. Ein Beitrag zur innern Geschichte der englischen Kirche und der Reformation. Von H. Weingarten. Leipzig: Breitkopp und Härtel; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1868.

England and America: "The task which in Germany was assigned to the Mystics and to Luther fell in England to the Puritans. They were the means of converting Romanistic Christianity into Germanic piety. They made the Reformation a matter of the heart; they changed the state church into a church of the people. That Christianity has become a national power in England and America is a fruit of their intellectual and spiritual struggles."

We should by no means be prepared to endorse all Lic. Weingarten's conclusions and reasonings; nor do we think he is always right in the view he takes of persons and events; but still he has produced a work well deserving of the attention both of Americans and English — one too that is fitted to further a better understanding of the distinctive mission of Congregationalism.

The History of the Passion of our Lord.[1] — After an introduction in which Professor Steinmeyer very ably and critically reviews various explanations of the atonement of Jesus, he discusses the history of his passion, in three sections entitled: 1. Jesus in Gethsemane. 2. The Sufferings of Jesus: (1) his Arrest; (2) his Trial; (3) his surrender to the Gentiles. 3. The Death of Jesus: (1) the Crucified One; (2) the Dying One; (3) the Dead One. The present work is a sequel to the Apologetic Discussion of our Lord's Miracles noticed in a previous number of the Bibliotheca Sacra, and is characterized by all Professor Steinmeyer's warmth, earnestness, vigor, and subtilty. The following extract will enable our readers to form some idea of the scope and manner of the book: "The history of the suffering Christ fits into no presupposition save one, namely, that it was God's means of propitiating human sin. If the history be true, the dogma is also true. The former rendered futile all the attacks of early Socinianism on the latter, great as were the learning and acuteness it brought into play; and it will cause the superficiality of modern Socinianism also to suffer shipwreck. Dialectically, the one and the other advantage may be gained against Anselm's doctrine and what has been subsequently built on his foundation; but a study of the history will force on the candid inquirer ever again its essential truth. But if this be the case ought not that which is the sure support of the doctrine to aid us in more fully understanding it? Must not the study of the details of the history conduct to a clearer insight into the doctrine than mere dogmatizing is able to do?" In view of Dr. Steinmeyer's own work we can answer, yes. We have never felt so strongly as we feel now that the doctrine of the atonement in its old-fashioned form is the only key to the history, and that the history confirms

[1] Die Leidensgeschichte des Herrn in Bezug auf die neueste Kritik betrachtet. Von F. L. Steinmeyer. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben; London Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1868.

the doctrine. Every step of the author's investigation is a step in advance. We thank him for the means of quickening the heart and invigorating the understanding, which he has supplied us, and commend his book most earnestly to the attention of all theologians and preachers, especially such as are coquetting in one way or another with Socinianism. We ought to add that the work is an apology, not merely for the orthodox doctrine of the atonement, but also and pre-eminently for the truth of the account given by the evangelists of our Lord's last days. This and the previous volume will, we trust, find a translator.

The Irvingites.[1]—The Irvingites or, as they prefer to style themselves, the Catholic Apostolic Church, are apparently making no inconsiderable progress in Germany; and Professor Jacobi of Halle has deemed it right to attempt to expose their errors of doctrine and practice. His small book, of which a second edition has just appeared, is ably, though perhaps rather sharply, written, and deserves the attention of those who are interested in this new sect. What we have seen of the Irvingites leads us to regard them as propagators of very dangerous half-truths and errors; and we fear that, owing to the weak hold evangelical truth has on the German nation, they are destined to gain a success in Germany that will be denied them both in America and England. We need scarcely say that Professor Jacobi's high attainments both in theology generally and especially in church history (he was a favorite pupil of Neander's), eminently fit him for counteracting the teachings of sectaries like the Irvingites.

Introduction to Monumental Theology.[2]—Monumental Theology is that branch of theological science which is built upon the Christian monuments that either exist now or of which we have reliable information. Of its importance, especially in relation to Roman Catholicism, there can be no doubt; and a safer or more accomplished guide in its study can scarcely be found than Professor Piper. It may not be generally known that the son of the poetess, Mrs. Hemans, who many years ago became a Roman Catholic, was induced by what he found on the early Christian monuments, especially in the catacombs of Rome, to return to Protestantism. Professor Piper has conducted the Christian Archaeological Seminary at the University of Berlin for the last eleven years, and this work has arisen out of his labors for that department. His book gives a history and the literature of monumental studies, from the apostolic age

[1] Die Lehre der Irvingiten oder der sogenannten apostolischen Gemeinde verglichen mit der heiligen Schrift. Von Professor Dr. J. L. Jacobi. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1868.

[2] Einleitung in die monumentale Theologie. Von Professor Dr. F. Piper. Gotha: R. Besser; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1868.

down to the present time, and supplies, besides, information regarding the monuments themselves in their relation to the various aspects of church life and activity.

COMMENTARIES ON THE PSALMS.[1] — A third enlarged and improved edition of Ewald's Commentary on the Psalms and Lamentations has appeared. The preface is the most interesting part of the work, for it is in some respects a master-piece of scolding; and Ewald has always been one of the greatest scolders in Germany. Of Hengstenberg he says: "His efforts are neither scientific nor Christian." Of Delitzsch "his piety is chameleon-like, his science vain." Olshausen and von Lengerke have too vague ideas of the heights and depths of religion to be fit to write on the Psalms; still less Hupfeld, who "concealed a frightful ignorance of the language and history behind unmeasured presumption; Hizig is as perverse in an opposite direction as Hengstenberg. After thus venting his spleen he proceeds to his Commentary, which follows not the usual, but a supposed chronological, order. He classifies the Psalms in five divisions, leaving, as is usual with commentators of his tendency, only a few to David. Despite his many defects, as rationalism, vagueness, dogmatism, and scolding, Ewald is a man whom scholars cannot afford to overlook.

The second and somewhat improved edition of Hupfeld's very able Commentary is edited by his pupil, friend, and successor, Dr. E. Riehm. Hupfeld could not be reckoned among the orthodox commentators, for his views on inspiration, on the Messianic elements in the Psalms, and in other minor matters were pretty free; but still he was greatly to be preferred to Ewald; and if compelled to choose between them, we should decidedly prefer the work of the former. Hupfeld was a profound scholar, and much more sober in his treatment than his Göttingen opponent.

Delitzsch's Commentary is as indispensable as Hupfeld's. It is, as might be expected from its forming part of the Keil and Delitzsch series on the Old Testament, orthodox; but not drily or mechanically so. Delitzsch inclines more to be fanciful than dusty. In a number of introductory essays various important points are thoroughly discussed, as, for example, The Musical Performance of the Psalms; History of the Translations and Commentaries on the Psalms; their Relations to the Legal Sacrifices and

[1] (1) Die Dichter des alten Bundes erklärt. Die Psalmen und Klagelieder. Von H. Ewald. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867.

(2) Die Psalmen uebersetzt und erklärt. 2 aufl. herausgegeben von Professor Dr. Riehm. Gotha: F. A. Perthes; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867.

(3) Biblischer Commentar über die Psalmen. Von Franz Delitzsch. Neue Ausarbeitung. Mit Beiträgen von Fleischer und Wetstein. Leipzig: Dörffling und Frande; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867.

to the Last Things. The Excursuses by Fleischer and Wetstein are on Ps. lx. 11; 1 Macc. v. 4 (Ps. lxxx.); Ps. lxxxiv. 4; cxxix. 3.

HUMANITY AND CHRISTIANITY.[1] — This is the second volume of the work the first volume of which we noticed in a previous number. The author's aim is to supply an apology for Christianity. He regards it as "the miracle of eternal love," as "the central fact which is to fill up the deepest abysses of the human heart, and in the course of its organic operation to penetrate from people to people, from century to century, satisfying and perfecting the yearnings and struggles of all that is good, holy, and true on earth." The present volume is divided into eight chapters, as follows: Christianity and Modern Times; Culture and the Church; Heathenism and Judaism; The Apostolic Church; The Greek and Romish Churches; The Church of the Reformation; The Progress of Culture; Modern Tendencies. The work contains unquestionably much that is instructive, and is adapted to be of service to educated Germans who are alienated from Christianity and the church.

THE RESURRECTION AND CHRISTIAN FAITH.[2] — In recent times the German orthodox theology has been frequently accused of not being able to prove that the resurrection of Jesus is of fundamental importance to Christian faith, notwithstanding all its assertions of this importance. Pastor Krüger, who considers the charge not altogether undeserved, despite what has been advanced in von Hofmann's "Schriftbeweis," Beck's "Christliche Reden" and Martensen's "Dogmatik," has undertaken to fill up the gap. His little treatise is divided into three main sections: 1. Settlement of the matter of fact. 2. The Position held by the Resurrection of Jesus in the entirety of the New Testament Revelation. 3. The Relation thereof to Man's Redemption: (1) to its Preparation; (2) to its Communication; (3) to its Completion. Though the task undertaken by the author has in some respects transcended his capabilities, his treatise deserves attention.

HEINRICH MUELLER AND HIS TIMES.[3] — Heinrich Müller was a Lutheran clergyman who labored in Rostock as Professor and preacher during the middle of the seventeenth century, of whom it has been said that "the Lutheran church has had no orator since Luther greater than

[1] Humanität und Christenthum. 2 Band. Cultur und Kirche. Von Heinrich Kritzler. Gotha: F. A. Perthes; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867.

[2] Die Auferstehung Jesu in ihrer Bedeutung für den christlichen Glauben dargestellt von W. Krüger. Bremen: Müller; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867.

[3] Heinrich Müller und seine Zeit dargestellt von Dr. O. Krabbe. Rostock: Stiller; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867.

he." One of his devotional works, the "Geistliche Erquickstunden" is to the present day a favorite with the pious of Germany and must be allowed to be a masterpiece of racy, concise, plain-spoken German. Professor Krabbe of the University of Rostock, a man well fitted for the task he has undertaken, has supplied an interesting contribution to the history of religion shortly after the thirty years war.

Evangelical (Protestant) Homiletics.[1] — The circumstance that this work of the eminent Suabian, Dr. Palmer, has now reached a fifth edition is enough to commend it to the attention of all who are interested in its important theme. His views are naturally those prevailing in the Lutheran church, which do not harmonize with our American ideas; but still much may be learned from those who differ from us. For our part, judging by the fruits it has borne, or rather not borne, we have no very lofty opinion of the German pulpit; but the theory of preaching, especially in such a land of developed theories as Germany, is mostly in advance of the practice. Dr. Palmer's work touches on all the branches of Homiletics, and supplies numerous illustrations of the principles he lays down.

The Prophecy and Ascension of Moses.[2] — This is a translation into German of the Jewish apocryphal work, discovered in the library of Milan in a Latin translation of the sixth century. Dr. Volkmar considers this to be the writing from which the passages in Jude 9 and 2 Pet. ii. 11 are taken; and, as it was not written before the year 137, he deduces the conclusion that these epistles belong to the second half of the second century. As the passages referred to, however, do not occur in what remains of Moses's "Prophecy and Ascension," the conclusion in question would seem to be a little adventurous, like many other, or rather most, conclusions at which the Tübingen critics arrive. It is surely an odd thing that the very books which during the first three centuries were by Christians rejected as unreliable, should now by the profoundest philosophical critics, be more and more constituted chief authorities as to early Christianity.

The Philosophy of Baader.[3] — Baader's philosophy is what Germans term theosophy. He may be called the last of the epoch-making theosophers. Jacob Böhme and St. Martin were his first teachers; his

[1] Evangelische Homiletik. Von Dr. Chr. Palmer. Stuttgart: Steinkopf; London; Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867.

[2] Mose Prophetie und Himmelfahrt, eine Quelle für das neue Testament. Von Dr. S. Volkmar. Leipzig: Fries; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867. 1 thaler.

[3] Die Weltalter Lichtstrahlen aus Fr. von Baader's Werken. Dr. Fr. Hoffmann. Erlangen: Besold; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1868. 2 thaler.

immediate predecessors were Jung Stilling, Hamann, the Magus of the North, and Oetinger, the Magus of the South. These last he is said to have surpassed in geniality, profoundity, and learning. He has at the present moment some able disciples, who zealously seek to propagate his philosophy, as, F. Hoffman, Julius Hamberger, Lutterbeck, and others, but owing to the mystic character of his ideas, the complication of his style, and the aphoristic and unsystematic nature of his publications, it has not received the attention which it may possibly deserve. The work whose title we have given below is an attempt to exhibit the main foundations of Baader's doctrine, by simply collocating passages from his writings, and to lay in this way the basis of a true philosophy of history. It is divided into the following sections: 1. Self-culture; 2. Faith and Science; 3. God; 4. Creation of the World; 5. Redemption of the World; 6. Perfection of the World. Whether Dr. Hoffmann's further-reaching expectations be realized or not, he has supplied intelligent readers with an anthology from Baader, containing much to suggest, stimulate, and strengthen. Baader was a Roman Catholic; but like most of the German philosophical Catholics, would scarcely be acknowledged in Rome.

For the sake of such as may be interested in the question: What will Prussia do with the various State churches which it now comprises? we give here a brief list of pamphlets that have appeared on the subject:

Dr. Fabri: Die Unions und Verfassungsfrage. Gotha: Perthes. 10 sgr

Die politische Lage und die Zukunft der evang. Kirche in Deutschland. Gotha: Perthes.

Grosspreussen und die Union der evang. Kirche in Deutschland. Elberfeld.

Die neuen Landestheile Preussens und die Union. Berlin: Rank.

Dr. Friedberg: Die evangelische und Katholische Kirche der neu einverleibten Länder: Halle. 12 sgr.

Furcht und Hoffnung der reformirten Kirche Deutschland. Elberfeld.

Die Zukünftige Gesammtverfassung der evang. Kirche Preussens. Göttingen.

Dr. Hinschius: Die evangelische Landes Kirche in Preussen und die Einverleibung der neuen Provinzen. Berlin.

Prof. Nebe: Union oder Conföderation. Barmen.

The numerous articles may also be compared that have appeared in Professor Messner's valuable "Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung," and in Professor Hengstenberg's "Evangelische Kirchenzeitung."

D. W. S.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

A Treatise on Meteorology, with a Collection of Meteorological Tables. By Elias Loomis, LL.D., Professor of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy in Yale College, and author of a "Course of Mathematics." New York: Harper and Brothers. 1868.

The phenomena of meteorology are described by Professor Loomis with rare perspicuity and precision. His treatise is well fitted to interest the lay reader as well as the professional scientist. It is designed to be a text-book for our colleges and scientific schools. It exhibits the wonderful progress which has been made in meteorological science during the last forty years, and gives premonitions of the progress which will be made in years to come.

Sermons by Rev. Newman Hall, D.D., of London. With a History of Surrey Chapel and its Institutions. By Dr. Hall. 16mo. pp. 309. New York: Sheldon and Co.; Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1868.

These sermons are written in a popular style, and are well fitted to interest the reader, although they are peculiarly adapted to affect the hearer. The conversational element often appears in them; they are characterized by great simplicity of method and felicity of biblical quotation; they contain many passages of thrilling power, especially when associated with their author's earnest and honest tones. They form a valuable memento of his remarkable tour through our country, and possess an independent value as plain and fervid exhibitions of religious truth. A main source of Mr. Hall's power in the pulpit is his familiarity with the English Bible. His style is kept fresh and vigorous by the inflowing of words and phrases from this fountain of pure old English.

Ante-Nicene Christian Library; Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325. Edited by Rev. Alexander Roberts, D.D., and James Donaldson, LL.D.

We gladly notice the fifth volume of this series containing the first volume of the writings of Irenaeus; and the sixth volume of the series, containing the first volume of the writings of Hippolytus, Bishop of Rome; the fifth volume having 480 pages, 8vo.; the sixth, 508 pages, 8vo.; both published by the enterprising house of T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh. 1868. The first two books of Irenaeus "Against Heresies" are translated by Dr. Alexander Roberts; and "the ground-work of the translation of the third book, and that portion of the fourth book which is contained in this [fifth] volume has been furnished by the Rev. W. H. Randant." "The Refutation of all Heresies" by Hippolytus, is translated by the Rev. J. H. McMahon, M.A., and the fragments from his Commentaries on various

books of scripture are translated by the Rev. S. D. F. Salmond. Both of these volumes contain interesting introductory notices, and are important contributions to Theological Literature.

The Augsburg Confession, literally translated from the original Latin, with the most important additions of the German Text, incorporated together with the General Creeds; and an Introduction, Notes, and Analytical Index. By Charles P. Krauth, D.D., Norton Professor in the Theological Seminary of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, Philadelphia.

This edition of the Augsburg Confession is prepared with great care, and is admirably adapted to popular use. It has peculiar facilities for reference, and its index is almost a concordance.

The Old Testament in the New. A Contribution to Biblical Criticism and Interpretation. The Quotations from the Old Testament in the New classified according to their Agreement with, or Variation from, the Original: the Various Readings and Versions of the Passages added, and Critical Notes subjoined. By David McCalman Turpie. 8vo. pp. 279. London and Edinburgh: M. A. Williams and Norgate. 1868.

In this work the Hebrew Text is taken from Hahn's edition of the Hebrew Bible, compared with that of Van der Hooght as edited by Judah d'Allemand, and also with that of Doederlein and Meisner; the Greek version of the Old Testament is taken from Tischendorf's edition of the Septuagint, compared with that of Leander Van Ess, and with that of Lambert Boss; the Greek text of the New Testament is that of the seventh edition of Tischendorf, compared with Lachman's edition of 1831. Two valuable indexes close the volume, and add to its value as a convenient book of reference. It is compiled with care, and deserves attention and study.

We have space barely to notice three new volumes of Lange's Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures. One of them will attract the particular attention of scholars who are interested in the scientific objections against the inspired authority of the Book of Genesis. It is entitled: Genesis, or the First Book of Moses; together with a general Theological and Homiletical Introduction to the Old Testament, by John Peter Lange, D.D., Professor in Ordinary of Theology in the University of Bonn; translated from the German, with additions, by Professor Taylor Lewis, LL.D., Schenectady, N. Y., and A. Gosman, D.D., Lawrenceville, N. J. 8vo. pp. 665. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1868. — Another new volume of the same series contains the Commentary on the two Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians, by C. A. Auberlen, Doctor of Philosophy and Theology, late extraordinary Professor

in Basel, and C. J. Riggenbach, Doctor of Theology and Professor in Ordinary in Basel; translated from the German by Rev. John Lillie, D.D.; the two Epistles of Paul to Timothy, by J. J. Van Oosterzee, D.D., Professor in Ordinary of Theology in the University of Utrecht; translated from the German by E. A. Washburn, D.D., Rector of Calvary Church, New York, and E. Harwood, D.D., Rector of Trinity Church, New Haven. The Epistle of Paul to Titus, by J. J. Van Oosterzee, D.D., Professor in Ordinary of Theology in the University of Utrecht; translated from the German, with additions, by George E. Day, D.D., Professor in Yale Theological Seminary; the Epistle of Paul to Philemon: a Theological and Homiletic Commentary, by J. J. Van Oosterzee, D.D., etc.; translated from the German, with additions, by Horatio B. Hackett, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Newton Centre, Mass.; the Epistle to the Hebrews, by Carl Bernhard Mott, Doctor of Theology, General Superintendent of the Province of Prussia, Director of the Royal Consistory, and Chief Court Preacher of the Cathedral Church of Konigsberg, Knight, etc.; translated from the second edition of the German Original, with notes and additions original and selected, by A. E. Kendrick, D.D., Professor in the University of Rochester, and in the Rochester Theological Seminary. The great variety in this (the eighth) volume will add to its interest with many readers, while it will be regarded as excelling some of the other volumes in accuracy of statement and soundness of criticism. — Still another volume of the series contains the Commentary on the two Epistles of Paul to the Corinthians, by Christian Friedrich Kling, Doctor of Theology, and late Dean of Marbach on the Neckar. The Commentary on the First Epistle is translated by Daniel W. Poor, D.D., Pastor of the High Street Presbyterian Church, Newark, N. J.; that on the Second Epistle by Conway P. Wing, D.D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Carlisle, Pa. It is obvious that much editorial labor has been expended on this, as on the other volumes.

We had intended to notice in our last number a new abridgment of Smith's Dictionary of the Bible. Its title is: A Comprehensive Dictionary of the Bible; mainly abridged from Dr. William Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, but comprising important additions and improvements from the works of Robinson, Gesenius, Fürst, Pape, Pott, Winer, Keil, Lange, Kitto, Fairbairn, Alexander, Barnes, Bush, Thomson, Stanley, Porter, Tristram, King, Ayre, and many other eminent Scholars, Commentators, Travellers, and Authors, in various departments. Edited by Rev. Samuel W. Barnum. Illustrated with five hundred Maps and Engravings. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1867, 1868. — Mr. Barnum was the principal assistant of the late Prof. Goodrich in the revision of Webster's unabridged Dictionary, and is evidently familiar with the details of lexicography. The Dictionary is published in semi-monthly numbers, and when completed will contain about twenty-two numbers.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE EXEGETICAL PUNCTUATION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.[1]

BY REV. CHARLES F. SCHAEFFER, D.D., PROFESSOR IN THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH, PHILADELPHIA.

Biblical Criticism.

The term "Biblical Criticism," which has been introduced into theological science, has not yet received a definition that is marked by distinctness and precision, or that has been unanimously adopted by theological writers. In the very comprehensive sense in which some German authors employ it (e.g. Ebrard, in Herzog's Encyk. viii. 90 ff.), the term embraces all the matter which belongs respectively to Isagogics or Canonics (Hagenbach, Encyk. §§ 46, 47), and to Apologetics. If this wide extent of signification be assigned to the term, it designates a comprehensive department of theological science, to which would belong all the investigations that are intended to demonstrate the authenticity,

[1] Some portions of this Article are extracted from an extended course of lectures on Hermeneutics and Biblical Criticism, which the writer had previously prepared, and delivered during several successive years before classes of theological students. But the great mass of the materials, including nearly all the passages from the Pauline and other Epistles which refer to the comma, were more recently collected by him for the purpose of illustrating the general subject to which the Article is devoted.

the genuineness, the integrity, or uncorrupted preservation, and the credibility of the sacred writings. In no sense, however, does the term "biblical criticism," in its genuine character, assume the office of deciding what the contents of these writings *ought* to be; it confines itself, even in this wide sense, to the task of ascertaining which of a certain class of ancient writings are properly component parts of the canon, what were the precise expressions of the writer, etc. When it has determined such points, it does not attempt to decide judicially on the competence of any inspired man; hence, its office simply is to exhibit as correctly as possible the true text, as it proceeded from the hand of a sacred writer. The term, however, may be employed in a restricted sense, and refer chiefly to the text of the books which are acknowledged to be canonical. In this case it discusses mainly the subject of ancient manuscripts, various readings, versions, early printed editions, and kindred topics, and it designs to determine by historical and other arguments the true meaning of the writer, as far as the editor can exhibit it to the eye in a printed form.

The System of Punctuation.

It cannot be doubted that the subject of the Punctuation of the text legitimately belongs to textual biblical criticism. As the masoretic points were attached to the text of the Old Testament at a comparatively late period (after the sixth century of the Christian era, Keil, Einl. in Alt. Test. §§ 169, 210; Herzog, Encyk. ix. 133), and were intended to preserve or define the exact meaning of the original; so, too, the marks of punctuation with which we are now familiar, were introduced into the text of the New Testament; and in many cases the sense of the original is materially affected by them. Although the autographs or original manuscripts of the sacred writers have long since perished, it is still possible to obtain a satisfactory view of the manner in which they were written when the appearance of the oldest manuscripts extant is studied. The apostles and their amanuenses (e.g.

Tertius, Rom. xvi. 22) employed the uncial (majuscule) characters, or capital letters exclusively,[1] without any spaces between the words (scriptio continua, serie continua) so that each line appeared to the eye to consist of a single word. They introduced no accents and no marks of punctuation whatever (Tischendorf; Herzog: Encyk. ii. 159, 160).

The original practice of writing without any spaces between the words led to various misconceptions in defining the sense of certain passages. Even Chrysostom read *σὺν ἐπισκόποις*, Phil. i. 1, as one word in the sense of fellow-bishops. The true reading in Phil. ii. 4 is now generally conceded, in accordance with the results of the investigations of Lachmann, Tischendorf, etc., to be *ἕκαστοι*. But the initial letter of *σκοποῦντες* (the more approved reading) was sometimes supposed to belong to the foregoing word, and the remainder of the latter (*κοποῦντες*, from *κοπόω*) would give the translation if the imperative form of the English version (which adopted *σκοπεῖτε*) is retained: "Labor not every man," etc. In Gal. i. 9 the last syllable in *προειρήκαμεν* was sometimes detached from the word, leaving the former part in the singular number, while the plural verb in the preceding verse should have at once indicated that here too the plural was intended. In James v. 12, the English version reads, "Lest ye fall into *condemnation*," whereas the German exhibits, "into *hypocrisy*." The Textus Receptus which here presents the Erasmian reading (the one to which the German version adheres) exhibits *εἰς ὑπόκρισιν*, according to some manuscripts. The omission of *εἰς* in others required a resolution of the compound word into *ὑπὸ κρίσιν*, and this reading was adopted by the English translators.

No cursive (minuscule) manuscripts, that is, those written with small letters, the forms of which at length differed

[1] This circumstance explains the fact that *ἄσσον* (Acts xxvii. 13) was originally (Erasmus, Textus Receptus, Vulgate, etc.) printed with a capital initial letter (*Ἄσσον*), and was supposed to be the name of a city, as in Acts xx. 13, 14; while later editors and commentators generally agree with the English version, and treat the word as an adverb.

widely from those of the uncials, are now known to exist, that were written previously to A.D. 900. A few of the uncial MSS. e.g. B.D. E. (Gospels), and E (Pauline Ep.) exhibit accents and the *spiritus asper et lenis;* but critics seem now generally to agree that these do not proceed *a prima manu*, but were added by a later hand. They were not generally employed until the cursive characters were introduced. Tischendorf (*loc. cit.* p. 161) remarks, however, that spaces between the words, and the simple point or period, were introduced as early as the fourth or fifth century. The Iota subscript, which had sometimes been annexed to its vowel as a co-ordinate letter in form, and was thus Iota post-script, appeared invariably as subscript only in the cursive manuscripts. Horne (Introd. i. 214) derives an argument from the mistakes of the church Fathers, and from their uncertainty respecting the meaning of various passages, to prove that the apostles employed no points for marking the sense (see also Gerard, *Bib. Crit.*, Part ii. Chap. iii.). The introduction of the system of punctuation, including the breathings, and the plan of exhibiting spaces between the words, are usually assigned to the period extending from the eighth to the tenth century. The points or marks were at first few and simple; the Alexandrian grammarians employed only three, corresponding to our comma, colon, and period. It was only during the sixteenth century, after the invention of printing, that the system received its fuller develop ment, having been first applied in some editions of the classical writers. The present punctuation of the Greek New Testament, the credit of which is sometimes (e.g. Brande's Dict., Art. Punctuation) given to the celebrated printers of Venice, named Manutius,[1] was not first employed

[1] Aldo Manuzio the elder, born in 1447, was not only a printer, but also an accomplished scholar. He opened a printing-office at Venice for the purpose of furnishing correct and elegant editions of the Greek and Latin Classics. Of his learning he gave ample proof in the dissertations which he wrote and prefixed to his editions of the classic authors. He was the inventor of the Italic character, which was for a considerable time called the Aldine, and the exclusive use of which was for many years secured to him by patents of the pope and the

by Robert Stephens (Stephanus, or, more correctly, Estienne), but had already been introduced by Erasmus in his first editions (Reuss, Gesch. d. h. S. N. T. § 378). The first two editions of the former appeared in 1546 and 1549, while those of Erasmus were published in 1516 and 1519.

The true principles of punctuation are not yet determined with such precision that doubtful cases cannot occur. Fowler (Engl. Gram. p. 743), who says that "the current practice is generally more in accordance with the grammatical than the rhetorical view," adds with great truth that "there is considerable diversity among authors and printers in their application" of the rules of punctuation. Any one who has read "proofs" sent from two or more printing-offices, or who compares different editions, British and American, of the same work, can easily understand that this "diversity" still continues. Of all the modern points none creates greater difficulty than the comma; writers and printers cannot always agree respecting the insertion or omission of it. The difficulty which existed respecting the precise use of the comma when the Article on Punctuation was written in England for the Cyclopaedia of Rees (reprinted in Philadelphia in forty-one volumes many years ago), is still painfully felt. The writer of that Article, who believes that certain expressions in the writings of Cicero and Seneca, which are sometimes quoted in this connection, by no means prove the antiquity of pointing, complains of the great "difficulty in pointing," and says that "there is scarcely anything in the province of the grammarian so little fixed and ascertained as this." It can therefore create no surprise that the punctuation of the earlier editions of the Greek Testament should be somewhat irregular and indefinite. Besides, the idiom of different languages modifies the modern system of punc-

senate of Venice. His son Paulo sustained the reputation of the family by his abilities as a printer and scholar. His grandson Aldo, born in 1547, also distinguished in the typographical art, was even more favorably known as an author. His library, consisting of thirty thousand volumes, was sold to pay his debts; and, as he left no children, the glory of the Aldine press terminated with him.

tuation ; a Greek or a German sentence, which exhibits at once by the inflections or terminations of words the relations which the several words constituting a clause or sentence sustain to one another, may dispense with the commas which the same sentence, when translated into English, would require.

The Exegetical Character of Punctuation.

As soon as the punctuation of the Greek Testament was recognized as a system, even before it received a fuller development after the appearance of Griesbach's editions, it at once assumed an exegetical character. In the section which Winer has introduced in his Grammar of the New Test. (§ 7, sixth ed., Leipsic, 1855), he says that a distinction may, in some cases, be made between the logical and the grammatical punctuation of a sentence. In 1 Tim. vi. 3, for instance, he remarks that the words, "If any man teach otherwise, and consent not to wholesome words," logically considered, contain two propositions or clauses, and hence the Vulg., Engl., Germ., and French (Martin and Ostervald) versions place a comma before "and"; whereas (Winer adds in reference to the Greek) the words, in a grammatical point of view, form only one proposition, and hence Lach., Tisch., Stier (Polyglot N. Test.) insert no comma before the first *καί*, while Knapp, like Erasmus, has placed one there, Winer (*loc. cit.*) gives Knapp the credit of having been the first editor who paid special attention to the punctuation of the Greek New Testament. — In such cases the idiom of a modern language, as we have just remarked, may require a modification of the punctuation necessarily adopted in a Greek passage ; the Greek relative pronoun, for instance, may grammatically connect two clauses, as they would appear logically in a modern language, so closely as to constitute only one in Greek. Winer objects to the insertion of a comma after *τρίτη* in Mark xv. 25, evidently assuming that it was the intention of the sacred writer to state only *one* fact, namely, that they crucified the Lord at the third hour;

the German version and the two French (*da ... quand*, being the equivalents for *καί*) present the same view; whereas the English version, following the Vulgate, exhibits two distinct facts; first, that the third hour had now arrived, and secondly, that they crucified the Lord. So, too, Winer maintains that a comma should not precede *ἀλλά* when this conjunction introduces a clause that is itself incomplete, and that belongs essentially to the foregoing; hence, he expunges the comma after *σαρκί* in Rom. viii. 9 (inserted by Erasmus, Text. Rec., Knapp, Stier, etc., but not by Lach., Tisch., etc.), while the Vulg., Germ., Engl., and French versions introduce it. As the principles which regulate the use of the comma are still somewhat unsettled, Winer expresses the wish that a "half-comma" were in existence, which would precisely suit cases like Luke xvi. 10 (after "least"; see his Gram. § 7, 2). In this passage, which Winer instances in reference to the Greek, the earlier editions of the American Bible Society introduced, in the English translation, a comma in both cases after "least," while the more recent editions uniformly omit both commas. The British editions exhibit the same uncertainty.

Finally, while Winer remarks that a translator ought not to obtrude on the reader his exegetical views by means of his marks of punctuation, he also says, with equal truth, that cases occur in which a colon, a period, or a note of interrogation *must* be inserted, while the precise place in which such a mark is found, will necessarily decide the exegesis of the passage. He refers, as an illustration, to John vii. 21, 22, where an editor is compelled to declare his opinion, whether he agrees with Chrysostom and some other church Fathers and also modern commentators in exhibiting *διὰ τοῦτο* as the commencement of v. 22, or with Theophylact and many modern editors and commentators in presenting these two words as the conclusion of v. 21. The position assigned to them materially influences the interpretation.

The importance of the punctuation of the New Testament,

not only in an homiletical, but also in an exegetical respect, may be further illustrated by a case furnished by the English version. In Matt. xix. 28 the Lord assures his disciples that "in the regeneration" when he shall sit, etc., then they who had followed him should also sit, etc. The earlier editions of the American Bible Society (e.g. the 8vo. Reference Bible, 1833; the 12mo. Reference Bible, 1853, etc.) exhibited a comma after "regeneration," and placed none after "followed me." The meaning plainly indicated by this pointing was, that the Lord spoke of his disciples as having already followed him in that regeneration which belonged to a distant future. The British editions seem to be free from this serious error. We owe it, doubtless, to the Committee of Revision, to which we shall afterwards refer, that now an intelligible and correct sense is expressed by the punctuation. The German version and the French of Ostervald give the true sense; but Martin's French version exhibits: "ye who have followed me in the regeneration."

One of the most striking illustrations of the necessity imposed on an editor of the Greek New Testament to indicate his exegetical views by the punctuation of a passage is furnished by John xiv. 2, the construction and punctuation of which even Stier, who rarely lacks confidence, regards (Discourses, etc. *ad loc.*) as very difficult. The English version implies that it places a full stop between ὑμῖν and πορεύομαι. The objection to this punctuation, which Knapp sanctions, is, among others (see Stier, Lange, etc.), that if there are (εἰσιν) many mansions, the act of going to prepare a place that is already prepared, seems to be unnecessary. The German version places a colon (indicating that *words quoted* follow) after εἶπον ἂν ὑμῖν, and the verse appears thus: "If it were not so, then I would say to you: 'I go to prepare the place for you.'" The objection to this punctuation, as urged by Meyer, is, that in the next verse the Lord appears to say that he does or will go. Lange endeavors to avoid all these difficulties by placing a note of interrogation at the end of v. 2, and translates: "If it were not so, would I then

have said (ὅτι) 'I go to prepare a place for you?'" Alford, in accordance with A. B. C. D. K. L. X. (to which Cod. Sin. may now be added), Vulgate, etc., inserts ὅτι before πορεύομαι, like Lach. and Tisch., and regards this word as the conjunction "because, for," and not as the frequent ὅτι *recitantis*, which is equivalent to a mark of quotation.

A similar difficulty occurs in John xiii. 34. The English version places a semicolon after the first "another," which throws some obscurity on "that" (ἵνα) in the last clause. The German version introduces only commas, and renders the second ἵνα, *so that*. By placing a semicolon before this word, that is, after ὑμᾶς, the sense would be obtained: I give you a new commandment, in order that ye may love one another even as (καθώς) I have loved you; so that (ἵνα *ecbatic*, Rob. Lex. p. 352), as the result, ye too (emphatically, καὶ ὑμεῖς) may love one another indeed — with an ardent and disinterested love like mine. — Three different modes of pointing John i. 3, 4, have frequently been noticed; see Reuss, Gesch. de h. S. N. Test. § 376 for this case, as well as others. Horne also (Introd. i. 214 n. 9) refers to it. See also 1 Cor. iii. 18; John xiii. 30, 31; 1 Cor. vii. 34. The last passage has led to a surprising variety of opinions, with regard both to the reading and the punctuation; the efforts of recent commentators to adjust these two have not yet produced a satisfactory result.

We shall add only one other case before we proceed, as it is well adapted to demonstrate not only that an homiletical, but also a grave doctrinal, interest may be connected with the punctuation of a passage. Some early interpreters whom Theophylact rebukes, connected, in Luke xxiii. 43, with λέγω σοι the adverb σήμερον, that is, virtually placed a comma after that word. Doctrinal considerations, very different in their nature, induced Roman Catholics in some instances, Socinians, and others to adopt the same course, which, as Alford says, is "surely something worse than silly," and which even Kuinoel regards as furnishing a "frigid" sense, namely: "I say unto thee to-day, thou shalt be with me in paradise."

The English, German, and French versions alike assume that a comma at least, if not a colon, should separate σοι from σήμερον, and, doubtless, few would now be inclined to expose their doctrinal and exegetical reputation to danger, by adopting any other punctuation and interpretation.

Matthew Carey's Researches.

This well-known Philadelphia publisher of a former day presented to the public an edition of the English Bible in 1801, in quarto form. He states, in a series of letters which he published many years afterwards (Letter xi.), that, in accordance with arrangements which he had made, eighteen different British editions were collated by his proof-readers, besides two others published in this country by I. Collins and I. Thomas. The discoveries which were made of errors and discrepancies in the several texts surprised and embarrassed him; he found, for instance, that the Oxford, Cambridge, London, etc. editions exhibited Luke xxiii. 32 thus: "And there were also two other malefactors, led with him," etc. This construction implied that Jesus also was a malefactor. Bagster (e.g. London, 1826) correctly points: "two others, malefactors, led" etc.; the American Bible Society exhibits the latter reading and punctuation. The Queen's printers, in their edition of 1859, which was intended for the British and Foreign Bible Society, retain the earlier form "other," but place "malefactors" between commas. Alford, in a note on this passage, by an oversight, says that a comma is usually placed after *two* in the English version. Just as the original indicated that κακοῦργοι should be interpreted as if placed between commas, so too in Luke x. 1, the word ἑβδομήκοντα should be understood. The present version: "appointed other seventy also" implies that the Lord had previously appointed a company likewise consisting of seventy, whereas Luke alludes by καὶ ἑτέρους to chap. ix. 1, where the twelve are called and commissioned; now, he proceeds, the Lord appointed also others (namely), seventy, etc.

Many changes, not only in the marginal matter of the English version of 1611, but also in the text, were gradually introduced. In 1769, for instance, Dr. Blaney dropped the article in the clause: "He casteth out the devils," etc. (Matt. ix. 34), and his example has been followed by all the later editors. In Matt. xii. 23 the word "not" was not found in any edition printed before 1660. In the same year the important change of "none" for "no man" (Mark x. 18) was made; the latter, which is not a strictly literal translation of οὐδείς, seemed to imply that God was a man. While important verbal changes of the text of 1611 were thus occasionally made, it is not surprising that the original punctuation was also altered to a certain extent. The revision of it constituted a part of the task assigned to Dr. Blaney; but later editors or printers, intentionally or unintentionally, introduced new variations. Mr. Carey incidentally remarks that Gen. xxvi. 8 had eight commas in the Edinburgh, six in the Oxford, and only three in the Cambridge and London editions which he collated.

The American Bible Society's Committee on Versions.

The Society assigned to this Committee, in 1847, the work of collating the editions of the English Bible which it had published with those issued in Great Britain. The Committee subsequently presented a Report which was adopted in 1851, and published; it furnishes very valuable information. Five changes in the punctuation, affecting the sense, were made by the Committee, and adopted in a new edition (see Report, p. 25). In Rom. iv. 1 the comma after "flesh" was removed; but it has since been restored, to the manifest injury of the true sense. The German version and the French of Martin, agree with the Committee in translating: "hath found as pertaining to the flesh," and Stuart, Olshausen, etc., adopt the same construction. But Ostervald (French), whom other interpreters sustain (see Lange, Bibelwerk, *ad loc.*) translates: "our father according to the flesh" — In 1 Cor. xvi. 22, a period (now a comma) was inserted after

"Anathema." — In 2 Cor. x. 8–11, an important change, affecting the exegesis of the passage, was made; but later editions conform to the earlier and less accurate punctuation. In Heb. xiii. 7 a period was substituted for the colon at the end of the verse, and it has been retained; in some editions a comma had been employed. — In Rev. xiii. 8 a comma was inserted by the Committee after "slain," which has since been cancelled. Here, too, an exegetical question is involved; it is obvious, however, from chapter xvii. 8, where precisely the same expressions occur in the original, that the words "from the foundation of the world," belong to "written" (as Ostervald understands the passage) and, not to "slain" (which is Martin's view); the recent editions of the Society do not seem to have gained in accuracy by expunging the comma which the Committee had placed after "slain."

The Society's Committee on Versions were embarrassed by another exegetical problem, in exhibiting the text to the eye, which they could not possibly solve to the satisfaction of all critics — a problem, however, unknown to German critics, in whose language all nouns, when written or printed, must begin with a capital letter. The English version seems to have originally followed the rule of printing the word "spirit" with a capital, "when it refers to the Spirit of God a divine agent," but with a small initial letter "when it denotes other spiritual beings or the spirit of man"; and the Committee on Versions re-adopted this rule (see Report, p. 24). It compels the editor to decide exegetically, in certain cases in which commentators widely differ, whether πνεῦμα means the Spirit of God or another spirit. Now even the British editions did not exhibit uniformity in the application of the principle. Bagster prints (1826) "My Spirit" in Gen vi. 3, whereas the British and Foreign Bible Society (1859) exhibits: "My spirit." The American Bible Society appears to recognize the principle in all of it editions. By a singular inconsistency, or through ignorance or neglect of the rule, Bagster and the British and Foreign Bible

Society exhibit in Rev. iv. 5, "seven Spirits of God." The American Bible Society had here adopted the same capital letter in its earlier editions, but printed "spirits" in the Committee's edition of 1853. It has now returned to the early practice, and represents the "seven lamps" as being "the seven Spirits of God." The same rule was adopted by the French; hence the latter, like the English, employ a capital in Acts ii. 17. But in John iii. 5, 6, 8, the English version and Ostervald teach that the Spirit of God is meant; while Martin (also published by the Society) holds that "another spirit" is meant, by exhibiting "esprit."

If editors or printers will insist on adopting the rule of employing a capital only when the word "Spirit" designates one of the Persons of the Trinity, they will, doubtless, be sustained by orthodox interpreters in their interpretation of many passages, such as John vii. 39; Acts viii. 29; Rom. viii. 4; 1 Cor. ii. 10; xii. 4; Gal. v. 22, as well as when they exhibit "spirit," for instance, in Luke viii. 55; 1 John iv. 1, and elsewhere. But very grave questions are involved in other cases. In Heb. ix. 14, is *πνεύματος αἰωνίου* the Holy Ghost, as our English version, possibly influenced by the reading *ἁγίου* for *αἰωνίου* (adopted by the Vulgate. — "sanctum") positively decides by the capital (Spirit), sustained at present by Bleek, Bengel, Tholuck, etc., or does the phrase mean the "celestial life" of Christ (Storr, Olsh.), or his "spirit of absolute love" (Ebrard), or the "divine nature of Christ" (Beza, Calov., etc.), or something else? Stuart hesitates, but is "rather inclined to believe" that the sacred writer meant a "divine influence," and not "the divine Spirit" (see his Commentary on Heb. *ad loc.* and on Rom. i. 4). In 2 Thess. ii. 2, does *πνεύματος* refer to the Holy Ghost, which our English translators deny ("spirit"), or is it to be understood of a "pretended inspiration" (Auberlen, Lange's Bibelwerk), or of the *charisma* styled the "gift of prophecy" (Olsh., Lünemann, in Meyer's Commentary, de Wette, Grotius, Bengel)? Ostervald, "inspiration"; Martin, "esprit." — In 1 Tim. iii. 16, was our Saviour

justified "in the Spirit," that is, in the Holy Ghost, as our English Bibles positively decide, or is πνεύματι not the Divine Spirit, but rather antithetic to σαρκί (Bengel, Olsh., Wiesinger, "Christ's divine nature"), or does it mean "divine miracles" (Grotius), or his "indwelling spirit" (Oosterzee, Lange's Bibelwerk), or "spirituali virtute" (Calvin)? Osterwald has "Esprit." Martin explains the passage differently by exhibiting "esprit."

In Jude 19, is the πνεῦμα which the mockers had not, the Holy Ghost, as our English Bibles teach (Spirit), with which interpretation de Wette agrees, or is it "that higher life of the soul which is wrought by the Spirit" (Huther, Meyer's Commentary), or "a rational spirit or mind," which they do not possess (Stier, Fronm., in Lange's Bibelwerk), or "soul" (Bengel)? Osterwald translates: "rien de spirituel," while Martin decides that the Holy Ghost is meant: "l'Esprit." — In James iv. 5 is the "spirit that dwelleth in us (and) lusteth to envy" the Holy Ghost, which the English Bible denies, but which Calovius, Wiesinger (cont. of Olsh.) and others affirm, or is it the "human mind" (Grotius), or "the soul" (Oecumenius), or "the human spirit"? Osterwald's punctuation differs widely from that of the English version, and, besides, exhibits here "Esprit," and Martin agrees with him. — In Rom. i. 4 is the "Spirit of holiness" the Holy Ghost, as some of the British editions maintain with those of the American Bible Society (with the exception of the editions published according to the directions of the Committee on Versions), and with Chrysostom, Lange, etc., which is denied by Olsh., Stuart, etc., or is it the "divine nature of Christ" (Clem. Rom.), or the "spirit which animated" him, as contradistinguished from the spirit which ordinarily governs men, or the "gifts of the Spirit" which he possessed, or the "spiritual aspect of the life of Christ" (de Wette), or are κατὰ σάρκα (v. 3) and κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης antithetical expressions? Osterwald and Martin agree (in opposition to the recent editions of the English versions) in denying that the Holy Ghost is meant, for they exhibit "esprit."

Our English version and the two French uniformly exhibit "spirit" in 1 Cor. xv. 45. But commentators differ respecting the meaning of πνεῦμα. Does the word indicate Christ's divine nature (Beza), or his human nature (Calov.), or something else? (See de Wette, etc. *ad loc.*).—In 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18, the word πνεῦμα occurs thrice. In all these cases our English version and the two French decide, in opposition to the exegesis of eminent theologians, that πνεῦμα is the Holy Ghost, although our translators were embarassed by the two genitives at the close of the passage. They exhibit: "the Spirit of the Lord" in the text, but in the margin: "the Lord of the Spirit." Calvin believes that the apostle here alludes to the "spirit" mentioned in v. 6; in that case, the general rule would require that the word should in all these cases (vs. 6, 17, 18) be printed alike.—In 1 Peter iii. 18, the English and the two French versions decide by the capital letter (Spirit — Esprit) that Christ was quickened by the Holy Ghost, whereas earlier and later commentators of the highest distinction regard σαρκί and πνεύματι as antithetic terms, in which there is no reference to the Holy Ghost.

While the English New Testament expresses its exegesis by the types in these cases, it occasions in others great perplexity. For instance, it agrees with most commentators in explaining in Matt. iv. 1, in accordance with Luke iv. 1 (in which there is an unfortunate introduction of two different words, an Anglo-Saxon and a Latin — *Ghost* and *Spirit*, for the one Greek πνεῦμα), that the "Spirit" is the Holy Ghost, but denies, in Matt. xxii. 43 ("spirit") that David at the time spoke by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, although such is usually the explanation of orthodox commentators; see Lange's Commentary *ad loc.* (English translation), and Dr. Schaff's note 7, page 402. Osterwald and Martin exhibit a capital letter in both passages, and employ the same word, like the German (Esprit — Geist). — So, too, in Acts vi. 10, and xx. 22, commentators are by no means agreed as to the interpretation (see Lechler, Lange's Bibelwerk, *ad loc.*).—In Acts xviii. 5, even the reading of the Textus Receptus is

doubtful, or rather, incorrect. It is not surprising that in such cases the printed editions of the Bible (British and American, — English and French) should exhibit great variations, and even inconsistencies. An important doctrine is, to a certain extent, here involved, or at least certain important facts connected with the Holy Ghost are affirmed or denied by the employment or non-employment of the capital letter. We hence ask the question: Would it be expedient, in view of the imperative rule, that the Bible should be printed "without note or comment," to print in Greek all words like *θεός*, *πνεῦμα*, etc. without capital letters (which is often done), and in modern languages to employ no capital letter in any case for "spirit"?

In the remarks which we now propose to make, we shall confine ourselves chiefly to two marks of punctuation; viz. the note of interrogation and the comma. The great diversity which these respectively exhibit, not only in different versions of the New Testament, but also in different editions of the same version, and the very different interpretation which they indicate, show very clearly the vast responsibility which an editor or commentator assumes, even in matters of punctuation.

Accentuation, etc.

The subject of punctuation furnishes such a large amount of materials for this Article that we cannot discuss that of the *accentuation* of the Greek New Testament. Should the editor, for instance, in Rom. ii. 22; Gal. v. 2, exhibit *ἴδε* or *ἰδέ*? Is the word in all cases a verb in the imperative, or is it merely a particle of exclamation, or do both cases occur? In John v. 39 *ἐρευνᾶτε*, whether it, as an indicative, states a fact (Ye search), or, as an imperative, contains a command (Search ye), is accented alike. But in 1 Cor. iii. 14, is the reading *μένει* (pres. tense), as Chrys., Theod., Olsh., etc., and modern versions assume, or is it *μενεῖ* (fut. tense), as Vulg., Griesb., Lachm., Tisch., Knapp, de Wette, Kling (Lange's Bibelwerk) assume? The latter seems to conform

to κατακαήσεται (v. 15). Thus, too, in John vii. 34, 36, does the Saviour say "I am" (εἰμί, Vulg., Text. Rec., Erasm., Germ., Engl., French: *serai*, de Wette, Knapp, Stier, Lange (Bibelwerk), Olsh.), or "I go" (εἶμι, Theophyl., H. Steph., Beza, Bengel, etc.)? Various other cases in which an editor of the Greek New Testament must decide such exegetical questions, we omit.

It had been usual in the earlier (Erasmian, etc.) editions of the Greek New Testament to insert a Greek colon (a point at the top of the line) when the direct words of any person were immediately quoted. Winer seems disposed to retain this plan; for he remarks (Gram. § 7) that the innovation of Lachm. and Tisch., who cancel the colon, rarely insert a comma, and begin the quoted words with a capital letter (after the manner of the English version), is one for which he cannot find a sufficient reason. Knapp, Stier, etc. even insert marks of quotation (e.g. Matt. ii. 6; Acts ii. 17; Rom. x. 21; 2 Cor. vi. 2) in those cases in which words are quoted from the Old Testament, but not when the direct words of Christ, or of any one who lived in or after his day, are introduced after words like *saying*, *saith*, *said*, etc. Is this system characterized by consistency, or is it not? Knapp, Stier, etc. even introduce the dash, e.g. before μένει in Heb. vii. 3, where the English version places a semicolon. These innovations only occasionally assume an exegetical character, such as is unquestionably the case in Acts xxiii. 9. The Vulgate here inserts a note of interrogation at the end of the verse; the Engl., Germ., and French versions exhibit the whole as an affirmation. But Knapp, as an editor and interpreter, explains that we have here a case of aposiopesis; for he prints: ἢ ἄγγελος ..... Πολλῆς δέ etc., omitting the intervening μὴ θεομαχῶμεν. On the whole passage and this reading, see Lechler's Com. (Lange's Bibelwerk).

Reiske, in his Annotations on the oration of Demosthenes, *De Falsa Legat.*, speaks very sarcastically of the excessive fondness of the British editors of his day for the *dash*. In his note on ὡς, p. 364 (Orat. Attici, etc., edited by Dobson,

London, 1828, Vol. ix. 96), he says: "Conveniret huic particulae adjungi illam virgulam transversam, quam nostrates *einen Gedankenstrich* appellant, indicantem aposiopesin, seu auctorem plura cogitasse, quam prolocutum esse, eosque suos sensus lectori vestigandos atque supplendos reliquisse. In usum hujus virgulae *Britanni*, gens acris, aetate nostra ita *furiose exarsit*, ut loco verborum excusorum totas saepe paginas in eorum libris videas his virgulis obsitas, quibus profunditatem et ubertatem cogitationum ementientes, jejunitatem et paupertatem ingenii produnt."

The apostrophe, which is introduced in the text of the classic Greek writers for the purpose of avoiding an hiatus, more frequently than in the manuscripts of the New Testament and the Septuagint, does not affect the sense. The same remark applies to the crasis, to the form of *sigma* in compounds (e.g., ὥςπερ, ὥσπερ), and to the mere orthography (e.g., λήμψομαι, λήψομαι). The editor can here decide on the mode of printing, without reference to the exegesis of a passage. But there *is* a difference in the sense or shade of thought between the simple αὐτοῦ and the reflexive ἑαυτοῦ. Some editors and commentators have reached the conclusion that the writers of the New Testament were not acquainted with the latter contracted form, and therefore, when the force of that pronoun was to be expressed, employed the fuller form ἑαυτοῦ. Winer seems to have formed no definite opinion on this point at the date when the sixth edition of of his Grammar was published.

Modern Versions, etc.

We may here remark that in this Article we usually quote from the Greek New Testament, which constitutes the last volume of Stier and Theile's Polyglot Bible. It is imported as an independent volume in two styles. Both contain the Latin, Greek, and German texts, with various readings. In the fourth column, one of the styles presents the English version; the other exhibits, in place of it, the cases in which the German translations made by de Wette

and others differ from that of Luther. The fourth edition (1604) contains an appendix which furnishes the various lections of Codex Vaticanus.

Luther's German version of the New Testament appeared in 1522. The normal edition of the whole Bible, which corresponds in text, authority, and general use, to the English "authorized version," was that which, after numerous corrections had been made in the earlier editions, appeared in 1545. The authorized English (King James's) version was last published in 1631. A French translation of the Bible had appeared at an early period (the whole Bible in 1530), which was ascribed to Jacques le Fèvre, that is, J. Faber, surnamed Stapulensis, from Etaples, near Boulogne. He was, however, persecuted by the Papists; his work was suppressed, and very few copies are now known to exist. Much obscurity still attends the history of this translation, although Prof. Rowe, who is distinguished for the ability and success with which he conducts such investigations, has probably devoted more time and attention to it than any recent writer. [See his Geneb. d. h. S. N. Test. §§ 473, 474, &c., and especially his Article in Herzog's Encyk. Vol. xiii., entitled Romanische Bibelübersetzungen].

It was a cousin of Calvin, named Peter Robert Olivetan, who furnished the French Reformed church with a translation of the Bible. Rowe remarks that it was quite imperfect; that the translator devoted only one year to the preparation of it; that it had been repeatedly revised by others, including Calvin himself; that, while it had received the sanction of the Reformed church in France, it had been often altered and corrected; and that, nevertheless, it at no time exhibited a text which could be regarded as normal and as equal to the just demands of modern philology.

As we shall have frequent occasion below to refer to this version, we add the following details: Olivetan's version was first published in 1535, at the expense of the Waldenses, although their dialect at that time differed from the French. Very few copies of this French Protestant version, or of the

earliest reprints of 1540 and 1541 have been preserved. Calvin's revision of 1545 was somewhat hastily performed. Beza devoted more time to the same work, substituted a new version of the Psalms, made by L. Budé, appended the Apocrypha, and published the whole in 1551.[1] The entire translation was revised and published in subsequent years, although even the editions prepared by the *Vénérable Compagnie* of Geneva exhibited many defects. Two[2] of these revisions of the old translation have been selected by our American Bible Society. The first is that of David Martin, whose revision of the New Testament first appeared in 1695 (the whole Bible in 1707). Our Bible Society furnishes it in a neat pocket edition. It exhibits very little resemblance to Calvin's old version, says Prof. Reuss, whose statement is at once confirmed by a comparison of the two texts; it is, nevertheless, a revision of it. Several Bible Societies in Europe circulate this text. The other is that of J. F. Ostervald (Osterwald, according to the orthography of German writers, e.g. Herzog, Encyk. x. 730). It first appeared in 1744. He had previously, in 1724, published a revision of the last Geneva revision. His more original work, nevertheless, takes that of Martin as the basis. Reuss remarks that Ostervald attempted to modernize the antiquated French of former revisions, but laments that his work is inferior to

[1] Our own copy, of the year 1553 is complete, except that the title-page of the Old Testament is wanting. It is a folio. The title-page of the New Testament exhibits in the old orthography the following, very near the top: "Le Nouveau Testament, c'est a dire, La nouuelle alliance de nostre Seigneur Jesus Christ." A large tree is exhibited on the middle of the page. A man stands under it with his right hand pointing upwards, and from his mouth proceed the words: "Noli altum sapere." Below are the words: "L'Oliue de Robert Estienne. MDLIII."

[2] A French New Testament was printed by A. Paul in New York in the year 1826, at the expense (*aux frais*, as the title-page informs us) of the American Bible Society. It does not, like the later editions, which specify respectively the names of Martin and Ostervald, mention any editor's name; but simply states in French that it is a reprint of the Paris edition of 1805. On comparing it with the more recent editions, we find that the text is that of Ostervald's version, with a few unimportant variations.

that of Martin in strength, and does not seem to regard it very favorably in reference to style and accuracy. The French Bible Societies circulate almost exclusively this revision; and this fact probably furnishes the correct explanation of the circumstance that when Frenchmen apply at our depositories for Bibles they generally, as we are informed, prefer Osterwald to Martin. Our Bible Society has chosen the revision of the former for the volume which exhibits the French and English New Testament in parallel columns. The truth is, as Professor Reuss clearly shows, that the French Protestants do not, like their German and English brethren, possess a standard or national translation, or one that is officially sanctioned. So that the American Bible Society is not justly subjected to any reproach for publishing two distinct French texts. It is, on the contrary, entitled to our thanks that it does not reprint a later revision, or rather translation, proceeding from Geneva, which is by no means characterized by fidelity to the original. It is undoubtedly an awkward circumstance that the Society circulates two French texts, which, verbally at least, widely differ. Osterwald's revision certainly possesses merit; still, we trust that, under present circumstances, the Society will not yet accede to the request which has already been made, that the printing and circulation of Martin's revision should be discontinued.

The Note of Interrogation.

Matt. xxvi. 45. "Sleep on now, and take your rest: behold, the hour is at hand," etc. English version, Martin's, Lachm., Tisch., Winer, Lange, Alford. This punctuation indicates a kind permission. — "Will ye now sleep and take your rest?" German version, Osterwald's, Knapp, Stier (Gr. Test., but not in his "Discourses," etc. *ad loc.*). This punctuation indicates a reproof.

Luke iv. 34. "Art thou come to destroy us?" English and both French versions, Oosterzee (Lange's Bibelwerk); Lachm., Tisch. — "Thou art come to destroy us." German version, Alford, Stier, de Wette, Knapp.

Luke ix. 55. "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of." English and both French versions; Alford, with some hesitation. The sense, according to this punctuation, might be thus stated: Ye know not that a spirit of revenge, or an unforgiving spirit, influences you. — "Know ye not what manner of spirit ye are of?" German version, Oosterzee, de Wette, Stier, Knapp. The sense now might be: Know ye not, or, Do ye forget, that the spirit of the gospel is one of forgiveness? Lachm. and Tisch. omit the words altogether, on manuscript authority.

Luke xviii. 6. "Hear (ἀκούσατε) what the unjust judge saith." The four versions. "Have ye heard what?" etc. de Wette and others.

John i. 50. "Because I said ..... believest thou?" English version, de Wette, Lach., Tisch., Knapp, Alford, with some hesitation. — "Thou believest, because I said," etc. German and both French versions, Stier. Lange says: "Not, properly speaking, a question, but an expression of wonder."

John ix. 27. "I have told you already, and ye did not hear." English, Alford, de Wette, Martin's French. — "I have told you already, (and) have ye not heard it?" German; Lange, Ostervald's French.

John xii. 27. "Now is my soul troubled; and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour: but for this cause came I unto this hour." English and both French versions; Calvin, Lücke, Meyer, de Wette, Stier (in his Discourses, etc.), Tisch., Alford. (This punctuation exhibits the Lord in a state of perplexity; he first prays that he may be saved from this hour; but then he immediately corrects himself on recollecting that he had come for this cause). — "And what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour? But for this cause," etc. German; Knapp, Schott, Lachm., Tholuck, Lange. (This punctuation, which differs from the former essentially only in placing a note of interrogation instead of a colon after ταύτης, implies the following: Shall I pray to the Father to save me, etc.? No; for this was the purpose for which I came).

Acts xiii. 35. "Whom think ye that I am? I am not he." English and both French, with various editors and commentators. — "I am not he whom ye suppose me to be." German, with another series of editors and commentators. Winer (Gram. § 25, 1) does not positively decide as to the superior claims of either mode of pointing.

Rom. ii. 21–23. In these three verses the English version exhibits five notes of interrogation; de Wette believes that this punctuation adds to the strength of each sentence. The German introduces no note of interrogation, but exhibits the three verses as containing five affirmative sentences; Knapp approves of this mode, but Stuart regards it as "a disadvantage to the sense." Ostervald (French) introduces five notes of exclamation, while Martin places a note of interrogation after the first sentence, and full stops in the other four cases. Lange, sustained by Meyer, exhibits the first four sentences as questions, but in the fifth case places a full stop, regarding v. 23 as an affirmative proposition — "a categorical accusation." How did Paul mean to be understood?

2 Cor. xii. 15. "Nevertheless, being crafty, I caught you with guile." English; so, too, both French versions, Kling (Lange's Bibelwerk). — "But, because I was crafty, have I caught you with guile?" So some editions of the German; others (Stier) place the exclamation point at the end, expressing Paul's grief that such a charge should be made; others, again, e.g. Teubner, whose editions claim to be very accurate, places, like the English, a full stop at the end. But does not the note of interrogation accord best with the animation with which the apostle speaks? Knapp is peculiar: *ἔλαβον ..... Μή.*

Heb. ix. 17. This passage is very differently explained by commentators, as some take *διαθήκη* in the ordinary sense of *covenant* (the Greek church Fathers, many Reformed interpreters, Grotius, Tholuck, etc.; see especially Ebrard, continuation of Olsh.). Others assign to the word the unusual meaning of *testament* (Engl., Germ., French, Vulg.,

Chrysost.). Lachmann places a note of interrogation at the end of v. 17, implying that the words ἐπεὶ ..... διαθέμενος constitute a question; he is sustained by eminent authorities (see Moll, Lange's Bibelwerk, *ad loc.*); but even this punctuation does not, of itself, furnish a solution of the exegetical problem.

Heb. x. 2. "For then would they not have ceased to be offered?" English version, Stuart. — "Otherwise the sacrificing would have ceased, etc." German and Ostervald's French version. Martin exhibits the entire verse as constituting a question, and this punctuation has been adopted by Knapp, Lachm., and many editors; Moll (Lange's Bibelwerk). In this case the reading is adopted according to which οὐκ is inserted between ἐπεί and ἄν (which is now generally conceded to be the genuine reading), and the whole assumes the form of a question.

Heb. xii. 5. The whole verse appears in the modern versions as an affirmative proposition ("Ye have forgotten," etc.), conveying a serious rebuke. But Calvin, Lachm., Tholuck, Stuart, etc. (but not Knapp) prefer the punctuation according to which a note of interrogation is affixed to the whole, thus softening the rebuke by representing the sacred writer as asking, not in indignation, but in sorrow: "And have ye forgotten?" etc.

Heb. xiii. 6. "I will not fear what man shall do unto me." English and the two French versions. — "And I will not fear; what should man do unto me?" German version. This punctuation, which exhibits more animation in the language of the speaker than the former, inserts a colon, if not a period, after φοβηθήσομαι, which the English version does not adopt. The original Hebrew (Ps. cxviii. 6) is rendered in the English Bible: "I will not fear; what can man do unto me?" but in Ps. liv. 4, 11 this version drops the note of interrogation, whereas Dr. J. A. Alexander (Commentary on the Psalms) prefers the interrogative form in the three cases. Stuart had already chosen the note of interrogation here, as in the German version, and this Erasmian punctuation is adopted by Knapp, Lachmann, de Wette, Ebrard, etc.

James ii. 4. "Are ye not then partial in yourselves, and are become judges of evil thoughts?" English and the two French versions. — The German version, which, in other respects also, differs from the English, exhibits the verse in an affirmative form: "Ye are become," etc. Lange (Bibelwerk) exhibits various interpretations when the negative particle οὐ is taken as in the German version affirmatively (with Knapp), and also several others, if the particle is taken interrogatively; he prefers the latter interpretation, and Wiesinger (continuation of Olsh.), who cancels καί before οὐ with A, B, C (to which may now be added Cod. Sin.), agrees with him. Winer (§ 30, 1, ult.; § 63, 1, ult.) is disposed to regard the verse as a "question of indignation"; but, if vs. 2–4 constitute the protasis beginning with ἐάν, then, as in 2 Thess. ii. 3, 4 (which he explains, § 64, 7, in the sense of the English version, which supplies in italics the words: *that day shall not come*), the apodosis is omitted, and the note of interrogation is inappropriate. Recent commentators agree with de Wette that the note of interrogation adds to the force of the passage. Other exegetical difficulties connected with this passage are independent of the punctuation.

James ii. 6. "But ye have despised the poor." All the versions interrupt the series of questions by placing a colon or period after πτωχόν. A note of interrogation in place of it would, as some believe, materially add to the concinnity of the passage.

James iii. 14. "But if ..... hearts, glory not, and lie not against the truth." English, German, and the two French versions. Winer remarks (§ 57, 3, with which comp. § 55, 7, and § 54, 2, note 4) that some (Griesbach), with whom, however, he does not agree, have taken μή before κατακαυχᾶσθε in the sense of *nonne* — "Do ye not (then) glory, and lie against the truth?" Editors generally, with de Wette, Wiesinger, Lange, etc. decidedly sustain the categorical or affirmative form.

The instances which we have now adduced, and to which others could be added, seem to furnish the following result:

The sense of a passage may gain or lose in vivacity, directness, power, and emphasis, in accordance with the punctuation (note of interrogation, or a comma, colon, etc.); but it is not, as a necessary consequence, essentially altered. The chief interest attaching to these cases is of an homiletical rather than of an exegetical nature. The preacher may find that one mode of punctuation will suggest thoughts for a sermon, which could not always be justified by another.

The Comma.

The circumstances are, however, widely different when we investigate the use, or the effect of the presence and the position of the comma. In such cases the interpretation is sometimes very materially affected. We propose to illustrate this point (to which Trench has not adverted in his admirable treatise on The Authorized Version of the New Testament, etc.), by adducing a number of cases furnished by the Epistles; and shall again compare the punctuation of the English, German, and two French versions.

Rom. xi. 13. The punctuation of the English version, of Erasmus (Greek and Latin), and of the Textus Receptus, that is, three commas, embarrasses the reader. Does Paul speak to the Gentiles, because he is the apostle of the Gentiles (which would be the first impression made on the mind of the reader by the repetition of the word "Gentiles"), or does he magnify his office, because he is the apostle of the Gentiles? Even in some German editions (Stier's, for instance, but not Teubner's) the same uncertainty is occasioned by the punctuation. In other German editions a semicolon precedes "inasmuch as (denn dieweil)," and in the Greek text of Stier, Knapp, Lachm., Tisch.; in accordance with this interpretation a colon is placed after ἔθνεσιν. The sense is then perfectly clear; i.e. Paul magnifies his office because he is the apostle of the Gentiles Martin unequivocally adopts this exegesis, by both pointing and translating in accordance with it. Ostervald, whose translation differs considerably from that of Martin, as far as the

mere words are concerned, appears to take the same view; but as he employs only commas, his version is nearly as indefinite as the English. Stuart very decidedly concurs with the latter view, by even placing "inasmuch as ..... office" in a parenthesis. Such, too, is the opinion of de Wette and Lange. Olshausen, who adopts the same view connects, however, in his Commentary and translation, the conclusion of v. 13 with v. 14, more closely than the English version, by placing simply a comma at the end of the former verse, and thus expressing more distinctly Paul's object in magnifying his office as the apostle of the Gentiles.

1 Cor. vii. 34. The punctuation of the English, German, and Osterwald's French version is the same; the sentence begins with *Μεμέρισται* (Textus Receptus; Erasmus, vs. 33). But the Vulgate and Martin's French version connect that word (prefixing *καί*, with some manuscripts) with the foregoing verse. Various readings, different admissible modes of placing the points, and other internal difficulties, have combined to convert this passage into a *crux criticorum*. A summary of the conflicting views of editors and commentators may be found in Kling's (Lange's Bibelwerk) Commentary.

Gal. ii. 20. The punctuation, and consequently the sense also, of this important passage, which is designed to give a view of the believer's Christian life, are encumbered with difficulties. The English version is the following: "I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh," etc. — The German version (Stier, Teubner, etc.) appears in the following form: (v. 19) "I am crucified with Christ. (v. 20) But I live; yet now not I, but Christ liveth in me. For the life which I now live in the flesh," etc. Stier's Greek text exhibits the following: (v. 19) "I am crucified with Christ. (v. 20) But no longer do I (*οὐκέτι*) live, but Christ liveth in me. But the life which I now live in the flesh," etc. Osterwald: "I am crucified with Christ, and I live, no longer I myself, but Christ liveth in me," etc.

Martin: "I am crucified with Christ, and I live, not however I, but Christ liveth," etc. — Schmoller (Lange's Bibelwerk): "I am crucified with Christ. But I do not live unto myself, but much rather (vielmehr) Christ liveth in me," etc. Ought a comma to be placed after ζῶ δέ, separating these words from οὐκέτι, with Beza, Knapp, etc., or with others, be omitted? The editor must decide, and thus determine the shade of thought which Paul intended to express.

Eph. vi. 6, 7. Two questions here arise. First, do the words ἐκ ψυχῆς belong to ποιοῦντες or to δουλεύοντες? Secondly, do the words μετ' εὐνοίας belong to the former or the latter participle? The English, German, and two French versions concur in connecting ποιοῦντες with ἐκ ψυχῆς; they exhibit: "doing ..... from the heart." As to the latter question, the English and the two French versions assign μετ' εὐνοίας to the second participle: "with good will doing service." The German, in accordance with the interpretation of Theophylact, assigns μετ' εὐνοίας also to the first participle: "doing the will of God from the heart, with good will." Lachmann's and Knapp's punctuation, in accordance with the interpretation of Chrysostom, assigns both ἐκ ψυχῆς and μετ' εὐνοίας to the second participle, so that the translation would be: "from the heart with good will doing service, as to," etc. This is also the view which Harless and de Wette take of the case.

Col. i. 3. "We give thanks ..... Christ, praying always for you." The English, German, and both French versions (with Chrysostom, Calvin, etc.) connect πάντοτε with προσευχόμενοι, and so Olsh. understands the passage. Others, however, place a comma before προσευχόμενοι, or as Knapp does, immediately after πάντοτε, and connect this adverb with εὐχαριστοῦμεν (to which there is an analogy in Eph. i. 16). The passages 1 Cor. i. 4 and 2 Thess. i. 3 demonstrate, in the opinion of de Wette (who enumerates many commentators entertaining the opposite view), that πάντοτε can belong only to εὐχαριστοῦμεν. In that case the translation should be: "we give thanks always to," etc. A similar case occurs in

Philem. 4. Here the modern versions connect closely πάντοτε with the two following words, whereas recent editors and commentators place a comma after πάντοτε, according to which the translation would be: "I thank my God always, making mention," etc. Even if no fundamental doctrine is endangered by either mode of punctuation, it would still be desirable to know with precision which one of two facts Paul really intended to state. The exegetical instinct of the editor may here decide for him.

Col. ii. 14. "Blotting out the handwriting of ordinances that was against us, which was contrary to us, and took," etc. English version. The German is as follows: "And blotted out the handwriting, that was against us, which arose through ordinances and was contrary to us," etc. There is here less conformity to the Vulgate than the English exhibits. Martin, whose revision Osterwald adopts, with two non-essential alterations, translates thus (as far as we can reproduce the French in English words): "Having effaced the obligation which was against us, which consisted in the (Osterwald: *ces* for Martin's *les*) ordinances, and was contrary to us," etc. The English version is exposed to the objection that it apparently charges Paul with a tautology ("that was against us, which was contrary to us"), which he is always very careful to avoid. The whole difficulty may be removed, as Olshausen believes, by placing a comma after χειρόγραφον, introducing τοῖς δόγμ. as an epexegetical parenthesis, and translating thus: "Blotting out the handwriting that was against us (which was, in consequence of its ordinances, opposed to us), and took," etc. But others adduce very serious objections to this punctuation. The English translation takes τοῖς δόγμασιν as equivalent to a genitive, assuming that the preposition ἐν prefixed before it without manuscript authority (σύν in one minuscule; *in* in some Latin church Fathers), gives this dative the force of "consisting of," which is, however, regarded by some as inadmissible. No explanation, of the many which commentators suggest who omit the comma

after χειρόγ., is free from the objection that it obtrudes on the passage a grammatically harsh construction. Here, too, an editor decides to a certain extent as to the exact exegesis, by the position which he assigns to the comma.

Col. ii. 21–23. A grave question is here presented, which the punctuation of the editor is required to answer. The words in v. 21 are confessedly those of false teachers. But is it Paul who expresses his own thought in the words, "which all are to perish with the using," or are these latter words, as the parenthetical mark in the English version after "using" implies, the continuation of the words of the false teachers? The German and the two French versions omit the parenthetical marks altogether; the German, however, introduces v. 21 with the words supplied, "die da sagen"; Martin supplies "Savoir"; Ostervald, "en vous disant." The words "which ..... using" (v. 22) are regarded by many (by Knapp, for instance, who inserts "Touch ..... handle not" between marks of quotation) as those of Paul. He exposes (if this is the correct view) the folly of such prohibitions, by referring to the fact that the objects forbidden to be touched, tasted, and handled were made to be consumed, and thus to perish; that here the question of the salvation of the soul is not involved; and that, therefore, these Jewish prohibitions had no ethical foundation (Chrysostom, Luther, Olsh., etc.). One objection to this exegesis is the unusual sense which it assigns to φθοράν. Others (Ambrose, Augustine, Calvin, etc.) believe that Paul, to whom they also ascribe the words, intended to say that such "ordinances," when used (obeyed), lead to destruction. In this case, the relative ἅ at the beginning of v. 22 refers to the prohibiting words. But as ἀπόχρησις seems to be used only in the sense of *abuse*, *misuse*, others, again, take v. 22 without any break by a parenthetical mark, but also as Paul's words in the sense; All these things are morally ruinous by an abuse which the commandments and doctrines of men sanction (de Wette). But then, apparently, the relative ἅ could have no definite antecedent, and the prohib-

iting words μὴ ἅψῃ, etc. no object. Hence other interpreters include the words "which ..... using" in the parenthesis, and suppose that the false teachers, to whom these words in that case belong, forbid not only the abuse, but even the use, of the objects to which they refer. Here, accordingly, the punctuation of the editor may absolutely decide whether the whole or only a part of the English parenthesis belongs to the false teachers.

Col. iii. 16. The English version indicates that it places a comma between πνευματικαῖς and ἐν χάριτι, and hence, attaching the latter to ᾄδοντες, translates: "spiritual songs, singing with grace in your hearts to the Lord." The German version, on the other hand, with Calvin and many others, places the comma only after ἐν χάριτι, and accordingly exhibits, "hymns and spiritual pleasing (lieblichen) songs, and sing to the Lord in your heart." Ostervald (French) differs from both versions. He translates, "spiritual songs, singing *from the bottom* (*du fond* in italics, as words supplied) of your hearts to the Lord, with thankfulness," for he so translates ἐν χάριτι, i.e. *avec reconnaissance;* and this is the definition which Robinson assigns to χάρις in this passage (Lex. New Test. ad verb. no. 4, p. 779). Wahl (Lex. p. 511) defines the word here, and in Eph. iv. 29, *venustas*, *suavitas* (Germ. *Anmuth*), etc., but also refers to Harless, who discusses the point elaborately in his Commentary, on Eph. iv. 29, and decidedly objects to such definitions. Martin seems undecided; he translates and points: "spiritual songs, with grace, singing from your heart to the Lord." The position of "avec grâce" between commas imposes the task on the reader to decide whether Paul's true meaning requires "with grace" to be connected with the words that precede, which is the impression which his version makes to some extent, or with those that follow. Knapp creates the same perplexity by an opposite course; for he omits the comma altogether.

1 Thess. ii. 13. "The word of God, which effectually worketh also in you," etc. English version. Although it

might at first seem uncertain whether the word "which" refers to "God," as in Matt. v. 9, or to "word," the comma after "God" appears to indicate that the translators connected ὅς with λόγον as the antecedent. This is very plainly the interpretation of Martin and Ostervald (la parole de Dieu, laquelle aussi agit, etc.). In this case a comma should, in the Greek, follow θεοῦ. This punctuation, with its corresponding exegesis, is adopted by Olsh., Winer (§ 38, 6, influenced by the Pauline *usus loquendi* of ἐνεργεῖν), Grotius, etc. The German version differs thus: "the word of God who (*welcher*, masculine, referring to 'Gott,' and not *welches*, neuter, as it is sometimes erroneously printed, referring to 'Wort,' a neuter noun) also worketh," etc. In this case no comma, if great precision is desired, ought to follow θεοῦ in Greek, or "God" in English, so that this divine name might the more clearly appear as the true antecedent of ὅς. The German and French might employ the comma, as the gender of the relative would prevent any misunderstanding. This is the interpretation preferred by Bengel and most recent commentators (see Lange's Bibelwerk *ad loc.*). The Vulgate, too, sustains this view, as *qui* refers to *Dei*, and not to *verbum*. An analogous case, 1 Pet. i. 23, will be found below. In both an homiletical interest predominates.

1 Thess. iv. 14. "Even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him." English version. The German essentially concurs, adhering even more closely to the Vulgate: per Jesum. Martin (French) agrees precisely with the English. This punctuation, which closely connects κοιμηθέντας with διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, is adopted by Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, etc., and Knapp even places a comma after Ἰησοῦ. Ostervald (French) differs widely; he connects κοιμηθ. with ἄξει, but evidently supposes that one of Winer's half-commas, referred to above, would be appropriate after the participle, and accordingly translates: "God will bring again (ramènera) through Jesus those who shall be dead." The question here arises: Ought any point, even if only a half-comma, to be inserted *before* or *after* διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ? In

the former case, Ostervald gives the apostle's true meaning; but in the latter, the Engl., Germ., and French of Martin alone are correct. The expression "to sleep in Jesus" is a favorite one. Still, recent commentators generally (see Riggenbach, Lange's Bibelwerk *ad loc.*) sustain Ostervald, on philological and other grounds, by connecting *διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ* with *ἄξει*.

2 Thess. iii. 14. "If any man obey not our word by this epistle, note that man." This is the text of the English version; but our translators insert in the margin a version determined by a different punctuation, viz. "signify that man by an epistle." This marginal version is precisely the one found in the German. The former, which is also that of Martin and Ostervald, places a comma after *ἐπιστολῆς*, and this punctuation is preferred by Olsh., de Wette, Riggenbach (Lange's Bibelwerk). But according to the German and the marginal rendering of the English a comma precedes *διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς*. Such is the punctuation of Calvin, Grotius, Bengel. It is also fully sanctioned by Winer (§ 18, 9 ult.), if we assume that Paul expected an answer to his epistle, in which case the presence of *τῆς* is fully explained. The position of the comma decides whether the editor understands by *διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς* this second Epistle to the Thessalonians, or one that was to be written by the latter.

1 Tim. i. 17. "The only wise God." English version. The German and two French versions essentially concur. (We take the Textus Receptus as we find it, since we are not now occupied with the *variae lectiones; σοφῷ* is now generally cancelled, on the authority of manuscripts, including Cod. Sin.; the Vulgate had already omitted it: soli Deo). If commas are inserted after the preceding adjectives respectively, the question arises whether one ought not also to be inserted between *μόνῳ* and *σοφῷ*. The present version seems to imply that other gods are not wise, while their existence is implied. A comma after *μόνῳ* would give emphasis to the truth that there is only one God, thus: "to the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only One, the wise One, to God be

honor," etc. We cannot apply the same remark to John xvii. 3, as *τόν* is not repeated before *ἀληθινόν*.

1 Tim. iii. 15, 16. Besides the very serious difficulty which editors find in deciding on the true reading of this passage, another is connected with the punctuation. The English, German and two French versions agree both as to the reading and the punctuation, but editors and commentators differ materially even with respect to the latter point. The versions connect the words: "the pillar ..... truth" by a comma with "church," as expressive of a predicate of the latter, and begin v. 16 with "And without controversy," etc. This punctuation is sanctioned by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Luther, Calvin, Calovius, Grotius, de Wette, Huther, Wiesinger (Olsh. com.) etc., although they differ in their respective modes of interpretation. Others, and first of all the Basel edition of the New Testament of 1540, with Bengel, Mosheim, Olsh. (in his manuscript), Knapp, etc., place a full stop after "living God" (*θεοῦ ζῶντος*), and regard the following words: "the pillar ..... truth," as expressing a predicate of "the mystery of godliness." With them the most recent commentator, Oosterzee (Lange's Bibelwerk) essentially agrees; he also reads *ὅς* in place of *θεός*, and introduces parenthetical marks in his translation, thus: "the living God (a pillar ..... of godliness) who was manifest," etc. He remarks that each mode of punctuation has been defended by learned and devout men.[1]

Titus i. 6. "Having faithful children not accused of riot or unruly." In some of the earlier editions of the American Bible Society, e.g. the royal 8vo. Reference Bible of 1833, the smaller Reference Bible of 1853, etc., a comma was un-

[1] This passage illustrates another point — the importance of the punctuation (depending on the exegesis) in controversies. The force of an argument or citation adduced by one party may be materially weakened, or exercise no influence whatever on the other party that punctuates differently. A writer, for instance, in the Mercersburg Review (July, 1867, p. 410) makes the following remark, which will have force only with those who adopt the punctuation of the modern versions: "The Bible itself, when asked, 'What is truth?' says, the 'church is the pillar and ground of the truth.'"

fortunately inserted after "children," thus implying that the elders should not be "accused ..... unruly," whereas the original (*τέκνα ..... ἀνυπότακτα*) shows that Paul refers to the children of the elders, and this is the sense distinctly presented in the Vulgate, German, and two French versions. This comma is properly cancelled in the later editions of the American Bible Society. It disfigured even some of the earlier British editions.

Titus i. 9. The English version, not recognizing a comma after *ὑγιαινούσῃ*, implies that a bishop should be able "by sound doctrine to exhort the gainsayers," and "by sound doctrine to convince the gainsayers." The Vulgate, German, and both French versions, on the other hand, concur in assuming, in accordance with the whole construction of the original, that a comma is indicated after *ὑγιαι.*, which Stier omits, but which Knapp has inserted. The sense then is, that the bishop should be able to perform two distinct acts; first, to exhort (edify) his hearers, or believers generally, by sound doctrine; and secondly, if any contradicted him, to refute them.

Tim. ii. 4. "That they may teach the young women to be sober, to love their husbands," etc. The English, German, and two French versions essentially agree in their construction, and Knapp even inserts a comma after *τὰς νέας* which, however, Stier omits. This translation implies that a Greek verb exists in the original for "to be sober," in the infinitive, and assigns a disproportionately full meaning to *σωφρονίζωσι*, thus tautologically anticipating *σώφρονας* in the next verse (translated *discreet*). The verb *σωφρονίζω* is not found elsewhere in the New Testament. Etymologically considered, the word is, according to Wahl (Clavis New Test.), equivalent to *facio aliquem σώφρονα*, i.e. *mentis compotem*, but the definition which he gives is: *in officio contineo, adhortandi sensu.* Robinson (Lex.) also defines it here as signifying *to moderate, to correct, to teach.* This interpretation is sustained by Oosterzee and by Wiesinger (continuation of Com. of Olsh.). The latter regards *σωφρονίζειν* as

very nearly equivalent to *νουθετεῖν* or *παιδεύειν*, as Theophylact explains it. If this view is correct, no comma should follow *νέας*, and the translation would be: "teach (admonish, exhort) the young women to love their husbands."

Titus ii. 13. "Looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, etc." In the several British and American editions of the English Bible, a comma is inserted after "hope"' and the article "the" follows. According to the punctuation of the Greek which this version implies (independently of the indefiniteness of the phrase "to look for a hope," and the inaccuracy of rendering the article *τήν*, which occurs only once, by the demonstrative "that," which no various reading supports), two objects are looked for; "that hope" and "the appearing," etc. The French versions of Martin and Ostervald make the same distinction. The German, on the contrary, does not recognize a comma after *ἐλπίδα*, but exhibits the following: "waiting for the blessed hope and appearance of the glory of the great God," etc. This punctuation is sustained by eminent authorities (de Wette, Wiesinger, Oosterzee, etc.). According to it, "hope" stands here for the object of hope, and the words which immediately follow, without the intervention of a comma and a second article, are taken epexegetically, that is, the (object of the) believer's hope is "the appearing," etc.

The same verse suggests another grave question, as the punctuation may or may not express a fundametnal doctrine. Does the name, "the great God" refer specially to the Father, and should a comma indicate that the following words refer to the Son, or do both appellations, not separated by a comma, refer to the same subject, i.e. Jesus Christ? Here a wide difference of opinions exists among commentators. Winer had, in earlier editions of his Grammar, held the former opinion; in the sixth edition (§ 19, 5, Aum. 1) he concedes (note 2) that on grammatical grounds the latter interpretation (viz. that both *θεοῦ* and *σωτῆρος*, as two predicates, refer to one subject, namely, Jesus Christ) is quite tenable, but dogmatical considerations, derived from the

Pauline system, still prevent him from adopting it. The English version by omitting a comma after "the great God" very distinctly and satisfactorily teaches that this divine name like that of "Saviour," is applied by the apostle to Jesus Christ.

Heb. iii. 9. "When your fathers tempted me, proved me, and saw my works forty years." English version. In Ps. xcv. 9, 10, the passage quoted, as Stuart remarks, the words "forty years are joined in the Hebrew with the following verse (Forty years was I grieved, etc.). But this depends on the punctuation system of the Masorites," etc. (Com. *ad loc.*). But Stuart appears to overlook the circumstance that the Septuagint (much older than the Masoretic system) conforms to the present Hebrew text. Moll's explanation (Lange's Bibelwerk) of the point is somewhat more satisfactory than that of Rosenmüller (Scholia in Ps. *ad loc.*). Indeed, the sacred writer himself in this chapter (v. 17) recognizes the present pointing of the Hebrew. The German is as follows: "When your fathers tempted me; they proved me, and saw," etc. This punctuation connects only "proved" and "saw" with "forty years"; it is preferred by Stuart and Ebrard, and essentially agrees with that of Knapp and Stier. Moll follows a different reading.

Heb. vi. 2. "Of the doctrine of baptisms," etc. English and both French versions.—"Of baptism, of (the) doctrine." German. The omission of a comma between *βαπτισμῶν* and *διδαχῆς* produces the English version; the insertion necessarily leads to the German. While editors and commentators generally prefer the former punctuation, they differ widely with respect to the construction of the entire passage, and variously explain the connection of the several genitives, etc.

Heb. x. 12. The position of the comma before or after *εἰς τὸ διηνεκές* decides whether Christ "offered one sacrifice for sins," and then "forever sat down," etc., or whether he "offered one sacrifice for sins forever," and then "sat down," etc. The former punctuation was adopted in the earlier American editions of the English Bible, and implied

that Christ's sitting on the right hand of God was eternal. But the later editions, like those of the British and Foreign Bible Society, exhibit the comma after "forever," implying the perpetual validity of the one sacrifice offered by Christ. This is also the sense of the German (Ein Opfer ..... das ewiglich gilt), while Martin and Ostervald connect "forever" with "sat." Editors and commentators are here much divided in opinion, and are guided by exegetical and other considerations in assigning a place to the comma. In an homiletical respect the question possesses much importance.

Heb. xi. 1. In this case, the early or Erasmian punctuation of the Greek text seems to be generally abandoned. A comma had been placed after πίστις by Erasmus, and his Latin translation appears in the following form: Est autem Fides, earum rerum quae sperantur substantia, etc. Knapp retained this punctuation, and Winer sanctioned it in the earlier editions of his Grammar. The sense would then be: There is (ἔστι δὲ π.) a faith, i.e. Faith has been already exhibited in its reality and power, as the following cases, found in the Old Testament, will demonstrate. — According to this interpretation, the words after πίστις and the comma are in apposition, or are epexegetical. But the modern versions and later interpreters regard ἔστι simply as the copula, and the words "the substance ..... seen" contain the predicates. Winer subsequently changed his opinion, and in the fifth and sixth editions (§ 7, 3) seems inclined to cancel the comma after πίστις, and adopts the prevailing opinion that the verse is intended to furnish a definition of faith. Other questions belong strictly to the exegesis of the passage.

Heb. xii. 22, 23. "To an innumerable company of angels, To the general assembly and church," etc. English version. The same punctuation appears in the German and two French versions, and it is adopted by Calvin, Beza, Calovius, Grotius, etc. A comma is here placed, not before, but after ἀγγέλων, hence "innumerable company of angels." But others place a comma between μυριάσιν and ἀγγέλων, and none between the latter word and the next, that is, πανηγύρει.

So Moll (Lange's Bibelwerk) punctuates; and his German translation, which we reproduce here as far as it is practicable, is the following: "to myriads, the festive assembly (πανηγ.) of the angels, and to," etc. (see his Com. *ad loc.*). This punctuation is preferred by Knapp, Stier, Bengel, Lachm., deWette, Ebrard, etc. Stuart also adopts it, and translates: "to an innumerable multitude, the joyful assembly of angels; and to the church," etc. Other opinions, for the details of which we have no room, are also entertained. The exegesis decides respecting the punctuation, or rather, the latter expresses the exegesis preferred by the editor.

Heb. xiii. 8. "Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever." English version. — "Jesus Christ, yesterday and to-day, and the same also forever." German. — "Jesus Christ is the same, yesterday and to-day, and will be so (lit. *il* . . . . . *et le sera*) forever." This is the version of Ostervald, who simply changes the tenses of the verb supplied by Martin; the latter translates: "Jesus Christ has been the same yesterday and to-day, and he is so (*il l'est*) also forever." Moll says on this passage: "Luther erroneously places a comma after σήμερον, in accordance with the Vulgate and Oecumenius. It is not the eternity of Christ (Ambrose, Cyrillus of Alex., Calovius, and others), but his unchangeableness, which is here intended to be prominently set forth; hence ὁ αὐτός is the predicate which refers to the three specifications of time." Moll accordingly translates, without inserting any point: "Jesus Christ yesterday and to-day the same and forever." Ebrard, whose exegesis varies somewhat from that of Moll, places with Knapp a comma after ὁ αὐτός. DeWette, who does the same, concisely reviews the numerous attempts already made to explain the passage. While Stier rejects all the commas in the Greek, Stuart inserts them after χθές and σήμερον. In this case interpreters may agree in the punctuation, and nevertheless differ widely with respect to the sense.

Heb. xiii. 15. "The fruit of *our* lips, giving thanks to his name." English version. The comma after "lips," and

the italicized pronoun "*our*" prefixed to the word, suggest to the reader that the subject of the participle "giving" which follows, is "we," as if "giving thanks" were epexegetical, referring to "let us offer," etc. But the original is: *χειλέων ὁμολογοῦντων* without an intervening comma (so Erasmus, Textus Receptus, Knapp, etc.); the sacred writer obviously means that the "sacrifice" is the fruit of lips which give thanks. Hence the Vulgate exhibits: fructum labiorum confitentium. The German version is: "the fruit of lips which confess his name." (The margin of the English version exhibits: "Gr. confessing to"). Ostervald's version precisely agrees with the German, but Martin adopts the erroneous interpretation which the English version might suggest, as he translates: "le fruit des lèvres, en confessant son nom." Moll avails himself of the German participial construction, which resembles that of the Greek language, and translates: "the fruit of lips gratefully confessing (that gratefully confess) his name."

Heb. xiii. 20. "Now ..... God ..... that brought ..... Jesus, that great shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of the everlasting covenant," etc. The English, German, and two French versions, which perfectly agree, imply that they insert a comma after *μέγαν*, and they evidently connect *ἐν αἵματι διαθήκης* with *ὁ ἀναγαγών*. Oecumenius, Calvin, Bengel, Bleek, etc. adopt this punctuation, and interpret: "God brought that great Shepherd through the blood," etc. Others — Baumgarten, Ebrard (cont. of Olsh.) etc. — closely connect *ἐν αἵμ. διαθ.* with *μέγαν* in the sense: "that Shepherd of the sheep who was made great through (or by) the blood," etc.; that is, his greatness arises from the circumstance that through his blood he established an everlasting covenant, precisely (says Ebrard) as in John x. 11 he is the good shepherd because he gave his life for the sheep. In this case, the usual comma after *μέγαν* should be cancelled, as Knapp, but not Stier, has done. While Stuart rejects the punctuation, and with it the interpretation, indicated by the English version, which he regards as unintelligible, his own punc-

tuation, and his translation appended to his Commentary, are not perfectly clear; his rendering is the following: "our Lord Jesus (who is the great Shepherd of the sheep with the blood of an everlasting covenant), perfect you," etc. For other solutions of the exegetical difficulties presented by this passage, see de Wette, Moll, etc.

James iv. 5. Lange (Bibelwerk) remarks on this passage, vs. 5, 6, that it is one of the most difficult which can be found in the New Testament. Stier inserts among the *var. lect.* in his Polyglot New Testament the remark that eleven different modes of adjusting the punctuation have already been proposed, e.g. a colon after λέγει, or a note of interrogation, or that note or else a colon after φθόνον, etc. Lange and Wiesinger (continuation of Olsh.) have here furnished elaborate articles in their respective Commentaries. The punctuation is the same in the English and German versions, but Martin and Ostervald, although exhibiting verbal variations, agree in introducing two notes of interrogation. Almost every question that can embarrass an interpreter, e.g. as to the pointing, the reading (ἡμῖν or, as in the Vulgate, ὑμῖν), the relation in which the several expressions stand to each other, the initial letter of "spirit" (or "Spirit" = Holy Ghost), etc., is suggested by this text.

Jas. iv. 15. "If the Lord will, we shall live (ζήσομεν), and do this, or that." English version. — "If the Lord will and we live (ζήσωμεν, Textus Receptus) we will, etc." German and versions of Martin and Ostervald. The Vulgate implies that a full stop precedes and that a comma follows the first καί, and repeats ἐάν before ζήσωμεν, thus: "If the Lord will And, If we live," etc. On the whole passage (readings, punctuation, and sense), see Winer, § 41, a. 4.

1 Pet. i. 13–15. "As obedient children, not fashioning yourselves," etc. English, German, and both French versions. A comma or semicolon precedes v. 14, and a comma follows "children" in these versions, and generally, in the editions of the Greek Testament and Vulgate. According to this punctuation, the words "not fashioning yourselves," etc.

are explanatory of "as obedient children." Winer says (§ 45, 6, b.) that the negative and participle *μὴ συσχηματιζόμενοι* may be regarded as depending on *ἐλπίσατε* in v. 13 (= "hope," etc., and, as the effect of that hope, "not fashioning yourselves," etc.); but he prefers to consider the negative and participle as parallel with *κατὰ τὸν καλέσαντα* etc. in v. 15, and connected with the imperative *γενήθητε*, which construction would require the usual colon at the end of v. 14 to be changed into a comma, which is accordingly done by Knapp, Stier, etc.; de Wette concurs. Fronmüller (Lange's Bibelwerk) places a full stop at the end of v. 13, and cancels the comma in v. 14 after "children," translating thus: "As children of obedience so conduct yourselves, that ye no longer yield to the lusts," etc. According to this view, the words "not fashioning," etc. are not so much explanatory as inferential, in their reference to "as obedient children" = Since you are obedient children, therefore, etc. Huther (Meyer's Commentary) also begins a new sentence with v. 14, but differs from Fronmüller in his exegesis, which would require a comma after *τέκνα ὑπακοῆς*,

1 Pet. i. 23. "By the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever." English version. Independently of the punctuation, a difficulty exists here in deciding whether "word" or "God" is the antecedent of "which." (A similar case in 1 Thess. ii. 13 is noticed above.) The translators used this relative both of persons and of things. Their *usus loquendi* in the present chapter is embarrassing, and does not decide whether here the word "which" is a masculine or a neuter pronoun. Thus in v. 3 we read: "the God ..... of ..... Christ, which ..... hath," etc., while in v. 17, we read: "the Father, who ..... judgeth," etc. But as the Vulgate which often guided them, refers "liveth and abideth" to God (verbum Dei vivi), our translators, no doubt, regarded "God" as the antecedent; in this case, however, they should have omitted the comma before "which," in order to prevent a misconception of their real meaning. Luther, on the contrary (German version), refers the pronoun (necessary

only in a modern language, but not found in the Greek) to "word," for the neuter *das* can agree only with the neuter noun "Wort." The two French translations which the American Bible Society circulates, exhibit a striking difference in this case. Ostervald translates: par la parole de Dieu, qui vit, etc. Although the French *qui* is used both for the masculine and the feminine genders, Ostervald makes the impression on us that his *qui* refers to "God;" if he had wished to designate unmistakably that he regarded *parole* (fem.) as the true antecedent, he would unquestionably have employed another French relative, namely, *laquelle* as he does in Col. ii. 14; 1 Thess. ii. 13. Martin, on the other hand, unequivocally states that "word" is the true antecedent to "which," or rather that it is not *God*, but the *word* which "liveth and abideth," for he translates: la parole de Dieu, vivante et permanente, etc.; the gender of the predicates plainly shows that the latter refer to "word." Luther (German) and Martin (French) cannot have been influenced in adopting this exegesis by the term occurring in v. 25 ("the word of the Lord endureth for ever"), for there the Greek, translated "word," is ῥῆμα, while here (v. 23) it is λόγου. Fronmüller (Lange's Bibelwerk) appears to have overlooked this circumstance, for he attempts to confirm his first remark on the passage (viz. that the words "liveth and abideth" refer to "word") in saying that the language in v. 25 shows this to be the case. But his reference to Heb. iv. 12 has more weight, for there we find ζῶν . . . . . ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, apparently corresponding to λόγου ζῶντος θεοῦ in the passage before us. Wiesinger (continuation of Olsh.) very decidedly adopts Fronmüller's opinion. Huther (Meyer's Com.) quotes the words of Calvin, viz. that we may translate, either "the living word of God," or "the word of the living God," and adds that the Vulgate, Oecumenius, Beza, etc., with Calvin, prefer the second mode of interpretation, while others (Luther, Calovius, Bengel, de Wette, etc.) prefer the former, and with these he agrees. Grotius, on the other hand, connects the predicate ζῶντος with θεοῦ, and remarks that the whole

phrase is taken from the Greek version of Daniel vi. 27 (26), where we find the words: *θεὸς ζῶν καὶ μένων εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*, to which our pressent passage undoubtedly exhibits a striking conformity. The force of this argument is, however, somewhat impaired by the well-known circumstance, attested by Jerome (Praef. in Dan.), that the Christians substituted Theodotion's Greek version of Daniel (made about the middle of the second century, Herzog's Encyk. ii. 188) for the original version of the Septuagint which Peter read; this was done, according to Credner, about the close of the third century (Keil, Einleit. § 179, ii. n. 10, p. 604). The original version, current in Peter's age, was supposed to be lost; but a manuscript containing it was found in a library at Rome in the last century, and published in a separate form by Simon de Magistris, J. D. Michaelis, and others (Herzog, Encyk. i. 229). The Greek participial construction in our text does not admit of a comma. As we are here concerned only with the punctuation, we refrain from inserting additional exegetical remarks, but cannot forbear to allude to the homiletical importance of the punctuation in this case. An English clergyman, before whose eyes a comma separates "which" from "God," or a French clergymen who uses Martin's revision of the old French translation, would probably enlarge in his sermon chiefly on the efficacy and power ("liveth") and enduring nature ("abideth," — notwithstanding the hostility of persecutors and the ravages of time) of the revealed word. But another, who should remove the comma, and thus immediately connect "God" with "which," or who used Ostervald's French version (although a comma here follows *Dieu*) would probably believe that the text required him to discourse on the eternity of God. Winer (Gram.) does not refer to this passage. In the Old Testament the terms אֱלֹהִים חַיִּים Deut. v. 23 (Hebr.; vs. 26 Eng.); Jer. x. 10, or אֵל חַי Josh. iii. 10; Ps. xlii. 3; lxxxiv. 3; Hosea ii. 1 (Hebr.), etc. are frequent. The Septuagint version, *θεὸς ζῶν*, is very often reproduced in the New Testament; e.g. Matt. xvi. 16; Acts xiv. 15, and especially in 1 Thess. i. 9

(θεῷ ζῶντι καὶ ἀληθινῷ, strikingly resembling the passage before us). These facts seem to justify the reference of the two participles to θεοῦ rather than to λόγου, and to require the following translation: "the word of the living God, who also (καί) abideth for ever." In this case the comma should be cancelled in the English version before "which."

1 Pet. iii. 7. The English and German versions evidently place a comma after γυναικείῳ, or else after τιμήν; hence, the translation: "giving honor unto the wife, as unto the weaker vessel," etc. They concur here with the construction of the Vulgate, and are sustained by Bengel and Grotius. Robinson (Lex. art. γυναικεῖος), who adopts the punctuation of Lachm. and Stier, removes the comma after γνῶσιν ("knowledge"), inserts one after γύναικ., and translates: "dwelling according to your better knowledge with the female vessel as the weaker." So, essentially, Martin and Osterwald; they, like Robinson, connect ὡς ἀσθεν. σκεύει with συνοικ., and not with ἀπονέμ., as the English and German, as well as Calvin, Beza, Grotius, etc. Fronmüller (Lange's Bibelwerk), de Wette, Wiesinger (continuation of Olsh.), Huther (Meyer's Com.) fully adopt the pointing recommended by Robinson. The judgment of the editor in the capacity of an exegete must here decide as to the punctuation.

1 Pet. v. 12. "By Silvanus, a faithful brother unto you, as I suppose," etc. English version, with which the German essentially concurs. *Notre*, in the edition of Osterwald's version (1860) of the American Bible Society, which is not supported by any manuscript authority, must be a typographical error for *votre*. The latter is the reading of the edition of 1826. It should, however, not be forgotten that in the edition of 1553 (Calvin's) the paraphrastic version was given: par Siluain nostre frere, qui vous est, fidele, etc. This version assumes that a comma precedes ὑμῖν, and that another follows λογίζομαι. In that case the construction is: "faithful ..... unto you." Martin and Osterwald, however, by translating, Je vous ai écrit, imply that,

as in Gal. vi. 11, ὑμῖν really belongs to ἔγραψα = I have written to you. So de Wette interprets, and Wiesinger, after some hesitation, occasioned by a possible but a very feebly supported various reading (τοῦ after ὑμῖν, omitted in Cod. B. and one minuscule manuscript), adopts the same view. With these Fronmüller agrees. Huther concurs on the whole, but concedes that ὑμῖν may also be connected with πιστ. ἀδελ. Knapp and Lachm., who place commas after ἀδελ., λογίζ., and ἔγραψα, appear to sanction the pointing of the English version.

2 Pet. ii. 12. "But these, as natural brute beasts made to be taken and destroyed," etc. English version. Here φυσικά is closely connected with ζῶα. Martin and Osterwald concur in adopting this construction, but understand, with verbal variations, φυσικά as Robinson (Lex.) takes the word, i.e. "following their natural bent."—"But they are like the irrational beasts, which by nature are born to be taken," etc. German. Here a comma placed after ζῶα, as in the Vulgate, connects φυσικά closely with γεγεννημένα. Fronmüller adopts this view of the construction; φυσικά in that case is taken for φυσικῶς (on which grammatical point see Winer, § 54, 2).

1 John i. 9. "He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins." English version. Here a comma after δίκαιος is not recognized, and ἵνα, which follows that word, and is represented in the Vulgate by *ut*, is almost entirely lost in "to," the English sign of the infinitive.—"He is faithful and just, (so) that he forgives," etc. German version. Here the comma after "just" divides this part of the whole verse into two clauses. In the two French versions ἵνα with its verb is represented by *pour* and an infinitive. Commentators are not agreed whether ἵνα is equivalent to ὥστε, whether it is used in a telic (de Wette) or ecbatic sense, etc. See Winer § 53, 6.

1 John iii. 11, 12. "That we should love one another. Not as Cain, who was of that wicked one," etc. English version. The efforts of translators and others to adjust the

punctuation and sense of this passage are various. The German and the Vulgate, like the English, supply a relative pronoun after "Cain." Martin and Ostervald supply, in addition to the relative, also a verb. The former renders: "that we should not be (soyons) as Cain; the latter: "Let us not do (faisons) as Cain." Branne (Lange's Bibelwerk) translates: "not, as Cain was of the wicked one," and explains thus: "The proposition 'Not, as ..... brother" is incomplete, like Jno. vi. 58 [where the same *οὐ καθώς* will be found]. It is a case of breviloquence, which in comparisons occurs in the Greek classics in very great variety. Compare Winer's Gram. p. 549." Winer here (§ 66, 2 f.) remarks that it is not necessary to supply any particular word, that the comparison is not expressed with strict precision, and that the reader himself can easily supply, for instance, words like these: "so must, or will not it be in our case." The example which Winer adduces from Demosthenes (*Κατὰ Μειδίου. ξά*) is very striking; he objects to the insertion by Reiske of *ὅς* after *Ἀριστοφῶν*. Spalding, who also objects to Reiske's explanation, says, in a note on the passage, that a change in the punctuation which he proposes renders the insertion of the relative unnecessary (Dobson's Oratores Attici. vii. 129, Reiske's ed. p. 564). Branne agrees with Winer that in the verse before us no word like *ὦμεν* before *ἐκ τοῦ πον.*, or *ὅς*, etc., should be supplied. Still, even his exposition does not entirely remove the apparent harshness of the construction. Perhaps if a comma were placed after *ἀλλήλους* at the end of v. 11, and a colon after *Κάϊν*, the verb to which the latter would be the nominative might, as is common in such cases, be supplied from *ἀγαπῶμεν*, thus; "that we should love one another, not as Cain (loved); he was of the wicked one," etc.

Jude 20, 21. "Building up yourselves on your most holy faith, praying in the Holy Ghost, keep yourselves in the love," etc. English version. Here a comma is implied after the first *ἑαυτούς* (v. 20), and "praying" is intimately connected in one clause with "Holy Ghost." This is the punctuation

found also in the Vulgate, Martin, and Osterwald. — "Build up yourselves on your most holy faith, through the Holy Ghost, and pray, and keep yourselves," etc. German version. Here the comma after the first ἑαυτούς is cancelled (which appears in Knapp, but not in Stier), and this word is immediately connected with those that follow, viz. ἐν πνεύμ. ἁγ., thus representing the *building up* as accomplished through the Holy Ghost. This is also the punctuation of Oecumenius, de Wette, etc. Fronmüller (Lange's Bibelwerk) also appears to prefer it, or, rather, cancels every point between τῇ ἁγιωτάτῃ and προσευχόμενοι, after which word a period is placed. He then translates: "Build up yourselves on your most holy faith in the Holy Ghost amid prayer." Wiesinger prefers a transposition of some of the Greek words, authorized by certain manuscripts, and hence his punctuation cannot be compared to advantage with the modes adopted in the cases just mentioned. Not only grammatical and homiletical considerations are here involved, but others also which are intimately connected with the believer's religious experience.

Italics, etc.

In the list which we have now given, we have abstained from introducing passages in which various readings that affect the punctuation occur, as well as those in which the English translators have supplied words in italics, and thus modified the punctuation. The latter class of passages embraces many in which the English and German versions differ, indicating a difference in the exegesis: e.g. in Luke x. 22, the English version supplies *him* as the object of the verb "reveal," referring to the "Father"; the German version supplies "it," referring to the whole subject of the revelation. In this class of texts, the modern versions exhibit many variations. We have, further, not referred here to the orthography of the earlier and later editions of the English Bible, as the sense of any passage is not often affected by it. There are, it is true, even in this respect,

some words, the spelling of which may affect the sense, e.g. *cloths* or *clothes*, in Exodus xxxi. 10; *sometimes* or *sometime*, Eph. v. 8 (the latter in the sense of once, formerly); in these cases the British and American editions vary. Nor have we referred to the insertion or omission of a hyphen in words like handmaid (hand-maid), burnt offering (burnt-offering), etc. There is another large class of passages, in which some of the editions of the Greek, Vulgate, etc. insert parenthetical marks, while these are omitted, or differently distributed, in other editions; in many cases the exegesis is materially influenced by the presence or absence of such marks. We have introduced only one of these cases above, viz. Col. ii. 21–23. There is only one instance in which brackets are introduced, viz. 1 John ii. 23. The edition printed under the supervision of the Committee on Versions, had here omitted them; the later editions have reproduced them, while there is still an uncertainty whether "but" alone should be thus marked, or else the entire succeeding clause, the whole being now again printed in italics in the English version. It is true that the Textus Receptus omits the clause, and it was not found in the earliest Erasmian editions from which the German version was made. Still, critics like Griesbach, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Knapp, de Wette, etc. receive it as genuine; Ostervald, like Martin, introduces it. Branne (Lange's Bibelwerk) receives it on decisive manuscript authority, and the American Bible Society has no reason to decline, as it now again does, to decide this critical question in the English version (by the awkward brackets and the italics), when it does decide it in versions in other languages.

We have, besides, not referred to a class of texts in which, independently of various readings and the punctuation, the difficulty in the construction of the Greek leads to a difference in the interpretation of the several versions. This class may be illustrated by the following case, selected from a long list. In Acts iii. 21, *ὅν* may be the subject of the infinitive *δέξασθαι* (accusative before it), and *οὐρανόν* is then the object (accusa-

tive), governed by the latter; or ὅν may be the object (accusative), and οὐρανόν after δεῖ (accusative before the infinitive) includes or specifies the subject. The sense is much affected by the decision; the Lutheran, or else the Reformed doctrine concerning the Person of Christ will materially gain by the result. The German version adopts the former construction ("who must receive the heaven"); the English, with which Ostervald and Martin (Reformed) agree, the latter ("whom the heaven must receive").

The editors of the critical editions of the New Testament have, as far as we have investigated the subject, usually directed their attention to the *variae lectiones*, and, with some exceptions, have adopted the punctuation which appeared in the early printed editions (the Complutensian, Erasmian, Stephens, Elzevir). The older commentators have been occupied in determining the meaning of words and phrases, and seem also to have given less attention to the punctuation than its importance deserves. It is one of the merits of the new Commentary of Lange and his associates, that they have in many instances referred to the modification of the sense of a passage by any change in the usual punctuation. They generally exhibit, in this respect, far more attention to the shades of thought indicated by the position of a comma, etc., than many of their predecessors.

Conclusion.

One object which we have had in view in directing attention to the subject of this Article was to show its homiletical importance. Revealed truth is of inestimable value. We cannot afford to lose one iota of it, and we dare not cast it aside. When the preacher of the gospel occupies the pulpit, and professes to explain God's word, or set forth the "mind of the Spirit" who inspired the prophets and apostles, ought he not to be very sure that he really states divine truth in its purity and in its fulness? Ought he not to furnish all the practical instructions which his text presents? Now, the insertion or the cancelling even of a comma, as many of the

passages quoted above demonstrate, may either prompt him to express thoughts which after the alteration of the punctuation are found to lie in the text, or else may imperatively require that he should withhold thoughts, instructions, etc. which are usually suggested by the text, but which after altering the punctuation he finds that the sacred writer did not intend to convey. In the latter case the established hermeneutical principle, that we are not authorized to obtrude thoughts on a passage which evidently did not occur to the writer, ought to be conscientiously followed in our exegetical and homiletical practice. We will illustrate this point, by selecting a passage which, in whatever mode it is pointed, does not affect any form of doctrine respecting which evangelical Christians differ. We have refrained as far as possible in the cases adduced above from expressing any personal or private doctrinal views, and have mainly endeavored to show objectively the great variety of opinions which the modern system of punctuation can express. In John i. 9 some editors (Knapp, Stier, Alford, etc.) place a comma after *ἄνθρωπον*, thus indicating that the participle *ἐρχόμενον* (as nom. neut.) refers to *φῶς*. If we should write a sermon on the text thus pointed, we would dwell at considerable length on the comparatively feeble light afforded by the Old Testament (e.g. the future state of rewards and punishments), and make much use of 2 Tim. i. 10; and we should not fail to dwell on John i. 17. We would refer to the fact that since this "true light" had come into the world the privileges of men had been greatly enlarged, and that their responsibility had also become more weighty and solemn. We might then refer to Sodom, Tyre and Sidon, Chorazin, Capernaum (Matt. xi. 20–24), and Jerusalem (Matt. xxiii. 37). Such is the punctuation of Ostervald; he places a comma after les *hommes*, and proceeds: *en venant*, i.e. "when the light comes," etc. Bengel, who adopts the same view, presents in his Gnomon additional remarks on the high value which we ought to ascribe to Christ, the light of the world, as compared with John, to whom v. 6 refers. See Alford, Lange, etc. on the passage.

Others cancel the comma after ἄνθρωπον, which Erasmus had introduced into the Greek text, although, like the Vulgate, he translates ἐρχόμενον by *venientem*, referring to *hominem*, and not to *lux*. If this comma is cancelled, ἐρχόμενον (now acc. masc.) agrees with ἄνθρ. which immediately precedes, and this, in accordance with the Vulgate, is the form of the English and German versions, as well as that of Martin (éclaire tout homme venant, etc.). Olshausen regards this construction as involving a pleonasm; for obviously all who are in the world must have come into the world. Many of the older interpreters, however (Origen, etc.), and of those of more recent times (Luther, Calvin, Meyer, etc.) cancel the comma, and translate after the manner of the Vulgate and English version. Now, if we should prepare a sermon on the text with this punctuation, we should be able simply to refer to the fact that after we have come into the world we assume certain responsibilities. But as ἐρχόμενον is now divested of much of its meaning and force, we would be compelled to omit very much of the matter stated above which the other punctuation suggests.

Our space, however, does not allow us to add other illustrations which we have collected, but which we are compelled by the length of this Article to omit. We close with the remark, that, as all revealed truth, even in its minutest details, is of inestimable value, it is, or ought to be, the great object of every theologian and teacher of religion to acquire, not merely general, but also very particular and distinct views of the meaning which any inspired writer expresses in any passage.

ARTICLE II.

THE NATURAL THEOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.

BY REV. JOHN BASCOM, PROFESSOR IN WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

No. IV.

LABOR AND CAPITAL.

Labor is the element of production which man furnishes; it is exertion which has value. In strict analysis all that labor can directly accomplish is transfer, a movement of bodies as wholes; a removal or readjustment of their parts; a commutation or commingling of particles preparatory to vital or to chemical action. All beyond this, and even much of this, is accomplished by natural forces. The farmer breaks up the soil and casts in the seed, and for the present his labor is ended. The manufacturer unites fitting material, or brings together appropriate ingredients, but does not impart the strength of fiber which binds the cloth, the cohesive force which compacts into a machine the wood and the metal, nor the affinity which causes the oil and the alkali to unite in soap.

This resolution of manual labor into simple mechanical changes has no particular importance, as the objects contemplated in the transfers are very different, and give the ground of its chief decisions. A first object is increase of quantity: a multiplication of that complete in itself, but deficient in amount. This end gives us the department of agriculture. The laborer works with the vital forces of nature, and meets their mechanical conditions in breaking up, enriching, planting the soil; in feeding herds and sheltering flocks, It becomes the study of the farmer to understand the laws of vegetable and animal life, and to avail himself skilfully of those forces which work reproduction. He is, in the highest sense, a producer, employing powers little less marvellous than those of creation.

The second aim of manual labor is to change the form of that already secured. This gives us the department of manufacture. The laborer avails himself of the cohesive and chemical forces of nature; relies on the qualities given by the one and the new compounds secured by the other; selects material for the offices it has to subserve, shapes it to its position, and combines those elements which are the ingredients of his dyes, paints, or medicines. There is here a change of form in that which has been gained, but no increase of its quantity. In this department a lower grade of forces is employed. It is molecular and mechanical, not vital, properties that the artizan considers.

The third object of labor is a transfer in place. This transfer is not obscure, incidental to some other process aimed at, but is itself the immediate end. If a thread of wool barely cohesive is twisted, we change the position of its fibres; but this change is not wrought for itself, but for the modification of form, and the increased strength which follow from it. If a skein of yarn is plunged into the dye, its place is changed, yet only in reference to a change of color; but when merchandise is shipped from place to place, the transfer is the obvious gain contemplated. This department is that of commerce. Here the laborer works only with the power-agents, the mechanical agents of nature. If, as in the consumption of fuel for the creation of steam, he employs other forces, it is only that he may resolve them through cylinder and piston into simple mechanical power. As in both the other departments of labor there is involved constant mechanical transfer, the power-agents are there also present to aid in its accomplishment. Though simple force is the whole manual contribution of man to the productive process, he is yet provided with inexhaustible, versatile, and mobile power-agents for furnishing even this. His ultimate attitude is that of a master, not of a servant: he obeys till he has wit to command.

It is worthy of note, that there is descent in the forces primarily employed as we pass from agriculture through

manufacture to commerce, from production to adaptation and exchange. In the first, we are operating with the ascending, in the second more frequently with the stationary, and in the third, with the descending, forces. The power which builds up the plant and animal is organic; is securing more complex, delicate, unstable compounds, and assumes what is termed an ascending action. Simple, elementary forces, like those of light and heat, are lodged in wood, oil, flesh, in a latent and more or less permanent form; ready, however, on slight provocation, to slip from these high points of composition back to their first rudimentary level. In the use of steam this actually takes place. There is a quick descent of elements to their simple forms. The heat is evolved which had long since been lodged in the fuel in the organic, upward movement. So is it also in the waterfall. The forces of evaporation and saturation compared with those of precipitation and the flow of rivers to the ocean, are constructive; inducing a more complex, advanced, and unstable state. The agriculturist belts on to drums driven by those forces through which nature breaks in on simple, mechanical equilibrium, and pushes forward its growth; while the power-agents, the chief instruments of the merchant, spring from the subsidence and return of elements to their first balance, when released by heat or by cold, at some high points of composition from the chemical or the vital powers. The manufacturer, intermediate between the two, uses chiefly the stationary affinities and cohesive forces of matter. Nature, whether quiescent, or flowing forward to the physical height of the rain drop, the figurative height of the organic products of wood and muscle, or ebbing thence in the rush of rivers to the ocean, the sinking of vital compounds into the heat and light and simpler elements which gave occasion to them, is ever yielding something to the labor of man.

This relation of agriculture to vital and ascending forces, so delicate and secret in their action, constitutes one among other reasons of its comparatively slow growth. It is only the most careful and balanced thought that is prepared to deal successfully with organic phenomena.

The efficiency of labor will depend on the character of the natural agents at its disposal — the fertility of the soil, its mineral wealth, the mildness of the climate, the available power-agents; on the amount and form of capital at its service, on the intelligence of the laborers, and on the freedom and security afforded by civil institutions. Liberty and justice are not causes, but conditions of the highest production. They give full play to those desires which impel acquisition. Suffering labor to reach its complete reward, they stimulate the producer with the hopes of unimpeded success.

The returns which nature yields to man's exertion may be, as we have seen, too great or too little. In a nice balance of ease and difficulty lies the highest stimulus — a relation that makes effort and skill necessary, yet amply rewards them. Though the fruits of the earth are sometimes too spontaneous for the highest industry, at least in low and savage life, her other resources are held in closer guardianship. The minerals, metals, oils, acids, gums, dyes, mechanical forces of the world, all require exertion and thought to secure and use them.

The amount and form of capital which labor possesses are determined by its previous exertion, are the momentum it has acquired by past movement. If capital has assumed the form of improvement, of tools, of varied and abundant machinery, of the manifold appliances of art, it places labor at once on a high vantage ground, makes its present tasks easy and its further progress natural. This, more than all other considerations, determines the immediate efficiency of labor, and implies the presence of the other conditions of success. But as capital, especially in these forms, is the result of past thought, it is the element of intelligence that is truly fundamental in labor. The other conditions are either already given, or are sure to follow, if this is present. While intelligence, spreading through all ranks, carrying with it liberty and safety, quickening desire and invention, is the root of production, it is evident that wide-spread thoughtful-

ness and control must be fed and maintained by a high moral and religious state. These, when universal, are light and heat shed down from heaven, not the glare of beacon-fires made conspicuous by the darkness, and casting in the air gigantic shadows of those who stand about them. We observe this in passing, waiting a later point for the full development of the dependence.

The several kinds of labor differ from each other in many particulars — in the skill they require, in the exertion they exact, and the trust they repose; in cleanness, respectability, and certainty of success; in the time required for the acquisition of skill, in the pleasure and play of mind they afford, and in the aid they demand of capital. Hence, between different kinds even of manual labor there is great diversity of wages. The more difficult employments receive a return not only apparently higher, but one actually so. The barriers which a demand for high skill, patience, or integrity oppose to success in any occupation prevent so many from engaging in it that there is left to those who possess the needful qualities a decided advantage. Though customs, prejudices, and social institutions may limit its action, competition is the final regulator of price in labor. With each rise, therefore, in the endowments of the laborer, there is a rapid falling off of competitors and a corresponding advance of wages. As in the pyramid narrowing on every side each successive platform gives a greatly reduced area, so with every increase of skill and character there is a rapid reduction of those who can meet the conditions, and hence an advance of recompence greater than the extra exertion or previous expenditure of time and money require.

He who furnishes mere muscle stands in such unfortunate competition with the inanimate and animate forces and with the most numerous and degraded class of his own species, as to find himself often pressed to the very verge of extinction, to a bitter, biting struggle for mere bread. Talent, on the other hand, united to education, secures an easy command of the market, and is able to put its labors at a price

which, contrasted with the wages of others, seems exorbitant. Though the lower ranks of life may be crowded to suffocation, there are air, light, comfort above. Not only is thoughtfulness thus made the chief element of success; with each increase of it, the reward is made unexpectedly great. Prizes are scattered in growing amounts along the upward way; and with each obstacle surmounted there comes a sudden gain of advantage. To him that hath is given, and he has more abundance.

The skilful laborer, also, while engaging in but one pursuit, can command a kindred degree of skill in other directions, or a proportionately larger amount of coarser work. The lawyer may repay by a half hour's thought a week's hard labor with saw and axe, one, two, or four days of mechanical labor, according to its craft, or five minutes of surgery. With his own power he works for himself in every employment — digs his garden with the force of ten Irishmen, builds his house with the hands of a half-dozen carpenters, or purchases his garments with an exertion but the tenth of that they have actually cost. He carries his own efficiency everywhere, and the mastery of one form of labor becomes a virtual mastery of all. The poor day-laborer, on the contrary, gets the pay of a drudge, whether he takes it in pill or writ, in food or clothing.

Toil itself, also, is made more and more optional as the workman advances in skill and increases his reward. Not only are the forms of it offered to us more various; we may put leisure among our gratifications, and, readily meeting the necessities of life, secure a command of time — of ourselves. The pressure of labor becomes lighter, its claims less imperative; and we are manumitted at least from the toil of a slave. Ignorance and dulness, in the meantime, are driven with a scourge; they are field-hands, sore of back and foot, under an unpitying task-master. To stop is to starve; and to advance is but to renew the pain of life, its unrequited toil and hopeless labor. The more civilized the nation, the wider apart have its upper and lower classes

usually fallen, both in character and advantages. With relatively greater severity have the laws of labor pressed upon those who by ignorance, vice, or misfortune have been placed at their mercy. Civilization is attended with an enlargement of population. The intelligence of which progress is the result is not evenly distributed; elements of barbarism still linger in some classes; and the several ranks, therefore, of society move forward with unequal rapidity; the advance leaving that hindermost negligent column upon which simple manual labor falls to endure a relatively larger share of the burdens and suffer an increasing disadvantage in the competition for success. When, with civilization, come the means of improvement, those who do not avail themselves of them fall under a still more severe regimen, a more tormenting discipline. The liability and the opportunity grow together, and the forces become more declared which bear us either backward or forward.

Labor is laid upon all; and the only avenue of escape is through intelligence; of general escape is through intelligence and morality. In barbarous forms of society the minimum amount of labor being sought for, the minimum amount of of life is the result. As the race degenerate they approach extinction; and only as they accept more faithfully, fully, and intelligently the toil laid upon them, do they so increase in numbers and strength as to meet extensively and readily the difficulties of their position — as to accumulate in cities and villages, in machinery and implements, in the means of water and land carriages that enginery of capital which makes existence easy and luxury possible. By accepting, not by shirking toil; by marching through, not by shunning difficulties, does the race truly evade them.

In the the lowest state of society it is the highest type of manhood there present that rises, that separates itself by a a little from its fellows, and shifts the heavier load on the weaker, in the main the baser. Knowledge overmasters ignorance; courage, cowardice; cunning, dulness; strength, weakness; activity, indolence; and the law becomes only

the more harsh, physical, and direct in its application as men sink in civilization. It may be felt by some that this is a hard law, difficult to be borne in the light of mercy and moral obligation; yet is it a most beneficient law, applicable to that low level of life which develops it. As men fall into barbarism, as they cease to be reached, not only by morality, but by the motives of ordinary thrift and foresight, they still fortunately find a governing force, a regenerating tendency; that which can reach them at the bottom of the lowest abyss. The fall is piteous; but the law which follows is a ray of light shot across the otherwise unbroken darkness. Disease, famine, violence, press upon these fugitive ranks; thin their numbers; sweep to oblivion those bearing the heaviest entail of sin; compel them to some activity, lodge power with the strongest, and force a foreign will on wills too weak to work reform. If that natural selection is good by which the most vigorous male leads the herd, by which the weaker brute is pushed to the earth by the stronger, and life gains ground by its own just ascendency, not less are those natural forces which sift and winnow savage society, and, with terrible waste of the worthless, preserve a little seed that may become the source of a better harvest.

In the march of civilization, the same foes still press on the hindmost; with the gain on the one hand, that the road to improvement is more plain before them; and with the very common loss on the other, that the few have stolen so many advantages as to be able to hold the masses in easy, abject submission. Here, again, there is no extrication except through character. Ignorance may not stand on equal footing with knowledge; this would arrest progress by removing all motive to it, by relieving that cogent pressure which can alone impel nations onward. Men move on much as flocks are driven; with one in advance to call the leaders, and one in rear to spur the loiterers. It is fruitless and foolish to regret the severity of laws which, after all, no more than reach the exigency, which are the only laws that the stupidity, inertia, and obstinacy of the parties will suffer them to

feel. We need to draw attention constantly to the internal, subjective state, as that which is truly sad, truly to be regretted, to be labored with by what means and processes it is capable of; and not to lament those external conditions which can alone handle and control and hold fast, if not draw upward, the semi-rational, semi-moral beings to whom they apply. Let us come suddenly on the outside accidents and loathsome consequences of sin; let us contemplate these as simple, sensible, immediate facts, aside from the moral history they tell and state they indicate; aside from the sweep of the healthly, holy law which eliminates them, casts them up to the surface, and works an ultimate riddance, and our feelings will be very much those expressed by the novelist:

"How difficult to believe that anything so precious as a germ of immortal growth can have been buried under this dirt-heap, plunged into this cesspool of misery and vice. As often as I beheld the scene, it affected me with surprise and loathsome interest, much resembling, though in a far intenser degree, the feelings with which, when a boy, I used to turn over a plank or an old log that had long lain on the damp ground, and found a vivacious multitude of unclean and devilish-looking insects scampering to and fro beneath it. Without an infinite faith there seemed as much prospect of a blessed futurity for those hideous bugs and many-footed worms as for these brethren of our humanity and co-heirs of all our heavenly inheritance. Ah, what a mystery! Slowly, slowly, as after groping at the bottom of a deep, noisome, stagnant pool, my hope struggles upward to the surface, bearing the half-drowned body of a child along with it, and heaving it aloft for its life, and my own life, and all our lives. Unless these slime-clogged nostrils can be made capable of inhaling celestial air, I know not how the purest and most intelligent of us can reasonably expect ever to taste a breath of it."

The resources of the globe are limited. It is capable under the best of cultivation of supporting only certain numbers. The reproductive powers of the race are without limit; and acting without check, proceed by a geometrical

ratio. They might, therefore, cause population quickly to reach the nutritive power of this, or indeed of any, globe. If then the treasures of production were all instantly available, if there were no obstacles to the complete occupation of land, and the immediate use of its utmost resources, it is evident that the final barrier might be quickly and violently approached, the wave of population breaking in foam thereon. The consequences of such a rapid increase and sudden arrest of life are fitted to startle the fancy of man, and impress his mind strongly with a sense of disproportion between the force employed and the provision made for its expansion. Facts, however, indicate a conclusion quite the reverse of our fears. The occasion of alarm is very much the same as in insect life, whose fecundity expressed in pure mathematics might seem about to darken the air with one impenetrable, unbroken swarm of diverse insects, and hide the ground from the revolted eye with their creeping larva, as if a sudden vital force had come to possess each particle of the crawling earth, and every molecule of the hot, humming air. Practically, however, the checks and compensations are so many and so adequate, that no very inconvenient multiplication for any length of time, or any large area takes place, and our marvel is directed to the ballance and not to the disproportion of forces.

The restraints on population are not brought to bear suddenly, but begin at once to be felt, are not so severe in the later as in the earlier stages of growth, do not so much oppress the future as darken the past. The gifts of nature are withheld, are purchased only by increasing skill; her storehouses are unlocked one after another by growing intelligence, and any great increase of numbers must wait, therefore, on that wisdom and prudence which are able to provide for them. The earlier checks on savage and semi-civilized life are indeed severe; hardships, neglect, famine, pestilence, war, cannibalism, cruelly waste life which is left wholly exposed to them; and all the productiveness of the race is hardly sufficient to force into this state and maintain

there the merest fraction of that population which the world, more wisely handled, is waiting to nourish.

The checks are physical, such as the world has long been familiar with in its darker portions, and are much like those by which the multiplication of one class of insects is balanced by the greedy feeding of others. In barbarous life, a state of warfare is habitual; and one tribe is preyed upon by another, as carnivorous beasts destroy and straiten each other in their hunting. In semi-civilized life, where numbers are greater, famine not unfrequently sweeps through a nation, desolating large areas. In previous centuries, famines in Europe and in England were common and severe, and now occasionally overtake some peculiarly poor, or poorly cultivated, country, as India or Ireland. Yet every step in civilization carries a people farther from this danger. Famine in its extensive and terrible forms is even now hardly possible in the more wealthy, commercial nations. Most of the physical checks, exposure, war, epidemics, famine, are already, in the progress of society, either greatly mitigated or wholly removed.

As intelligence is the means by which alone we can secure in any good measure the gifts of nature, can draw from her bountiful storehouses the means of subsistence, it is chiefly in the savage and lower forms of human life that the positive checks of increase are constantly and severely applied, reducing man like his fellows of the field, to a constant struggle for existence.

As increasing knowledge rapidly develops the resources of the globe, it makes way for a corresponding growth of population, and, at the same time, provides a new system of mollified checks. Ambition, prudence, the hope of what may be gained, the fear of what may be lost, come in to do more unobservedly, and far less painfully and more perfectly, that which was previously accomplished by physical restraints. The more advanced classes are scarcely aware of any restriction of their actions, so fortified are they in prudence by custom, forecast, and common sentiment; yet they of all

others hold fast the advantages which nature and their social positions have granted them, enlarge upon these, and transmit them to their children. In enlightened nations, at the two extremes of society are seen respectively those still subject to physical checks, and those who impose the simple restraints of wisdom; who refuse by any act of their own to put social rank and privileges in jeopardy.

There is, then, no danger from growth: quite the reverse. Intelligence not only makes nature liberal, but imposes the simple checks of patience and prudence, teaches us to wait on her liberality, and not to squander the future by the haste and indiscretion of the present. It is the blind prolificness of low life that is devoured up by every accident, preyed on by disease, swept into the maw of famine, and trodden like dirt under the heel of war. Forces are matched to those who are to experience them, and we have but to discover the forecast of knowledge in what we do, to soften the harshest laws of nature. War still lingers so long among us, because there are so many who are willing to be, or can easily be pressed to be, its food. Did every common soldier leave an abundant and delightful home the ranks of armies would not be so easily filled.

The more densely populated parts of the globe are usually those in which the greatest comfort prevails. This is true not only of Europe and America, but even of China and Japan. No portion of the world has reached its maximum of population while the larger share of it lies comparatively waste. Yet tracts the most sparsely occupied have been frequently overpeopled, when judged by the ability of the inhabitants to secure sustenance; and departments of labor have been often crowded by those who would have found abundant employment if they had brought more skill and forethought to their tasks. Their race has never approached an exhaustion of the resources of nature, though it has often found occasion to shift and improve the means of their development; as unwise agriculture may speedily impoverish a soil that under more thrifty handling would constantly

develop new power. It is not wise men, but fools, that nature objects to multiply; these she presses to extinction, while still liberal with those. The more virtuous and intelligent a population, the more numerous and prosperous may it be; the more vicious and ignorant, the more is it open to every fling of fortune and bolt of fate. There have been too few men, not too many, to make life easy hitherto.

The point at which the pressure of population presents a problem of practical interest is chiefly that of the poorer classes. It has not been found possible to relieve the natural penalties of indolence and improvidence, to take men out from the laws and forces to which their own characters subject them without the rise of some unexpected and severe evil. Poor-laws that are ample and lenient tend to feed the mischief they are designed to remedy. The indolent cannot be laid as a load upon the industrious without becoming at once a dead weight, losing all remains of helpfulness, and settling into a state of contented dependence. The harsh spur of poverty is not found too severe for the tough skins and blunted sensibilities of the majority of those to whom it is applied; and aid must come in the way of opportunities opened, incipient enterprise nourished, a chrysalis of intellectual and spiritual life spun, rather than by any decided modification of the conditions and forces under which the problem of prosperity is wrought out. The refractory indolence of the prisoner is sometimes corrected by placing him in a position in which he must work or die, must pump the water, or allow it to rise and suffocate him. Such stern disposition do the laws of God make of the most dull and perverse of his subjects — of savage man:

> "A creature, squalid, vengeful and impure;
> Remorseless, and submissive to no law
> But superstitious fear and abject sloth."

As the work of sin deepens, the curse strengthens, and "In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread" becomes a most painful and persistent fact.

Another device which a hasty philanthropy has hit upon whereby to relieve the sad features of the world — to undo by a trick of management and new relations the work of sin, and unbind its heavy burdens — has been socialism, an artificial equality of labor and reward. Akin to this is the plausible, but equally impossible, claim of Ruskin, that all labors of like amounts should receive the same reward; that a scheme of justice weighing out wages according to the exertion expended should supersede commercial law. Such systems have no imperatives, no final persuasive to compel the purchase of the unprofitable labor, to impose the divided burden, each parcel to its own place. Nothing remains, therefore, but to let the willing do the work of the unwilling, the industrious, of the indolent; or to allow these last to accept and suffer the consequences of their own action. But this leads us back to God's method, and leaves us subject to those same fearful forces that have wrought such a melancholy work of scourging on the backs of the blind and perverse. Outside philanthropy finds itself in the dilemma of either robbing intelligence and industry of their reward, — every praiseworthy citizen taking a beggar to his shoulders, and travelling hopelessly with a burden of faults not his own, — or of casting off the unworthy, hemming them in once more to the fruits of their folly, till the bitterness of sin shall aid in working its cure, and help to create an appetite for something better.

A still graver difficulty with reforms which rest in a readjustment of natural relations is, that they confound justice and benevolence, and thus destroy the latter; that they require of the strong and faithful as a duty, as a direct obligation to their fellows, what is at most a gift, a kindness, the play of affection. If I am bound to the common service, if I am made its drudge, if my own is not after all my own, then benevolence can find no true play, and my spiritual life is choked by the tight-clasped hands of the the parasitic, portable poverty wherewith God and nature have loaded me. Nothing can be spontaneous, religious;

since a false notion of law has made it necessary, obligatory.

God demands a growth in character as the final and indispensable condition of increasing prosperity; and this demand even philanthropy cannot evade. It must learn to work with it, and reach the external chiefly through the internal, the actions through the disposition which inspires them. A new state of things is of little moment save as it is accompanied by or gives rise to a new state of thoughts, of desires, a new balance of impulses. Such has always been the fool's paradise. God suffers it no more in nature than in religion. He conditions success on the presence of the mental qualities which secure it. The incipient movement is in mind; while growth is continued and completed by the favoring results of its own action, as life develops and builds up the very functions and organs which are to maintain it. The earlier Christians, under the force of their first love, held all things common — a system which they had by no means sufficient religious power to support. It presented at once to Ananias the fatal temptation, and drew forth the murmurings of the Grecians against the Hebrews. The church had much longer to travel the hard road of discipline which the selfishness of the human heart prepares for it, before it could safely enter into an equal and easy partnership of physical gifts.

As long as the staple with which Providence has to deal in the races of men is ignorance and indolence interstratified with sin, — stupidity made heavy, solid, opaque, and gritty with a wicked will, the unpliant and stubborn mass can only be broken and ground and reformed by the strongest and harshest of machinery. Unpitying poverty, absolute and severe want, must be allowed to force action, to sharpen instincts, to strengthen the will. War and pestilence must winnow the feeble races, lest they swarm in vile, unprofitable life. The gold-bearing quartz is to be crushed, and in separation to be mainly lost. If any race or individual discovers a rugged physical strength greater than that of others, he is

to find in the prizes of violence motives for activity and development. Such a state is scarcely a moral one; physical forces have sway, and death is of little moment if it plays into a higher life. The insects that feed the bird meet their destination. The savages that are trodden out of a stronger race are in the line of progress. It is well that the Tyrian, Carthaginian, Greek, Roman, struggling into civilized life, should rule, should more and more trample and subordinate the weaker races; for in them is the bud of development, and it cannot be expanded without the nutriment of the whole plant, without this apparent usurpation of rank and position.

We — we as interpreters — are not to bring higher and impossible motives and feelings into a lower field. Mere life and naked life is nothing. God allows us to feed constantly upon it to teach us its subordination. He sets half the jaws of the world preying upon it, to show that only as evolved into that which is higher is it of worth. Not in stolid maintenance, not in hopeless pause, not as mere cunning mechanism, is it sacred and heaven-cherished; but in its upward tendencies, in that growth by which it is more and higher than all about it, and may be infinitely greater than it now is. Hence that which is best in it, low as this may be, has the field, is trained into statelier growth. Such has been the plan foreshadowed from the beginning. The vast losses of the process in human society spring from the worthlessness of the material, the low range of motives at work, and thus belong to that debased state of transgression which makes other instrumentalities ineffectual and transcendental.

That tenderness of life which we meet in natural theology confronts us again here. It argues against the mercy of God from the simple presence of suffering. It isolates the naked fact of pain, and, with the exasperated sympathies of a child, refuses to contemplate the sweep, grandeur, and high character of the plan which includes it, — which, with the weight and splendor of its ultimate attainments sinks

out of sight this rugged, angular stone of the foundations. It forgets that we must sacrifice the whole, or accept its parts.

We need not fear a return to darkness, to physical checks. These have sway in savage life. Every century of Christian progress carries us farther and farther beyond them. Extreme poverty, cruel tyranny, the ravenous impulses of the barbarian, give us the lowest government of which human society is capable, yet a government, and one in perfect keeping with the appetites and passions thereby handled and trained.

When in any race the germ of growth is found; when intelligence meets with a reward, and is quickened by the reward with which it meets; when the degradation, weakness, and poverty left behind, the rank, strength and luxury gained, have aroused the mind to full activity, we at once discover the possibility and the play of higher motives, the setting in of new social forces producing, to the eye at least, better results. Thought and activity become the recognized means of success. These soon gain large gifts from nature, and population rapidly increases. Honesty and the virtues of thrift claim a place in public sentiment and institutions. We have now a government of self-interest — not that blind, passionate, brute selfishness, which knows not how to prosper on that it plunders, but a determined, restrained, intelligent self-interest, which finds an adequate motive for industry in the good to be gained, and also a reason therein for some measure of justice and mercy.

As the rewards of skill increase, as the stimulus to production becomes great, appearing in varied forms of pleasure and power, all classes of the community are affected thereby, yet very unequally. Those more susceptible of intellectual excitement, more ambitious of success, come at once and so fully under the forces which secure material progress as to exercise almost unconsciously that forecast, prudence, and diligence which are its conditions. The lower classes, in the meantime, relatively little quickened by the new incitements, still press and punish each other with competition in

a labor-market overcrowded with the proffer of mere brute strength.

The loitering, unambitious poor still reserve for themselves the lash of necessity, are checked in increase on their narrow basis of skill by hardship and disease, and left under the severe hand of physical law, treating them according to the dulness and sin that is in them. While the motives in an enlightened community securing progress are less and less of an external character; while they have with some very complete power, and reach all with a measure of influence, there is sure to come, in a society relying chiefly on the selfish impulses, an arrest of material and intellectual growth. Other stronger and more generous forces must take up the social movement, bear it into a higher field, and complete it in a nobler life. Failing of these influences diffusing themselves from above, the nation is first checked, then weakened, by the conflicting forces of evil, and at length dissolved and thrown back into the elemental and chaotic state in which physical laws are pre-eminent.

These nobler impulses, which must early intervene and at length assume the government, — wanting which all is imperilled, — are those of our moral and spiritual nature. Religious love can no more be robbed of its field than can self-interest. Certain stages of growth demand its presence, cannot be passed or maintained without it. The advanced ranks will, as we have seen, more and more take the lead in the march of improvement, will secure a degree of attainment and consequent power which will enable them easily to shift the common burdens back on those who have fallen behind. Indeed, the tendency of natural law is to make hard terms with servants; and when avarice, arrogance, and tyranny add themselves thereto, they are able to lay a load of difficulties on the abject classes or subject races, which, ceasing to stimulate, discourages and overwhelms them.

Though the most just and long-sighted self-interest does, indeed, include a regard for others, and make way in free competition for their development, ambition for wealth and

distinction is so relative, seeks so little what is absolutely good, is so excited by immediate and comparative superiority as always and certainly to avail itself to the full of the power over inferiors which falls into its hands. Slavery, labor pressed to the lowest limits of the market, classes left without educational, or denied social and religious, privileges, or excluded from the ownership of the soil, are quite consonant with self-interest seeking in the readiest way the eminence and influence it craves. So long, therefore, as those forces prevail which mere intellectual development calls forth, the lower ranks often find the increasing inducements to effort more than compensated by the social barriers and inabilities which have sprung up in their path, and that they are absolutely little nearer, and relatively farther off, from their true social rank than in barbarism.

Thus the slaves of Grecian republics, the populace of Rome, the bondmen of America, the colliers and kindred classes of England have been so anticipated and outstripped in the race of progress as to become the pack-horses of the more powerful. They have not been able to emancipate themselves from the reign of physical law, in part because of the savage element lingering in them, and in part because those who have gone before them have sedulously hedged up the way against them.

Another cause from which we are sure to find progress resting on intelligence alone, ultimately thwarted is, that the very qualities which self-interest at first disciplines, it at length allows to decay. The desire of wealth, a high estimate of the comforts and elegances of life call forth industry, quicken skill, impart patience and courage; but when prosperity begins to follow, when the returns of labor multiply, the sinews of strength are first relaxed, then lost. The desire is both palled and disappointed by gratification. Indulgence, luxury, hatch their brood of vices, character becomes more intensely selfish, less courageous, less manly. The virtues which were called forth and disciplined in acquisition slowly disappear, and, the support of character

being lost, the accident of possession is sure to disappear. Open to all violence from within and without, the state, the nation, enervated by its own success, its power lost in the arrest of its momentum, is certain, sooner or later, to fall. To the impulse of interest a rapid movement onward, a new world to conquer, a fresh motive wherewith to break up the camp and resume the march, are indispensable; since it knows not how truly to inherit good, or quietly to hold what it has won, and profit by it. The arts of peace which are the arts of virtue; the pleasures of enjoyment which are the luxuries of holiness, it has not learned; and therefore, checking itself in no indulgence, it sinks into debauch, and perishes, like Alexander, at what seems to be its goal.

Self-interest, therefore, — though quickening the minds of men, though inciting long and rapid strides in civilization, though powerfully operative, even when moral forces assume the lead, — cannot sustain progress; since it cannot close up the ranks of the straggling army, cannot put it at harmony with itself, cannot win rights, opportunities for the lowest, cannot even satisfy and firmly nerve from generation to generation those who take the lead. It may break, like Hannibal, through the Alps, and carry victory down their slopes; but is sure to find its forces waste away amid the delicacies and indulgences of conquest. In neglecting the lowest it destroys the highest ranks of society, and both perish together.

To prosper the languid movement, then, to lift men into permanent enlightenment, those moral forces for which intelligence makes way must come into the ascendency. The laborer must find his mind quickened, his hand made skilful, his heart enriched, by the aid and sympathy of those who have preceded him; while those who hold the advance must be strong to maintain their ground in the temperance of virtue, must measure and enjoy the good they have won in its moral and spiritual ministrations, in the inheritance of substantial, peaceful acquisitions, in the pleasure of social affections, and benevolent impulses. Thus the community is knit togther,

strong against the shock of armies and decay of time. The wilderness is passed, and a promised land reached and rested in. How impossible that this Beulah of the race should simply give rein to passion and scope to desire. With character the foundations of good give way. When man approaches the moment of indulgence, there must spring up afresh the strength of a spiritual life or the debasement of a physical one.

There are here three grades of law; each lower passing into the higher, and only capable of completion, fulfilment, by it. We have sheer physical necessity, a law of violence acting on the savage with the constant and close checks of famine and pestilence. Lifted by diligence from this stage of development, self-interest furnishes society a very wide and varied and powerful class of motives; and prudence supplies a check to increase which is hardly felt in comparison with those close limits which barbarous life had rendered necessary. Later, the moral impulse comes in to regulate, temper, and maintain that of self-interest; and the moral affections so assume dominion over the appetites, that the forces of life are made to expand and occupy vacancies, are fitted to exigencies and opportunities without any sense of collision or restraint.

Man is first driven to work and becomes a laborer; he is then urged by all those motives which cluster about success to acquire skill, and later finds the ground he has gained is worth little and cannot be held without virtue. Thus the forces below link themselves with those above, and serve their purpose in preparing for, and giving way to, this higher order. The savage in becoming a producer is civilized, but seeking to retain and enjoy that which he has gained, has need of the manhood of virtue.

There is here no intimation that the race have travelled, or are to travel, *seriatim*, through these three grades of law. In some instances, nations have sunk from the second to the first, in others partially risen to the third. For the present, we merely mark these strata of forces, as always acting, or

ready to act, on society; that nations cannot by disobedience fall below the lowest, nor by growth fail to reach the highest as a necessity in its completion. The only permanent, universal, safe, protective progress of the race, then, lies in the line of those religious forces which God has established, maintains, and pushes by natural and supernatural agency to their consummation.

Capital is the third great agent of production, the third force working for physical good and the conditions of high, social life. Natural agents are first present, affording that with which and on which labor is employed. Labor, then, comes in as the effort of man by means of these to improve his position. But he soon finds that effort productive of progress must contemplate long periods, cannot be a simple transfer of food from hand to mouth. The results of present exertion must be held in reserve, ready to accrue with increased gains at some future moment. This necessity gives rise to capital. Capital is any commodity or commodities retained to be employed in production.

It involves an arrest of consumption, a defer of returns, that these may in the end be larger. The forms it assumes are two — fixed and circulating. Under the first we have tools, machinery, buildings, vessels, railroads; under the second, material in the processes of production, wages, products on sale. In fixed capital, the product retained is not destined for direct, but indirect, mediate, consumption. It is made and held as a means to something else.

The necessity of capital in production is most obvious and most urgent. There can be no conjoint labor, and hence no division of labor, without capital. For this the processes of production must be separated, broadened, enlarged in their scale, admitting the labor of many, and assigning each step of manufacture to its own agent. A corresponding amount of material is at once involved, a meeting of present necessities with other resources, a waiting for the future, and frequently

somewhat remote, aggregate return of toil to compensate present expenditure. In proportion, therefore, as labor involves itself, rolls up into great establishments, into a powerful, complex, and massive agency; in proportion as it divides its functions, multiplies its instruments, gets skill and precision at many and diverse points, increases, as it were, its specific powers and senses, and then organizes all into a single, compact, mechanical body, a branch of manufacture, sending diverse materials through many hands and processes to bring them at length together with marvellous aptness and precision of adaptation, a finished whole, clock, watch, or rifle; according as it spreads yet relates its action, giving to an express company ramifications that cover a continent, yet a unity and consistency of movement that scatters to all quarters and gathers from all quarters the bundles and boxes of cities, villages, and hamlets, with the system and regularity with which the heart sends the blood to the extremities, and draws it again to the seat of life; in the measure that labor gets to itself power, becomes grand and massive in some railroad corporation, sets a thousand employés, scattered over hundreds of miles, with incessant, vigilant toil, to bear, without delay or danger, the onward and refluent waves of travel, chasing each other in interminable and rapid succession along the great thoroughfares of a nation; in the degree that labor understands and accepts these its great tasks will it find the storehouse of its material, the magazine of its strength, in capital.

Nor is this organizing and compacting of labor till it becomes truly formidable, equal to the greatest undertaking, any more marked result of capital than the resources which are placed at its disposal in tools, machinery, buildings, and the appliances of commerce. The present efficiency of labor is almost wholly dependent on these: they are the fruit of past thought, the seed of future harvests. It is in the mechanical arts that we find the grade mark of present physical prosperity. Stripped of these results of past labor, society relapses instantly into a barbarous state, as much as the individual turned naked into the forest.

The length backward of that line of connections by which every present productive result is bound to the past, the multiplicity of directions into which it divides, the perfect and extensive net-work of relations which it finally forms, can hardly be better illustrated than by a simple supposition: I break the blade of my knife; with the present appliances of art an accident of little moment; a few minutes of labor may replace it. Suppose me now cut off from the aid of previous labor, from the advantages of all forms of capital, and called on to restore the steel. Grant me the skill necessary in all the mechanical branches connected with the manufacture, and my food and clothing while in the pursuit of my purpose, and yet a hundred years might not suffice to replace in its perfection the broken instrument. I reach, on foot, the distant ore-bed, and there I find myself with no pickaxe to break the ground, or shovel to remove the soil. I can only arm my naked hands with a stick, picked up at random. If I would either point or flatten this to make it more serviceable, I have no tool at hand for the purpose. To shape, therefore, the rudest implement, without which I cannot penetrate the soil to any depth, I must learn to manufacture stone into knives and hatchets, and with these hew out the wooden instruments for which I have occasion. Once in possession of the ore, I have no smelting-furnace wherein to separate the iron; and in the construction of this shall have sore need of some steel tool, wherewith to fashion the stone, and bring them to their places. The pig-iron secured, and a second furnace erected for annealing and making pliant the metal, I have no sledge wherewith to hammer, no anvil whereon to hammer, the half-molten mass. The nearer the process approached completion, the more difficult should I find it to handle, shape, draw, weld iron without iron. I might be compelled to abandon my brittle unmalleable stone-tools, and seek to work first some of the easier, purer metals, as copper, that by means of more efficient instruments, I might later manage the iron. My knife once brought to full perfection, and the means at my disposal of extracting ore and

carrying it through the entire process by which it at length becomes a well-shaped, sharp, and polished blade, I should find, when I had replaced my less fit instruments through the entire manufacture with those of iron, that I had opened a path which successive races and nations have occupied many hundred years in exploring, and which lies central amid those great thoroughfares of art along which the mechanical invention of the world has advanced. I should have traced a line of progress from its very first effort in infant human society to its very last result, and have marked every step with a new tool, a new resource, a fresh accumulation of capital. When we observe how this simple, straight line of effort connects itself with every other, — with work in stone, wood, and metals other than iron, with invention in directions which accompany and call forth invention in this — the civilized man shaping the light, elegant, pliant blade of his pen-knife, daintily forming and beautifying its handle, and closing the two with snug and easy clasp, only because his whole life is one luxury — we shall understand what an accumulation of previous labor and thought, what complexity of capital, what potentialities of execution, of cunning, adroit, nimble craft, are back even of so simple an enjoyment as the slender knife that I use for a moment, and hide in my waistcoat pocket.

Capital, then, is the mechanical grainery of the race, the storehouse of its efficiency, the arsenal whence art sends forth her troops with arms and siege-trains. Its power is not due to its present value, but to the potentiality that is in it, — to the ease with which it creates products and renews itself. It is like the farmer's seed, of no great worth if more can be obtained, but of inestimable worth if it be all. But this power is not lodged in mere capital, in tools, machinery, and appliances. These are nothing without the skill of the workman ; can no more avail by themselves than can that skill without them. To make the warrior, there must be both the sword and the right hand to wield it.

In the arts, these two powers so essential to each other,

physical and mental efficiency and the instruments they require are usually separated, and we have two classes, the capitalists and the laborers. These are either enemies, opponents, or coadjutors, according to the growth of the society of which they form either wing. So long as force retains ascendency, and violence is the bond of order, there will be but little capital, and laborers will refuse all exertion not laid upon them by necessity and the exactions of others. As, however, a nation advances in production, as the power of capital begins to be felt, and the sceptre passes into the hands of the wealthy, the relation between the laborer and capitalist ceases more and more to be one of force, and becomes that mutual, commercial dependence which opens advantage and furnishes incentives to all. There do, indeed, linger here and there traces of the earlier condition. Slavery and serfdom, heirlooms of the reign of violence, a solution by force of the interests of society and the rights of men, may, stubbornly fortified in the selfishness of a few, hold for a while their ground. Though this state of things is no more an economic answer to the problem of society than it is a moral one, it yet rarely happens that the purely productive power, the simple commercial principle, unaided of religion, is able to make a stand against wedged, compact customs, drifting down from ages of rapine and violence, like ice-fields from the north; to break them up, and secure in the once more mobile elements of society a free field for the play of its own forces. When the commercial relation is not obstructed by serfdom and law, it often is by the slighter but most serious obstacles of ranks and classes, rooted in the customs of society and the opinions of men. Thus certain races are debarred from the free use of their powers, and the female sex from many employments.

Society is in its productive organization no further commercial than it rests on simple economic forces, and suffers competition to determine the condition of individuals and classes. So far as any are bolstered by custom, shielded by hereditary privilege, or armed with legal power, the remains

of an earlier and lower state are seen — the wash and ploughing, the grinding and scouring of a glacier period.

Commercial rule, though certainly far in advance of that of violence, with strong features in it of liberty and just law, though leaving each with the fruits of his own forethought and industry, abstinence and skill, may yet in many phases of society — phases which all civilized communities more or less widely present — rest with a heavy hand on those who fall with narrow resources of intelligence and opportunity into its power.

The fulcrum across which labor and capital act on each other is competition. If there is little capital and much labor, the former has the long arm of the lever, and the latter must put forth the more strength or be crushed. If the reverse is true, the situation of each is reversed. It is the competition of capitalists with capitalists for laborers that compels them to lay aside their reserve, forfeit the advantage of distance, and approach the workmen with favorable proffers. On the other hand, it is the crowd of workmen besieging the doors of capital that puts them at the mercy of the employer who, with a short, tight nip, warps them to his terms. As a superior hand, a skilled foreman, singles himself from many, we at once see the length of leverage he secures, and the easy conditions he makes between competing capitalists. The strictly commercial attitude of the laborer and capitalist is one of rivalry; each finding it for his interest to push the fulcrum toward his opponent, nothing determining that it shall rest in the midway region of justice save the joint intelligence of the parties.

Unfortunately, we may say, — yet fortunately, if we consider the motives of progress and the exigencies of society, — capital always in the outset has the advantage. It comes in small amounts later than labor, and finds this depressed by its poverty. Hence it learns to make its own terms, and acquires a prestige and arrogance which are not easily shaken off. While the early advantages of the capitalist

give an unusual stimulus to that industry and abstinence by which a most indispensable agent of progress is secured, they also impose a prudence and thrift on the laborer he is not always prepared to accept, and failing of which he slips into the hands of his employer.

Though the principles on which social forces act are ever the same, the forces themselves are constantly varied. As the current of the river now cuts one bank and now the other, and again glides quietly midway in the channel, so the competitive power of trade is now pressing one class of agents, sweeping the ground from beneath them, and now, leaving these, turns to another. If we take any single moment in the productive history of a nation, the share of the common products which capital will, when both agents are free, be compelled to yield to labor, and the amount it will be able to reserve, will depend on the present relation of the two. The more numerous the capitalists compared with the laborers, the more liberal will be the portion which the latter will obtain. If, however, the wages-fund be small and the workmen many, the quotient will be correspondingly reduced. From this determination of the problem there is no immediate escape. The forces which have established the present relation of the parties lie in the past, and cannot be approached. The most that can be done is to modify the agencies now at work, and through these reach future results; to introduce new conditions into the problem, and thus secure new solutions. Each succeeding period is determined by preceding ones, and itself in turn settles the character of those which come after it. The economic transitions of society are gradual, giving forethought, diligence, patience, their perfect work. Possession, control, are gained here exactly as in the individual conflict with mutinous passions and the tyranny of circumstances. Single points are painfully won, and these at length united in compact, easy dominion. Looking at a single unfortunate section of life, we seem to be the bondmen of fate; tracing a series of faithful and skilful struggles, we show ourselves the masters of events.

On the part of laborers, the quality which chiefly determines their relation to capital is intelligence accompanied by virtue. Intelligence gives versatility to the laborer, and enables him to relieve the pressure in one place or in one occupation by turning to another. It makes the joint product of itself and capital greater, thus enlarging and stimulating the latter; it suits its action to its circumstances, and prevents the speedy and premature devouring of limited resources, the destruction of seed-grain, the increase of mouths on provision. Thus the shore is slowly lifted up, the current diverted, and labor enabled easily and firmly to maintain itself.

On the part of capitalists, that which improves the condition of the laborer, indeed of all, is primarily abstinence, the addition of profits to capital. This great instrument in its increase not only places the best and most numerous facilities at the disposal of labor, but on the cheapest possible terms. The increase of capital incident to progress in production is attended with a relative loss, compensated by large absolute gains. The rate per cent sinks as wealth increases. Capital is more readily acquired and consequently loaned on easier terms.

The progress of production, then, tends to a relative gain on the part of laborers, and a corresponding loss by capitalists. The absolute and relative share of the former, the absolute share alone of the latter, is enlarged. In the earlier stages of growth, the chief demand is for capital; hence a powerful motive is present, searching far and wide for the required agent. As this want is met the demand slowly subsides; a counter desire springs up for intelligent labor; the advantage sets steadily with every step of real progress in this direction; till, at length, the industrious and prudent masses hold the sceptre. The capitalist is to the very end a gainer, but not so unqualified and great a one as the laborer. The profits of capital necessarily tend to their own reduction, since they in part, at least, are thrown into competition with the very capital from which they were realized. A high per cent

cannot be long maintained, as capital so rapidly increases under it as to reduce the value of its use. Though the returns of capital must, by simple, normal growth, ever diminish, those habits and desires in the meantime on which abstinence depends become so settled and powerful, that the rate of interest may fall off without arresting the accumulation of capital.

The gains of the laborer, on the contrary, may steadily increase, and this, so far from being in itself an occasion of a future reduction, will, by the social rank and advantages conferred, only tend to prepare the way for further growth. Labor in the end enters fully into all the advantages of superior productiveness, the gains of skill, discovery, and invention, and also acquires an increasing control of its chief instrument, capital. The normal growth then of society is toward man, not toward mechanism; it lodges more and more power with the person, the laborer, and makes the accumulations of capital, the ponderous wheels and appliances of production, increasingly subservient to him.

There is not at bottom and finally any real diversity of interest between the laborer and capitalist. The absolute gains of each depend far more on the cordial co-operation of each, the union of the best and most willing skill with the most complete instruments under the stimulus of generous dealing, and the consequent increase of the sum-total of products, than on securing a somewhat disproportionate share in a greedy division of present returns. Capital that remorselessly scrapes all that it can into its own coffers, that presses ill-paid labor to the last point of competition, so weakens the character, undermines the strength, and reduces the motives of its chief agents, as to render the highest production impossible. The quality of labor is so dependent on the quality of manhood, on social and intellectual rank, that these cannot be overlooked in securing the highest results. Productive power is proportioned to skill and integrity: qualities that are born and bred on generous, spiritual fare. The moral element must thus begin early to permeate

society, that the productive element may reach full expression. Only as selfishness is steadily softened into a just and generous regard of the good of others, will the friction of society cease, and concurrent wheels bear all rapidly to the goal.

But while this ultimate harmony of interests waiting to be developed by the religious impulse is most undeniable, it will not reveal itself, or become very potent in controlling the action of men, till late in the progress of society. The earlier, the more habitual attitude of parties, after the period of violence has passed, and that of law, of civil rights, has commenced, will be that of sharp competition, of a stern and unscrupulous use of the advantages which the market affords. Indeed, this is the basis of simple justice, of pure economic right, and therefore the only one on which the claims of all parties can find firm, constant, and conclusive adjustment. All beyond this is charity on one side and supplication on the other. If a workman wishes higher wages than the employer is willing to pay, he has but one test of the validity of his claim, but one method of constraint; and that is his ability to secure elsewhere the sum demanded. From the alternative which the workman is thus able to present, the capitalist has no appeal; he must pay the wages claimed, or yield the laborer to the competing proffer. Here is commercial law, commercial justice, a practical and final decision of all questions, beyond which there is the opportunity for no claim, as there is for no coercion. Indeed, a claim implies an actual or possible means of its enforcement, some law resting either on social justice or natural forces for its maintenance. But in trade, whether in labor or in commodities, there can be laid no constraint on the will of the parties beyond that springing from their own desires, and neither party has a hold on the desire of the other, by which to force an advance except as he has potentially at least a better proffer. His power to do better is the vantage ground of the seller, and the injunction, "Do better if you can," the adequate commercial basis and retort of the buyer in a free market.

The constant and familiar aspect, therefore, which this relation of labor to capital everywhere assumes is one of trade; the employer buying the services of the employé according to their nominal quality at the lowest possible rate. The harmony of interests is in a strictly commercial stage a speculative truth rather than a practical one, and suffers long eclipse amid the hardships of coarse, unqualified labor, amid the heartless pressure of stern forces that seem capable of no immediate and adequate mitigation. The capitalist goes to the market for his laborers as for his material, takes them as possessed, in the rough and on an average, of a given grade of efficiency, pays them what they can get elsewhere, and, with rare exceptions, lays little stress on any peculiar willingness they are to bring to his tasks, or any new skill they are to develop under personal stimulus in his own and their behalf. An average of efficiency and character is all that is expected, all that is usually recognized or paid for. If more than this is shown, it may become the means of rising into a higher class; if less, of sinking into a lower one. As yet it is the exception that the workman brings the more obscure yet effective virtues of character to enhance the price of his labor, or finds a willingness to pay wages in the hopes of developing more hearty, skilful, and frugal labor. The estimates of the capitalists are too hasty, too much in the gross, while the sensibilities of the laborers are too feeble and fluctuating to make this method extensively prevalent. Blunt, rude forces must, or at least will, be dealt with in the quick, careless methods of approximate justice. In a much higher degree is this true when there is found in a wealthy community a large class of degraded laborers much below the standard of respectable citizens.

It is not, moreover, absolute but immediate good that the employer chiefly aims at. Men make haste to be rich. They expect more from reducing the expenses of production, from a close handling of its agents, than from their education and the stimulus of generous incentives. It is relative advantage, superiority, display, the instant assumption of

rank, that those in the acquisition of wealth more frequently covet; and this end, to the greedy, grasping nature of man, seems about to be reached most quickly by a scramble for ascendency which leaves to the devil the hindmost. Selfishness, unscrupulous, urgent, mole-eyed, remains the prevalent, effective force of production, adjusts the relation of parties, and will not close up the ranks of labor in solid columns for a quiet, firm, patient march of progress.

Nor, in the school of God's training, is this altogether loss. Independence and strength are as much to be developed as generosity and forbearance. Not, therefore, till character has been beaten, felted firm under much pressure and many blows, are the poor ready to be united to the rich in mutual, generous co-operation. As long as the one party is so weak as to be willing to load the generosity of the other, it is not without significance that these are so selfish as pitilessly to spurn the burden. First independence, then favor; strength, then beauty, is the line of development.

In this close, sharp traffic of labor with capital which the productive world still presents, the capitalist usually holds the balance of advantage. In some of the most enlightened nations a numerous class of improvident, hungry laborers press each other to the limits of life, and hang in perpetual squalor and destitution on the verge of extinction. A second class rises into the possession of necessities, a third, of decencies, and a few, of luxuries. In more fortunate countries, as our own, the first or lowest class is nearly wanting, and the remaining classes are correspondingly more numerous. But the laborer, whatever his rank, — whether standing on the crumbling brink of poverty, ready to be carried by a week's illness or a month's idleness into pauperism, or planted on a firmer ground, fortified by the earnings of years, — has less reserved power, less mobility, fewer resources than the capitalist; and when, therefore, the endurance of the parties is tested, as by a strike, is usually compelled to yield.

A strike is a species of commercial warfare, hazardous, attended by severe loss, and of rare application. As a

perfectly voluntary compact of workmen, it is the simple assertion of a right, and, save as ineffective and wasteful, cannot be condemned on moral and commercial grounds. So extreme a measure, however, is rarely necessary. The causes which justify a rise of wages will usually, by the inevitable laws of trade, quietly secure that result. If the clamor becomes loud and the measures violent, the fact more often marks the absence than the presence, in the relation of the parties, of those grounds which render the claim just. It is only rarely that one party to a trade so falls into the hands of the other that an open market furnishes no means of quiet and speedy redress. Yet it must be admitted that workmen more frequently than others, trafficking as they do in a single commodity, a peculiar form of labor, are liable to find themselves with no immediate and adequate resource. Thus employers, frequently few in number, can easily come to a tacit understanding without attracting public attention, and steadily resist the natural forces which are tending to press up the price of labor. The workmen, on the contrary, cannot easily shift their abode or their occupation, and feel keenly the immediate necessity of continuing labor on the best terms they can make. There is, indeed, with us a good deal of mobile labor, but it usually takes up its vagabond habits at the expense of prosperity.

On any sudden inflation of prices laborers are sure to be relatively the losers. Goods may rise repeatedly, till profits become enormous, and yet the operative secure but a slight, a very inadequate increase of wages. In the years of war which followed with us the rebellion, profits in most branches of manufacture were very unusual; while the advance of wages, though considerable, by no means kept pace with prices; and the condition of workmen became, and remains, more trying than before. It may be thought that if the laboring class receive less than their portion of unusual gains, they also suffer less when profits fall away. This is very often not true. Many branches of manufacture are suspended in times of depression, and thus an almost insup-

portable burden is thrown upon workmen. While we do not think, then, that laborers, fastened by limited means and skill to a single place and employment, and pressed to the immediate sale of their services, command the advantages of the market in an anything like the same degree as the capitalist, neither do we think that in an extreme measure of resistance, a strike, they are likely to carry their point, unless sustained by such obvious justice, such a pressure of natural forces, as to render the measure with a little more patience and management unnecessary. In a mere struggle of passion the capitalist has the position. Immediate production is rarely a necessity to him, and is so, oftener than otherwise, to the laborer. It is hard work to starve out a garrison that starts with more provision and resources than the encompassing host. Unless, therefore, natural forces vigorously second a strike, — unless the exigencies of the employers are urgent, and their sources of relief inadequate, — such a movement cannot often be successful; and if these advantages do belong to the workmen, and are brought skilfully to bear, it cannot often be necessary. A relapse into open conflict is a disastrous retreat for both parties from the commercial position they have reached. It indicates a passion so violent as even to disregard self-love.

It is the character of the natural forces at work, the actual balance of advantages in the market, that must finally settle the rate of wages. The most successful strike cannot push them long or much above the trade-mark, nor the most absolute injustice of capitalists press them much or long below it. The competition of laborers will correct the one, and of capitalists the other, evil. Profits cannot be depressed without a reduction of capital, a falling off of employment, and a quick transfer of the burden, sadly increased, indeed, back again to the working classes. What the laborer requires is skill to develop the market, to bring out and avail himself to the full of all its advantages. Nature, not his co-workers, must be made more generous. This power is more effective than strikes; and strikes without

it are delusive and pernicious. They retard production, waste the savings of the poor, use up reserved power, check the growth of capital, provoke passion, and thus lessen at once the ability and inclination of the employer to advance the condition of those in his service. These efforts as a whole should be classed among the foolish, frantic efforts of persons to improve their condition without personal progress, to secure better terms than the stringent justice of trade allows them — a kicking against the pricks most fatal to those who practise it most frequently and persist in it most faithfully. We say this with most hearty sympathy for those as a class who have undertaken them, and because we believe there is a better, wiser way.

Another method, besides this of compacts among workmen, aiming also to affect the scale of prices in their favor, is legislation. The end sought for is a diminution of the hours of labor. There is here a most desirable object, but also a grave mistake as to the office and power of legislation. A contract loses its character when the law steps in on behalf of either party to assign its conditions. A contract constructed under such legal constraints is a contract only in name, is often, in fact, a legalized plunder of one class by another. In saying this, we proceed on the supposition that both parties to the contract are adults, each able and at liberty to pursue his own interests, with no other restraints and disadvantages, with no other powers and advantages, than those which spring from the natural forces indicated by the condition of the market. If law may interfere with these inherent, spontaneous influences in apportioning the advantages of a contract, a principle is established which would allow the regulation of all prices, the division of the proceeds of labor between the parties to production, at the discretion of the legislature — a substitution of civil for natural law.

But this effort to secure a legal advantage beyond that of a free market must prove as inefficient as it is inadmissible. Indeed, the impotence of the effort is the best safeguard

against its ignorance. The aim, of course, is to limit labor to ten or eight hours without a corresponding reduction of compensation. The workman is left at liberty to labor for himself as many hours as he chooses, but not at liberty to sell his labor to one person for more than eight hours in one day. It is not generally the desire of laborers to reduce the hours of work so low as eight if the full loss of production must fall on themselves. This is seen in the many employments which readily admit this restriction of time, and in which, with appropriate abatement of wages, no opposition would be experienced on the part of employers. To expect, however, to be able to reduce the time of labor from ten to eight hours with the same wages and no change secured in the conditon of the market, by the mere force of law, is an anticipation arising in entire oversight of the forces at work. So far as such an effort should be successful it would result in immediate and severe discouragement of capital. Some branches of business might be ruined by it, and all would be in a measure depressed. As capital is fluent, sensitive to every unfavorable condition, its growth in the locality of the law would be at once retarded or wholly arrested. It would gradually loosen itself from present engagements, and seek elsewhere more favorable conditions, a free enjoyment of all its natural gains. Now no parties are more interested in the rapid growth of capital than the working classes; since it is the demand for labor that this occasions that gives them full and profitable employment. Their own effort, therefore, to secure a legitimate gain in a hasty and unjust way would quickly result in abridging capital, through this the demand for labor, and finally the wages of the workman. A serious and permanent evil would arise, which could only be removed by a complete restoration to capital, the most needful of agents, of all its lost advantages, its natural incentives; and by a fresh and longer lease of patience under a depressed labor-market, slowly regaining the ground lost by the check and withdrawal of this great instrument of production.

These considerations apply with greater force as the hours of labor decrease. In passing from thirteen to ten hours, it is fairly urged that the services rendered are as great in the shorter as in the longer period, since this passes the limits of attentive, sustained exertion. Such a statement is not applicable to a substitution of eight for ten hours, as the strength of most men is not overtasked by the larger number. The ostensible purpose, then, of a law establishing eight hours is to secure the same wages for less service; against this, honesty and wisdom alike protest.

In an exceedingly prosperous community, such legislation may repress growth without wholly arresting it, and thus seem endurable, even beneficial. Yet in fact, it will only defer the possession of those full, natural advantages which will finally give to intelligent labor by inalienable, irresistable right every reasonable claim. Our own thriving condition as a nation often disguises the effects of an unfortunate policy. A healthy constitution will throw off much poison. Legislation that is at war with natural law rarely does the amount of mischief by the analysis of causes attributable to it, since it is seldom able to secure any tolerably complete execution. When both parties find a contract for their common interest, and that neither can secure it on easier terms, the requisitions of the law are readily forgotten, and there is no moral or interested sentiment present for its execution.

We have touched this point in passing, not because we do not regard the end aimed at as desirable, but to show more distinctly the impossibility of evading the natural laws under which we are at the time acting, the impossibility of affecting favorably or shifting the conditions of society except in connection with the forces that give rise to them. Our remedies must be more interior and radical, recognizing the seat of the difficulty in character, and confronting it with moral forces. Man is bound to the conditions of progress society has already laid down, is baffled in his attempts to infringe on natural justice or natural liberty, is held sternly off from the rights of others, and compelled to advance in personal power as the

price of superior position. God rules, and will not allow the repeal or suspension of his laws.

The reduction of the hours of labor is sure to come; and when it shall come as the fruit of healthy growth, a most desirable result will it be. We object to legislation only because it disappoints and perplexes itself, retards the action of forces certainly and safely seeking the desired end; and because, if prematurely successful, it confers a good on many who are not prepared to appreciate and profit by it. The demand for leisure comes in gratification of the later and higher wants of our nature; it is a demand instituted in behalf of our intellectual, social, and moral tastes. Until the impulse and desire come from these quarters, leisure is an opportunity more full of fear than of hope. A holiday, a saint's day, in which mere ignorance, appetite, and criminal hilarity break loose, is to be dreaded as much as coveted; is more potent for degredation than elevation.

The natural relation of the productive forces is such that the desire for leisure and the power to secure it increase with increasing intelligence, as do also the pleasure and profit which it yields. Neither the safety, the harmony, nor the growth of society allow the later rewards of skill and cultivation to be forestalled and wasted by the vicious, the improvident, and the indolent. These qualities, all of them, depress labor, keep it on small returns, and thus under the constant spur of necessity. The severity of law holds back the dull and brutal from a good they would turn into evil, from an opportunity they have not fairly won, must soon forfeit, and for whose abuse there is sure to be exacted a severe penalty.

But how may this progress of the workman toward that command of the market which shall put leisure among his luxuries be accelerated? We will not dwell on intelligence as the essential condition, enabling the skilful laborer to press into and widen every opportunity, to discover and open new ones, to win independence, and command terms by the value, the indispensable character, of the services he renders.

In addition to this, labor should strive constantly to acquire the capital it needs to make an easy and feasible path from station to station in toil, from those positions in which wages are received to those in which a partnership is secured, and the use and profits of capital obtained. This constant aspiration of the workman for a more independent and commanding position, the joining of his means with those of his fellows to establish a new manufactory; this grading down of capitalists to laborers and grading up of laborers to capitalists; this cherishing of those intermediate employments and branches of business which allow capital and labor to centre in the same person, are of the utmost importance in pressing the lower ranks upward, and in allowing the advantages of accumulated wealth to descend freely downward with numerous and varied proffers of employment and openings for enterprise. When midway-men are extensively swept from between the two classes, as by heavy taxation, unequal legislation, and the disturbances of currency and production incident to war, the enormous accumulation of capital in the hands of individuals makes competition difficult, opens a gulf in the path of labor which it is too weak to bridge, and leaves it, relaxed by perpetual discouragement, to swarm and chafe hopelessly on the farther side, or push its foremost ranks in blind passion into the chasm. Joint-stock companies, copartnerships, the enterprise and talent of individuals, constitute the engineer-corps of the laboring classes, which is to re-open old, and establish new roads into the field of capital. Only as these Vandals of the workshop break in on the luxuries of the effete and effeminate, only as these Goths of the field bring sturdy and multitudinous powers wherewith to freshen and re-invigorate the pursuits and customs of society, rescuing to a new growth the seeds of civilization, shall we reach that later state, wherein the inheritance of kings and aristocracies becomes the abundant and sufficient possession of the people.

We now see the grades of change and of law through which that most important of social and productive classes,

the capitalists, pass. As tribes increasing in numbers, turning from a nomadic and plundering mode of life, begin to lay the foundations of a broad, growing, and permanent society, influence and power pass rapidly into the hands of those who are acquiring, or have acquired wealth. Not only do they reap its direct, immediate advantages, but as the community becomes increasingly commercial, they find new opportunities perpetually pressed upon them. Those who control the productive processes, who add to the national wealth, and furnish the sinews of war and the luxuries of peace; who command every variety of service and commodity, experience more and more the power of this new agent, and are stimulated to its further accumulation. Capital being required to open a fresh career of progress, to carry the nation on in growth, all forces concur for its creation by giving it large rewards. Economic, social, and political power gravitate toward the capitalist, and incite him to fresh efforts.

The selfish impulses of our nature are played on more intensely and unintermittedly than in the reign of physical strength. Every form of advantage, honor, luxury, display, arouse and stimulate the mind in its pursuit of wealth. The extent to which one motive is everywhere and every instant present, running through all classes and ages, one appeal sure to meet a response, one power certain to be felt in a commercial community, a large metropolis, is astonishing. Here is a force reaching all, — bringing to the counter every variety of commodity and service, enabling us to buy directly or deftly everything but virtue.

So intense does this desire for capital through these its advantages act on the mind, that it occasions a passion the most remorseless, unflinching, unpitying of all — avarice. Here, then, is a government intense enough, universal enough, to reach all classes, plying everywhere the sharpest spur of desire, quickening the foremost into a gallop, and helping the jaded laggard on the road.

Again, we inquire how far this grade of law, this stroke of force, can bear men and society toward the goal? Nor

have we to look long for an answer. Here is, indeed, a power which works toward morality, and yet more toward decency, which arrests and controls those who do not feel or will not abide under moral motives, but also one which altogether fails to anticipate the higher impulse or approach the results possible to religious love. The insufficiency of the economic incentive is seen in the instant, intense selfishness it begets, prompting the eager capitalist to wrench his full advantage from the reluctant hand of the workman, and press with long, quick strides into the ranks of the wealthy. Nor is it less seen in the passions and appetites it feeds, and which, in truth, lie at the bottom of its power. Vanity, among the more harmless of these, is yet thoughtless, unsympathetic, intensely grasping, and delights in that very separation of classes which makes perpetual poverty with its social and moral incidents the inheritance of half the human race. The merely selfish motive, therefore, capable as it is of arousing the mind, is not able to turn the strength of the higher classes backward and make it minister to the growth of the weaker and lower; but continually draws the nutriment of all upward, as the wick the oil to the light, that it may be consumed in the pride and luxuries of the few, till, the nerve and courage and patience of the nation burned out, it falls, like Rome of old, with strength all too little to bear the strokes of fate.

ARTICLE III.

MR. GROTE'S THEORY OF DEMOCRACY.

BY GEN. FRANCIS A. WALKER, EAST HAMPTON, MASS.

THE world has lost its taste for *a priori* politics. The discussion of metaphysic rights, which acquired an overwhelming interest through the French and American revolutions, has fallen rapidly off under the dull or painful reactions of the present century. A stern and practical inquiry into the workings of government, the capacities of representation, the prevention of crime, the safeguards of official purity, has taken the place of those high reasonings which sought the ideal perfection of the state, or claimed the prerogatives of an impossible freedom. The latest election at Melbourne and the police-returns of the metropolis have more interest to the student of political science than all the speculations of all the philosophers. Hobbes and Jefferson, Rousseau and Sir Thomas More, Harrington and Filmer have given way to patient thinkers, who ponder the ways of men, pore over the daily records of events, and, humbly acknowledging the omnipotence of fact, strive to deduce a practical wisdom for the conduct of the nations. The thought of the present age directs its efforts to reach the true conditions of a peaceful and liberal administration of law and revenue.

Such a philosophy need not be blind to lofty ends while pursuing the low and devious means. It walks its humble, winding way by the high, pure light of heaven; but it no longer seeks to climb those serene spaces. It is content to tread on earth. Reject with never so much indignation the pitiful materialistic politics; hold at never so high a price the dignity of man; have faith still in a good time coming, and in glorious days of liberty, equality, and fraternity that shall surely be; but stand fast by the best-proved systems of distributing poor-relief and determining appeals at law.

The era of revolution is past. Men will yet rise upon their oppressors; the public body will be convulsed with faction, and discontent will culminate, as heretofore, in rebellion. But insurrection, as a means of advancing freedom among the nations, will no longer find any considerable sympathy among intelligent philanthropists or patriots capable of self-control. The attitude of the world to-day is in striking contrast to that of 1789, and even that of 1848. Then the mutterings of revolution were listened to as the whisperings of hope. Every people that rose in arms were believed to be regenerate; and the determination to be free was accepted as the fruition of freedom. That a nation should turn upon its tyrants, or discard an hereditary sovereign, was welcomed by all liberal-hearted men as an intrinsic good. It was cowardice or coldness or outright sympathy with absolutism — vile choice! — that kept any one from rejoicing at the signal-guns of La Renaissance. The sad results none might anticipate; none may misunderstand.

Revolution makes no people free. As against positive tyranny, it is well; for, though it cannot redress, it may grandly revenge, the wrongs of humanity. Assassination and revolt are the constitutional checks of despotism. It is thus the slave interpellates his lord. As against power which is no more than arbitrary or needlessly restrictive, insurrection is only not to be regretted when it clears the ground for the afterwork of a people capable of self-restraint and harmonious action. The knights of our modern chivalry have grown particular about the respectability of females in distress. We have good-will for the Cretans, because, if successful, they would naturally fall into the order of an established monarchy. But for the Irish liberators, neither the devotion of a generous people, nor the confessed ill-government of England, nor our own traditional grudges suffice to create general sympathy; and this solely because we have no assurance that the nation which would then be freed from an odious and oppressive yoke would be found capable of an independent career. The world rejoices over

such advances as were made by the instrumentality of the needle-gun in the hands of loyal subjects, directed by a most arbitrary and disagreeable premier. It rejoices in the new Hungarian ministry, not so heartily perhaps, but more wisely than in the victories of Kossuth and Klapka. It rejoices in the recent decree of Paris, in the French Treaty, and in the liberation of the serfs.

Political optimism is dead. There is not even an occasional philosopher who cherishes the fond hope in a garret, hardly a madman who raves about it in his cell. You shall meet in Bedlam unfortunate Czars of Russia and deposed Emperors of Morocco, but not even a defeated candidate for the presidency of an ideal republic. Nor is this reaction, merely. We believe the time will never come when abstract rights or the reason of the case will be the foundation of another state. As well build a house out of pure principles. It is settled forever that the forms of government must have reference to the facts of society. France had its Law scheme, England its South-sea bubble, America its eastern lands and western mines, its petroleum and fancy-banking; and each is ready to tread over the same path of imposture to the same end of ruin. The generations of men grow no wiser as they grow older in finance and industry. Each covets the luxury of learning by its own experience. The susceptibility to humbug is perennial in the human heart; but in the one matter of social organization the whole world has stiffened into conservatism.

And this is the more remarkable because it has been imposed against the strongest natural current of feeling. Optimism is an element of our being. Enthusiasm, which works all the miracles of the race, is its child. Nothing is so congenial as to dwell on the fair side of humanity, forgetting the dark and loathsome contrast; to build spiritual mansions, rather than mortal tenements, for our habitation; to run on with the feet of fancy, which disdain the earth, to all the glad possibilities of our nature, while the feet of flesh sink hopelessly in the mire of the horrible clay. Because

they came so kindly to the heart of man it was that every nation broke into singing when the sun of liberty rose in the sky; that all merchandise and worldly goods were so gladly exchanged for this pearl of price; and when it was lost, and when sudden night fell upon these hopes, that a despair too profound for utterance succeeded to joy and thanksgiving.

But all is not lost. The heart of freedom is as green as ever, though its head has grown gray almost in a night under the terrible disappointment. The broken columns have retired from the breach only to repeat their assault on more favorable ground and on a happier day. The sanguine volunteer has become the steady veteran. Better than the glad, untaught confidence with which the conflict was begun is the grave and earnest resolve that assures our victory, but not in an hour, not at a blow. We may none the less cherish the hope of equality and fraternity because we have thrown down the red cap and the rough hewn pike. The mattock and the spade far more befit the hands of freedom. To work out, not to fight out; to be, not to do, is our problem. The romance of political youth is gone; the stern duties of manhood remain. We must regard liberty no longer as a female, but as a fact.

Accepting this result, and holding ourselves bound to show from actual experiment the fitness of free institutions to secure the best economical and social condition, we look, not to the moral consciousness nor to the aspirations of the human heart, but to history and the outer world. When and how may democracy successfully be inaugurated? What are its perils, its opportunities, its triumphs?

By far the best field for such inquiry is included within the scope of Mr. Grote's imperial History of Greece. Modern Europe presents few examples of pure democracy, and those of the most limited character. Of mixed governments, all the merits, all the defects, may in turn be claimed or charged by the adherent of either principle, for his own, or against the other. Both may derive consolation from considering

the same facts. But when we turn to Greece, we find a race especially qualified to develope the possibilities of government; as submissive to law as the subjects of an eastern despot; as prompt to arms, as heroic in sacrifice, as romantic in aspiration as the Frenchman or the Swiss.

And this people was not organized as a single body politic, whose experiences could have afforded only one of the many instances needed to generalize the principles of government, but from the peculiarities of its character and of its geographical endowment, was parted into hundreds of communities, each with its cherished independence; each erecting its own social structure; each with centuries of unbroken history. Nor were these states, however closely circumscribed, however minute their courts and armies, in any proper sense, mimic, like the free cities and minor principalities, accidentally formed out of the fragments of the great German crust, and owing their preservation to the jealousy or caution of their monstrous neighbors. Neither extended territory nor vast numbers are essential to a complete nationality. The proper genius of Greece created its policy of local autonomy. Those tiny states, nestling among the sacred mountains of Pindus, or describing their magic squares and circles on the plains of Thessaly and Elis, were not splinters from a disrupted mass, uncouth, incoherent, inert; but vital creations, perfect in structure, highly organized, and in many cases inspired with a purpose as lofty, a patriotism as intense, a comprehension as grand as that which directed the flight of the Roman eagles.

The nation that arose on the Tiber cannot be compared with them in the single element of interest for the student of political forms. Rome was wonderful; prodigious. Its arms, its law are unrivalled. But its governmental scheme was originally and fatally defective, on every principle and from every point of view. The states of Greece are to Rome what the swift-darting humming-bird is to one of those huge, unshapely monsters that crawled out on the muddy banks of primaeval rivers. "A Grecian history, perfectly written,"

says even Mr. Mitford, "should be a political institute for all nations."

We shall, however, direct our references mainly to a single one of those free cities: that city beside which all others of the ancient or the modern world seem to have something villainous and coarse. We shall do so, because our object now is not proof, but illustration; because we have not room for a wider survey; and because it is here that the detractors of democracy have taken their stand. What name has pointed as many oligarchic morals as "Athens"?

We have no criticism to offer upon Mr. Grote's history. Its place has been assigned, not by the suffrages, but by the applause, of the literary world. We shall find enough to do, if we pass straight on to examine the political principles of this work.

Mr. Grote has a larger faith in Democracy than any other writer we know, whose faith is at all intelligent. He believes that the practical workings of Democracy have proved it to be eminently superior to all other political forms, though he makes a patriotic proviso, of course, in favor of Great Britain; and this belief is warm, animating, impulsive, enthusiastic. His appreciation of the social developments of Grecian life rises to positive enjoyment. Gusto would hardly be too strong a word to express his sense of some striking manifestation of the high qualities of the Athenian people. It is not easy to define satisfactorily his feeling in this respect. It is not the admiration of personal character which William of Orange arouses in Mr. Motley. This author's heroes are not persons, but states. It is not the mixture of party purpose with cynical sympathy, which presided over Macaulay's creation of the Younger Orange. Mr. Grote seems to look down upon, rather than up to, the politics of Great Britain; nor can we, though apprised of his advocacy of Reform, detect the influence of any ulterior designs in his historical views. It is not the chivalric devotion with which the much-married Queen of Scots, or her virgin rival have inspired their biographers. It is not the resolute determination to ignore

unpleasant facts, which alone could sustain the historians of the great white-washing, disinfecting, and deodorizing school, who find sweetness in the names of the Bloody Mary, the Eighth Henry, Antony's Cleopatra, Judas surnamed Iscariot, and the slandered Messalina: historians whose Clio appears tightly grasping her classical nose. Mr. Grote takes no interest in the reaction which brings the chaff back to argue the matter with the fan.

Nor is it, we dare to say, in any degree, the eagerness of literary controversy. Regret has been treacherously expressed in some circles, that this work should have so much the air of a party pamphlet. Those who say it would be glad to say that it was partial in statement, raw in criticism, or shallow in scholarship. Failing of this, they lament its angry tone. Now of all things to disparage and exasperate the allegation of ill-temper is the most successful and the most safe. Very likely, too, it will result in producing the state of things it assumes. It is the last resort of spiteful mediocrity. It was employed with admirable effect on the glorious Chatham. It has been the chief defense of the English Tory against Mr. Gladstone's luminous argument. It has ever been put to good service against one of the most distinguished of our American scholars and statesmen.

Peace and war, the games, the courts, the treaties, all phases indeed of Grecian life, give rise to comparisons between the democratic and the oligarchic forms of government. At times Mr. Grote's discussion of them is extended to pages; at times, a single sentence serves to point the reader to a striking feature of one or the other political mechanism; at times, the allusion is perhaps unconsciously made by the author, so thorough and instinctive has become his political philosophy. These reflections are always on the immediate topic; many are so brief and casual that the copious index does not notice them; nowhere does Mr. Grote collect the arguments on both sides, or sum up the case for democracy. There are great advantages in this mode of treatment, since it gives the lessons with the whole effect of particular

incidents and the freshness of a first recital. Yet with reference to this question only, we cannot but regret that he has not submitted at least a summary of doctrine. Our object is to pick out this thread of gold that runs through the web, and consider apart from its wars and its festivals, its lofty art and its heroic examples, the democracy of Greece.

The practical superiority which is claimed for the principle of popular sovereignty, admitting the main body of inhabitants to equal and original rights, will not of course be found to extend to all the concerns of the individual or the state. Government is but one of the powers which affect personal and national character. It enters into alliance, it may be into competition, with others as pervasive or plastic as itself. The family, the daily occupation, the service of arms by land and sea, the forms of nature that strike the eye, her unseen chemistry in which the fibre of hand and brain are laid, the joys of plenty, the strokes of fate, are all common to the proudest republican and the most complaisant subject of despotism.

The effect of popular institutions naturally divides into two classes — those which appear in the character of the citizen and those which come out in the career of the state. The former, we shall be called on to treat with comparative brevity, since the advantages of democracy in this respect are hardly challenged. Granting other things equal, that is, the same protection to person and property, the same dignity abroad and peace at home, it cannot be questioned that those who are called to the high decisions of sovereignty, to each of whom from childhood is presented the prize of office and emolument, who are addressed as the custodians of authority and of honor, who are educated to the deliberation of national measures and the contemplation of far-reaching interests, will be more intensely organized as a body and will present a more complete development of individual character. There are many things which take off from these apparent advantages; there is a limit, soon reached, to the power of improving men by noble opportunities; it is sadly human to pervert

privileges to occasions of excess; but none the less is it true that the result must be in a given generation, to exalt the standard of life and quicken thought, while transmitting from age to age an advancing civilization and an increasing power.

There is a class of qualities which, though they may be found apart, and though each has a distinct character and its own relations to success, are yet kindred, and for our purpose may be grouped. They are readiness, adroitness, resource. These Mr. Grote attributes to the citizens of a democracy in a degree to which we hesitate to follow him. The principle, however, cannot be doubted. Place the representatives of popular and of aristocratic government anywhere under any complications of difficulty or novelty, the odds are, that the former escapes danger more readily, conciliates a wider good-will, builds his house first, gets the better of the bargain, rises higher in the community. In the choice of means to an end, in tact and contrivance, in fertility of invention and appropriateness of address, the republican uniformly and of course excels. Allow all that may be for circumstances, stock, and breeding, there is a valuable element which comes only under the training of political freedom.

Our author finds abundant illustration in the infinite variety of Grecian life. He repeatedly contrasts the dull, sullen, unready Spartan with the adventurous, the alert, the quick-witted Athenian. And there was a difference not to be wholly accounted for by the comparison of race, soil, coast-line, or prevailing occupation — a difference due to that education in public affairs which the Constitution of Lycurgus so strongly discouraged, and that of Solon promoted. The great, the splendid example, over which Mr. Grote exults as Paris exulted over Jena and Austerlitz, is afforded by the fortunes of the Ten Thousand.

We do not propose to recite those well-worn horrors which met the eyes of that little band as they turned back from the Euphrates. It is enough to say that the passage of the Balkan by Diebitsch and the great march of Sherman were

summer-sport compared with the retreat from Cunaxa. In such a strait, a dozen rivers behind, not a day's subsistence on hand, when the grizzled captains of Sparta and Arcadia could only say that they would not surrender, and they could die, an Athenian volunteer, of no rank and of no following, of little renown and of little experience, by his buoyancy of spirit, terse speech, and ready wit, acquired the confidence of the army, aroused their courage, proposed the daring plan, directed the critical details, and brought the Greeks to Byzantium. "This tripartite accomplishment, to think, speak, and act with equal efficiency, was purely Athenian." Xenophon was not a man of military genius. Had he been opposed by men of military genius, he would have failed. The lesson of his mighty achievement is something greater and nobler than the display of strategic abilities.

"In him," says Mr. Grote, "were exemplified those peculiarities of Athens attested not less by the denunciations of her enemies than by the panegyrics of her own citizens — spontaneous and forward impulse, as well in conception as in execution, confidence under circumstances which made others despair, persuasive discourse and publicity of discussion made subservient to practical business, so as at once to appeal to the intelligence and stimulate the active zeal of the multitude. Such peculiarities stand out much more remarkably from being contrasted with the opposite qualities in Spartans — mistrust in conception, slackness in execution, secrecy in council, silent and passive obedience."

There is another group of qualities, not so practical, perhaps not so useful, certainly not so generally diffused among a people, yet far more conspicuous and commanding greater applause, which Mr. Grote attributes to the culture and the inspiration of popular government. These are high words: geniality, taste, expression, art. We do not believe that vote by ballot or public debate create genius. They divine, they discover it. For every fountain that rises sweet and clear and musical to tongue and eye and ear many are sealed in darkness and silence. Every hill-side might sparkle with its

down-glancing stream, and the babble of the brook mingle with the sighing of every grove, if only a magic touch could be laid upon the hidden springs. The question of greatness or insignificance in any age or nation resolves itself simply into that of getting out what is in it. There are elements enough and powerful enough. Combination and interaction make up the difference.

In a democracy every child is afforded the means of education. Of what democracy has this not been true? Nor only the means of education: free institutions supply the mightiest incentives, propose the loftiest aims. The child can plant his foot upon the first step; the highest is a throne. Ambition applies itself to every faculty; exacts every moment of time. The prizes of success are not political alone. Popular rights in government make popular rights elsewhere. Monopoly and restriction are thrown down in every direction, and the honors of church and letters, society and trade, are made free to all. Nor opportunity and object alone. Excitement is contagious; the impulse becomes irresistible, Even the quiet and retiring are caught up and borne on by the whirling chariots in the race, Men shout from sympathy, cry from sympathy, and sympathy makes busy minds and busy hands in every democratic community. The course is open, the prize is in front, and when the runners are heard upon the track, are here, are past, whose blood does not stir, does not leap to follow?

Such has ever been the experience of democracies. There has never occurred an enlargment of popular rights that has not been followed by a conspicuous advance in power and influence. This has not always taken the direction of art. Sometimes the emancipated energies of a nation have turned to the development of material resources; and the strides of wealth have been beyond imagination. Sometimes to conquest; and the cunning fabric of policy and the iron league of power have been swept away like hen-coops before the rising flood. More often and more happily, as at Athens, they have found voice in poetry, philosophy, and eloquence.

It seems to have been ordained that every recognition of the nobility of man should be celebrated by the songs of new-created genius.

The few brilliant examples which despotism can present of art and letters flourishing under its patronage, do when closely examined, prove that liberty is the life of thought. The same Alexander who enriched Anaxarchus for his servile flattery, murdered Callisthenes for refusing to accord him divine honors. Virgil who could frame a fable to glorify the Gens Julia, and interrupt the march of prophecy with panegyric on a good boy, was indulged to bask in the smiles of royalty; but the robuster genius of Ovid pined in barbarous exile. The same Stuart who patronized the recreant Dryden persecuted and silenced Locke, the philosopher of English liberty. The same magnificent Bourbon who distributed the prizes of war among the chivalry of France, refused a regiment to Eugene because of his physical insignificance. The same brilliant court applauded with rapture the eloquence of Bossuet, and banished a greater man in Fénélon; crowned Pradon in tragedy, and broke the heart of Racine.[1]

In fact, look where we may, we shall find that while the literature of sycophantic dedications and courtly allegory — art devoted to vanity, or ministering to lust; philosophy degraded to guard desmesnes of royal pleasure; science prostituted to idle curiosity and the amusement of the serene few; poetry, its glorious eyes deprived of sight, obeying only the hunger of the belly and the itching of the palm; religion, proclaiming with eloquent lips the right divine of kings — while these have flourished under the patronage of power, little that is truly honorable to man; little that has advanced his state or enlarged his bounds; little that has promoted the welfare of the subject, or added to the treasures of the poor, has come from the inspiration of arbitrary government. But who shall keep the tale of poets and orators, philosophers and statesmen, lost in the night of despotism.!

[1] A portion of these examples are cited by Prof. Smyth, in his lecture on the age of Louis XVI.

Yet the relations of art and literature are far more creditable in absolute than in limited monarchies. Tyrants have often made poets and philosophers their companions, and almost their equals; have placed them on the right hand, and given them honor before the people. But a constitutional king with an aristocracy of half a dozen grades about him, is as powerless to confer real distinction on high merit as if letters-patent did not run in his name. The jealousy of the orders forms an impenetrable shield, against which the stoutest spear is launched in vain. Just as England affords the most perfect example of constitutional monarchy, so may it without exaggeration be said, that in no other country, in any age of the world, has the relation of genius to power been so dishonorable. Literature and art have been recognized just enough to degrade them. They have been admitted to the lowest orders of the nobility grudgingly and late. The Bard has been received into the Hall; but he takes his food below the salt, among the poor relations, or, more happy he, among the servants in the kitchen. The Wizard of the North at last receives the title which the king's apothecary has borne for years. England's great explorers by land and sea, the inventors who quadruple the productive powers of the kingdom, her foremost men of science, her artists and her scholars, cannot hope to rise above the honor which, by immemorial prescription, awaits the bearer of a dutiful address.

One is reminded of an incident connected with the visit of Ulysses to the regions of the dead. He started at the same time with a young acquaintance.

> "Not much for sense, nor much for courage famed."

Elpinor, having broken his wicked neck, starts as a ghost; Ulysses in a swift ship, its sails all unfurled, and gods and winds assisting. Yet, when the hero arrives on the Plutonian shore, the first person turning up to his astonished sight, is that rather disreputable character, Elpinor, stroking his shadowy legs and quite in wind after his journey.

We have thus rudely grouped the qualities, practical and

artistic, which our author attributes to the culture of free institutions. There remains one, moral in its nature, which, while it is the most important of all, will also serve to conduct us to the social characteristics of democracy. It is Devotion to the State. We do not mean that the citizens of any government or class of governments alone love their country and are willing to die in its service. But it is in accordance with reason, and history abundantly confirms the principle, that patriotism is never so deep, pervasive, and inspiring as in republics. Any man will fight for his fireside; any army properly officered will use a good proportion of its numbers in battle; every nation is capable of the stupidity of attributing fair weather and large crops to the magic of law; all noble people are susceptible of enthusiastic devotion to some gallant young king, accomplished and generous; some royal lady, gracious and fair and wise; some veteran conqueror, war-worn, forbidding, and stern. But for attachment to the state, pure and simple, for no reasons, and in the time when it especially needs support, when neither romance nor chivalry nor fat good-nature avail, in the awful days of defeat and disaster, when policy and systems fail and fall, when government, like the Roman candidate, must go about the streets taking its greatness in its hand, showing its wounds, and asking of every citizen his support: then it is, that the uprising of a free people is terrible in its sublimity and power. We shall not here discuss the fitness of popular forms for aggressive or merely fantastic warfare, though we should find their traditional weakness to be no mean provision for peace and industrial well-being; but there can be no doubt that in the ultimate appeal, in the final struggle, they are stronger just as they base themselves on a wider consent. A free people is like the shrewish wife who may pout or sulk or scold, but whom neither weariness nor plague nor death can drive from the bed of pain and languishment.

Such being the qualities of individual character which, following in the main the suggestions of Mr. Grote, we would attribute to the culture of democracy, we are now prepared

to inquire what effects are produced upon the nation, and how free governments compare in certain important particulars with those of a more exclusive order. We might expect that the first group of qualities developed in the individual, viz. readiness, adroitness, resource, would bring out some corresponding merit in the state — that the political body would be more flexible, more enterprising, more influential by reason of the peculiarities impressed so decidedly on its citizens. Again, we might expect that the second group designated would create something of their own in the national life — that manners would be refined and ennobled, that philosophy would found its schools, that painting and sculpture would produce their master-pieces, that poetry and oratory would be inflamed by the general communicativeness and corrected by the general taste; and that, accordingly, the periods of purest democracy would be those of highest art. And finally, we might expect that the exalted and comprehensive public spirit which of right belongs to every well-founded democracy would raise the state to dignity and power abroad, would secure peace and harmony at home; that the popular forces which free institutions originate would prove a tremendous engine in attack, a bulwark in defence, an inexhaustible reserve in disaster; that the habitual exercise of the loftiest duties and the compensations and compromises involved in the possession of equal rights would establish substantial justice and order in the community.

But we shall not undertake to follow out these causes to these results with any such logical strictness, if for no other reason than the hopeless fact that printed words bear a definite and unalterable relation to space. We shall have to content ourselves, therefore, with pursuing our inquiry on two or three special subjects.

How does Democracy stand related to Good Government?

We use the term "good government" technically, to embrace those homely but important virtues, personal liberty,

security to life, the protection of property, frugal administration, and the equalization of public burdens. In its full extent, good government means the glory and advancement of the state, its dignity and power abroad, its efficiency in war, the encouragement of art, eloquence, and philosophy, the culture of its citizenship, the creation of a profound and controlling public spirit, its own preservation and permanence. But there is a narrower sense in which it may be provided by political forms, which are in themselves bad, which hamper the popular energies, depress the national spirit, and defer the enfranchisement of the race. This is the burgher point of view. It answers the bread-and-butter question. It is the father-of-a-family's fruition. This is the view which Macaulay, with his strange cynical predilection, so delighted in, and even seemed to enjoy thrusting as offensively as possible at his readers. And, indeed, these little matters of life, liberty, and property do require the first attentions of government.

The protection of life and personal liberty are dependent on a proper judicature; and this the ancient world knew little about. It was reserved for the barbarians of Caesar's day to discover the only possible means of securing the order of the state without subjecting individual rights to the policy or the caprices of the administration. People which have an independent judiciary with the writ of *habeas corpus*, and a unanimous verdict by peers with right of challenge, have as little to learn from the ancients of the modes of justice as of the methods of locomotion. Yet when the question is only of the tendencies of government, we may derive instruction even from the rude schemes of those early days. The fair and open trial afforded the worst offenders in the democratic communities of Greece contrasts strongly with the secret resolutions of the Spartan ephors, and their systematic assassinations, prototype of the vile oligarchy of St. Mark. The death of Phocion, occurring after the murder of Demosthenes and the Antipatrian supremacy, can hardly be said to belong to the period of Grecian liberty. But for

the one hundred and seventy-five years from the constitution of Clisthenes to that time, we do not remember a single instance recorded by the bitterly hostile historians of Athens in which it is alleged that the forms of judicial procedure, remarkably fair and favorable for the accused, were departed from in the case of any citizen, high or low, insignificant or dangerous; except only in the condemnation of the generals after the battle of Arginusae. Here the innovation was solely on the provision of a separate trial for each accused. We shall not discuss the justice of that decision, though we think that Mr. Grote's compact and sinewy argument annihilates the vicious charges of Xenophon; but, allowing that the people, maddened by the most melancholy catastrophe that ever attended a naval fight, the perishing of the entire crews of twenty-five ships of war belonging to the victors in the sight of their comrades, — affixed blame harshly, and illegally pronounced sentence of death, can we point off a similar period of years in the career of many nations, and find less to censure?

It is often impossible in history to assure ourselves that we have obtained all the elements of calculation in many cases; while yet we can separate and perfectly distinguish every feature of some characteristic trait or event. Such examples for the purpose of criticism are invaluable. Determining these, we may, without accepting in full the notion of solidarity, be at rest on other and disputed points, assured that no principle can come out in them adverse to what has already been obtained. Such are the gradual disuse of ostracism at Athens and the absence of reactionary madness after the expulsion of the Four Hundred, and later of the Thirty. Satisfying ourselves that there was nothing partial or accidental in these, we reach a position which we can maintain with confidence in the more doubtful and disputed portions of history. This is not the hasty generalization of law; it is the intuitive perception of character. May we dwell a moment upon this? The physical philosopher needs to collect every particular, since he has no right

to assume a common ground for his facts; that is what he is to prove. But men and nations, and even policies, have their identity, which assures a common ground for all their manifestations. This the historian has at the start, and it justifies him in drawing conclusions far earlier than the student of nature is at liberty to do.

"The majority in America," says Alison, "has grown so powerful that no crime committed in their interest can be brought to punishment." Exclusive of the falsity of the assertion, inasmuch as local judges and local juries in two thirds of the counties and States of the Union may be, and often are, opposed to the national majority, it may be worth while to ask: In what countries, and in what ages, crimes really in the interest of the governing power have been brought to punishment? Can any form of government secure it, without virtue in the administration and virtue in the people? How many Governors-General of India or Governors of Jamaica, how many Lord-Lieutenants of Ireland or crown officials of any sort have been brought to justice in England unless abandoned to their fate by the home government? "There has not been," said Pitt, "a violation of the Constitution but it has been sanctioned by our greatest judges." "Every time," says Macaulay, of the period before the Revolution, "that the power passed from one party to another, took place a proscription and massacre, thinly disguised under the forms of judicial procedure."

It will not be necessary to argue that the inviolability of the person accompanies free institutions. Scourging and the mutilation of prisoners, and even of women, so prevalent among the despotisms of antiquity, contrast darkly with the sacredness which attached to the citizens of republics. Men are human; and it would be weak to assert that man, simply as man, has received, even in democracies, all that reverence which belongs to his character and his descent. The rod and the branding-iron for the despised and oppressed have disfigured the noblest nations of ancient or modern times. But it is generally true that for the free citizens of

the community there has been but one law — that of profound respect for the body. It has been the aristocratic element everywhere that has demanded the whipping-post and the stocks. It was so in the Southern States, with their practical oligarchy. It is the same influence which retains flogging in the British army to-day. The recent exciting division in Parliament set forth beyond mistake the position of the parties for and against corporal punishment. The whole aristocratic interest moved in a body to support the favorite institution of the Duke of Cambridge. Freemen never vote "the cat" for themselves or their equals.

Of personal rights there is but one absolute assurance; and it is found in the enfranchisement of the people. Sympathy, generosity, and shame may have an influence to mitigate the severity of the ruling-classes; but no immunity or privilege is made complete, or secured beyond anger and caprice, except as the ballot is put into the hands of every freeman.

Now the sacredness of the human body contains a wonderful mystery. Those nations which are blind to it, must remain brutal and low. All domestic virtues, all national forces spring out of this. The vision of the Pallas or Apollo never rose before a people accustomed to the sight of mutilated limbs, branded cheeks, or bleeding backs. One hundred years ago, over almost all the main-land of Europe (peninsular people, somehow, never have made so good cattle), peasants and laborers were accustomed to take the blow at the whim of the gentleman or noble. The tenth of August changed that; and while there is quite enough of aristocratic insolence to day, the nations of slaves can never return. The wicked, odious, horrible Revolution, like an earthquake shock, raised a continent above shame. Historians have been wont to hold the cost to life and limb by the institution of chivalry cheap, in the sentiment of honor which it created and maintained among the favored classes. What price can we ever put upon that change by which millions are made to feel that no man living has the right to strike them, or shall?

Look for the difference when Greek encounters Barbarian, Persian encounters Median, Swiss encounters Austrian. The blushes of the back drive away the blushes of the face. Where you cannot make the cheek mantle, you can have neither virtue, nor courage, nor public spirit, nor faith, nor truth.

But it is in respect to the security of property that the allegations against democracy found themselves with the greatest assurance. Terrible visions of agrarianism, confiscation, and plunder have been conjured up by the death-compelling zeal of some anti-popular writer. Yet it may safely be asserted that there is not on record an instance of a people committing spoliation when it has not been goaded by long courses of robbery and fraud on the part of the ruling classes. Who says that democracies plunder? Where are the historical examples to substantiate a proposition of such extent? Athens offers a testimony which we do not hesitate to pronounce decisive of the whole question. The archonship of Solon is fixed at B.C. 594. From that to the Samian War, when ends the independence of the city, was more than two hundred and seventy years. Yet in that period, though it includes the formation of the democracy, the supposed tumultuous and lawless rule of the mob under the influence of the reviled demagogues, the mighty epochs of the Persian Invasions, the Peloponnesian War, and the supremacy of Alexander; though there is nowhere else such a period of bewildering change, excitement, contest, yet, neither in the exertions preceding Marathon, Salamis and Cheroneia, nor in the distress which followed the disasters of Syracuse, Aegospotomi and Crannon, was there a general effort, or even a well-supported individual proposition, either (1) to confiscate debts in whole or part, or (2) to reduce the value of the coin, or (3) to divide lands among the poor.

We do not propose to wander over the fields of history, picking up instances of aristocratic or autocratic spoliation, but will be content with a single excerpt from the history of modern England. In the space of one human generation,

the currency of the realm was eight times changed, only two changes being for the advantage of the public creditor; and in one decade, under the auspices of two several monarchs, the value of the coin was reduced just seventy per cent. It is not too much to say, that the example of Athens in this respect is above that of all other people upon the face of the earth. Think of the struggles against the Persian empire, against the poisonous wrath of the whole Dorian race, against the force of Philip and Alexander! Yet through all, not a proposal mentioned by any contemporary, to support the burdened and tottering state by a single measure affecting the value of property!

There is yet one feature of good government remaining, which relates to the degree and the equity of taxation. We shall content ourselves with doing little more than to assign its place, and to express the belief that under the same circumstances the expenditures of republics will always be less than those of despotic powers; and that while in all arbitrary or aristocratic governments the scheme of public contribution has been adjusted to bear especially upon the productive classes, the tendency among a free people is to harmonize all economical interests, and distribute the pressure of taxation according to the best reason of the case. We have expressed the belief that the fear of agrarianism or communism had its origin in the guilty imaginations of conservative philosophers; and necessarily connected with this is the assurance that no such inclination is found in the mass of the community to place undue burdens upon property. Those who augur such a result forget that the sentiment of commonwealth becomes developed equally with the progress of popular power. Certainly the tyranny of the majority, if exerted in this form, could not be more oppressive, and would be less iniquitous, than that of the ruling minority has been. We will not go back to the old régime of taille, corvée, and banality, all over the continent of Europe, which the few, in every country, decided to be the proper duties of the many. How is it in France, Austria, Spain, and Russia

to-day, after the destruction of the feudal system? In almost every article on the revenue-lists of England, even down to the passage of the Reform Bill, it is notorious, that through a series of tentative duties, the maximum was discovered in the occurrence of insurrection or the prevalence of smuggling; and just short of that point the charge was permanently fixed. Not even philosophical speculation, but actual outbreak, afforded the limit of taxation. Precisely as mechanics construct boilers, with a view to a certain pressure, and stamp on them the number of pounds they will bear to the inch, so every tax had its private mark, inside of which government felt it safe to work. "Great financial abilities" were not understood to mean the faculty of wisely directing expenditure, diminishing debt, or multiplying the national resources, but solely a practical ingenuity in the application of taxes. A chancellor of the exchequer might as well have hoped to reach fame without imposing a new duty, as an astronomer without hunting up a new planet, or, if planets were scarce, at least an asteroid; and it is only strange that discoveries which reflected so much honor upon English statesmen should not have been named after them. Are the property laws of the realm more or less just to-day than before the constituencies were popularized?

On the other hand, with reference to the degree of taxation, Americans are apt to be deceived by the present reckless extravagance of their own country. Republics are generally frugal. They earn more, they spend less, than their grander neighbors. Athens had her festivals, consecrated by the holiest feelings of her people, and made superb by her music, poetry, and art. But otherwise her expenditure was modest and reasonable; taxation was severely scrutinized, and encountered a healthy degree of resistance; while the integrity of her theoric fund during the most agonizing struggles is in favorable contrast to the history of almost all national sinking-funds. Holland and Switzerland, in modern times, have shown, what indeed hardly requires illustration, that the participation of tax-payers in government is not likely to

augment taxes. What item, e.g. in the budget of republics answers to the expenditure for the household of the monarch, which in England, France, and Austria combined amounts yearly to more than eleven millions of dollars? In the United States, however, we have come into our fortune, and are eager to spend it. The wealth so easily gathered from our mines and virgin fields goes easily, of course. We have yet to learn the value of money or the weight of taxes. When we do we shall be economical accordingly. We are in that condition which trainers of athletes describe as "on the gain," and are therefore sanguine and confident. We shall get over it easily enough, and become as prudent as our neighbors who have entered the valetudinarian stage, and have learned with all their soul to scrutinize their diet, and speculate upon the wind.

How does Democracy compare with Despotism in Justice and Generosity towards Subordinates and Dependents?

For convenience, the question may be divided as follows: Are democracies just towards weaker foreign and allied powers? Are republics ungrateful?

Of the first, we shall have to be content with a general impression. No subject is less susceptible of detailed proof. The elements of the problem are numerous and involved: all governments have been guilty of much meanness; there are always a plenty of good rascally reasons, such as the wolf gave the lamb, for aggression and spoliation. It avails little to cite special instances on either side. If it were a question simply between Athens and Sparta it could be easily dismissed. We might contrast with the greediness of Sparta towards its own allies at the close of the Peloponnesian war the loyalty of Athens to Thebes in the Congress of B.C. 371. We should set against the known impossibility of obtaining redress at Sparta for the outrages of her harmosts and her generals, the testimony even of enemies, that allies and dependents "looked to the Athenian demos as a chastener of evil doers, and a harbor of refuge to themselves." But we can

base our claim on broader ground than occasional or casual pre-eminence. The people are always more generous and just than any narrower governing body. Do we not all know that it takes a council, a clique, a corporation, a committee, to do the meanest things? The instincts of fair-play, of liberal terms, of honest construction, of reasonable delay, are all personal, all popular. It has passed into a proverb that officialism tends to contract the sympathies and embitter the prejudices, while the great heart of humanity keeps itself pure and sweet, with an incorruptible savor. Imagine a case: an ancient people, brave, devoted, unstained, lies helpless at the feet of a rival. Who would be more moved by a plea for forbearance — by allusion to former glories, by frank submission, by the wail of national distress — cabinet or commons? Which among the victors of 1815 did more to mitigate the ferocity of conquest, to save the lives of Ney and Labedoyére, to break the terrible fall of French glory, to rescue the monuments of renown and the treasures of art, the more despotic or the more liberal government, Prussia or England?

We shall perhaps get a better idea of the mercy that is to be expected from arbitrary rulers by inquiring what degree of truth may fairly be looked for — what has been their own standard of morality? "A monarch's promises," said Alva, Regent of the Netherlands, "are not to be deemed as sacred as those of humbler mortals." But exception may be taken to the character of our witness. If so, we will introduce Mary of Guise, Regent of Scotland, against whom, surely, the same objections do not lie. "The promises of princes ought not to be carefully remembered, nor the performance of them exacted, unless it suits their own conveniency." But it may still be urged that Mary was at least a Guise. Let us then summon a man well and fairly known to all — the flower of chivalry, Sir Walter Raleigh: "The bonds of subjects to their kings should always be wrought out of iron; the bonds of kings to their subjects but with cobwebs."

A striking and beautiful illustration of the more generous

and lofty instincts of the people is afforded us in the history of those two cities, Athens and Sparta, of which we have spoken so much. Dorieus of Rhodes was probably the most conspicuous personal hero of historic times. In competition with all Greece — that wonderful Greece of story — he had borne away the prizes of three successive Olympic festivals. Eight times he had been crowned in the Isthmian, and seven times in the Nemean games. Of ancient family, of commanding stature, of lion-like courage, beauty like a god, he was the ideal of the Grecian heart and brain — their Hercules, their Apollo. This man became the prisoner of Athens under circumstances which, by the rude laws of that time, made his life forfeit. Yet when he was brought before the people, and they beheld the matchless strength, the supple limbs, the inimitable grace, remembered his triumphs and the long descent of the Rhodian heroes, instead of condemnation shouts of applause rose from the thronging multitude; they restored him to freedom, and attended him with acclamations to his ship.

But it was his fate to make that comparison to which we invite the reader, and try the tender mercies of a select board. Fourteen years after, when Rhodes broke away from Lacedemonian rule, he was seized and brought to Sparta. He had not happened to take part in the revolt, — was not, indeed, living in the city at the time. Yet he was a Rhodian, and the wrath and spite of the oligarchy vented itself on its nearest and most illustrious victim. Brought before the ephors, they saw nothing of the majesty, the beauty, the renown. Not generosity, not justice, not mercy, come from such. This victor of eighteen Pan-Hellenic festivals — himself of Dorian and even of Messenian stock — was basely put to death in revenge for the gallant resistance of his native city.

Are republics ungrateful? If they are not, a vast amount of vituperation is yet to be repented of. This particular charge against free governments arose in connection with Athens, gets its arguments from the history of Athens, and to Athens we properly turn our inquiries.

That the institution or exercise of ostracism, whatever may be said of its other bearings, was proof of ingratitude, Mr. Grote has abundantly refuted. It was a political necessity for a state that was only in fact a city just emerged from oligarchy, and, under its inspiration, accustomed to divide into factions following great men. It was employed but ten times in all, at widening intervals, and was finally disused, a century before the downfall of the democracy. We have not time to cite the many points of the case; but Mr. Grote's statement embodies the main principle: "When two party-leaders, each powerful in adherents and influence, had become passionately embarked in violent and prolonged opposition to each other, such opposition was likely to conduct one or the other to violent measures. Over and above the hopes of party triumph, each might well fear that if he himself continued within the bounds of legality he might fall a victim to aggressive proceedings on the part of his antagonist.[1] To ward off this formidable danger a public vote was called to determine which of the two should go into temporary banishment, retaining his property and unvisited by any disgrace."

Aside from the half-dozen instances of ostracism which have been received as indicating a spirit of ingratitude on the part of the people of Athens, the stock-example, we believe, is that of Miltiades. Our author puts the charge at rest, however; though we confess his relentless scrutiny of character makes one a little nervous. Miltiades always was an overrated man. No hero ever earned his trophies so cheaply. The merit of the commander was measured by the relief afforded to the vague and excited fears of his countrymen. But whatever it might have been, it cannot be claimed that disobedience, fraud, and treason might not offset them. Otherwise, Americans would still praise the name of Benedict Arnold. His head fairly turned by success, Miltiades began a career of unexampled folly. He

[1] "It was as safe to be a highwayman as to be a distinguished leader of opposition." — Macaulay on English Politics.

deceived the people, wasted a costly armament, attacked for pillage unarmed and valued allies in a period of profound peace, and involved his state in odium and possible war by the violation of sacred treaties and hospitable rites. The whole action was of a purely piratical nature, and deserved hanging as much as the exploits of Colonel Burr or Captain Kidd. Yet the Athenians, remembering Marathon, omitted the penalty of death, and only amerced him in a fine, certainly not too heavy for his estate to pay, since it actually did pay it. Miltiades, meanwhile, died from the mortification of a wound received in a rash and wanton attempt.

This is the very case in connection with which the phrase "the ingratitude of republics" took its rise. Comment is unnecessary. It is on such evidence that democracy has been convicted of the score of charges brought against it. We do not claim that free people are above that most despicable vice, but that they are no more given to it than their neighbors. Accepting the plea that Alexander was crazed with wine when he slew the Clitus who interposed his body to save his chief, it cannot be denied that the fate of Parmenio was less than an indifferent reward for fifty years faithful service to the Macedonian kings. Stilicho, "the fourth founder of Rome," was murdered for no fault by the master whose throne he had repeatedly saved. Constantius omitted from the laurelled letters which proclaimed the victories of the German war even the name of "the inimitable Julian." Narses, we will admit, met a very poor return for his heroic labors, even from the royal Justinian. The world still weeps over the picture of Belisarius in exile. It really seems as though the third Africanus had as much to complain of in the way of ingratitude as the first. Wolsey had reason to say: "Had I served God as diligently as I have served my king, he would not have given me over in my gray hairs." Charles abandoned Wentworth and Laud to the vengeance of a people infuriated at his own crimes. Choiseul found it vain to put trust in princes.

Were the American people ungrateful to Washington?

It is easy to show that he was annoyed and distressed at times by enmities and intrigues; for anything else would not be human. But was ever a man more truly "first in the hearts of his countryman"? Was the North untrue to Grant, the South to Lee? Have the Dutch forgotten William the Silent; the Tyrolese, Hofer; the Hungarians, Kossuth; the Irish, Emmet? Did Timoleon die unhonored at Syracuse? Are there no tears for Napoleon, as he sleeps by the stream he loved so well? We are all ungrateful, if we are to be judged by the complaints of our friends or the accusations of our enemies.

"It would be easy," says Macaulay, "to name demagogues whose popularity has remained undiminished, while sovereigns and parliaments have withdrawn their confidence from a long succession of statesmen." But the crowning example of loyalty and faith is found among this very people, against whom ingratitude has been so strenuously charged. Demosthenes had aroused his countrymen to resist the growing power of Philip. He had been the life and soul of that policy; in it he was, by all the statesmanship of ancient and modern times, fully justified; yet by it, as the result proved, as the fortune of war and diplomacy determined, Athens was ruined. Had she chosen the part of the tyrant, and made herself the minister of his injustice, she might have become the first city in the Macedonian kingdom — probably its capital, instead of Pella. But the way of duty and honor was plain then, and is not doubtful now, though it is known to have led to disaster and downfall. "It is," says Mr. Grote, "among the most memorable facts in Grecian history that, in spite of the victory of Philip at Chaeroneia, in spite of the subsequent conquest of Thebes by Alexander and the danger of Athens after it, in spite of the Asiatic conquests which had since thrown all Persian forces into the hands of the Macedonian king, the Athenian people never could be persuaded either to repudiate Demosthenes or to disclaim sympathy with his political policy."

Let us place beside this action of a democracy the conduct

of Charles towards his two faithful servants, of which we have already spoken. See a people refuse to save themselves from the wrath of the conqueror by condemning their illustrious leader! See a monarch, the flower of knighthood, the mirror of kingliness, the sainted original of Eikon Basilike, give up to the vengeance of his subjects two as trusty ministers as ever a ruler knew, whose crimes were all his own, neither of whom had gone a step beyond the letter or spirit of his instructions!

Men are alienated by defeat. Long heroic effort, demanded of common minds, has its reaction of disgust; the instinct to throw off blame upon others is the strongest, as it is the meanest, of our nature; the pretensions even of undoubted merit offend our self-love; the present held close to the eye eclipses a greater glory in the past; and nothing grows old so quickly as high desert; but ingratitude is human, not popular.

We have thus rapidly considered two of the relations which democracy sustains — the one practical; the other romantic. But it may not unfairly be claimed that the grand question, as between democracy and monarchy, is that of superior permanence. Whatever else may be the advantage of one form of government or the other, all, it may be said, are insignificant unless associated with this.

We are quite willing, for the purposes of our argument, to submit to this test; yet we seriously doubt its accuracy. As against a frequent succession of dynasties or constitutions there can of course be no doubt. The public energies should not be frittered away in alterations of government, nor should far-reaching and comprehensive plans of finance and social polity be rendered impracticable by repeated revolution in the state. But the mischief of mere changes put at intervals greater than the life of man has been grossly, and perhaps intentionally, exaggerated. It has been habitually spoken of as embracing about all the miseries of the nations or the race; while the fact is, that, if we set aside struggles for national independence, religious feuds, wars of disputed

succession, and the contests of aristocratic factions, — none of which aim to alter political forms, and all of which are simply tributes to the natural wrong-headedness and pugnacity of man, — the loss of life and property which has been incurred in changes of domestic policy has not been as one to a hundred for that which has been caused by foreign wars; involving, generally, questions of useless boundary or empty commercial privileges, and finding their inspiration in the ambition of rulers or in national antipathies. Or, to put it in another form, the cost of efforts to rectify the dividing-lines of states has been vastly greater than to adjust their internal relations.

We do not mean that the latter are therefore of no consequence. God forbid that a year, or even an hour, of war should be vainly incurred! But it should be known just what danger it is which we are told may offset the highest advantages of social life. The advocates of free institutions have often enough been silenced by reference to occasional intestine disturbances along the course of time, urged by men who deliberately invite approbation to the war of the Spanish Succession, the Coalitions of 1796 and 1805, and the Western Alliance of 1854. And these men, who would keep the world in arms to preserve the balance of external interests, are inexpressibly shocked at the few brief struggles which have marked the efforts of the nations to create new life within themselves and come into harmony with man and nature. Half the revolutions of history have been bloodless; for they only finished by a stroke the long-preparing work of character.

No! the impious apothegm of Bacon, well worthy of the biographer of Henry VII., — that foreign war is the heat of exercise, domestic the heat of fever, — has had acceptance long enough. War is war, — cruel, wasteful, horrible. But which did more for England — her flaunting campaigns under Edward III. and Henry V., tightening the fetters of prerogative; or the grim work of Fairfax and Cromwell, that made her people free? Which did more for America —

the barbarous struggle with Mexico in the interest of slavery propagandism, or the mighty civil war fought for freedom, unity, and law? Which did more for France — the exploits of the Grand Monarque, or the barricades of Paris which broke down the old régime, parted her fair soil into a million blossoming freeholds, and granted the franchise of 1867?

We believe that, were it proved that popular institutions have in them the seeds of dissolution, and must expire, sooner or later, by inherent defects, yet, were the choice offered between an unbroken course of government more or less arbitrary, and an occasional period of democratic inspiration and power, no patriot should hesitate to accept the latter. There will be time enough for the sweets of despotism; why refuse the repast of the gods? If the eyes must close forever on the light, let them for a moment drink in the glad prospect of the day, and carry to the dungeon of their despair the vision of wood and flowery mead, of rising cliff and glancing stream, of the sun in his glory and the immortal colors of the dawn. If the people must sink to the dull repose of despotism, grant that a generation may have privilege to rise to the height of man's glory in freedom, and stand where Athens stood under the aegis of her benignant deity.

So far is it from being true that all the political evil of the world is embraced in revolution, that nothing is more palpable than that the most abject misery we can conceive is found to follow invariably the establishment of governmental forms beyond the reach of popular power. China, Turkey, Austria, Sparta, and Venice may serve to illustrate the stolid and hopeless permanence of despotism. Were America to perish in 1876 by the exhaustion of her democratic principle, could the historian look back to say that it would have been better had a substantial monarchy been established a century before; that for the dauntless courage and unbounded energy which has pushed up the columns of our state, and spread its dome over such wide-lying people, we should have enjoyed the prim propriety and the safe stolidity of a government knowing any other authority than the actual, vital, perennial

consent of the whole nation? The United States have given the world a century of practical art and enterprise as unrivalled as is the century of eloquence and philosophy in which, if you please, Greece expired. Should monarchy by any mischance, or melancholy necessity of being, succeed to our republic, it would inherit a giant frame and a giant spirit, such as monarchy never did create, never could create.

But what proof is there that republican government has any tendency to decay, beyond what is incident to all human institutions? It is difficult to speak with patience, impossible with respect, of the argument by which the world has been assured of the hopelessness of permanent freedom: Rome and Greece have fallen! Monarchies fall like fig-leaves; but no principle can be deduced from their unvarying fate. A single example will suffice to illustrate the conservative reasonings. Professor Blackie, among the most eminent of Scotch scholars, in a recent lecture at Edinburgh, declared that Athens had "paid for a century of unbridled liberty by two thousand years of political servitude." This is a fair average instance. He forgets to tell us for what aristocratic Sparta is atoning by her political servitude! The free states and the oligarchies of Greece alike went down before the aggressive ambition of Philip of Macedon, a prince more highly and variously accomplished than any known to history: a strategist, adroit as Sertorius; an inventor of the weapons of war, not less original than Iphicrates; a creative genius in tactics, like Epaminondas; in enforcing discipline, like Frederick the Great; in organizing discordant elements, like Hannibal; in awakening a barbarous people, like Peter the First; in capacity for intrigue, like Mephistopheles, for all strictly human parallels fail here; and in attack, irresistible as his own immortal son; but it is only the fall of the free states which possess political significance. The examples cited to show the temporary character of democratic institutions prove absolutely nothing but that all human agencies have a tendency to abuse, all races, to corruption, all systems, to downfall. In ages of fraud and violence national life is

naturally insecure; but it would be easy to establish it as a rule, that those have best withstood the shocks of war which rested on the full, constant, and actual, not the partial or original or constructive, consent of their people. "The world," says the wise and benign Professor Smyth of Old Cambridge, "has nothing to do with certainty and security, but popular privileges afford the best chances of tranquillity, strength, and happiness." Suppose you had made up your mind, from the contemplation of the pure form, that the cone is the most perfect figure for solidity and permanence; that the same matter cannot be arranged in any other body of the same height so advantageously to secure equilibrium; that every atom has a direct office to keep the centre of gravity; that the difference in its favor as against a cylinder is just the whole difference between them; that every particle taken off the latter to make the former adds to the persistency with which it will cling to its base; that when the cone shape is reached, not another particle can be taken away without in so far endangering its rest; if you saw all this by that inner and assured sight which makes denial or doubt an insult to the Creator and an uncrowning of reason, would you believe any one who should whisper that allowance must be made for resistance and inertia, material and violence; that, though a very good theory, it was not practical? as if ever a theory of practical art was good which did not include all the conditions and contingencies of the subject, and as if, once including these, theory ever swerved from practice a hair's breadth.

But suppose, notwithstanding the demonstrations of your reason, you did hesitate upon putting the principle to use, would you feel justified in rejecting it altogether, were you shown, by a hundred experiments, that the cone when placed upon its apex inclined to fall over? Would you echo the triumphant glee of the operator who should show you that this much vaunted figure was actually the worst by all the difference between it and others, that could be conceived for the purposes of stability? As if the catastrophe were

not nature's way of indicating the truth of your first proposition!

Just such have been the experiments tried with free institutions. They have been brought into existence amid the wreck of society and in the fury of popular passions. The untried bark with its untried crew has been launched amid the mad turmoil of the elements, and on a sea that had swallowed the staunchest ships. Republics have succeeded to the encumbered estates of despotism, have inherited blood poisoned by ages of wrong, have started under burdens which had crushed their predecessors. This includes the whole body of democracies having rise in the violent revolutions of the last and the present century. They were born of madness that was born of tyranny. Without irreverence, the words which the Lord spake of old to his servant David may be put in the mouth of liberty: "because thou hast been a man of war and hast shed blood, thou shalt not build a house for my name." The shedding of the blood was right. Ammonites, Amalekites, and Jebusites were to be smitten, hip and thigh; but it is reserved for a generation with hands undefiled by fratricidal strife to raise the temple and consecrate the altar of freedom. We should be glad if our space allowed us to take up in order the several causes of national failure, and inquire historically of each how it stood related to our subject. We have been obliged to put aside a considerable section which we had prepared in this connection. We will only indicate two or three marked advantages which free governments possess to assure their continuance.

The first is the greater power of self-restraint in reaction. We do not, of course, apply such an expression to the conduct of a people just broken loose from the oppression and exactions of oligarchic misrule, for we remember the French Revolution; we do not claim that there have been no democracies planted in such unfavorable soil, or so poorly nurtured, as to bear the harsh and bitter fruit of intolerance and hatred, for we recall the massacre at Corcyra and the cudgeling at Argos; nor do we deny that there are circumstances

in which the prompt and terrrible punishment of treason may be in the interest of humanity and order. But we claim that history exhibits all well-centred popular governments as being more capable of self-restraint in reaction, and after public commotion, than those people which have been accustomed to aristocratic or monarchic sway.

They are not suspicious of hostility; their atmosphere is unfavorable, not only to the growth of conspiracy, but to apprehension of it. By means of free-speech and open ballot the administration can keep itself informed of the precise state of the public mind, and the measure of severity necessary to preserve the peace. They have the consciousness of strength, and are perhaps too much inclined to scorn the beginnings of rebellion. Generosity comes with power; not the seeming power which resides in the suppression of all wills but one and which must guard itself by art and violence, but the real power which resides in the full and intelligent consent of many wills. Moreover, the established rights of discussion, and the habit of decision by general vote create and cultivate a practical liberality towards political differences; while the respect for law, so deeply implanted in the citizens of democratic communities, secures a fair investigation and all the beneficient delays of justice. Even the exceptional cases of harshness and cruelty will bear comparison well enough with the average conduct of arbitrary governments. They are appropriate to prove the imperfection of humanity, not the inexpediency of freedom.

We might illustrate this principle from recent occurrences in our own land: the temper of the nation during the great struggle, the spirit in which victory has been accepted and enjoyed. But lest it should be said that these indicate only a more advanced civilization (yet the example afforded by England during the same period in India, Jamaica, and Ireland are not of the same character), we prefer to go back to the days of violence, and there see how a free people can deport itself in the trying times of reaction.

It will not be necessary to trace the causes which initiated

the tyranny of the Thirty. It came in with the downfall of Athenian independence, with the demolition of the walls, and the introduction of a foreign harmost. Detestable in its origin, it became doubly infamous by the cruelties it wreaked on the friends of liberty and of the old constitution; by judicial murders, proscriptions, and confiscations; by the expulsion from the state of more than half its citizens. Athens drained the bitter cup to its dregs. A generation of war had left the heroic city in the dust before its insolent conquerors. Yet even then a better day was before it. The jealousies of its foes, and the undiscourageable buoyancy of freedom enabled it, after months of galling servitude, to rid itself of its oppressors, to recall the exiles, and to take its place, though discrowned and broken-hearted, among the states of Hellas. In what spirit was the restoration effected? What bloody sacrifices were accounted adequate to atone for the violent subversion of the constitution, for the spoliation of the city, for the murder of friends and relatives? "The amount of wrong suffered," says Mr. Grote, "had been infinitely greater than in the time of the Four Hundred, and the provocation on every ground, public and private, violent to a degree never exceeded in history. Yet, with all the sting fresh in their bosoms, we find the victorious multitude, on the latter occasion as on the former, burying the past in an indiscriminate amnesty, and anxious only for the future harmonious march of the renovated and all-comprehensive democracy. We see the sentiment of commonwealth in the demos twice contrasted with the sentiment of faction in an ascendant oligarchy, twice triumphant over the strongest counter-motives, over the most bitter recollections of wrongful murder and spoliation, over all the passionate rush of reactionary appetite, which characterizes the moment of political restoration."

This, which we think we may consider as granted, namely, that a people trained in the exercise of political duties, will exhibit far more moderation, temper, and good feeling on those occasions which especially appeal to vindictive senti-

ments, and where the restraints and delays of legal procedure are overborne, is of great practical importance to the permanence of government. Nations are not generally destroyed by original shocks, but in reaction, and often after several relapses. Physical illustrations are often deceptive; but is there not something in the manner in which governments perish like the manner in which men drown, going under, once, twice, to rise each time fainter, yet with still a chance of rescue? To us there has always seemed more than a show of resemblance here. There are blows which are stunning, crushing, and allow no struggle; but it is very seldom that such blows are dealt on a nation. There is almost always a chance for life: the nation regains its feet; it may be wildly, blindly, but still it gets upon its feet. The drowning man comes up to gasp, if not to breathe. Seldom is the ruin of a people a tragedy in a single act. Athens had its Syracusan disaster, its conspiracy of the Four Hundred, its Aegospotami, its Thirty tyrants, its Cheroneia, its Crannon. Rome fell by no one hand, by no single blow. There was many a chance of reconciliation between Charles and his people, between England and her colonies. There was no inevitable process from the summoning of the States General to the formation of the Directory. Napoleon had his Spanish failure, his Russian campaign, his Elba, his Waterloo. The dramatic unities are not preserved in history.

If it is true that nations seldom perish at the first great shock, it becomes of vast importance how the disasters which must come at times to all shall be met; in what spirit and with what temper the opportunities of restoration shall be employed. That régime which makes the people most confident, self-reliant, and courageous, while securing respect for political differences, moderation in council, and the incalculable advantage of formal procedure, will largely increase the chance of final recovery. It is generally in the excesses which follow the seeming triumph of one party, that we find the reason of a second and a more deplorable convulsion. The nation loses its balance from too violent exertions to retain

it. This was not the case at Athens, although the succession of disasters might seem to indicate it. No city ever stood so long against such a combination of enemies. For more than a century it had borne the assault of the Persian empire, and of the whole Dorian race, when the gigantic Macedonian power rising in the north, completed its ruin. Perhaps in not making peace after the victory at Sphacteria the people were in fault, and brought evil upon themselves; though it was a mistake most statesmen would have made in the same circumstances. Aside from this, the causes of Athenian downfall must be found in the extraordinary combination of hostile elements around her.

The principle, if it has been properly deduced, has its lesson for our own people at the present time. The great blow that was dealt the nation in 1861, did not destroy the national life, yet our position is now more critical than ever. In the use to be made of victory, and in the manner of restoration, in the tone to be given to our society, and in the shape our law is to assume, lie the possibilities of wider and more lasting evil than could have attended the accomplishment of secession in the first year of the war. We congratulate ourselves on our resemblance to Russia: shall we have a Poland?

Another prime advantage we would attribute to democracy is a greater freedom from purely treasonable attempts upon the established order. We do not refer to outbreaks from actual suffering, nor to efforts to set up local liberties at the expense of national authority, or to assert a claim, honest though mistaken, to independence; but from conspiracies to establish by force or fraud the domination of a man or of a class, and to overthrow government for purposes of selfish ambition, all real republics have been in a remarkable degree exempt. What a testimony to the truth of this is found in the complete misapprehension of all our recent political involvements by the public and the press of Europe! Now, Mr. Johnson was just about to expel Congress from the capitol; now, Congress was to enact the role of the Long Parliament; now, General Grant was to assume the dictatorship. Of course

such charges would be made and repeated for effect by the partisan journals and party-leaders of our own country; but it has been the philosophers of the old world who have echoed this unmeaning talk, because it was impossible for them, with their education, to appreciate the fact that free people take all that sort of thing out in talking of it. Even our kind, good French and German friends have failed to discover the real forces that move us, the real sentiments which control us, and have given us advice as ludicrously unsuited to the case, as if some amiable Quaker, having visited a court for the first time, should seriously set himself to work to effect a reconciliation between two lawyers whom he had heard furiously abusing each other, and who, likely enough, adjourned together to the inn, and are already wholly oblivious of their ferocious encounters.

Treason is a plant not native to the soil of freedom. Open discussion and universal suffrage give no relish for conspiracy. Where no class is proscribed or excluded, where opposition is legalized and protected, where peaceful resistance may be the avenue of honor and power, men are not going to meet in church-vaults to whisper either their hopes or their fears. That government which takes all its manhood into citizenship, offers redress for every grievance, and invites reform, need not proscribe gatherings or establish censorship. No dissatisfaction can be felt which does not register itself in political effort; once so embodied, there is little probability of its proceeding to violence, other than in words: party struggles and harsh words afford a safety-valve to the popular excitement, and the nation passes through a crisis which in an oligarchy would have required a revolution.

There is one practical advantage in this direction, belonging to free institutions which we do not remember to have seen noticed. It may be indicated thus: revolution oftenest results from the fact that one class or section of the community is violently excited while that which should keep it in check and preserve the equilibrium is indifferent and inactive. It is the unequal heating which causes fracture. Dissatis-

faction may be gradually produced, feed itself by sullen and hopeless complaint, and proceed to the fatal degree of explosion, yet hardly attract the attention of the most sagacious statesman. Nothing is better established in oligarchic politics than that the greatest storms burst unexpectedly; that the elements of danger arrange themselves in silence and darkness. Make the most we can of a few dubious or accidental expressions since hunted up in the writings of Chesterfield or Burke, who really foresaw the French Revolution? But had a hundred philosophers foreseen it, could the noblesse have been convinced of its imminence? It is certain that no aristocratic class realizes the approach of this kind of danger. Insurrection is a bolt out of a clear sky. Only Fenian storms mutter beforehand. Not a Louis XI., not a Richelieu, not a Fouché, can tell the hour when a dumb nation shall cry aloud, and tear itself with more than demoniac rage. They who stand above the well-sodded magazine can never know when the fuze begins to burn short, and spit fire in the dark vaults beneath.

But in a democracy how different the case! Dissatisfaction at once makes itself known. It registers itself, from the lowest degree that only calls a derisive smile to the lips of the experienced engineer of state, to the higher mark which he carefully regards, or approaching that fatal line when he springs to his feet, opens every valve, and lets the machine scream itself out of danger. In a government of free speech and equal rights no sooner does any portion become excited than, by the complete contact and perfect communicability of the parts, all rise to the same temperature. There is no such thing as a party aflame on one subject and its antagonist intent wholly upon another. They follow each other, they sympathize by their antagonism. Lovers do not look into each other's eyes so fondly as gladiators at their deadly play. No longer the sagacity of a minister of police is to be baffled. The sense of a people, subtiler far, is aroused and at watch. Suppose the ablest despot that ever sat upon a throne made aware, as by that remarkable anonymous

letter to Louis XV., of disaffection proceeding fast and far within his realm, who would say that he could tell, within one half of, more or less, the actual force it had attained, its striking power, or its readiness to strike? He must either concede prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily, or run the risk of holding on, till the one ounce too much brings his empire down in ruins.

And we say again, dissatisfaction, alienation, enmity, not only register themselves in a free government, but, by the inevitable spirit of party, they provide the very forces by which they are to be resisted. No furious minority may surprise and vanquish a nation unexpectant and unprepared. The same trumpet calls both armies to the breach, clamors for assault, and invokes the steady courage of defense. When the sun of liberty is on high, if party look into the water, it shall behold a brow resolute and defiant as its own; if upon the ground, a mightier form shall stretch away before it. It is only with despotism that faction can escape shadow or reflection in the universal gloom.

But the most conspicuous advantage which democracy possesses is seen in its power of recuperation from disaster. This is kindred to the faculty of self-restraint in reaction, which has been spoken of, yet is not the same. That assured moderation, forbearance, and mutual respect in victory, or in partial successes; this gives the vigor and the courage of the actual conflict. An historical contrast in point is presented us by Mr. Grote, of a very striking character.

The destruction of the Athenian armament at Syracuse was probably the most complete that ever occurred in war. Only the very young and the very old were left to guard the Long Walls, or man the few Triremes that remained in the Peiraeus. The loss of Napoleon in the Russian campaign was not nearly so disastrous, if we consider his army; or so exhausting, if we look to the resources of France. Not one war in a hundred closes with as good reason for utter submission as Athens then had. In fact, her ruin was not regarded as inevitable, it was hailed as accomplished. Allies fell off in

quick succession from her doomed fortunes, or joined the ranks of her enemies; satraps, wielding the powers of the great king, started up to divide the territory and the treasures of their hated rival; the whole Dorian race crowded forward to heap insults on the prostrate foe. Yet for ten years longer Athens maintained the unequal contest; chased Dorian fleets and Dorian hoplites more than once; and only broke down after a struggle that had outlasted a generation, and against a combination of force that made it hopeless from the start.

From this we turn to a remarkable instance of oligarchic weakness under defeat. The relations of Sparta, in arms, to its neighbors can only be appreciated by a student of ancient history. They can never be repeated in modern warfare. Gymnasts by constant practice; as severely restrained in diet as is the pugilist; accustomed from childhood to wear heavy armor and wield ponderous spears; solidified by an organization more intense, a discipline more exact, a military spirit more controlling than ever was elsewhere known, which dictated the modes of speech, suppressed tears for the dead, annihilated the family relation, and turned into sullen or malignant fanaticism all the the gentle affections and wholesome appetites of our nature, — the troops of Sparta were not to be resisted by the unprofessional soldiers of peaceful cities, with nerves relaxed by study, leisure, or indulgence, and strangers to that public sentiment which sacrifices to the state every individual hope, pleasure, or fear. For generations hardly a show had been made of opposing them in the field. Wherever the hoplites of Lacedaemon appeared, the people retired within their walls. Year after year the citizens of Attica withdrew to their fortifications, and suffered every acre of their highly cultivated fields to be ravaged by a Peloponnesian army.

Such for a century had been the prestige of Sparta when Epaminondas rose to the control of Theban politics. He first organized the national forces, drilled them to the perfection of hoplomachia, trained them to soldierly endurance, and at Leuctra disputed the headship of Greece. The Spartans,

superior in numbers, but stolid, stupid, clumsy, slow, were beaten by an army, now for the first time on an equality with them in the practice of arms, and intelligent by the culture of free-thought, animated with the spirit of liberty, directed by the genius of that early Washington. Such, to the surprise of the whole world, was the issue of the conflict. Now mark the result. Not five per cent of their arms-bearing population had perished in the fight, not a single military organization had been annihilated. And yet, their traditional invulnerability once violated, their supremacy boldly challenged, the mere fact established that other people could use spears, they sank without a struggle into insignificance, and submitted to take affronts from the weakest of those who had but recently cringed before them. Mr. Bumble, the parochial beadle, who had been mighty to beat orphans and paupers, was not more utterly disconcerted by the rebellion of his new wife. Mantineia, a city near their own borders, which they had a few years before, by a wanton exercise of power, broken up and distributed into five distant villages, now began defiantly to rebuild its walls and collect its population. And Agesilaus, the greatest of the Dorians, was reduced to the humiliation of asking that the work might be delayed till a decree could be passed at Sparta recommending the restoration, and contributing to its cost. Even this poor boon was refused to the once proud dictator of Hellas, the victor of Sardis, Coronea, and Lechaeum.

"Sparta," says the wise old Stagirite, "could not stand up against a single defeat, but fell by reason of the small number of her citizens." How much better for the days of darkness and disaster, had she, in the language of Thucydides, "taken her people into partnership." We have given this contrast at length, because it is altogether the most striking and important of history; because, moreover, none of the elements of either case were such as to diminish the force or truth of the teaching. Athens was saved by no unexpected alliance, by no avatar of warlike genius. Her great rival was at the period of Leuctra every whit as sound

and strong as when her troops demolished the Long Walls, and she still possessed in the veteran Agesilaus, her most renowned chieftain and king.

The same principle is abundantly illustrated in the annals of other nations. Twice an English king was crowned at Paris as the result of a single battle, and the Frankish Empire fell at a blow. But when the twenty-five millions of Celts rose to command by virtue of the Ninth Thermidor, the powers of Europe were hurled about like mere mountains at the hands of the infuriated Titan. Year after year renewed the conflict, and it was not until the generation which witnessed the great uprising of a freed people, had almost wholly passed away, that the armies of six nations forced their way to Paris. This is the way men taken into partnership in government defend their soil. It is no answer to say that Napoleon was technically a monarch. The power he wielded was from the people; his success was the death of legitimacy; he ruled by the glad consent of France.

Hence came the prodigious exertions of the American war, which so amazed the Old World, and called forth the splendid tribute of Gasparin.

Nor is the recuperative energy displayed by free governments under the disasters of war more remarkable than their recovery from the worst misfortunes of the civil power. It is by no ordinary shocks that republics fall. Self-centred, they can be ruined but by their own consent to anarchy or servitude. While the body of citizens remains sound, the torrents of invasion, of faction, of revolution, by whatever cause excited, will rise and beat in vain. A democracy permeated, as it will be among any generous people, by civil pride and personal self-respect, has all the privileges of the life-boat, that floats upon the stormiest sea, and, if plunged beneath the waves, rights itself with indestructible buoyancy.

We have seen that republics die hard when assailed by foes without. We have cited from Mr. Grote a surprising instance of their moderation under the severe test of reaction. Let us close this Article, already greatly protracted,

with an example of the power they have of restoring the state after internal violence. It will not be necessary to trace particularly the conspiracy of the Four Hundred. Athens had lost blood even to fainting at Syracuse, yet had summoned old and young for new fleets and new armies to carry on the desperate contest against enemies encouraged and reinforced. These exertions left the city at the mercy of an oligarchic faction supported by the threats and bribes of Persia, strengthened by the sympathy of the numerous foes of free government without, and wielding the weapons of fraud and murder within. A reign of terror was suddenly inaugurated; assassination was perfected into a system; one by one, with dread certainty, the leaders of the democracy were struck down by the decrees of a secret tribunal; no one dared to make himself conspicuous in resistance; no loyal man knew from what quarter the blow came, or who of his neighbors were engaged, whom to trust or whom to speak to; panic scattered the friends of liberty; suspicion kept them apart. In the midst of universal bewilderment a foreign force was treacherously introduced into the city, and Athens fell. Any state that was only a city might thus fall. No one who remembers how New York was swept by the draft-mobs, or London on the terrible days and nights of the Gordon riots, will wonder at the success of such a blow so directed.

Now let us turn to the fleet lying off the friendly democratic island of Samos. Hither came the ambassadors of the new government, proclaiming the downfall of the republic, and demanding the submission of the army and navy. Then appeared the fruits of the long training in self-government, the public trials, the open discussion of national measures, the frequent appeals to the will of the majority. Had it been the fleet of an oligarchy or of a monarchy to which the representatives of the new order came, the decision would have rested with a few leading officers; the men, not accustomed to the assertion of rights or the exercise of power, would have quietly submitted; and the usur-

pation would have passed unchallenged. Even if we suppose an extraordinary degree of public virtue in the commanders, what could they have been in resistance but outlaws, without a government to represent or a warrant to execute?

Such was not the fleet at Samos. The entire armament, by a spontaneous impulse, declared for the old democracy. The common sailors and the private soldiers (as, without exception, in our own service, at the outbreak of the Rebellion), were foremost in proclaiming their determination to live under the constitution or die with it. The few officers in secret communication with the Four Hundred were swept away before the high-running torrent of patriotic wrath. Army and navy, assembling on the shore, and joined by their profoundly sympathizing brethren of Samos, resolved, in solemn Athenian assembly, that the change which had been wrought in the laws of their native land was violent, treacherous, and void; that no obedience could be paid by any citizen to the mandates of the new government; that they tendered, as ever, unflinching hostility to Peloponnesus, and held the conspirators at home their deadly foes. A purpose so lofty they confirmed with an oath, and proceeded to give it effect by the election of officers for the state the current year. Theirs was the true legitimacy. They were Athens.

"The city," said Thrasybulus, with impassioned eloquence, "has revolted from us." Wherever the spirit of the olden time was cherished, wherever the institutions so dearly purchased were honored, wherever the protecting gods were worshipped in sincerity and the oaths were loyally observed, there was Athens. They alone had the sacred fire, while the altar was cold. They bore about with them the penates of a city which was worse than burned. The Acropolis and the Parthenon, the Peiraeus and the Long Walls, were the ruins of a state; but Pallas Athene, and the fathers, and the glories, and the laws, all,—all were theirs. Those who abode under the shadow of Pentelicus were the exiles, the homeless, the forlorn. For them the exclamation of the dutiful Kent was doubly true:

"Freedom lives hence, and banishment is here."

"The scene," says Mr. Grote, "is one of the most dramatic and inspiring in the history of Thucydides." The world has never ceased to admire the resolution of that silent chief, "Saevis tranquillus in undis," that if the last resort failed to check the already overshadowing power of France, he would gather his comrades on their ships, and plant Holland upon some far island of the Pacific. Not unlike was the resolution of this gallant band: "If worst comes to worst, and all other hopes fail us, our fleet shall find places of refuge and a city for us." Such courage, such devotion were not, can never be, in vain. The usurpation of the Four Hundred passed away; for the spirit of Athenian freedom was mightier than fraud or violence.

ARTICLE IV.

THE DEATH OF CHRIST IN ITS OUTWARD APPEARANCE AND ITS HISTORICAL INFLUENCE.

BY REV. DR. D. W. SIMON, BERLIN.

We propose, in the following pages, first, to call attention to the contrast between the estimate formed of the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth by his contemporaries and the position it has actually held in the history of mankind for the last eighteen hundred years; and secondly, to inquire into the reason of this phenomenon. Outwardly considered, few events have had less significance than the death of Jesus on Calvary; and yet his death has formed one of the principal factors in the life of humanity ever since it occurred. What is the explanation? There is not another phenomenon of human history remotely comparable to it — not even that very remarkable phenomenon, the rise and progress of Buddhism. The existence of the contrast cannot be denied save by an ignorance so dense that its opinions are worthless. It is therefore the duty of the philosophical historian to

seek to account for it. Nor, considering the important practical bearings of the question, ought any man to rest until he has found a solution. Especially ought those philosophical historians to recognize their obligation, one of whose fundamental principles is, that the course run by the human race has been the development of the highest reason, and one of whose prime axioms is: Where reason is, there must reason be found.

Attempts without number have been made to solve the problem to which we refer; and one solution has seemed to satisfy thousands and tens of thousands of the wisest and best men who have lived. Is that solution the true one? Or does the problem still await a solution?

We shall discuss the subject before us under three heads:

I. *In what Light was the Crucifixion of Jesus regarded by most of his Contemporaries?*

II. *What Position has his Death actually held in the Spiritual History of Humanity?*

III. *What is the Explanation of the Contrast between the two?*

Let us then consider,

I. The Light in which the Crucifixion of Jesus was regarded by most of his Contemporaries.

1. *How it appeared to the Romans and Greeks.*

Those who were immediately concerned with the crucifixion of Jesus evidently regarded it as in itself an event of slight consequence.

Pilate, for example, by the very readiness which he evinced to let Jesus go, showed that he attached little importance to his life; and if his life were of small consequence, of how much less his death! He, for his part, found no fault in him; he felt that to execute him would be needless cruelty. He saw clearly that the objections brought against him, so far as they came under his cognizance, were false, and that his accusers were stirred by envy; and yet he delivered Jesus to be crucified! The fact was, he had an opportunity

of meeting the wishes of the Jewish people and thus securing a little popularity without risk and at little cost, and therefore let them have their way. For a man in his position to "take water, and wash his hands before the multitude, saying, 'I am innocent of the blood of this just person; see ye to it,'"[1] was to show for his victim and everything relating to him a profound indifference, or even contempt.

The general sentiment is reflected clearly enough, also, in the conduct of the officials who had to see to the carrying out of the sentence. The simple details given by the evangelists[2] betray a cold-blooded cruelty and unconcern such as the slightest sense of the significance of the transaction would have rendered impossible: "They stripped him, and put on him a scarlet robe; they platted a crown of thorns and put it on his head, and a reed in his right hand; and they bowed the knee before him, and mocked him, saying, Hail, king of the Jews! And they spit upon him, and took the reed and smote him on the head. And after they had mocked him, they took the robe off from him, and put his own garment on him." While he hung on the cross, they parted his garments among them, casting lots; and sitting down, watched him. It is true the bitterness and scorn felt for Christ's person by the Jews seems to have passed over to the Roman soldiers; but that the death they were bringing about with such a brutal spirit was in itself more than the death of the malefactors who shared Jesus's fate, they had not the remotest conception. To one man alone, to the centurion, does a passing glimpse seem to have been vouchsafed into the character of him who hung before his eyes on the cross; but he too did not dream that "the "Son of God," as he termed him, was, at the moment of giving up the ghost, accomplishing that reconciliation of heaven and earth which had been the object of the deepest yearnings of all the ages.

[1] See Matt. xxvii. 24 sq.; Mark xv. 15 sq.; Luke xxiii. 22 sq.; John xix. 6 sq.

[2] The momentary qualm of conscience, or perhaps superstitious fear, to which John alludes, must have disappeared again directly.

Nor did the higher Roman authorities — the authorities to whom Pilate was answerable attach any importance to the crime he committed in putting Jesus to death. For this event he was certainly never called to account. On the contrary, to judge by analogy, one may imagine that he would rather earn praise than blame for preventing a disturbance by sacrificing Jesus. So long as peace and the semblance of contentment were preserved, the life of this or that man was of little consequence.[1]

Contemporary Roman and Greek writers, both by the way in which they mention the event and by their silence, treat the death of Jesus as a trivial occurrence.

Tacitus (A.D. 61–117) in his account of the great fire of Rome during the reign of Nero, tells us that the emperor, "in order to suppress the reports which charged him with the deed, accused other people of it, and inflicted on those who went by the name of Christians the most exquisite punishments. The originator of this name was one Christ, who was punished with death during the reign of Tiberius by Pontius Pilate the procurator." He afterwards speaks also of Christianity as a *superstitio exsecrabilis*, and refers to both Christians and Jews as being in many cases taken into custody, not so much for the crime of setting fire to Rome as because they were haters of the entire human race. The death of Christ had obviously no meaning to this most philosophic historian save that of the merited end of a wretched impostor.

Suetonius (A.D. 54–110) refers in his Life of Claudius to the banishment of the Jews from Rome, assigning as the reason that they were constantly exciting uproars at the instigation of Chrestus (Christ); and in the Life of Nero informs us that the Christians — a sect given up to a new and pernicious superstition — were punished with death.

[1] Pilate was removed from office by Vitellius the President of Syria in consequence of the disturbances to which his violence and tyranny gave rise, and which could only be suppressed by force of arms. See Josephus, Antiquities 18, 3, 1 sq.; Jewish War 2, 9, 2 sq.

So far was the death of Jesus from being to him of any weight that he does not even seem to be aware of its having occurred prior to the great fire of Rome. He speaks as though Chrestus were personally the exciter of the tumults in question.

Pliny the Younger (A.D. 62–117) describes the Christians as holding a *pravam et immodicam superstitionem*, but makes no allusion to the crucifixion on Calvary.[1]

Lucian (A.D. 120–200) introduces into his Life of Peregrine[2] a reference to the worship paid by the Christians to the crucified impostor, and terms Jesus ironically, "the great man who was impaled in Palestine." But that such a death should or could have any great significance never occurs to him.

How difficult it was, and must always have been, for Greeks and Romans to attach any importance to this event, we may learn also from the mode in which their writers allude to the Christian belief on the subject. Celsus, for example, who probably lived early in the second century, bases on the death of Christ arguments against his having the elevated characteristics ascribed to him by Christian believers. The notion of their worshipping as the Son of God a man who had been so ignominiously put to death was in his eyes intensely absurd. And that his death should be for the destruction of the devil and sin he is quite unable to admit. The worshippers of the captured and dead Christ he compares to the Getae who worshipped Tmolus.[3] Tertullian (A.D. 160–220) says that the Pagans called Christians *crucis religiosi*, *crucis antistites*, *crucicolae*, by way of nickname.[4] In the dialogue of Minucius Felix, between Caecilius and Octavius, the former, the representative of heathen objections to Christianity, is introduced as speaking with abhorrence of those who worship one punished with the extreme penalty of the law for the crimes he had committed,

[1] See Pliny, Epist. ix., x.

[2] Peregrinus Proteus.

[3] Orig. Contra Celsum, lib. ii., iii., vi.

[4] Tertull. Apolog. cap. xvi.; Ad Nationes, lib. i. cap. xii.

and ridiculing the reverence of Christians for the cross.[1] Lactantius (A.D. 330) writes: "It is made a matter of opprobrium against us, both that we worship a man at all, and that we worship one who was tortured and put to death."[2] And Arnobius (A.D. 300) expresses the views and feelings of the heathen in the words, "We [the heathens] are not angry with you because you worship the omnipotent God, but because you pay daily homage to a man, whom you maintain to have been God, and who was put to death in a way that is a disgrace even to the vile."[3] These testimonies, selected from among many others, are surely clear proof, if proof were required, that the heathen, at all events, were as far as possible from attaching importance to the death of Christ. Nor was it possible, considering the estimate in which death by crucifixion was held, that anything but contempt should be felt for the man who underwent such a punishment. Seneca styles the cross, *infelix lignum*; Livy, *infelix arbor;* Apuleius, *crux damnata;* others, *infamis stipes*. The punishment is spoken of by Cicero as *crudelissimum deterrimumque supplicium;* by Apuleius as *extrema paena;* by Tacitus as *servile supplicium*.

2. *How it appeared to the Jews.*

The priests, scribes, and elders of the Jews, who had been the means of securing Christ's condemnation, undoubtedly regarded his death as a triumph, as the removal of a danger. No thought of its being the divinely foreknown and fore-ordained completion of their enemy's mission ever entered their minds. The advice given by Caiaphas—"It is expedient that one man should die for the people"—meant, so far as the words expressed the views of himself and companions, 'to avert the peril this man threatens to bring on us and the nation, it is better that he be put out of the way; it is better that one suffer, rather than that the many suffer.' How far any of them were from discerning the significance

[1] Minucius Felix. *Octavius.* [2] Lactantius, lib. iv. cap. xvi.
[3] Arnobius, Adversus Gentes, lib. i.

of the death of Jesus is sufficiently clear from their conduct on Calvary. The chief priests, we read in Matt. xxvii., with the Scribes and elders, mocked him, saying: "He saved others, himself he cannot save. If he be the king of Israel, let him now come down from the cross, and we will believe him. He trusted in God; let him deliver him now if he will have him; for he said, I am the Son of God." The passers-by, too, "reviled him, wagging their heads, and saying, Thou that destroyest the temple, and buildest it in three days, save thyself. If thou be the Son of God, come down from the cross." Even one of his fellow-sufferers "railed on him, saying, If thou be Christ, save thyself and us" (Luke xxiii. 39). Not the vaguest idea that the Son of God could not descend from the cross — could not in their sense save himself — without failing to accomplish the work committed to him, crossed their minds. It was his *life* they feared; it was to his life they attached importance: dead, he was dead. The request of the chief priests and Pharisees, that the sepulchre might be made sure (Matt. xxvii. 64) until the third day, lest the disciples should come by night and steal him away, and say unto the people, He is risen from the dead, and the last error be worse than the first, shows also that the death in itself was to them a trivial affair. These were the enemies of Jesus Christ among the Jews.

3. *How it appeared to his Friends and Disciples.*

But he had friends, well-wishers, and disciples; in what light did his death appear to them? As a most sad and cruel event, but certainly not as an event of the profound significance which they afterwards saw it to possess. Joseph of Arimathea went to Pilate, and besought him that he might take away the body of Jesus; and he took it, and laid it in a new tomb hewn out of the rock; thus paying, as he supposed, the last honors to his friend and master (Matt. xxvii. 60; John xix. 38). Nicodemus, which at the first came to Jesus by night, brought a mixture of myrrh and aloes, about a hundred pounds weight, and wound the body

of Jesus in linen clothes, with the spices, as the manner of the Jews was to embalm; wishing at all events to preserve the mortal remains of his rabbi as long as possible (John xix. 39). Mary Magdalene and other women prepared spices and ointments for the same purpose, and, not finding the body of Jesus, supposed the gardener or some other person had removed it. But no one of them breathes a syllable indicating insight into the true nature of the death Jesus had endured. Nor is a different impression made upon us by the simple and touching story of the walk to Emmaus. As the disciples tell their unknown companion, in the most artless possible way, how Jesus of Nazareth had been a prophet mighty in deed and word before all the people; how they had trusted that it had been he which should have redeemed Israel; how the chief priests and rulers had delivered him to be condemned to death, and crucified him; and how certain of their number had astonished them all by saying that they had been early to the sepulchre where Jesus was laid, had not found his body, but had seen a vision of angels which said that he was alive; nothing can be clearer than that they had never dreamed of the crucifixion,—which robbed them of their beloved master, blasted their brightest hopes, and quenched the purest joys their lives had known,—having a profound, an universal significance.

Confirmatory evidence that these were the lights in which the death of Jesus appeared to contemporary Jews, foes and friends, and that it could not well be otherwise regarded, is supplied also by Jewish works written and opinions reported during the succeeding two or three centuries. Philo Judaeus (who was born twenty years before Christ, and died about A.D. 50), the Alexandrian, never so much as mentioned the name of Jesus or any circumstance connected with his life or history; and yet he can scarcely be supposed to have remained in ignorance of what passed in Jerusalem. Josephus (A.D. 37–93) does not allude to Christ with a single syllable in his "History of the Jewish War," although he gives a detailed account of the Procuratorship of Pontius

Pilate. In his later work, that on the Jewish Antiquities, occur two passages in which Christ is mentioned. The second one,[1] in giving an account of the martyrdom of James, simply says that he was the brother of Christ. The first passage[2] is one of great importance, if it be not a Christian interpolation. It runs as follows: "At that time lived also Jesus, a wise man, — if it be allowable to call him a man — for he was an accomplisher of wonderful works and a teacher of men who receive the truth with pleasure; and drew to himself many, both Jews and Greeks. This was Christ; and although Pilate punished him with the death of the cross at the complaint of our chief men, those who loved him at first did not cease: for he appeared to them on the third day again alive, the divine prophets having declared these and myriads of other wonderful things about him. To the present day the tribe of Christians, called after this same man, has not failed." Supposing Josephus himself to have written these words, which we greatly doubt, still they evince no sense of the importance of the death of Christ. The Mishna, although it introduces many Rabbis who lived at or about the time of Christ, never mentions the name of the latter or refers to any one of his sayings.[3] Both in the Babylonian and the Jerusalem Gemara are passages relating to Jesus.[4] The former adduces a tradition that "Jesus was crucified on the day of preparation for the Sabbath. Forty days long an Herald walked before him who proclaimed aloud, 'He is to be stoned because he has practised magical arts and excited

[1] Antiq. lib. xx. cap. 9, 1.

[2] Antiq. lib. xviii. cap. 3, 3. A small library might be formed of the treatises discussing this passage. Some consider it altogether spurious; others maintain merely portions of it to be interpolations; and others believe the whole to be genuine. We, for our part, agree with the first mentioned; but this is not the place for examining the point. It has no special bearing upon our present argument.

[3] The Mishna was probably collected about A.D. 219; but portions of it are certainly as old as, if not older, than the Christian era.

[4] The Jerusalem Gemara was collected about A.D. 390; the Babylonian about 500; but both include much that is centuries older. See, for example, Tract. Sanhedrim 43, 67, Fol. 107; Sota, Fol. 47; Sabbath, Fol. 104.

and seduced the Israelites.' Whoso is able to advance anything to prove him innocent, let him come and declare it! As no evidence of his innocence could be adduced, they crucified him on the day before the Feast of Passover."[1] The other passages either do not allude at all to his death, or else in a manner even more superficial than in the one just quoted.[2] Justin Martyr in his Dialogue with Trypho,[3] represents the Jew as objecting: "Be assured that all our nation waits for Christ; and we admit that all the scriptures which you have quoted refer to him. Moreover, I do also admit that the name of Jesus, by which the Son of Nave (Nun) was called, has inclined me very strongly to adopt this view. But whether Christ should be so shamefully crucified, this we are in doubt about. For whosoever is crucified is said in the law to be accursed; so that I am exceedingly incredulous on this point. It is quite clear, indeed, that the scriptures announce that Christ had to suffer; but we wish to learn if you can prove it to us whether it was by the suffering cursed in the law. Prove to us whether he must be crucified and die so disgracefully and so dishonorably by the death cursed in the law. For we cannot bring ourselves even to think of this." There is every reason for assuming that Trypho's words express the feelings most natural to, and most widely cherished by, the Jews.[4]

[1] Tract. Sanhedrim, Fol. 43.

[2] We quote these authorities because there is little doubt but that they contain much precipitated Jewish sentiment of far earlier date, which, considering the conservative tendency of the nation, need not occasion surprise.

[3] Dial. cum Tryph. c. 89, 90. We quote the translation published by Clark of Edinburgh.

[4] We might have quoted also the Toldoth Jeshu, or Jewish "History of Jesus"; for, although first brought to light in the thirteenth century, it contains fragments of a tradition which was probably current among the Jews at the time of Justin Martyr, and parts of which we find in Origen's work against Celsus. As some of our readers may not be acquainted with the Toldoth, we will add a word or two about its character and contents. There exist two versions of the book; but who were their writers is totally unknown. Both of them contain the most extravagant stories and frightful blasphemies. According to the version first published by Huldrich in Leyden in 1705, under the title, "Historia Jeschuae Nazareni a Judaeis blaspheme corrupta," Jesus was

If there is one thing clearer than another in connection with the history of Christianity, whether viewed with the eye of hostile criticism or of loving belief, it is that neither its friends nor its foes originally saw any special significance in the death of Jesus, the founder. His death, as such, was no more than the death of his companions in tribulation. We might even question whether his friends deemed him a martyr to the truth.

II. We come now to the second part of our task, which is briefly to review the position held by the death of Christ in the spiritual history of humanity.

1. *The View taken by the Personal Disciples of Jesus.*

Scarcely had three months elapsed when we find the men whom Jesus had appointed apostles and who had followed him as disciples — men almost exclusively drawn from the uncultivated classes; who, though their souls had been touched by the spiritual power, life, and light of the master, had probably been mainly spurred on by dreams of realizing

a son of adultery — the son of Miriam a Friseuse, wife of Papus, by Joseph Pandira of Nazareth. Jesus, when he was grown up and heard that he was an illegitimate child, is said to have crushed his mother's breasts between the door and the door-post, and to have killed his father. As a sample of the stories it contains, we may quote the following: "One day Jesus asked a shepherd the way. Too lazy to get up, the man simply pointed with his foot in the direction which Jesus and his disciples ought to take. Shortly after, they meet a shepherdess; and she, being asked the way, accompanied them till they came to a stone that served as a sign-post. Jesus blessed the girl, and wished that she might become the wife of the shepherd. Peter asked: 'Why didst thou bless the shepherd, by wishing that this woman might become his wife?' Jesus answered: 'Because he is idle, and she, being active, will be able to keep her husband, who would otherwise fare ill; for I am a compassionate God, and appoint marriages according to the works of men. David prophesied of me in Psalm cii. 24, 'He weakened my strength in the way.'" One of his miracles was rowing about on the sea seated on a millstone; a power which he had in consequence of uttering the name of God, to which the Jews ascribe a magical force.

Further details may be found in Eisenmenger's "Entdeckte Judenthum," in Origen's work against Celsus, and in a little book entitled "Die Urtheile heidnischer und jüdischer Schriftsteller über Jesus und die ersten Christen," to which we are indebted for several references, though we have used them for a purpose directly opposed to that of the anonymous author.

their country's hopes and thus promoting their own temporal interests; who had hoped against hope, notwithstanding the strange and to them foolish ideas and words of Jesus, as long as he lived; but who were scattered like sheep without a shepherd by his death; — these men we find giving utterance to conceptions totally opposed to all that we know of them before. We find them proclaiming publicly that the Jesus who had been ignominiously nailed to the cross was a man approved of God, though according to the law every crucified man was accursed; that God had showed before by the mouth of all his prophets that he, the Christ, should suffer (Acts iii. 18); that he was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God (Acts ii. 23), being the Prince of Life (Acts iii. 15); that there is no salvation in any other, none other name being given under heaven among men whereby we must be saved (Acts iv. 13). Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that the teachings of the apostles regarding the crucifixion very soon acquired the clearness and definiteness which we find in the Epistles of Peter and of John; where the former speaks of the blood of Jesus Christ as the blood of sprinkling (1 Pet. i. 2); of our being redeemed with the precious blood of Christ as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, from our vain conversation (1 Pet. i. 18, 19); of his suffering for us and bearing our sins in his own body on the tree, healing us by his stripes (1 Pet. ii. 21–24); of his having once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God (1 Pet. iii. 18): while the latter, the beloved disciple, tells us that he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world (1 John ii. 2); that he laid down his life for us (1 John iii. 16).[1] Now even supposing that the Tübingen view of

[1] It seems to us that neither scripture nor the psychological constitution of man warrant us in supposing that the first teachings of the disciples were as clear as their later ones. The later were not opposed to, but they certainly were a development of, the earlier. And it strikes us that a most powerful argument for the genuineness of the Acts of the Apostles might be drawn from a comparison of its doctrinal teachings with those especially of the first Epistle

the Epistles of John and Peter as the products of a later age, and the reflections of a later phase of thought had been established, there would still be satisfactory reasons for assuming that the conception of the death of Jesus just quoted was the one germinantly, if not substantially, held at the early date to which we are alluding. Such passages as Acts ii. 23, "delivered by the determinate counsel of God"; or Acts iii. 18, "those things which God before had showed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled"; or Acts iii. 26, "God sent him to bless you in turning every one of you from his iniquities"; or lastly, Acts ii. 38, "Repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus for the remission of sins," are the vague expression of a state of feeling which must recognize in the statements of the Epistles the distinct expression of its real essence.

This is the first problem presented by the history of Christianity: How came these disciples to entertain such views of the death which had been the death-knell of their hopes and joys?

2. Not only did these uneducated, dispirited men proclaim a conception of the ignominious event to which no one had at first dreamed of attaching any special significance, that ran counter to all their own and their countrymen's prejudices; but, what is even more surprising, actually persuaded a considerable number of their antagonists to accept the same view. The very men who had made a mock of the apostles, became pricked in their heart, and said unto Peter and the rest, "men and brethren, what shall we do?" (Acts iii. 37); and formed themselves into a community which recognized Jesus as the corner-stone, in whose name alone there is salvation (Acts iv. 11, 12) and as the "Saviour who giveth repentance to Israel and the remission of sins" (Acts v. 31); — in a word, whose constitutive principle and bond of union

of Peter — a comparison showing how Peter's mind grew to fuller clearness, and how what he is reported to have preached at first was just such a basis of what he wrote later as the nature of the human mind and the circumstances of the case would have led us to expect.

was belief in the death of the Nazarene as a death for human sin. The Acts of the Apostles tells us that three thousand souls were added in one day; but even if this were an exaggeration — which there is no reason whatever for believing it to be — one thing is clear: the newly-formed community was sufficiently large and important to excite a severe persecution. No critic has called in question the reality of the persecution spoken of in Acts viii. 1; and one can scarcely imagine that the Jewish leaders were foolish enough to stir up a persecution merely because a handful of poor men was preaching a view of Christ's death which to the natural mind must always appear absurd.

This is a second problem: how came Jews, either inhabitants of, or sojourners in Jerusalem, or both, who probably knew all about the condemnation of Jesus, and had possibly witnessed and mocked at his crucifixion, to consent to do after his burial what they refused to do before; namely, take upon them the reproach of his name and expose themselves to rejection, expatriation, imprisonment, and death on his account?

3. Within three years of the death of Jesus, we see the principal and most zealous agent in the persecution to which we have referred, suddenly allying himself, body, soul, and spirit, with the community against which he had "breathed out threatenings and slaughter" (Acts ix. 1). Saul of Tarsus, who said of himself at Jerusalem before his countrymen (Acts xxii. 3), "I am verily a man which am a Jew, born in Tarsus, a city of Cilicia, brought up in this city at the feet of Gamaliel, taught according to the perfect manner of the law of the fathers, and zealous toward God, as ye are this day"; who afterwards, in perfect harmony herewith, wrote to the Galatians (Gal. i. 14): "I profited in the Jews' religion above many my equals in mine own nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of the fathers"; who after his conversion loved his countrymen so passionately that he could use the strong words: "I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy

Ghost, that I have great heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart; for I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh" (Rom ix. 1–3); who had probably known Jesus, and if he were not present at, was fully aware of the fact and circumstances of, his crucifixion, and who had "verily thought with himself that he ought to do many things against the name of Jesus of Nazareth" (Acts xxvi. 9); — this same Saul burst all the ties of blood, custom, country, belief, religion, and adopted, and began to preach with most fiery energy, such ideas as that "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me" (Gal. ii. 20); "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree" (Gal. iii. 13); "God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us ..... being justified by his blood we shall be saved from wrath through him" (Rom. v. 8, 9). And so possessed was he by the unfathomable significance of that apparently most unimportant event, that in his Epistle to the Galatians he gave vent to his feelings in the almost extatic words: "God forbid that I should glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world" (Gal. vi. 14).[1]

This is the third problem which calls for solution: How a man of Paul's training, ability, intelligence, sincere attachment to the faith of the fathers, and burning contempt for the new sect, should come to make that very thing his glory which was once in his eyes the uttermost ignominy?

4. During the next two hundred and fifty years we find

[1] We have purposely quoted solely from the four principal Epistles of Paul, — namely, those to the Romans, Corinthians, and Galatians, — because even the wildest criticism is compelled to acknowledge their genuineness and authenticity. We shall refer further on to the explanation of Paul's conversion given by Dr. Baur of Tübingen and his school.

the view of the death of Jesus which the apostles, including Paul, had preached, further adopted and advocated by thousands and tens of thousands of men of all classes and conditions, and in all countries; and that in the face of every species of opposition and persecution that subtle cruelty could devise or strong political authorities carry out. Hundreds of communities were formed whose constitutive principle was the recognition of the death of Jesus as a propitiation for the sins of the world. If we only cast our eye superficially over the pages of the church writers of the first three centuries, we shall be surprised at the singular unanimity with which they reiterate, not slavishly, but under forms suggested by their own peculiar training and circumstances, the teachings of the first apostles on this central and vital theme. It will be of interest, however, to adduce the principal names and let them speak for themselves. Clement of Rome (about A.D 97), a man of appreciative, if not productive mind, sound, practical judgment, and general culture, says, in his Epistle to Corinthians:[1] "Let us reverence Jesus Christ, whose blood was given for us" (chap. xxi.); "On account of the love he bore us, Jesus Christ our Lord gave his blood for us by the will of God; his flesh for our flesh, and his soul for our souls" (chap. xlix.); "Let us look steadfastly to the blood of Christ and see how precious that blood is to God, which having been shed for our salvation has set the grace of repentance before the whole world" (chap. vii.). In the so-called Epistle of Barnabas[2] (about A.D. 107–120) we read: "the Son of God who is Lord, and who will judge the living and the dead, suffered that his stroke might give us life: — the Son of God could not have suffered except for our sakes" (chap. vii.).

[1] With the majority of authorities at the present day we regard the Second Epistle of Clement as spurious. But, whoever may have been its author, its teachings on this matter are identical with those of the other writings of this period.

[2] It is scarcely likely that this Barnabas is the Barnabas mentioned in Acts iv. 36 and elsewhere; nor would it be a gain to the church and Christianity to establish their identity.

Ignatius writing about A.D. 107 or 116,[1] speaks of Jesus as "giving himself an offering and sacrifice to God" (Eph. i.); as being nailed to the cross for us in the flesh, and suffering all things for our sakes, that we might be saved (Smyrna, i. 2); as having died for us (Rom. vii.). Polycarp, the martyr (before A.D. 107), who, according to Irenaeus his disciple, was instructed by the apostles and brought into contact with many who had seen Christ,[2] uses in his Epistle to the Philippians such words as, "who for our sins suffered even unto death" (chap. i.); "who bore our sins in his own body on the tree; who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth, but endured all things for us that we might live in him" (chap. viii.). In the calmly philosophic but also deeply earnest Epistle to Diognetus (during the second century), whose writer is unknown, we find the following noble passage — than which a nobler is scarcely to be found in any Christian production: "He himself took on him the burden of our iniquities; he gave his own Son as a ransom for us — the Holy One for transgressors, the Blameless One for the wicked, the Righteous One for the unrighteous, the Incorruptible One for the corruptible, the Immortal One for them that are mortal. For what other thing was capable of covering our sins than his righteousness? By what other one was it possible that we, the wicked and ungodly, could be justified, than by the one only Son of God? Oh sweet exchange! Oh unsearchable operation! Oh benefit surpassing all expectation! That the wickedness of many should be hid in a single righteous One, and that the righteousness of One should justify many transgressors!" (chap. ix.). Justin Martyr, a Samaritan by birth, trained in the schools of philosophy, but afterwards converted to Christianity, and put to death in Rome about A.D. 161–168,[3] expresses himself as follows:

[1] We have quoted passages only which are found both in the short and the long version of the Epistles of Ignatius.

[2] The Epistle of Polycarp, with the exception perhaps of Chapter xiii., is now generally allowed to be genuine.

[3] Three works alone attributed to Justin Martyr are probably genuine, — the two Apologies — one addressed to Antoninus Pius about 138, the second to Marcus Aurelius soon after A.D. 161 — and the Dialogus cum Tryphone.

"It is he who bears our sins and is afflicted for us; he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities, the chastisement of peace was upon him, by his stripes we are healed" — quoting the words of Isaiah the prophet;[1] "He became man for our sakes, that becoming a partaker of our sufferings he might also bring us healing";[2] "The Father of all wished his Christ for the whole human family to take upon him the curses of all";[3] "the lamb which was commanded to be wholly roasted was a symbol of the suffering of the cross which Christ would undergo";[4] "Christ served (as Jacob did Laban) even to the slavery of the cross for the various and many-formed races of mankind, acquiring them by the blood and mystery of the cross."[5] Irenaeus,[6] the greatest teacher of the church before Clemens Alexandrinus, the first who combined philosophical insight, breadth of mind, and liberality of spirit with due regard to the history and earnest belief in the truths of Christianity, speaks of Christ being made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross, that he might do away with the disobedience of man"; of his destroying death, doing away with error, exterminating corruption, dissipating ignorance, leading captivity captive, and vanquishing the devil by his death; of his redeeming us rationally by his own blood, giving himself a ransom for those who had been led into captivity, giving up his soul for our souls, and his flesh for our flesh.[7] Clemens Alexandrinus (died A.D. 220), one of the most genial, learned, and cultivated of the early Fathers of the church, a man who had drank at the purest, nay, perhaps at all, the fountains of heathen wisdom, but had been unable to quench his soul's thirst save in the scriptures; who refers also to the "foolishness of the cross,"[8] says that Christ was immolated a sacrifice

[1] Apol. i. 50. [2] Apol. ii. 13. [3] Dial. c. Tryph. c. 95.
[4] Dial. c. 40. [5] Dial. c. 134.

[6] Irenaeus was Bishop of Vienne and Lyons from A.D. 177 to 202. The only work of his extant is the "Adversus Hereses" in five books.

[7] See lib. v. 16, 1, 2; ii. 20, 3; v. 1. Irenaeus was the first to attempt to theorize about the death of Christ.

[8] Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, c. 18.

for us, being typified by Isaac;[1] that we are redeemed by his blood;[2] that he gave his life a ransom for many;[3] that as a good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep, so he gave himself a sacrifice for us;[4] that we are healed by his stripes.[5] Tertullian (A.D. 160–220) the fiery African rhetorician, the Tacitus of the young Christian church, represents Christ as expiating the sins of men by every kind of satisfaction.[6] He says, it behoved him to become a sacrifice for all nations;[7] Christ our passover is sacrificed;[8] who can free another from death by dying himself, save the Son of God, — he, being himself free from fault, underwent all suffering for the sake of sinners;[9] Christ redeemed man by his blood; he was delivered unto death, even the death of the cross, that he might free us from our sins.[10] Origen (A.D. 185–254), the founder of philosophical theology, and the learned commentator and critic, the chief originator of the celebrated Alexandrian school, discusses the death of Christ in numerous passages, and represents it under the most varied forms, all, however, in harmony with the view we have hitherto described. Our Lord and Saviour, being led as a lamb to the slaughter and offered as a sacrifice on the altar, obtained remission of sins for the whole world;[11] he made propitiation by the shedding of his own blood;[12] we are cleansed by the precious blood of Christ as of a spotless victim;[13] God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son for the life of the world.[14] Cyprian, bishop of Carthage from A.D. 248–258, a celebrated rhetorician and pleader till his conversion, and to the end a man of insight, experience, and earnestness, speaks of Christ undergoing death on the cross, redeeming believers with the price of his own blood, and reconciling man to the Father;[15] of his being wounded that he might heal our wounds; of his

[1] Paedagogus, lib. i. c. 5. [2] Paed. lib. i. c. 6. [3] Paed. lib. i. c. 9.
[4] Paed. lib. i. c. 11. [5] Stromata, 2. p. 388. [6] De Cultu Foem. i. 1.
[7] Adv. Jud. 13. [8] Cont. Marcionem, 4, 7. [9] De Pudicit. 22.
[10] De Fuga 12. [11] Origen. In num. hom. 24, 1.
[12] Comm. in Ep. ad Rom. 3, 8. [13] In Levit. hom. 3, 8.
[14] In num hom. 24, 2. [15] Cyprian, Ad Demetrium, p. 196.

being made subject to bondage that he might bring those who were bound to liberty; of his enduring death that mortals might have immortality;[1] of his offering himself up a sacrifice to the Father;[2] of our being redeemed and quickened by his blood.[3]

These, and many others who speak in the same tone, and express the same view of the death of Jesus on Calvary, spoke not merely for themselves but for myriads of Christians scattered through Arabia, Parthia, Persia, India, Italy and Rome, Africa and Carthage, Asia Minor, Gaul, Armenia, Germany, Britain, Spain, and many other countries. On this point there was perhaps more agreement than any other. From all parts of the then known world the eyes of sin-sick men were directed to the dying Nazarene uplifted on Calvary, and the sight brought comfort to their guilty hearts, light to their understanding, strength to their will, and purity to their entire being. This is the fourth problem.

5. About the year 305, the Emperor Diocletian, instigated by his vicious colleague Galerius, inaugurated a last, cruel persecution of the Christians, designed to exterminate the *religio crucis* and to rehabilitate Paganism. But neither the one nor the other end was gained. The immediate successors of the retired Diocletian, namely Galerius, Maximian, and Constantius Chlorus, were soon superseded by Licinius in the East and Constantine in the West. In 313 both emperors issued edicts of toleration, in virtue of which the *crucicolae*, the cross-worshippers, were recognized as a religious party, having equal rights with all others. As emperor of the West until A.D. 323 Constantine treated the Christian church ever with more and more favor, conferring upon it privileges, wealth, security; and when he became sole possessor of the

[1] De opere et elemos.

[2] Epist. 63.

[3] Epist. 63. We need scarcely remark that we have no intention of giving anything like an exhaustive view of the teachings of the church during the period in question. See Baur's "Geschichte der Lehre von der Versöhming Christi."

empire, he openly avowed his wish and design to constitute Christianity the one undivided religion of the state. And this purpose he executed. Henceforth we find the cross, which three hundred years before had been spoken of, especially in connection with the low-born Nazarene, by the high in station, the refined in taste, the lofty in genius, the profound in thought, the philosophic in insight, the learned in knowledge, the devout in religion, as *crux damnata*, *infelix lignum*, *infamis stipes*, occupying the highest place of honor that the universal Roman empire could assign it: it was stamped on the coinage, it formed an integral part of the *labarum* or imperial standard borne before the emperors, and it raised its head on the temples and other buildings recognized by the authorities. Surely a marvellous revolution! And what a powerful commentary on the paradoxical but profound words used by the apostle Paul relatively to Jesus the Crucified One in his First Epistle to the Corinthians: "God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty; and *base things of the world and things which are despised*, hath God chosen, yea and things which are not, to bring to nought things which are."

Whatever view we may take of the motives that animated Constantine, and whether we may regard the event as beneficial or harmful to the church and Christianity, it cannot be denied to be one of the most striking phenomena presented by the history of the world! It is a fifth problem arising out of the course run by the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth.

6. The death of Christ constitutes from this time onwards one of the most important factors in the life of civilized humanity. Its history is, to no small extent, the history of what is profoundest in human thought, what is purest in human feeling, what is noblest in human endeavor, what is loftiest in human self-sacrifice, nay more, we might add, of what is best in human life — whether in the family, the society, or the state.

Paganism made a last attempt in the person of Julian the apostate to recover the position from which it was rapidly being driven by the *religio crucis*. If ever there were a man fitted for extirpating a hollow belief, it was Julian — a valiant soldier, a man of philosophic culture, a comparatively pure and generous character, an intense lover of his country, and a thorough devotee of the ancient superstition. All that man could do, and that man an emperor, with every conceivable human means at command for realizing his aim, was done. He ridiculed, reviled, controverted, and discouraged the Christians in every possible way, without positively persecuting them; he extolled, praised, defended, encouraged the old idolatry and its priests in every possible way, by example, precept, and favor; but all was in vain; and when he died (A.D. 363) he is said to have exclaimed: "Nazarene, thou hast conquered." Whether these were his words or not, they undoubtedly express the fact. What his predecessors had failed to accomplish by brute force, seconded by the blind hatred of the mob, the fanatic hostility of the superstitious, the scorn of the refined, the satire of the poets, the misrepresentations of the historian, and the subtle refutations of the philosophers when the Christians were as yet a very feeble fold, Julian also failed to accomplish. The cross has pursued an almost unhindered course of conquest down to the present day; and we should but express the thorough conviction of myriads of souls were we to describe it as "the salt of the earth and the light of the world." But we must as heretofore limit ourselves strictly to bare facts, — facts which all acknowledge to be such, whatever opinion may be entertained as to their rationality or worth.

a. No inconsiderable portion of human thought has been devoted to this event, from the days of Anselm, who first opened up the ethical problems it involves, down to Hegel and Baur, who after their manner also constituted it one of the main pillars of their speculative historical edifice. To enumerate the writers who have made it the subject of some of their profoundest inquiries would be to tell the roll of the

greatest thinkers of their respective ages; and these all, with rare exceptions, have recognized the fact that the cross is the salvation of humanity, even when they were either unable to explain how, or fell on explanations logically incompatible with the fact. Prior to Anselm we find it discussed most zealously by Augustine, whose influence on Christian literature is traceable even to the present hour; by Leo, justly designated the Great, a churchman of most vigorous grasp of mind and will; by Gregory of Nyssa, noted for philosophical subtilty; by John of Damascus, the comprehensive summarizer of the results of theological thought up to his time; by Basil, great in his zeal alike for science, monkery, and the church; by Gregory Nazianzen, theologian and orator; by Athanasius, mighty in faith, in word, in deed, and in suffering; by Theodoret the learned; by Hilary, the Athanasius of the West; and by Scotus Erigena, one of the profoundest thinkers of the Christian era.

After Anselm had given a new direction to inquiry by his immortal treatise "Cur Deus Homo," we find the subject taken up in all earnestness by Abaelard, once the most popular teacher of philosophy and theology in Paris; by Bernhard, saint and hero; by Hugo St. Victor, scholastic and mystic; by Peter Lombard, the learned master of sentences; by Bonaventura, the seraphic doctor; by Thomas Aquinas, the Doctor Angelicus, who aimed at combining Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine in one comprehensive system; by Duns Scotus, Doctor Subtilis; by Wyclif, the morning star of the Reformation; by Wessel, the reformer before the Reformation; by Luther the Reformer; and by a host of thinkers of all classes, and in all the countries of the civilized world, since his day down to the present moment. And never did the crucifixion on Calvary under Pontius Pilate attract more thought and speculation than it does at this present moment. So much for its position in the history of human thought. A thousand times tabooed as a problem beneath the notice of philosophic minds, and a thousand times imperiously claiming the most concentrated attention of the simplest and the profoundest!

b. But, besides engaging the intelligence of man, it has also awakened in him feelings, stirred him to efforts, and manned him to self-sacrifice as pure, as high, as lofty — we should be justified in saying immeasurably purer, higher, and loftier — as any recorded on the whole page of human history. What was it that led to the establishment of the hundreds of monasteries, convents, and similar institutions, which, whatever they may have been in the days of their degeneracy, were founded by men of the purest zeal for their own and others' welfare, and were for generations a source of refining, elevating, and civilizing influences to the districts around them? It was the cross. What was it that drove hundreds of the best men of their respective generations from their native lands to traverse pathless wilds, and seek out unknown and barbarous tribes for the purpose of saving them from temporal and eternal ruin? It was the cross in their hearts, whose image they often bore in their hands. What gave the signal for the movement of those immense masses of men of all classes and ages from all parts of Europe on Jerusalem during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries — to the crusades, which, however else we may judge of them, must be confessed to have been rooted in an enthusiasm such as the world had never before witnessed? It was the cross. What was it that inspired Italian art, at the noblest period of its existence, with its grandest thoughts and colors and forms? Was it not the cross? In whose honor were raised the finest monuments of the most spiritual style of architecture that human genius has conceived? Surely the cross, which they exhibit in their form — the cross, that towers aloft on their summits! Under what sign arose and labored the numerous orders and associations of the Middle Ages — cleric and laic, civil and military — for the defence of the church and for the care of the sick and needy? Under the sign of the cross. Why was it that the Romish church gradually lost so much of its quickening and purifying influence on the world, and became at its very centre a mass of festering corruption?

Because it had dimmed the brightness of the cross, substituting other sacrifices for the one sacrifice offered by the Nazarene. What was it that gave light and life to Luther's soul, and lent his voice an almost magical influence on the hungering and thirsting peoples of Europe? It was the message of the cross. To what do the tens of thousands of churches whose spires adorn the landscapes of Europe and America and other parts of the world owe their existence? To the cross. To what purpose are devoted the vast majority of the benevolent associations which exist all over the civilized world? To the preaching of the cross. Whatever may be said to the contrary, and however many defects and weaknesses may be pointed out in its bearers, can it be denied that the message of the cross is at the present moment as powerful and stirring as ever?

Throughout Christendom, notwithstanding that many maintain it to be surfeited of the cross, wherever that cross is held up distinctly, simply, faithfully, it never fails to speak to the human conscience, heart, and will with a power which, unexplained as it may be, is none the less indubitably great. And the victories it gained over the heathenism of Greece and Rome and Egypt and Carthage during the early years of its proclamation it is still gaining, and likely to gain, in India, China, Africa, and Polynesia.

Here we have a sixth problem, or rather a series of problems, which awaits the solution of the philosophical historian.

Such, then, is a brief and very imperfect view of the position occupied by the death of Jesus in the history of humanity during the last eighteen hundred years. It has been believed in by millions as the propitiation for the sins of the world, and as such has stimulated thought, awakened hope and love, strengthened volition, and restored life to an extent unparalleled within the known existence of humanity.

III. We have now to inquire: What is the reason that the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth, which, as we have shown, no one regarded as an event of special significance when it

took place, came to be believed in — first by the disciples, then by natives of Jerusalem, then by Paul, and afterwards by millions throughout the length and breadth of the world — as a sacrifice for sin; and as such to take so strong a hold as it undeniably has done on the human intelligence, the human heart, the human will, the human conscience, in a word, on human life? Or, to put the matter in another form, what conclusion are we justified in drawing from the contrast between the supposed and apparent insignificance of the event and the marvelous influence it has had on the course of human history?

Throughout all the centuries of the church's existence attempts have been made to explain the phenomenon under consideration in a way different from that adopted by Christian believers and apologists; but the only success achieved has been to saddle mankind with a degree of folly and hallucination such as to render all inquiry alike futile and absurd. To review these attempts would be a labor as tedious as unprofitable. Whatever form the explanations may have taken, they have all issued in the one or the other of the following alternatives: those who first taught that Christ's death was a sacrifice for sin — whether they were the original disciples, or Paul, or later writers — must either have been laboring under an hallucination, or have wilfully propagated what they knew to be erroneous; and their successors, whether in the belief or in the propagation of the belief, must either have deceived themselves or been deceived, or been deceivers and deceived together. By way of at once confirming what we have just remarked and furnishing a sample of the kind of shifts to which eminent men have resorted, we will here notice the account given by Dr. Baur of Tübingen, of the way in which first, the immediate disciples, and then Paul, arrived at their belief. With regard to the former he says:[1] "As long as Jesus lived there was still a possibility of the Jewish people recognizing him as the Messiah, notwithstand-

[1] We quote from Dr. Baur's "Kerchengeschichte der drei ersten Jahrhunderte," pp. 39 sq. and 45 sq.

ing the antagonism between his idea of the promised deliverer and theirs. But after enduring the death of the cross it was totally impossible for a Jew, so long as he remained a Jew, to recognize him as the Messiah. Whoso believed in him as the Messiah after such a death must have cast aside all the carnal elements of the ordinary Jewish expectations. In fact, what could a dead Messiah possibly be to a Jew? Either, therefore, the faith on him must be extinguished by his death, or, if it were firm and strong enough, it must break the bounds of death, and pierce through from death to life.[1] Nothing but the miracle of the resurrection could have scattered the doubts which seemed necessarily to involve the extinction of faith. What the resurrection was in itself is not a subject for historical inquiry. It is sufficient for the historian to know that the disciples believed it to be a fact. The fact of the resurrection is not necessary to the explanation of what follows, but only the belief of the disciples in the fact." Dr. Baur elsewhere denies that the resurrection was or could have been a fact. Expressed in plain English Baur's view is just this; the hallucination into which the disciples fell as to the significance of Christ's death, was a consequence of the hallucination under which they labored that he had risen again.[2]

Let us now hear what he has to say about Paul. After affirming that the *miracle* (Wunder) of Paul's conversion was nothing but an inner spiritual process, though Paul himself labored under the hallucination of having actually seen Jesus, he goes on to say: "The very thing which rendered it impossible for a Jew to believe in Jesus as the Messiah, to wit, his death on the cross, was converted by Paul's deeper thinking mind into its very opposite; the thought dawned upon him that that which is most opposed to the carnal

[1] We think it proper to assure our readers that we are not caricaturing, but quoting.

[2] It would lead us aside from our present purpose to attempt to point out the absurdities contained in this pre-eminently philosophical and rational account of the rise of Christianity, as it claims to be.

mind of man may be the profoundest truth; that the very death which is apparently the strongest argument against the Messiahship of Christ, may have been a part of his mission, and, as ordained by God, have a special religious significance."[1] How Paul's mind came to perform so extraordinary a summersault Dr. Baur does not at all explain. The sentences immediately preceding what we have just quoted indicate so extraordinary a power of performing logical and psychological summersaults on the part of Dr. Baur himself, that we cannot help further referring to them. "No analysis, whether psychological or dialectical, is capable of clearing up the mysterious act by which God revealed his Son in him. Still we are justified in asking whether his conversion was not brought about by the mighty impression which the great fact of the death of Jesus all at once made on his soul. From the moment when the Son of God was revealed in him he lived in the contemplation of the Crucified One; he knew of no other; he was crucified with him; and his entire system of thought hung on this one fact. The death which was to the Jews a stumbling-block and to the Greeks foolishness, was to him the sum and substance of salvation." Unpleasant as it is to us to refer to a man of Dr. Baur's eminence in such terms, we must say the above passage is as conspicuous an instance of perversity as can be found in any work that has ever come into our hands. 1. He speaks of God revealing his Son: a "God" who, according to Baur, is not a God in any sense warranting his being represented as revealing; and a "Son" who in no sense whatever suitable to the connection, deserves the name. 2. What he immediately before describes as purely a process of Paul's own mind, he here describes as a revealing act of God. 3. The death of Jesus, that is, the very event, which we have every psychological reason for believing to have been one of the chief grounds of his righteous scorn and wrath at those who trusted in him as the Messiah, became the principal link in his conversion.

[1] See also Baur's "Neutestamentliche Theologie," p. 130.

This is one of the latest and confessedly ablest attempts to account for the rise of the idea that Christ's death was a sacrifice in a way different from that recognized by the church; and with what result? Surely, to add hallucination to hallucination, improbability to improbability. In point of fact, as we have already remarked, every explanation save one issues in the imputation of either hallucination or imposture, of self-deception or the wilful deception of others. Either it was the fact, or not the fact, that Christ died a propitiation for sins. If it were not the fact, the propagators of the idea must either have persuaded themselves of its truth, or have propagated it knowing it to be an untruth, or have been misunderstood by those to whom they spake. Let us look for a moment at each of these alternatives. Were the first propagators self-deceived? No one of the first preachers of Christ did so much to persuade men that he died for sin as Paul. He himself lays special stress on his not having received his gospel of man, and pronounces accursed all who should preach any other gospel than that which he had preached (Gal. i. 8, 12). Is it possible to suppose, then, that he was self-deceived? One of the subtilest attempts to show how he might have arrived at the conviction he entertained although it was groundless, is the one made by Dr. Baur; and what perversities it is chargeable with we have seen above. Eccentric as the human mind sometimes is, and capable as it is of cherishing strange delusions, an eccentricity and a delusion like this of the disciples of Christ has never been witnessed — apart altogether from the improbability that their very enemies, who were as well acquainted with what had occurred as themselves, should be also persuaded to accept the delusion. Nor have we another example in the entire religious history of the world of such a significance being attached to the death of a mere man, either by his own friends or by later generations — not even among heathens, how much less among Jews! As to the second alternative, that the first followers of Jesus wilfully propagated what they knew to be untrue, such a thing lay, of

course, within the range of possibility. Abstractly considered, we allow they might have combined for this purpose. But it would have been a folly of unparalleled senselessness and purposelessness. They had all to lose, and plainly nothing whatever to gain, by adopting such a course. And surely we can scarcely suppose that the enemies of their Master and of themselves would be persuaded to accept the lie that was offered to them, and risk for its sake the loss of all things. The third alternative, that the first preachers of Christ were misunderstood, seems more plausible; but, often as it has been advanced, it is hollow to the core. We are told that, as Orientals, and particularly as Jews, they may have used much stronger language than Occidentals are in the habit of using; and that, accordingly, they may merely have intended to represent Jesus as dying a sacrifice for us in essentially the same sense as that in which all sufferers for the truth, for right, and for love are sacrifices both for men and for sin. Or they may have regarded him as the head, and the Jewish people — nay, the whole world — as his veritable members; both form a solidaric unity;[1] and in this sense

[1] One of the youngest and ablest members of the Tübingen school, Dr. Th. Keim, Professor of Theology at the University of Zürich, expresses himself in his "Der Geschichtliche Christus," as follows: "Strongly as many object at the present day to recognize in Christ our substitute both in obedience to the law and in the payment of our debts, and much as they try to loosen the connection between what he did and what humanity has gained, faith demands and facts recommend its recognition; although not in the coarse sense in which the Middle Ages understood his substitution. Faith is not quieted before God by an ideal in the soul which never becomes a reality, nor by the penitence which is always imperfect, and which would not atone for the irrecoverable burdens of our life, even if it were perfect, nor by the certainty that Jesus has revealed the heart — the love, grace, and compassion — of God. In view of the holy God, faith cannot be content with what is imperfect; and the soul cannot think of God's love without also thinking of his righteousness — that righteousness which Jesus also proclaimed. It calls for facts instead of wishes, and finds them in Christ. The perfect Christ, being ours, consoles us for our imperfection. The Christ suffering innocently, being ours, calms us relatively to the divine and human remembrance of our sins and guilt. Is it a mere matter of religious fancy thus to base on persons and facts what is essentially an inner experience? Not so; for all people in all times have believed in substitution. God was gracious to Israel for the sake of the faithfulness of Abraham, Moses, and

have believed in Christ as a propitiation for the sins of the world. Apart altogether from the difficulty of explaining how they could have risen even to such a view of their master's crucifixion without some hallucination like that of the resurrection, and while we may allow that Western hearers might possibly have attached to some of their words a fuller meaning than they naturally bore, we must still ask: Did then the inhabitants of Jerusalem who believed in Jesus not understand them? Was Paul, who sets forth the view in question with greater definiteness, fulness, and variety than any other of the sacred writers, incapable of rightly apprehending what was intended? And was he never brought to correct his own language by his intercourse with Greeks and Romans to whom his preaching was foolishness? Did the converts from heathenism never make the discovery that the doctrine they had accepted was based on a misapprehension; not even those who, like Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others, had gone through the schools of philosophy prior to their conversion? The entire supposition is absurd.

There is but one hypothesis fitted to account satisfactorily for the phenomena we have passed in review. This hypothesis does fully and satisfactorily account for every one, whatever difficulties it may itself involve. The hypothesis in question is, that what was preached was true — that what

David. For the sake of unrighteous sufferers, but still more for the sake of righteous sufferers, are people delivered. The greatness of great men is diffused, as it were, over the entire nation The scene of a martyrdom lightens the hearts of those who surround it, as though it were a means of purification and propitiation before God. And here is more than a great man, more than a human martyr. What history teaches is confirmed by reason. There is a veritable, vital unity, a solidaric obligation between the members of the same people, between all the members of the human race. As the vital process rises and falls, the one lives and suffers with the other; the weak lean on the strong, the strong bow down to the weak; and when the strong man dies for the weak the latter can courageously rise again. The life of Jesus is an illustration of this league between the strong and the weak." An interesting approximation to the doctrine of the atonement on the part of a man who logically ought to reject it in every form.

was proclaimed as a fact was a fact. If the death of Jesus really was the propitiation for the sins of the world, and, as implied therein, the world needed a propitiation, then nothing could be more natural than that it should produce the effects ascribed to it; nothing would have been more unnatural than for it not to stir the deepest depths of the intellect, heart, conscience, will, and whole life of mankind. And as the hypothesis fully explains the facts, so the facts require the hypothesis. Every single step in the history of the position actually occupied by the crucfixion of Jesus in the life of humanity becomes as simple and natural as possible the moment we accept the double supposition above mentioned. If either the one or the other be denied, the history of humanity, not only during, but even before, the Christian era, becomes a huge labyrinth of confusion. Under these circumstances there is only one other question that the philosophical historian, the man of science, has a right to put, — the question, namely, whether the acceptance of the hypothesis lands us in greater difficulties than its rejection? If it does, we must of course reject it. We cannot here enter on a discussion of this very important question, but must content ourselves with one remark: The difficulties which present themselves when we deny that Christ actually made propitiation for our sins are appreciable, tangible, demonstrable; the difficulties in the way of the acceptance of the fact of the propitiation are almost all *a priori*, theoretical suppositions, and of such a nature as to give the lie to other important phenomena of human history which are altogether independent of Christianity and of the Bible.[1]

[1] It is clear enough that if the phenomena described warrant us in concluding the death af Christ to have been actually what it was believed to be, they warrant also other conclusions, or require other hypotheses, as, for example, the divine-human nature of Christ, that he rose again from the dead; that the disciples were supernaturally enlightened to see the significance of the outwardly insignificant event, and so forth.

ARTICLE V.

THE LAND OF MORIAH.

BY REV. SAMUEL WOLCOTT, D.D., CLEVELAND, OHIO.

A QUESTION has been raised within a few years respecting the locality designated in the divine direction to Abraham to offer his son Isaac in sacrifice. The command was: "Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah, and offer him there for a burnt-offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of" (Gen. xxii. 2).

The name Moriah occurs but in one more passage in the sacred scriptures, and in this it is given as the site of the temple which Solomon built: "Then Solomon began to build the house of the Lord at Jerusalem, in mount Moriah, where the Lord appeared unto David his father, in the place that David had prepared in the threshing-floor of Ornan the Jebusite" (2 Chron. iii. 1).

Is the Mount Moriah in Jerusalem on which the temple stood identical with one of the mountains in the land of Moriah on which Abraham was directed to offer Isaac? Such has been the accepted tradition and current belief. The identity, naturally suggested by the name, does not appear to have been seriously questioned, except by the Samaritans in behalf of Mount Gerizim, which has been rejected by others as the unfounded claim of an interested party.

This discredited claim found, at length, a champion in Professor Stanley, who in his "Sinai and Palestine" gave his reasons for adopting it, and in his later "Lectures on Jewish History," ventured to assume it as an ascertained and established site. In this claim he has been supported by two eminent contributors to Dr. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible — Mr. Ffoulkes in the Article "Gerizim," and Mr. Grove in the Article "Moriah." These three writers, all versed in Bible

history and in the topography of Palestine, concur in rejecting the claim of Jerusalem, and in maintaining that of Gerizim as the scene of the offering of Isaac by Abraham. This theory could not have a more respectable authorship, nor a more weighty endorsement. But it cannot be established by authority; it must rest on its merits; and we propose to offer our reasons for dissenting from it. The arguments on the two points, which are really distinct, have been naturally blended in the discussion. We will quote them together, as they are given, but in the examination we will separate them as well as we can, and consider each locality by itself. Our quotations from the first writer are from the American edition of his first work above named; and from the other two, from the English edition of the Dictionary. We omit portions of each, to avoid repetition.

"Abraham was 'in the land of the Philistines,' probably at the extreme south. From Beersheba or Gaza he would probably be conceived to move along the Philistine plain, and then on the morning of the third day would arrive in the plain of Sharon, exactly where the massive height of Gerizim is visible 'afar off,' and from thence half a day would bring him to its summit. Exactly such a view is to be had in that plain, and on the other hand, no such view or impression can fairly be said to exist on the road from Beersheba to Jerusalem, even if what is at most a journey of two days could be extended to three. The towers of Jerusalem are indeed seen from the ridge of Mount Elias, at the distance of three miles; but there is no elevation corresponding to the 'place afar off,' to which Abraham 'lifted up his eyes.' And the special locality which Jewish tradition has assigned for the place, and whose name is the chief guarantee for the tradition — Mount Moriah, the Hill of the Temple — is not visible till the traveller is close upon it, at the southern edge of the Valley of Hinnom, from whence he looks down upon it, as upon a lower eminence. ..... Hebrew scholars must determine how far the difference of the radical letters of מריה and מורה is an insuperable objection to the identification. In Gen. xxii. the Samaritans actually read Moreh for Moriah" (Stanley, Sinai and Palestine, 247, 248).

"Let it be observed that it is not the mountain but the district which is there (Gen. xxii.) called Moriah (of the same root with Moreh see Corn. a Lapid. on Gen. xii. 6), and that antecedently to the occurrence which took place 'upon one of the mountains' in its vicinity, a consideration which of itself would naturally point to the locality already known to Abraham as the plain or plains of Moreh, 'the land of vision,' 'the high

land,' and therefore consistently 'the land of adoration,' or 'religious worship,' as it is variously explained. ..... It is by no means necessary, as Mr. Porter thinks, that he should have started from Beersheba (see Gen. xxi. 34 'the whole land being before him,' xx. 15). ..... Again, it is not necessary that he should have arrived on the actual spot during the third day. All that is said in the narrative is that from the time that it hove in sight he and Isaac parted from the young men, and went on together alone. ..... Different reasons, in all probability, caused these two localities to be so named; the first, not a mountain, but a land, district, or plain, called Moreh or Moriah, from the noble vision of nature, and therefore of natural religion that met the eye; the second, a small hill deriving its name from a special revelation or vision, as the express words of scripture say, which took place by the threshing-floor of Araunah the Jebusite.' If it be thought strange that a place once called by the 'father of the faithful' Jehovah-Jireh, should have been merged by Moses, and ever afterwards, in a general name, so different from it in sense and origin as Gerizim; it would be still more strange that if Mount Moriah of the Book of Chronicles and Jehovah-Jireh were one and the same place, no sort of allusion should have been made by the inspired historian to the prime event which had caused it to be so called. True it is that Josephus in more than one place asserts that where Abraham offered, there the temple was afterwards built. Yet the same Josephus makes God bid Abraham go to the mountain — not the land — of Moriah; having omitted all mention of the plains of Moreh in his account of the preceding narrative. Besides, in more than one place he shows that he bore no love to the Samaritans" (Ffoulkes, Gerizim, i. 679, 680).

"Although it was more than two days' journey from 'the land of the Philistines,' yet it is not said how much more than two days it was. The mountain — the 'place' — came into view in the course of the third day; but the time occupied in performing the remainder of the distance is not stated. ..... The former [Moreh] was well known to Abraham. It was the first spot on which he had pitched his tent in the Promised Land, and it was hallowed and endeared to him by the first manifestation of Jehovah with which he had been favored, and by the erection of his first altar. With Jerusalem on the other hand, except as possibly the residence of Melchizedek, he had not any connection whatever; it lay as entirely out of his path as it did out of that of Isaac and Jacob. The LXX. appear to have thus read or interpreted the original, since they render both Moreh and Moriah in Gen. by ὑψηλή, while in 2 Chron. iii. they have Ἀμωρεία. The one name is but the feminine of the other (Simonis, Onom. 414). The Jewish tradition, which first appears in Josephus, unless 2 Chron. iii. 1 be a still earlier hint of its existence, is fairly balanced by the rival tradition of the Samaritans, which is at least as old as the third century after Christ. ..... The single occurrence of the name in this one passage in Chronicles

is surely not enough to establish a coincidence, which, if we consider it, is little short of miraculous. There is in the East a natural tendency when a place is established as a sanctuary to make it the scene of all the notable events, possible or impossible, which can by any play of words or other pretext be connected with it. Had the fact been as the modern belief asserts, and had the belief existed in the minds of the people of the Old or New Testament, there could not fail to be frequent references to it in the narrative, so detailed, of the original dedication of the spot by David; in the account of Solomon's building in the book of Kings, of Nehemiah's rebuilding (compare especially the reference to Abraham in ix. 7); or of the restorations and purifications of the Maccabees. It was a fact which must have found its way into the paronomastic addresses of the prophets, into the sermon of St. Stephen, so full of allusion to the founders of the nation, or into the argument of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. But not so; on the contrary, except in the case of Salem — and that is by no means ascertained — the name of Abraham does not appear once in connection with Jerusalem or the later royal or ecclesiastical glories of Israel..... But in addition to this, Jerûsalem is incompatible with the circumstances of the narrative of Gen. xxii. To name only two instances: (1) The temple mount cannot be spoken of as a conspicuous eminence [see Stanley above]. (2) If Salem was Jerusalem, then the trial of Abraham's faith, instead of taking place in the lonely and desolate spot implied by the narrative, where not even fire was to be obtained, and where no help but that of the Almighty was nigh, actually took place under the walls of the city of Melchizedek" (Grove, Moriah, ii. 422, 423).

The above citations give, we believe, all the points of the argument of these writers. We proceed to show the particulars in which it strikes us as inconclusive, discussing each locality separately, as far as practicable.

The Claim of Gerizim.[1]

1. The assumed identity of Moreh and Moriah cannot be admitted. There is a radical difference in their roots, as Dean Stanley concedes; that of מוֹרֶה being יָרָה, *to teach* "the

[1] That portion of Hackett's edition of Smith's Dictionary which embraces the Article "Gerizim," though not issued when this goes to press, will probably reach some of our readers soon. The substance of this part of the argument will be found in that, as that of the remainder will be in the Article "Moriah" when it is reached; the Article here offered, like its predecessors, being not so much a criticism on the Dictionary as a discussion of topics in that work supplemental to the English edition. To prevent misapprehension, we add a fuller statement at the close of this Article.

oaks of Moreh, so called from their owner," "hill of Moreh, teacher's hill"; and that of מֹרִיָּה being רָאָה, *to see* (Robinson's Gesenius, Lex. ad loc.). To this high authority we add the following from a recent able English writer:

"Moreh is strictly a proper name, and as such, both in Gen. xii. 6 and Deut. xxix. 30, though in the genitive after a definite noun, rejects the article; the 'hill of Moreh,' mentioned in Judg. vii. 1, where the name has the article, being a totally different place. On the other hand, the name Moriah, in the two places of its occurrence, namely, Gen. xxii. and 2 Chron. iii. 1, bears the article as an appellative, whether it denotes the same situation in both places or not. It is true the LXX. render the Moreh of Gen. xii. and the Moriah of Gen. xxii. alike by the adjective ὑψηλή, in one case translating by the words 'the lofty oak,' in the other, by 'the high land.' It is plain that on whatever grounds they proceeded in thus translating, this gives no support to the supposition that the names, as names of places, are synonymous, inasmuch as they did not take the words for names of places at all, but as descriptive adjectives. Mr. Grove tells us that מֹרִיָּה is only the feminine form of מוֹרֶה. According to no analogy of the construction of feminine forms can this be said; the masculine form should in this case have been מוֹרִי" (Quarry, Genesis and its Authorship, 210, 211).

Dr. Murphy makes the following just observation on this point in his Commentary:

"As the two names occur in the same document, and differ in form, they naturally denote different things" (Genesis, 339).

All the reasoning above quoted about the locality already known to Abraham as the plain of Moriah, the land of vision, called Moreh or Moriah, from the noble vision of nature, etc., is consequently, irrelevant.

2. The distance from Beersheba to Gerizim is fatal to this hypothesis. The suggestion that Abraham need not have "started from Beersheba" is gratuitous; the narrative fairly conveying the impression that he started from his residence, which was then at that place. From this point Jerusalem is three days' journey north, and Gerizim two days still further north. The journey could not have been completed "on the third day" with a loaded ass, whether the animal carried its master, or bore the wood for the sacrifice. We presume it to have been used for the latter purpose — for either it would have been "saddled" — and this accords with the view of Josephus: "he took Isaac, with two of his servants; laying

what things were necessary for a sacrifice upon an ass." The route, moreover, by which these writers would conduct the company to Gerizim, is an unknown and unnatural route.

3. The suggestions of Mr. Ffoulkes and Mr. Grove that the patriarch only came in sight of the mountain on the third day, and had an indefinite time for performing the rest of the journey, and the similar suggestion of Dr. Stanley that after coming in sight of the mountain he had half a day in which to reach it, are inadmissible. Acknowledging "that from the time it hove in sight, he and Isaac parted from the young men and went on together alone," these writers all overlook the fact, that from this point the wood for the burnt-offering was laid upon Isaac. Thus far the needed materials had been borne by the servants and the ass. That the young man could bear the burden for a short distance, does not warrant the supposition that he could have carried it for a day's journey, or a half-day's. In that case, it would seem that the donkey and the servants might have been left at home. They halted, apparently, not far from the spot of the intended sacrifice.

4. The commanding position of Gerizim, with the wide prospect from its summit, is not a necessary, nor even probable, element in the decision of the question. It was to *the land* of Moriah that the patriarch was directed, some one of the eminences of which, apparently not yet named, the Lord would designate as his destination. In favor of Gerizim as an elevated site, Stanley lays stress upon the phrase, "*lifted up* his eyes," forgetting that the identical phrase had been applied (Gen. xiii. 10) to Lot's view of the plain of the Jordan far *below* him.

5. The Samaritan tradition is unreliable. From the time that this people erected on Gerizim a rival temple to that in Jerusalem, they naturally desired to invest the spot with the sanctities of the earlier Jewish history. The substitution of Moreh for Moriah in their version of Genesis xxii. 2, is of the same character with this claim. If this had been the traditionary site of the scene in question, it would have abated

something of the utter detestation with which the Jews subsequently regarded the spot. In the face of such a tradition Josephus would hardly have claimed Jerusalem as the site; and while he, doubtless, shared the prejudices of his countrymen against the Samaritans, his general fairness as a historian forbids the supposition that he was capable of robbing a community of a cherished site, and transferring it to another. Moreover, the incredible theory that Gerizim, and not Jerusalem, is the original site of the city of Salem, for which Professor Stanley earnestly argues, and which Mr. Ffoulkes is constrained to reject, has the same support of Samaritan tradition.

In corroboration of our views of the untenableness of this claim for Gerizim, we will now quote the opinions of three competent writers, who have traversed the ground subsequently to the publication of Stanley's theory, and given their attention to this point.

Professor J. Leslie Porter, author of the valuable "Handbook for Syria and Palestine," says:

"That Gerizim was the mountain in the 'land of Moriah,' on which Abraham was commanded to offer up Isaac, seems to be simply impossible. Abraham was undoubtedly at Beersheba when he received the command (compare Gen. xxi. 33 and xxii. 1–3, 19). It appears from the narrative that on the third day he reached the place, offered the sacrifice, and returned to the spot where he had left his servants. The distance from Beersheba to Gerizim, is about seventy geographical miles as the crow flies, which in such a country will give ninety of actual travel. Abraham's servants were on foot carrying wood; Isaac also was on foot, and Abraham rode an ass; they could not, therefore have travelled such a distance" (Kitto's Bib. Cyc. ii. 113).

Dr. Thomson, the veteran American missionary, whose personal acquaintance with the country is unsurpassed, says:

"Mr. Stanley's geographical argument is more than feeble. It is almost absurd to maintain that Abraham could come on his loaded ass from Beersheba to Nablûs in the time specified. On the third day he arrived early enough to leave the servants 'afar off,' and walk with Isaac, bearing the sacrificial wood, to the mountain which God had shown him, there build the altar, arrange the wood, bind his son, and stretch forth his hand to slay him; and there was time too, to take and offer up the ram in Isaac's place. That all this could have been done at Nablûs on the third day of

their journey is incredible. It has always appeared to me since I first travelled over the country myself, that even Jerusalem was too far off from Beersheba for the tenor of the narrative, but Nablûs is two days' ride further north. Nor will the suggestion of Mr. Stanley that Abraham came up through Philistia and then turned eastward into the mountain bear examination" (Land and Book, ii. 212).

Mr. Tristram, the observant English traveller, who visited Gerizim two or three times says:

"I have traversed and timed these routes repeatedly, in a greater or less portion of their course, and feel satisfied that as long as the sacred text remains as it is, 'on the third day,' the claims of Gerizim are untenable" (Land of Israel, 153).

We believe that history will confirm the judgment of these three writers on this point rather than that of the three whose argument we are reviewing. The theory which claims the Moriah of Jerusalem as the locality of the scene in question has its difficulties; but whether that theory be accepted or rejected, the claim of Gerizim appears to us to have too slight a support to be entitled to any weight in the discussion.

The Claim of Jerusalem.

Rejecting the theory which would identify the Moriah of the patriarch with Mount Gerizim, we have the claim of Jerusalem clear of a rival. But this claim is distinct, and, like the other, must rest on its own merits. Its principal proofs are the identity of its name; the distance from Beersheba, which suits exactly the requirements of the narrative; and the tradition of the Jews, twice recorded by Josephus.

"It was that mountain upon which King David afterwards built [purposed to build] the temple (Antiq. i. 13 § 2). Now it happened that Abraham came and offered his son Isaac for a burnt-offering at that very place, as we have before related. When King David saw that God had heard his prayer and graciously accepted his sacrifice, he resolved to call that entire place the altar of all the people, and to build a temple to God there" (Antiq. vii. 13 § 4).

Without countervailing evidences these grounds would be accepted as sufficient. Let us now examine the objections which these writers bring forward to this view.

1. Abraham had little or no "connection" with Jerusa-

lem. "It lay out of his path," while Gerizim was "well-known" to him, and "was hallowed and endeared to him." The obvious answer to this is, that the patriarch did not choose the spot; he went to the place which the Lord selected for him, and started apparently ignorant of his precise destination. This argument further assumes that he not only went to a place of his own selection, but also that he started on an agreeable excursion, which he would naturally wish to associate with the pleasant memories of his pilgrimage; the reverse of which we know to have been the fact.

2. "Had the fact been as the modern belief asserts, there could not fail to be frequent reference to it, by the writers both of the Old and New Testaments." The reply to this is strongly put by a learned writer whom we have already quoted:

"This *argumentum ab silentio* is notoriously not to be relied on; the instances of unaccountable silence respecting undoubted facts, where we might have expected them to be mentioned, are too numerous among ancient writers to allow it any weight, except as tending to corroborate arguments that may have considerable weight in themselves. In the present case, the clause in 2 Chron. iii. 1. 'which was seen' (נִרְאָה) or 'provided by David,' may fairly be taken as containing an obscure reference to the Jehovah-Jireh, and the saying: 'In the mount of the Lord it shall be seen,' of Gen. xxii. 14, so that the absence of all such reference is not so complete as is alleged" (Quarry, 213, 214).

Still, if this site had been selected for the temple by King David *because* it was the scene of the offering of Isaac (and another reason is assigned by the sacred writer, 1 Chron. xxi., xxii., without any intimation of this), the absence of some more distinct allusion to the fact, though not more unaccountable than other omissions in the scriptures, must yet be admitted to be unaccountable.

3. "The Jewish tradition is fairly balanced by the rival tradition of the Samaritans." Surely not "balanced"; the latter is later and less reliable. Josephus and the rabbinical writers doubtless embodied the honest tradition of their countrymen supported by the identity of names; the Moriah of Genesis and the Moriah of Chronicles being not only the

same word, but used in no other connection. The first tradition is natural; the second is suspicious — in keeping with other Samaritan claims, which we know to have been false.

4. "The temple-mount is not a conspicuous eminence, like the one to which Abraham 'lifted up his eyes.'" This objection we have already answered. The phrase simply indicates the direction of the eyes, whether up or down, and a further illustration is furnished in vs. 13 of this chapter.

5. The eminence was seen "afar off," and "the hill of the temple is not visible till the traveller is close upon it." The phrase, "afar off," is relative. It is modified by circumstances, as in Gen. xxxvii. 18, where it is limited to the distance at which a person could be seen and recognized on a plain. In most connections it would indicate a greater distance than is admissible here; but there is a circumstance which qualifies it in this passage. From the spot where the place became visible (as is conceded by Mr. Ffoulkes) Abraham and Isaac proceeded alone to the appointed spot, the latter bearing the wood. The distance to be traversed with this load from the point at which Moriah becomes visible to a traveller from the south to its summit is fully as great as any reader would naturally associate with this fact in the narrative.

6. "If Salem was Jerusalem, instead of the lonely and desolate spot implied by the narrative, it took place under the very walls of the city of Melchizedek." Mr. Grove, who suggests this, not being convinced of their identity, nor inclined to admit it, — Dean Stanley is fully convinced that they are not identical, — this argument is for other minds, for those who hold other and positive views on this point. We accept the identity, and we feel the force of the objection. Our only reply to it is, that the environs of an Eastern walled town are often as free from observation, as secluded and still, as a solitude. The writer of this has passed hours together within a stone's throw of the walls of the modern Jerusalem at various points undisturbed by any sound, and

as unobserved as though the city had been tenantless. This view is supported by a writer already quoted:

"Even under the walls of the city of Melchizedek the whole may have taken place without attracting the notice of the inhabitants, and the desolate loneliness of the spot, supposed to be implied in the narrative, has no place in it whatever. It is not implied that Abraham could not obtain fire, but going to an unknown place, he took with him, by way of precaution, what would be needful for the intended sacrifice" (Quarry, 213).

This partially relieves the difficulty which Mr. Grove has raised for those of his readers who identify Salem and Jerusalem; but only in part, we think. It must be acknowledged that close proximity to a city is not a natural locality for such a scene. We should suppose that the patriarch would have been directed — we should naturally infer from the narrative itself that he was directed — to some spot remote from the dwellings of men, where, in the performance of this remarkable rite, which even his servants were not to witness, he would not be liable to interruption or intrusive observation.

It must also be admitted that the selection of this spot, with or without a design, for the two events associated with it, is a most unlikely occurrence. "It would take a vast amount of contrary evidence to force me to abandon this idea," says Dr. Thomson. It would require very little to lead us to relinquish it; for in itself it seems to us the height of improbability. That the altar of burnt-offering for the Hebrew worship should have been erected on the identical spot where centuries before the great progenitor of the nation had erected the altar for the sacrifice of his son, led thither for the purpose three days' journey from home, — that this should have occurred without design, have been a mere "coincidence," — we must concur with Mr. Grove in pronouncing "little short of miraculous." Yet if it did occur, this is a somewhat less incredible supposition than that it was by design. That the locality became invested with any sanctity in the Divine mind — was divinely selected as the site of the temple, the scene of the second manifestation, because it had been the scene of the first — is wholly

uncountenanced by any fact or analogy within our knowledge. The "natural tendency" of the Eastern mind, moreover, to cluster supernatural or sacred events around the supposed scene of a known miracle, is correctly stated by Mr. Grove. Nothing could be more natural than for the Jews, without any clear warrant, to connect if possible the scene of their sacrifices with the offering of Isaac, and associate the altars of their typical worship with the altar on which the son of promise was laid. This correspondence is thought by some to favor the identity; we cannot but regard a double claim, so peculiar, as in itself a suspicious circumstance.

We would say in conclusion that in favor of the identity of the two sites may be urged the identity of the name, used without explanation in these two passages of Scripture alone, and "in both places alike as an appellative bearing the article"; the possible allusion in a clause of the latter to a clause in the former; the correspondence of the distance with the specifications of the journey; the ancient and consistent Hebrew tradition, universally received in Christendom; the failure to establish a single presumption in favor of any other locality; and the absence of any fatal or decisive objection to this identification. On these grounds the traditional belief will probably abide. Nevertheless, for reasons above intimated, we cannot feel the absolute confidence in it which some express. And the most which we think can be safely affirmed is, that Mount Moriah in Jerusalem, on which the Temple of Solomon was built, was probably, also, the spot where Abraham offered up Isaac.

In this and preceding numbers of the Bibliotheca Sacra we have examined three different theories relating to Biblical topics, which have been advocated by contributors to Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, and which we regard as unsound and untenable: namely, the fantastic theory originated by Mr. Fergusson, which would identify Mount Zion with Mount Moriah, and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre with the Mosque of Omar; the theory propounded by Mr. Grove, and adopted

by Mr. Tristram,[1] which would locate Sodom and the Cities of the Plain north of the Dead Sea; and the theory urged by Dean Stanley, and supported by Mr. Ffoulkes and Mr. Grove, and assumed by its author as proved, which would identify Mount Gerizim with the Land of Moriah. These several theories, with whatever names associated, we anticipate the concurrent judgment of our readers in pronouncing fanciful speculations.

Should any of our readers who have not examined the Dictionary receive from these discussions the impression that it is largely the refuge and repository of new and crude theories, they would form a very inadequate, mistaken, and unjust estimate of this great work. These theories are exceptional. In the department to which they belong they are, perhaps, the only points which invite serious criticism, though others admit of minor corrections and additions. The touchstone of discussion and of time should, doubtless, have been applied to these speculations before they were incorporated with a work like this, designed for permanent reference. New theories touching disputed localities, of which Palestine is prolific, should be treated, on their first promulgation, like her own visitors on their arrival — put into quarantine, until their salubrity has been ascertained.

But with these deductions, no one can study the Dictionary without gathering from every examination a more profound conviction of the breadth and value of the learning and research which it embodies. It is only surprising that a work so vast, prepared in detached sections by so many original contributors, should, when brought together, be on the whole so coherent and correct. With the whole work issued, so that its parts may be compared, the new edition occupies the high vantage-ground of a revision which, without abridgment, can adjust, balance, and supplement the original, and give it completeness and symmetry. Some of our scholars who have used and prized the English edition find the American so enriched by its editors as to be a necessity by the side of the

[1] We have private advices that Mr. Tristram has abandoned this theory.

other. We have no living countryman who, in this special field, so nearly occupies the place vacated by our lamented Robinson as Dr. Hackett, both in the thoroughness of his Biblical investigations and in the carefulness of his conclusions. The positions in the Dictionary which have been discussed in these pages all illustrate the propriety of a revised edition; but in connection with our repeated criticisms we deem it a duty to guard against an impression which might do injustice to the original work.

ARTICLE VI.

BIBLICAL NOTES.

BY HORATIO B. HACKETT, D.D., NEWTON CENTRE, MASS.

"Jesus saith unto her, Touch me not; for I am not yet ascended to my Father" (Λέγει αὐτῇ ὁ Ἰησοῦς· μή μου ἅπτου· οὔπω γὰρ ἀναβέβηκα πρὸς τὸν πατέρα μου) John xx. 17.

These words form part of the Saviour's address to Mary the Magdalene (the article always inserted in the Greek) at the sepulchre, on the morning of the resurrection. The meaning, it is well known, is very obscure, and has given rise to various explanations. It is impossible within our limits here to enumerate the different interpretations, and still less the grounds on which they have been maintained or opposed by commentators. The reader will find ample information of this nature in the writings of Lampe, Lücke, Stier, Luthardt, and others.

The view perhaps which has found most currency among general readers is, that Mary at that moment was on the point of embracing the knees or feet of the risen Saviour, as a mark of affection or an act of divine homage. But our Lord, anxious that the fact of the resurrection should be known to his disciples as soon as possible, refused the proffered demonstration, and instead of allowing Mary to consume time in this way, bid her depart at once, and inform the others that he had risen and had appeared to her.

But here the main difficulty of the passage presents itself; namely, how we are to regard our Lord's saying, "For I am not yet ascended," etc., as a reason (γάρ) for his forbidding Mary to touch him. He was standing in person before her, and how, with that evidence of her senses, could she need the assurance that he was not in heaven? The reply to this question has usually been, that he wished to console her for her present disappointment. Although, it is true, he was about to ascend to the Father, as she well understood, he had not yet ascended; and hence, in the interval, she would have other opportunities for testifying her love and devotion to him in the manner now denied to her. But in this case we certainly read into the words much more than they directly or naturally express. It appears singular too that the Saviour should refuse to allow Mary on this occasion to do that which he permitted the other women to do, to whom he showed himself on their return to the city (Matt. xxviii. 9). He gave a similar command to them to go and report his resurrection, and yet did not on that account forbid them to worship or detain him. Further, the language which he addressed to Mary is not μὴ κράτει or μὴ προσκύνει as we might expect on that supposition of the meaning, but μὴ ἅπτου, a variation of

itself suggestive of a different purpose on the part of Mary in offering to touch him, and on his part in interrupting the act.

Meyer, in the later editions of his Commentary on John, proposes another explanation which deserves to be known. It is a different one from that which he adopted in his earlier studies. It is to be observed that this form of the negative imperative implies an incipient act from which the doer is called upon to desist, or one which he shows by some look or gesture that he is about to perform. Mary, it may well be supposed, was in the same perplexed state of mind on the appearance of Christ to her, which was evinced in so many different ways by the other disciples after the resurrection. She had already, it is true, exclaimed in the ecstasy of her joy, "Rabboni," but she may not yet have been certain as to the precise form or nature of the body in which she beheld her Lord. It is he, the Great Master, verily, she is assured; but is he corporeal having really come forth out of the grave? Or is it his glorified spirit, having already gone up to God, but now having descended to her in its spiritual investiture? In this state of uncertainty she extends her hand to assure herself of the truth. She would procure for herself by the criterion of the sense of touch the conviction which the eye is unable to give her. The Saviour knows her thoughts, and arrests the act. The act is unnecessary: his words are a sufficient proof of what she would know. He "had not yet ascended to the Father," as she half believed, and consequently has not the spiritual body which she supposed he might possibly have. He gives her by this declaration the assurance respecting his bodily state which she had proposed to gain for herself through the medium of sense. Her case was like that of Thomas, and yet unlike his; she wished, like him, to touch the object of her vision, but, unlike him, was not prompted by unbelief.

Self-commendatory Allusions in John's Gospel.

Under this title we refer to the well-known instances in John's Gospel in which he mentions incidents or events that took place which imply something honorary or complimentary in relation to himself, and which call attention to him in that light. It is true, the evangelist does not speak of himself by name in these cases, but since at the time when John wrote every one in the circle of his readers must have known who was meant, the personal reference could hardly have been more explicit if the writer had actually spoken in the first person instead of the third. In addition to the notoriety which the facts of the Gospel history had acquired among Christians near the close of the first century, this fourth Gospel itself furnishes the means of identifying the anonymous beloved disciple with the writer of the Gospel; for the writer mentions this identification in express terms in xxi. 20, 24. For this reason, too, it is not very pertinent to say that John suppressed his name in these passages, altogether out of modesty; for, though it may have been slightly less obtrusive to withhold the name,

it is evident that his connection with the acts or words referred to was not thereby concealed, and hence that he was not kept by fear of this publicity from making such allusions to himself. This freedom on the part of John appears at first sight to be at variance with the usual reserve of the New Testament writers. Nor, so far as respects this particular aspect of the question, would the case be different if it be thought that John, in speaking of himself so often as the favored disciple, adopted here a designation which originated with others, and was current before it appeared in his writings.

On examining more closely this class of passages, it will be found in every instance, it is believed, in which John makes the so-called complimentary allusion to himself, that he does so for the sake of explaining something relating, not so much to himself, as to others, or to the course of the history apart from himself, which would otherwise be obscure to the reader. In this fact we have perhaps an adequate explanation of the peculiarity which has been pointed out.

John states, for example, that at the last supper the disciple whom Jesus loved reclined on the bosom of the Master, the place of the highest honor; and the reader understands that John is meant as readily as if he had named himself. But this notice evidently is not for its own sake. That the reader may know how Peter could beckon to John, and John in compliance with that intimation could ask Jesus who was to be the traitor and receive an answer without being heard by the others, it must be stated how the parties were arranged on this occasion. Hence the evangelist mentions that in consequence of a special affection which the Saviour was known to entertain for him, it was his privilege to be reclining at table directly in front of Christ (ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ) and therefore, by simply throwing back his head upon the breast of Jesus (ἐπιπεσὼν δὲ ἐκεῖνος ἐπὶ τὸ στῆθος τοῦ Ἰησοῦ), he could ask the question and be answered without its being noticed by the other guests. The fact of John's occupying this place, it is true, might have been stated without assigning the reason for it; but the *why* in this instance was almost inseparable from the fact because we need to know why John was the only one of the disciples through whom Peter could gain the information which he sought.

John brings himself to view in a similar manner in reporting the words which the Saviour spoke from the cross relating to the care of his mother: "When Jesus therefore saw his mother, and the disciple standing by whom he loved, he saith unto his mother, Woman, behold thy son! then saith he to the disciple, Behold thy mother! And from that hour that disciple took her unto his own home" (xix. 26, 27). In all probability Joseph the husband of Mary was no longer living. It is certain, however, that Mary had other sons, step-sons at all events, who under ordinary circumstances would have been her natural guardians, and Jesus had other disciples, who, though scattered in that hour of peril, were still devoted to him, and would have been not unworthy of such a charge. Yet passing over all these, the

Saviour selected John as the one of this entire number to whom he committed the heart-stricken mother, in words so full of tenderness and love. It was "the disciple whom Jesus loved," we are told, on whom he conferred this responsibility and honor; and how readily do we think of that love as the ground of this distinction, and as the evangelist's own recognized reason for his being so preferred to others. With any other view the more obvious statement would have been simply that Jesus saw John, or saw one of his disciples, standing near the cross on that occasion.

Again we read in John xx. 1, 2, that Mary the Magdalene on coming to the sepulchre, and finding the stone which had closed its mouth rolled away, hastened "to Simon Peter, and the other disciple whom Jesus loved," in order to inform them of what had taken place. It does not appear that she went to any of the other disciples at this time. The eminence of Peter among them explains why she sought him thus promptly, and certainly the well-known affection of Christ for John would be a reason for carrying the important news also to him. It is impossible not to feel that the evangelist, in this reference to himself, was thinking of Mary's motive for coming to him with her tidings, arising out of her knowledge of Christ's special friendship for him. This tacit explanatory force of the clause makes it altogether pertinent here. In fact some of the interpreters admit it in this instance who overlook or deny it in other places.

The example of this usage in John xxi. 7 may seem to be more doubtful. The Saviour standing at a distance on the shore of the sea of Galilee showed himself to his disciples as they were fishing on the lake by night; but he was not at once recognized by them. The first who made the discovery was John; and that is stated by saying "the disciple whom Jesus loved [as if endowed with some power which the others did not possess] saith unto Peter, It is the Lord." Peter, then, with characteristic eagerness, leaped into the sea, and swam or waded to the shore where Jesus was. Did the Saviour reveal himself in a special manner to John at this time? And does John mean to intimate by speaking of Christ's love to him, that it was on this account that Jesus granted to him this more speedy recognition of the common Lord and Master? Or is it possibly a finer thought still which has introduced the parenthesis here? Love is quick-sighted, as well as strong: the love here was reciprocal. That it should be John whose eyes made out the loved form through the darkness sooner than the others might almost be expected, from the union of soul and spiritual affinity between them. In John's writings, above all others in the New Testament, such a thought may be allowed to be not out of place. One has to choose between some such explanation as this and that of an almost unmeaning, not to say egotistical, repetition of the phrase.

The passage in which John makes his own personality most prominent occurs near the end of the Gospel. The scene brings us again to the shore of the lake. Jesus and his disciples are there. Three times (answering to the number of the denials) the Lord has put the question to Peter:

"Lovest thou me?" And Peter has replied to each question: "Yea, Lord; thou knowest that I love thee"; with an appeal at last to Christ's omniscience that he was sincere: "Lord, thou knowest all things; thou knowest that I love thee." Peter *was* sincere, but must be admonished that severer trials of his fidelity awaited him, and he was to be prepared for them. In enigmatical terms the Saviour held up to him a confused vision, in which old age and feebleness are seen struggling in vain against violence and power, and instruments of torture and chains and a martyr's death are shadowed forth to him. "Verily, verily I say unto thee, When thou wast young, thou girdedst thyself, and walkedst whither thou wouldest: but when thou shalt be old, thou shalt stretch forth thy hands, and another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldest not. This spake he, signifying by what death he should glorify God" (xxi. 18, 19). Just then, with his mind full of such images, it is related that Peter, happening "to turn about, sees the disciple whom Jesus loved, following; which also leaned on his breast at supper, and said, Lord, which is he that betrayeth thee? Peter seeing him, saith to Jesus, Lord, and what shall this man do" (xxi. 20, 21)?

At first sight it might appear as if this minute account of John's personal relations to Christ was without pertinence or interest in this connection. But does it not throw light on the spirit of Peter's abrupt inquiry respecting the fate of John, and explain to us also why the Saviour replied so sharply to his question? "If I will that he tarry till I come," was the Lord's answer, "what is that to thee? Follow thou me." This allusion by John to the marks of special favor by which Christ had distinguished him — does it not read out to us certain unuttered thoughts in the mind of Peter at that moment, serving to account for John's apparent digression, as well as the severity of Christ's answer? Such, then, is to be my sad experience — may have been Peter's silent reflection, — but this favorite of the apostolic circle, who has enjoyed such distinctions, is the same partiality to follow him and exempt him from trials? It is evident that our Lord rebuked Peter's question as one of impertinent curiosity, and certainly it deserved that censure the more if mixed with it there was some feeling of jealousy towards John.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Germany in the Light of the Kingdom of God.[1] — Whatever judgment may be formed of individual parts or of the general tendency of the work whose title is given below, every one must be surprised at the

[1] Deutschland Einst und Jetzt im Lichte des Reiches Gottes. Von Dr. W. Hoffmann. Berlin: Stilke und van Muyden; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1868. Price, 2½ thaler.

author's profound and minute acquaintance with the history, not only of Germany but even of Europe generally. How a man with Dr. Hoffmann's many and distracting duties could find time for amassing the information contained in the work, not to mention the labor of writing a volume of more than five hundred pages in a comparatively short time, will be a riddle to most Americans. It is a difficult book for a foreigner to read, still more difficult for a foreigner to review; and that for the simple reason that it implies a knowledge of the ins and outs of German history that is possessed by scarcely one in a thousand. We have felt everywhere, except perhaps during the last one hundred and fifty pages, that in order to form a proper estimate of Dr. Hoffmann's views and judgments we ought to devote a year or two to reading up German history. We shall therefore limit ourselves to indicating the contents and general design of his work, adding a remark or two by way of criticism. The work is divided into fifteen chapters, headed respectively: Introduction; I. The Prophecy of Germany; II. The First Step to the Fulfilment of the Prophecy; III. Breach with the Preceding History; IV. The Growth of the German Powers; V. The Final Decision; VI. The Extinction of Unity; VII. The Dualism; VIII. The Antagonism; IX. The New Rising of Germany; X. Prussia's Vocation in Germany since 1813; XI. The National Revival; XII. The Last War of Liberation; XIII. Germany, North and South; XIV. German Christianity; XV. The Kingdom of God. The points on which the book turns, and which Dr. Hoffmann clearly meant to bring to view are the failure of Austria to fulfil the mission once apparently assigned to it in Germany; the gradual transference of this same mission to Prussia, Saxony being passed over, and the increasing consciousness and fulfilment of this its mission by Prussia, under, in, and through its royal family. We must say that it is scarcely possible to rise from the perusal of Dr. Hoffmann's work without feeling that the course of the house of Hohenzollern has been under the special direction of God, and that it seems destined still to do a mighty work in Germany. We should certainly not quite agree with many things put forward; but this is the distinct general impression left on the mind. The portions relating to Frederick William IV. are specially interesting, chiefly because they are based on the personal intercourse of the author with the late King; and they deserve the careful perusal of all foreigners. Whether Germany is destined to play the part in the development of the kingdom of God here assigned to it; whether the constitution of the German church as sketched by Dr. Hoffmann would do for his country and the world what he expects; whether Prussia's part in the events of 1866 bore altogether the character here attributed to it, — these are questions to which we think various answers might be given. On one point we think Dr. Hoffmann is too much under the influence of the mode of thought prevailing in his country, namely, in looking for the progress of the kingdom of God too much from general influences, and too little from the slow method of the conversion

of individuals and their incorporation into church organisms. American theologians ought to make themselves acquainted with this work, for it represents to a large extent the thought of the higher religious mind of Prussia; and sooner or later Prussia will be Germany or Germany Prussia.

Laws Relating to the Higher Schools of Prussia.[1] — In a former number of the Bibliotheca we noticed the first part of the above work; the present, the second part, relates to the office of the teachers and the teachers themselves. The character and value of the volume will best appear from the following summary of the contents: I. Preparation for the Office of Teachers; Length of University Studies; Plans of Study; University Seminaries — philological, historical, mathematical, pedagogical (at the various Universities); Seminaries after the University Course — pedagogical, for modern languages, for music, for gymnastics, etc. II. Examinations. III. Appointment of Teachers. IV. Duties of Directors; Ordinary and Assistant Teachers. V. Military Duties. VI. Income. VII. Disciplinary Procedure against Teachers. VIII. Change and Resignation of Position. IX. Personal Affairs; e.g. permission to marry. X. Pensions, Insurance for Widows, etc. XI. Male and Female Teachers at Young Ladies' Schools. Ample indexes facilitate reference to the various points touched on in the two volumes. We can but repeat what we said in our former notice, that so far as the character and working of the educational institutions and arrangements of Prussia can be learned from books, these two admirable volumes of Dr. Wiese are well adapted to serve the purpose. No man knows more about the subject, and few men in Germany are better fitted by breadth of view, earnestness of purpose, and Christian spirit, for pronouncing judgment on educational questions. We therefore commend the two handsomely printed volumes to all interested in this important matter. There should be many such; for the relations between Prussia and America, and their influence on each other, are becoming closer and greater every year.

The Philosophy of Bacon.[2] — An inaugural dissertation by the son of Professor Dorner of Berlin, evincing a careful study of Bacon's writings, and no slight power of philosophical analysis. The subject is discussed under the following heads: 1. Introduction; 2. Bacon's System; 3. Bacon's Times; 4. The Relation between Bacon and his Successors, especially Locke.

[1] Verordnungen und Gesetze für die höheren Schulen in Preussen, herausgegeben von Dr. L. Wiese. 2 Abtheilung. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1868.

[2] De Baconis, Baronis de Verulamio, philosophia, Dissertatio etc. Aug. Dorner. Berlin: Schade. 1867. Price, 1 thaler.

From Eden to Golgotha.[1] — A pious looking title to an impious book. It is the commencement of a kind of biblical history of the human race. The two volumes embrace the following books: I. The Biblical Eden in the Land of Syria; II. Stonequarry and Ruins of Nations; III. Wanderings of Peoples and Foundings of States; IV. The Seed of Jacob in the Good Land of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon; V. Israel's Progress to the Heights and his Fall through Japhet. One specimen will suffice to indicate the character and tendency of the work: "No sacred festal week of centuries lies at the commencement of the times when Habel robbed sheep and Quain took care of his skin till the devil of envy made him a brother-murderer. The natural history of the Biblical myth of the primal period of our race must be incorporated with the general picture of the world's course which sober science has sketched of those far-off ages, when men lived on the young earth pretty much as a wild beast among his wild brethren and sisters in field and forest, although he may in this or that respect have been superior to the four-handed animal, that some pretend to have been his ancestor." The work is full of innovations and blows right and left, rather in the manner of Ewald. Appended are chronological tables of Hebrew and Egyptian history, above three hundred closely printed pages of notes, and a well-executed but very revolutionary map of Galilee.

History of Modern Philosophy.[2] — The idea of this History of Philosophy is expressed in the following words: "My aim is such a methodical development and reproduction of the main systems from which light proceeds and the history of philosophy draws in truth its life, that my readers may learn to what problems they owe their existence, how they have solved these problems, and what questions they have left for their successors to solve." The first volume, in two parts, comprises a general introduction and account of Descartes and his school and Spinoza; the second volume, Leibnitz and his school. As the three parts cover upwards of two thousand pages, it may be imagined the expositions must be very detailed; so far as we have been able to read they are clear and suggestive. We imagine that such a work must be very acceptable to many who are not content with the mere outlines given in hand-books, and have no time or power to read the original works. Professor Fischer's view of Christianity and its rise seems to be that of the Tübingen school, a circumstance which cannot but interfere with the satisfactory accomplishment of the purpose referred to above. We much need a history of philosophy

[1] Von Eden nach Golgotha. Biblisch-Geschichtliche Forschungen. Von Prof. L. Noack. Leipzig: O. Wigand; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 2 Vols. 1868. Price, 9 thaler.

[2] Geschichte der neuren Philosophie. Von K. Fischer. Heidelberg: Bassermann; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1865–1867.

written by a man who thoroughly appreciates the relation of Christianity or Christ to human reason, human intelligence; and who will write with the objectivity which ought to be the peculiar virtue of a Christian mind.

This is the second edition of Professor Fischer's history, and so much changed as to deserve the name of a new work. About each philosopher a good deal of biographical information is given, as introductory to the discussion of his philosophy.

J. H. Fichte: The Immortality of the Soul and the Position of Man in the World. Dr. Fichte, son of the celebrated Fichte, a philosopher of the theistic school, seeks in this new work, in a series of anthropological, metaphysical, ethical, and historical investigations, to establish the immortality of the soul and to determine the nature of its immortality. Dr. Fichte's writings all deserve careful attention; they are warm and suggestive, but his positive, tangible results are liable to melt like vapors when one draws close to them. pp. 446. Price $2\frac{2}{3}$ thaler.

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Dr. Robert Ferguson has well said of the author of this volume: "If genius is the instinct of enterprise, and if the instinct of enterprise is labor, then, in this sense, my honored friend was the possessor of this mighty gift. He excelled in weighing evidence, and impressing upon it its relative value. His discrimination was clear and his judgment was sound. He dealt with fact, not with fiction. He searched for data, not for opinions." Dr. Henderson was not only well versed in the Hebrew language, but also in its cognates. Few men, either in England or America, have been his equals in Oriental literature. His Commentary on Jeremiah has the same general characteristics which appear in his Commentary on the Minor Prophets which Mr. Draper republished in the year 1860. It is less elaborate than his Commentary on Isaiah, but far superior to that on Ezekiel. Its statements are clear, judicious, often impressive.

Our Branch and its Tributaries; being a History of the Work of the Northwestern Sanitary Commission and its Auxiliaries during the War of the Rebellion. By Mrs. Sarah Edwards Henshaw. Including a Full Report of Receipts and Disbursements, by E. W. Blatchford, Treasurer; and an Introductory Chapter by Hon. Mark Spinner. pp. 432 8vo. Chicago: Alfred L. Sewell. 1868.

In no part of the world have been put forth such gigantic efforts for the relief of sick and wounded soldiers in the time of war as in this country during the late rebellion. The present volume gives us a more vivid idea than we have gained elsewhere of the extent and worth and true Christian nobleness of these efforts. It presents a vast amount of detail in a lucid order and in a captivating style. We are not wearied by its multitude of facts, for they are enlivened by the genial sentiment which

entwines itself around them. Mrs. Henshaw has developed a rare power of combination in marshalling so many incidents and making them all concentre in producing one good and deep impression. Her narrative now enchains our interest more than if it were a novel; and it will in future years suggest many a thrilling tale to the writer of fiction, as well as form the basis for many a statement of the historian. The value of such a narrative for the more formal works of history cannot be overestimated. Sixty-six solid pages of the book are devoted very profitably to the report of E. W. Blatchford, Esq., treasurer of the Commission. It is a full, condensed, yet luminous and impressive document, illustrating the degree of practical energy and skill which were expended on the philanthropic agencies of the war. The mechanical execution of the volume is admirable.

The Modern Representations of the Life of Jesus. Four Discourses delivered before the Evangelical Union at Hanover, Germany. By Dr. Gerhard Uhlhorn, First Preacher at the Court. Translated from the third German edition by Charles E. Grinnell. 16mo. pp. 164. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1868.

Dr. Uhlhorn is one of the most eloquent preachers in Germany. Although of humble origin he has worked his way up to the highest places in society. His learning is extensive and accurate. He is a vigorous opposer of Strauss, Renan, and Schenkel in their view of Christ. The present volume is a valuable contribution to the literature of Christology.

Familiar Quotations; being an Attempt to trace to their Source Passages and Phrases in Common Use. By John Bartlett. Fifth edition. pp. 778. 16mo. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1868.

To our readers who are generally familiar with the excellences of this work, nothing need be said in its praise. The mere fact that it contains an index of one hundred and sixty-three pages is of itself a sign of the great worth of the volume.

From the press of Robert Carter and Brothers, New York, we have received The Works of the Rev. John Howe, M.A., with Memoirs of his Life. By Edward Calamy, D.D. Complete in two volumes. pp. 1276. We gladly avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our desire that every minister of the gospel should possess a copy of the works of this master in Israel, who will continue to be read when the names of many more recent authors will have been forgotten. From the same publishing house we have received the second edition of Yesterday, To-day, and Forever; a Poem in Twelve Books, by Edward Henry Bickersteth, M.A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Hampstead, and Chaplain to the Bishop of Ripon. pp. 441. 16mo. The poem contains many fine passages. The different books, however, are of unequal merit.

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